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Abstract	  
In	  the	  last	  decade	  of	  the	  20th	  Century	  Somalia	  made	  the	  headlines	  around	  the	  world	  
as	  the	  place	  where	  a	  UN	  force	  had	  been	  withdrawn	  from	  due	  to	  losses	  inflicted	  on	  
US	  and	  other	   troops	   by	  members	   of	   groups	   associated	  with	   two	  warlords.	   In	   the	  
latter	  part	  of	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  21st	  Century	  Somalia	  was	  again	  in	  the	  global	  
headlines,	  but	  this	  time	  associated	  with	  acts	  of	  piracy	  committed	  off	  its	  coastline.	  
Behind	  these	  headlines	  lay	  a	  complex	  mixture	  of	  problems	  stretching	  back	  as	  far	  as	  
the	   early	   colonisation	   of	   the	   lands	   that	   became	   Somalia	   and	   populated	   with	  
western	   European	   concepts	   ill	   suited	   to	   the	   peoples	   of	   those	   lands.	   The	   loss	   of	  
effective	  government	  opened	   the	  door	   to	  neo	  colonial	   issues	  of	   illegal	   fishing	  and	  
hazardous	   waste	   dumping	   that	   contributed	   to	   the	   piracy	   problem.	   Finely	  
interwoven	  amongst	  all	  these	  issues	  runs	  a	  thread	  of	  international	  law.	  
This	  thesis	  examines	  that	  thread	  as	  it	  runs	  through	  the	  concept	  of	  state	  failure	  and	  
asks	  if	   it	   is	  a	  legal	  term	  and	  what	  legal	  consequences,	   if	  any,	  are	  attached	  to	  it.	  It	  
examines	   the	   international	   legal	   frameworks	   that	   support	   fishing	  and	  hazardous	  
waste	   dumping	   and	   seeks	   to	   understand	   why	   they	   have	   not	   prevented	   illegal	  
fishing	  and	  the	  illegal	  dumping	  of	  hazardous	  waste	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia.	  
This	  thesis	  then	  examines	  the	  concept	  of	  piracy	  as	  applied	  to	  Somalian	  pirates	  and	  
seeks	  answers	  to	  questions	  as	  to	  what	  it	  is	  and	  how	  it	  has	  been	  applied.	  It	  looks	  at	  
the	  use	  of	  private	  security	  as	  a	  response	  and	  seeks	  to	  find	  the	  legitimation	  for	  their	  
actions	  in	  relation	  to	  pirates.	  	  
Sewn	  throughout	  is	  a	  comparison	  of	  responses	  and	  suggestions	  for	  improvement	  to	  
international	  law.	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1 Introduction	  	  I	  am	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  I	  am	  now	  a	  war-­‐torn	  ravished	  nation	  Very	  little	  for	  my	  people	  All	  seeking	  a	  new	  location	  (Helwaa)1	  	  Somalia	   is	  now	  the	   landmass	  known	  as	   the	  Horn	  of	  Africa.	  To	  the	  west	   lies	   the	  vast	  area	  of	  the	  Indian	  Ocean.	  To	  the	  north	  lies	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Aden,	  the	  Red	  Sea,	  and	  the	   entrance	   to	   the	   Suez	   Canal	   that	   provides	   access	   to	   the	  Mediterranean	   Sea.	  Situated	  as	  it	  is,	  it	  has	  significant	  strategic	  value	  as	  a	  protector	  of	  access	  to	  ports	  on	   the	   Red	   Sea	   that	   are	   responsible	   for	   the	   flow	   of	   oil	   to	   the	   international	  community	   as	  well	   as	   the	   flow	   of	   commerce	   to	   Europe	   from	  developing	  Asian	  nations	  and	   from	  Europe	   to	   those	   same	  nations.	  The	  waters	   that	   surround	   the	  Horn	  particularly	  on	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  side	  are	  home	  to	  many	  species	  of	  valuable	  fish	  stock.	  2	  The	  currents	  that	  well	  up	  just	  off	  the	  coast	  provide	  rich	  nutrients	  for	  these	   fish	   and	   have	   provided	   a	   source	   of	   food	   security	   as	   well	   as	   exports	   for	  Somalia.3	  Any	  loss	  of	  stability	  within	  its	  borders	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  safe	  flows	  of	  both	  oil	  and	  commerce.	  Its	  value	  therefore	  to	  the	  Western	  World	  does	  not	  lie	  in	  and	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Joseph	  Cachia	  “Comical…If	  it	  weren't	  so	  sad.”	  (2014)	  Malta	  
2	  Mahamuda	  Bawumia	  and	  Rashid	  Sumaila	  “Fisheries,	  Ecosystems	  and	  Piracy:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  Somalia”	  2010	  Working	  Paper	  (2010-­‐04)	  The	  University	  of	  British	  Columbia	  at	  p6.	  
3	  Mohammed	  Waldo	  “The	  Two	  Piracies	  in	  Somalia:	  Why	  the	  World	  Ignores	  the	  Other”	  Wardheer	  
News	  (8	  January	  2009)	  at	  p3.	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its	  self,	  but	  in	  the	  Western	  Worlds	  interest	  in	  the	  oil	  and	  commerce.	  This	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  no	  different	  to	  how	  it	  has	  been	  treated	  by	  the	  Western	  world	  since	  the	  arrival	   of	   the	   Europeans	   in	  Africa.	   As	   is	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   the	   colonisers	  divided	   the	   land	   and	   separated	   the	   peoples	   for	   their	   own	   ends.	   The	   Cold	  War	  protagonists	  used	  Somalia	  as	  a	  tool	  in	  their	  battle	  for	  global	  domination.	  	  Somalia	   attempted	   to	   set	   its	   own	   course	   during	   the	   period	   following	  decolonisation.	   This	   was	   interrupted	   by	   the	   overthrow	   of	   the	   government	   by	  coup	   d’état	   and	   what	   followed	   was	   a	   period	   of	   repression	   by	   the	   new	  government	  who	  was	  courting	  one	  or	  other	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  powers	  to	  remain	  in	  power.	  The	  collapse	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  a	  change	  in	  the	  ideology	  behind	  how	  aid	  funding	  was	  allocated	  saw	  the	  reigning	  government	  unable	  to	  sustain	  its	  system	  of	   patrimony.	   The	   following	   overthrow	   of	   the	   government	   lead	   parts	   of	   the	  country	  into	  more	  than	  two	  decades	  of	  turmoil.4	  	  While	   parts	   of	   the	   interior	   of	   the	   country	   were	   in	   a	   phase	   of	   prolonged	  disruption,	  overseas	  fishing	  fleets	  were	  heavily	  fishing	  the	  waters	  off	  the	  coast.	  It	  is	  alleged	   that	   the	  value	  of	   fish	   taken	  out	  of	   these	  waters	  was	   in	  excess	  of	  USD	  300million	  per	  annum.5	  	  The	   waters	   were	   also	   being	   used	   as	   a	   dump	   for	   the	   waste	   produced	   by	   the	  Western	  World.6	  A	  response	  to	  the	  ongoing	  insecurity	  within	  the	  country	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  effective	  government	   to	  protect	   the	  waters	   for	   the	   artisanal	   fishermen	   from	  overfishing	  and	  the	  dumping	  of	  waste	  led	  Somalis	  to	  take	  to	  the	  waters	  to	  protect	  what	  was	  theirs.	  This	  resulted	  in	  acts	  of	  piracy	  being	  committed	  against	  trawlers	  and	  small	  commercial	  vessels	  that	  were	  supplying	  aid	  to	  Somalia.	  Success	  followed	  success,	  the	   targets	   grew	   in	   size,	   the	  waters	   off	   the	   coast	   become	  dangerous	   for	   larger	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Jose	  Pureza	  and	  others	  “Do	  States	  Fail	  or	  Are	  They	  Pushed?	  Lessons	  Learned	  From	  Three	  Former	  Portuguese	  Colonies”	  2007	  273	  Oficina	  do	  CES	  at	  pp1-­‐3.	  
5	  Johann	  Hari	  “You	  are	  being	  lied	  to	  about	  pirates:	  Some	  are	  clearly	  just	  gangsters.	  But	  others	  are	  trying	  to	  stop	  illegal	  dumping	  and	  trawling”	  (2009)	  United	  Kingdom	  at	  p2.	  
6	  See	  Chapter	  4	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  this	  topic	  in	  full.	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commercial	   vessels	   that	   were	   hijacked,	   and	   the	   crews	   held	   to	   ransom.	   This	  success	  drew	  ever	  more	  pirates	  as	  the	  ransoms	  grew	  in	  size.7	  	  Eventually	  the	  problem	  of	  piracy	  developed	  to	  such	  a	  size	  that	  the	  international	  community	   was	   forced	   to	   respond.	   	   Several	   joint	   naval	   task	   forces	   were	  dispatched	   to	   the	   region	   and	   there	   was	   a	   flurry	   of	   international	   action	   and	  condemnation	   for	   the	   pirates’	   actions.	   Merchant	   vessels	   were	   armed	   with	  security	  guards	  to	  protect	  the	  vessels	  and	  the	  incidents	  of	  piracy	  declined.8	  Woven	  throughout	  this	  tale	  is	  a	  thin	  thread	  of	  international	  law	  that	  struggled	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  state	  that	  had	  lost	  effective	  government.	  Somalia	  became	  labelled	  as	  a	  ‘failed’	  or	  ‘collapsed’	  State.	  While	  this	  is	  a	  political	  label,	  there	  are	  consequences	  for	   its	   use.	   The	   signification	   that	   a	   state	   has	   lost	   effective	   government,	   or	   is	   a	  failed	   state,	   limits	   its	   ability	   to	   form	   international	   relationships,	   to	   partake	   in	  voting	  within	   international	   institutions	  and	  indicates	  that	   it	   is	  unable	  to	  supply	  basic	   public	   goods	   for	   its	   citizens.	   A	   further	   exploration	   of	   these	   terms	   and	  consequences	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  	  This	  thesis	  investigates	  international	  law	  surrounding	  the	  situation,	  as	  it	  existed	  in	  Somalia	  post	  1991	  to	  the	  present.	  This	  thesis	  utilises	  legal	  analysis	  to	  examine	  four	  of	  the	  major	  areas	  of	   international	   law	  that	  have	  had	  an	  affect	  on	  Somalia.	  These	   are	   the	   legal	   concept	   of	   a	   state	   and	   asks	  whether	   or	   not	   there	   are	   legal	  consequences	   to	   the	   use	   of	   the	   term	   ‘failed	   state’,	   the	   illegal	   fishing	   and	   the	  international	   fishing	   regime	   and	   whether	   it	   could	   have	   prevented	   the	   illegal	  fishing	  from	  occurring:	  the	  dumping	  of	  hazardous	  waste	  and	  asks	  could	  it	  have	  been	  prevented	  and	  looks	  at	  the	  use	  of	  international	  law	  to	  suppress	  piracy.	  Chapter	   2	   examines	   the	   reasons	   behind	   the	   seemingly	   high	   rate	   of	   failure	   in	  African	  States.	  It	  looks	  particularly	  at	  Somalia	  as	  a	  state	  and	  explores	  why	  it	  has	  lost	   effective	   government.	   It	   then	   examines	   the	   concept	   of	   a	   State,	   how	   States	  come	   into	   being	   and	   the	   legal	   consequences	   of	   being	   a	   State.	   The	   term	   ‘failed’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  D	  Cronji	  “The	  Pirates	  of	  Somalia,	  Maritime	  Bandits	  or	  Warlords	  of	  the	  High	  Seas?”	  (Stellenboch	  University,	  2009)	  
8	  Milena	  Sterio	  “Fighting	  Piracy:	  why	  more	  is	  needed”	  2009-­‐2010	  33	  Fordham	  Int'l	  L.	  J.	  372.	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State	  and	  all	  its	  derivatives	  are	  examined	  as	  to	  what	  they	  actually	  mean.	  It	  asks	  what	   has	   actually	   failed	   in	   a	   	   ‘failed’	   State	   and	   searches	   for	   possible	   legal	  consequences	  attached	  to	  the	  use	  of	  that	  term.	  It	  explores	  the	  possibility	  of	  one	  of	  the	  regions	  of	  Somalia	  seceding	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  Somalia’s	  failure.	  The	  purpose	   of	   Chapter	   3	   is	   to	   examine	   the	   international	   fisheries	   regime	   and	  how	   it	   is	   applied	   in	   the	   case	  of	   Somalia.	   It	   asks	  whether	   the	   lack	  of	   a	  declared	  Economic	  Exclusion	  Zone	  has	  affected	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  fishing	  that	  occurs	  off	  the	   Somali	   coast	   is	   illegal.	   There	   are	   significant	   international	   legal	   agreements	  that	  cover	  international	  fishing.	  These	  agreements	  are	  meant	  to	  stop	  the	  fishing	  in	   sovereign	   waters	   of	   another	   state	   unless	   licensed.	   The	   responses	   of	   the	  international	  community,	  the	  regional	  community	  and	  the	  various	  states	  within	  Somalia	  are	  examined	  as	  to	  whether	  they	  have	  in	  anyway	  been	  able	  to	  prevent	  illegal	   fishing	   from	   occurring.	   The	   question	   is	   asked	   as	   to	   whether	   there	   is	  anyway	   the	   international	   community	   could	   have	   assisted	   Somalia	   to	   police	   it	  waters	  to	  prevent	  illegal	  fishing.	  	  The	   waste	   dumped	   off	   Somalia’s	   coast	   became	   known	   because	   of	   the	   2004	  boxing	  day	  tsunami.	  Chapter	  4	  examines	  in	  detail	  the	  international	  and	  regional	  hazardous	  waste	  regime	  and	  asks	  questions	  as	  to	  whether	  it	  is	  robust	  enough	  to	  carryout	   its	   function.	   This	   regime	   and	   the	   general	   principle	   to	   prevent	  environmental	  harm	  being	  caused	  to	  another	  state	  should	  have	  protected	  Somali	  waters	  from	  hazardous	  waste	  dumping.	  The	  chapter	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  look	  at	  the	  assignment	   of	   responsibility,	   liability,	   and	   compensation.	   It	   then	   tackles	   the	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  Somalia	  can	  obtain	  compensation	  for	  the	  damage	  caused	  by	  the	  waste	  dumping	  off	  its	  coast.	  	  Piracy	   is	   the	   subject	   of	   Chapter	   5	   and	   in	   its	  wide-­‐ranging	   discussion	   it	   briefly	  covers	  the	  law	  history	  of	  piracy	  in	  Africa.	  It	  asks	  the	  question	  as	  to	  what	  piracy	  actually	   is	  and	  if	   it	  should	  be	  criminalised	  and	  what	  empowers	  the	  response	  of	  the	  international	  and	  regional	  community.	   	  It	  asks	  the	  question	  as	  to	  why	  there	  appears	   to	   be	   different	   responses	   in	   the	   treatment	   of	   pirates	   and	   is	   there	   any	  liability	   for	  the	  destruction	  of	   fishing	  skiffs	  by	  the	  navy	  if	   the	  suspected	  pirates	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are	  not	  charged.	  The	  question	  of	  extra	  judicial	  killing	  of	  pirates	  is	  raised	  and	  the	  different	   responses	   by	   the	   international	   community	   to	   these	   killings	   and	   the	  killings	  by	  pirates	  are	  questioned.	  Lastly,	  the	  chapter	  examines	  the	  use	  of	  Private	  security	   companies	   and	   the	   pitfalls	   to	   their	   use	   are	   exposed	   in	   the	   nature	   of	  human	   rights	   breaches	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   international	   agreements	   that	   offer	  protection	  to	  both	  the	  guards	  and	  those	  they	  are	  intervening	  against.	  The	  thesis	  concludes	  by	  summing	  up	  the	  various	  questions	  and	  investigations	  and	  offers	  the	  conclusion	  that	  three	  major	  issues	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  quagmire	  of	  international	  law	  that	  surrounds	  the	  situation	  in	  Somalia.	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  State,	  the	  issue	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  that	  while	  conservation	  aims	  are	  hortatory,	  breaches	  need	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  transnational	  criminal	  offences,	  like	  piracy,	  and	  supported	  by	  effective	  policing.	  This	  helps	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  response	  of	  the	  international	  community	  has	  differed	  so	  vastly	  between	  the	  four	  topic	  areas.	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Chapter	  2	  
State	  Failure	  	   I	  am	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  Once	  a	  beautiful	  nation	  Before	  the	  civil	  war	  Before	  the	  invasion	  (Helwaa)1	  
2 Introduction	  	  Threats	  to	  peace	  and	  security	  for	  the	  international	  community	  come	  from	  failed	  States.	   These	   threats	   have	   not	   diminished	   through	   action	   taken	   by	   the	  international	   community.	   They	   have	   occurred	   outside	   the	   mainstream	   of	  Western	  States	   in	   areas	   considered	  as	  of	   little	  possible	   consequence.	  Unrest	   in	  States	   such	   as	   Libya,	   Syria	   and	   the	  Ukraine	   continues	   to	   fuel	   the	   possibility	   of	  more	  state	  failure.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Somalia,	  previously	  the	  most	  widely	  recognised	  example	  of	  a	  failed	  State,	   recent	   political	   activity	   has	   seen,	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   new	   constitution,	   the	  initiation	   of	   processes	   towards	   a	   referendum	   on	   that	   constitution	   and	   steps	  towards	  stability	  being	  taken.2	  	  	  The	   purpose	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   examine	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   failed	   State	   in	  relation	  to	  a	  functioning	  State	  and	  the	  legal	  consequences	  that	  flow	  from	  the	  use	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Cachia,	  above	  Chapter	  1	  n	  1.	  
2	  M	  Harper	  “Somali	  Leaders	  Back	  New	  Constitution”	  BBC	  News	  Africa	  (London	  UK,	  	  2012).	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of	   the	   term,	   failed	   State.	   It	   will	   start	   by	   examining	   the	   ‘why’	   of	   State	   failure	  particularly	  in	  Africa	  and	  distinguish	  between	  threats	  to	  peace	  and	  security	  and	  State	  failure.	  	  
2.1 Why	  State	  failure	  is	  prevalent	  in	  Africa	  The	  failure	  of	  States	  in	  Africa	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  particular	  problem	  not	  experienced	  to	  the	  same	  extent	   in	  other	  regions	  of	   the	  world.	  While	  Asia	  has	  Cambodia	  and	  Central	  Asia,	  Afghanistan,	  the	  African	  continent	  has	  experienced	  failed	  States	  in	  the	   form	   of	   Chad,	   the	   Central	   African	   Republic,	   the	   Democratic	   Republic	   of	  Congo,	  (DRC),	  Somalia,	  South	  Sudan,	  Sudan,	  and	  Zimbabwe.3	  Failure	   in	  Africa	   is	  the	  result	  of	  pre-­‐colonial	  political	  organisations	  rendered	  irrelevant	  by	  both	  the	  colonisers,	  and	  those	  who	  would	  rise	   to	  replace	   them.4	  State	  creation	  paid	   little	  heed	  to	  the	  indigenous	  nations’	  political	  structures	  before	  laying	  down	  artificial	  borders.	   Once	   the	   United	   Nations	   General	   Assembly,	   (UNGA),	   had	   ratified	   the	  new	   boundaries	   and	   declared	   the	   new	   entities	   sovereign	   States	   there	   was	   no	  going	  back.5	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  African	  States,	  little	  attention	  was	  paid	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  an	  African	  concept	  of	  a	  political	  entity.	  African	  concepts	  would	  better	  suit	  the	  history,	  past	  political	  structures,	  and	  the	  vast	   array	   of	   different	   cultures	   that	   would	   function	   in	   Africa	   as	   well	   as	   the	  Westphalian	   model	   of	   statehood	   functioned	   in	   Europe.6 	  The	   creation	   of	   an	  alternative	  to	  the	  western	  model	  of	  statehood	  could	  be	  as	  threatening	  to	  existing	  African	   leaders	  as	  the	  actions	  of	  Eritrea	   in	  gaining	   independence	  from	  Ethiopia	  and	  the	  secession	  of	  South	  Sudan	  from	  Sudan.7	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Fragile	  States	  index	  http://fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi,	  six	  of	  the	  top	  ten	  fragile	  States,	  the	  others	  being	  Afghanistan,	  Yemen	  Haiti	  and	  Pakistan.	  
4	  Jeffrey	  	  Herbst	  “Responding	  to	  State	  Failure	  in	  Africa”	  1996	  21(3)	  International	  Security	  at	  pp121-­‐122.	  	  
5	  Herbst,	  above	  n	  4	  at	  p121.	  
6	  At	  pp123,	  125.	  	  
7	  At	  p133,	  137.The	  feared	  cascade	  of	  other	  peoples	  seeking	  self-­‐determination	  has	  not	  occurred.	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Pureza	  et	  al	  expand	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  colonial	  system	  by	  stating	  that	  it	  was	  a	  system	  of	  taxation,	  extraction	  and	  domination	  of	  the	  people	  that	  left	  behind	  a	  bureaucracy	  that	  was	  poorly	  suited	  to	  govern.8	  The	  bureaucracies	  created	  by	  the	  colonisers	   would	   take	   on	   the	   characteristics	   of	   sovereignty,	   as	   viewed	   from	   a	  western	  perspective,	  and	  deliver	  organised	  public	  goods,	  control	  over	   territory	  and	   provide	   an	   administrative	   presence	   throughout	   the	   country. 9 	  The	  expectation	  was	  African	  States	  would	  accomplish	  in	  less	  than	  eighty	  years	  what	  had	   taken	   the	  Europeans	   centuries	  of	   State	   evolution	   to	   achieve.10	  The	   changes	  wrought	  by	   the	  colonisers	   in	  creating	  clearly	  demarcated	  boundaries	  unsettled	  the	  existing	  political	  order	  and	  imposed	  the	  necessity	  of	  shifting	  allegiances	  from	  local	   leaders	   to	   a	   centralised	   and	   largely	   unknown	   authority.11	  The	   creation	   of	  borders	  that	  failed	  to	  recognise	  the	  diversity	  of	  the	  clan	  and	  tribal	  units	  led	  to	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  ostensibly	  by	  one	  tribe	  against	  another,	   in	  the	  battle	  for	  control	  of	  the	  mainly	  urban	  areas.12	  	  	  The	  historical	  African	  concept	  of	   sovereignty	  differs	   from	  the	  western	  concept.	  The	  African	   concept	   of	   sovereignty	   focuses	  on	  people	   rather	   than	  on	   territory.	  The	  control	  the	  land	  and	  the	  control	  the	  people,	  under	  this	  concept,	  are	  shared.13	  The	   ‘new’	  concept	  of	  sovereignty	  brought	  by	   the	  colonisers	  required	  allegiance	  to	   the	   State.14	  The	   failure	   by	   the	   international	   community	   to	   recognise	   the	  possibility	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   alternative	   political	   structures,	   not	   based	   on	   the	  Westphalian	   model,	   has	   led	   to	   the	   international	   community	   persisting	   in	  propping	   up	   States	   that	   have	   failed.	   	   The	   rush	   to	   create	   new	   nations	   all	   but	  ignored	   the	   existing	   arrangements	   for	   recognition	   of	   States	   and	   in	   so	   doing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Jose	  Pureza	  and	  others	  “Do	  States	  Fail	  or	  Are	  They	  Pushed?	  Lessons	  Learned	  From	  Three	  Former	  Portuguese	  Colonies”	  2007	  273	  Oficina	  do	  CES	  at	  pp1-­‐3,	  and	  Herbst,	  above	  n4	  at	  p122.	  
9	  Herbst,	  above	  n	  4	  at	  p	  122.	  
10	  Herbst,	  above	  n	  4	  at	  p130.	  Even	  the	  establishment	  of	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  was	  not	  without	  its	  Civil	  War	  and	  War	  of	  Independence	  as	  was	  the	  same	  for	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  its	  Civil	  War.	  The	  French	  also	  experienced	  their	  revolution	  as	  did	  Russia.	  The	  slowly	  maturing	  international	  community	  left	  these	  States	  to	  solve	  their	  own	  issues.	  	  	  
11	  Herbst,	  above	  n	  4	  at	  p	  129.	  
12	  At	  pp130-­‐131.	  	  
13	  At	  pp128-­‐129.	  
14	  At	  p122.	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showed	   the	   peril	   of	   disregarding	   how	   effective	   or	   stable	   States	   were.15	  Both	  Hartmann	  and	  Giorgetti	  argue	  that	  this	  mismatch,	  between	  governing	  structure	  and	  the	  governed,	  is	  not	  a	  cause	  for	  State	  failure.	  States	  exhibit	  the	  same	  type	  of	  dysfunctional	   operational	   structure	   but	   are	   not	   in	   danger	   of	   failure.16	  To	   avoid	  this	  continuing	  cycle	  of	   failure	  Herbst	  argues	   that	   the	   international	  community	  needs	   to	   recognise	   the	  historical	   concepts	   of	  African	   identity	   and	  be	  willing	   to	  integrate	  them	  into	  a	  system	  that	  has	   for	   too	   long	  been	  fixated	  on	  the	  Western	  model	  of	  a	  State.17	  	  The	  next	  major	  influences	  on	  African	  States	  were	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  neo-­‐liberal	   counter-­‐revolution.	  The	  Cold	  War	  brought	   funds	  and	  arms,	   and	  supported	  a	  system	  of	  patrimony	  that	  helped	  keep	  autocratic	  leaders	  in	  power.18	  The	  over	  supply	  of	  arms	  enabled	  dissident	  groups	  to	  challenge	  newly	  instituted	  governments. 19 	  The	   issues	   facing	   post-­‐colonial	   second	   and	   third	   generation	  regimes	   were	   compounded	   by	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   Cold	   War,	   which	   led	   to	  cutbacks	   on	   public	   spending,	   donor	   specialisation,	   reduction	   in	   subsidies	   for	  primary	   goods,	   and	   a	   diversion	   of	   aid	   funding	   to	   non	   bureaucratic	   corporate	  bodies.20	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  this	  counter	  revolution	  was	  occurring	  there	  was	  an	  increasing	   demand	   on	   developing	   States	   to	   comply	   with	   a	   neo-­‐liberal	  programme	   that	   was	   beyond	   their	   ability	   and	   exceeded	   the	   demand	  made	   on	  developing	   States	   at	   any	  other	   time.21	  Following	   the	   example	   of	   their	   colonists,	  the	  newly	  elected	  local	  leaders	  rampantly	  plundered	  the	  State	  coffers,	  Sese	  Seko	  of	   Zaire,	   Siaka	   Stevens	   of	   Sierra	   Leone	   and	   Siyaad	  Barre	   of	   Somalia	   to	   name	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Nil	  Lante	  Wallace-­‐Bruce	  “Of	  Collapsed,	  Dysfunctional	  and	  Disoriented	  States:	  Challenges	  to	  International	  Law”	  2000	  47(1)	  NILR	  at	  p54.	  
16	  Chiara	  Giorgetti	  A	  Principled	  Approach	  to	  State	  Failure:	  International	  Community	  Actions	  in	  
Emergency	  Situations	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  Leiden,	  2010)	  at	  p46.	  William	  Zartman	  (ed)	  Collapsed	  
States:	  The	  Disintegration	  and	  Restoration	  of	  Legitimate	  Authority	  (Lynne	  Reiner,	  Colorado,	  1996)	  at	  p6.	  
17	  Herbst,	  above	  n	  4	  at	  p	  p132-­‐3.	  	  
18	  At	  p124.	  
19	  At	  p122.	  
20	  Pureza	  and	  others,	  above	  n	  8	  at	  p4.	  
21	  Susan	  Woodward	  Institutionally	  	  Fragile	  States.	  Fragile	  States,	  Prevention,	  and	  Post	  Conflict:	  
Recommendations	  (FRIDE	  Working	  Paper,	  Madrid,	  2006)	  at	  p19	  cited	  by	  Pureza	  and	  others,	  n	  8	  above	  at	  p4-­‐5.	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few.22	  These	  new	  leaders	  were	  able	  to	  develop	  a	  highly	  tuned	  patrimonial	  system	  that	  survived	  as	  long	  as	  there	  was	  Cold	  War	  funding.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  funding	  was	  so	  the	  two	  major	  protagonists	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  could	  purchase	  allies	   in	  the	  global	  struggle	  for	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  most	  territory.23	  	  These	  conditions	  caused	  the	  weakest	  of	  African	  States	  to	   fail.	  The	  phenomenon	  of	   a	   failed	   State	   is	   not	   the	   direct	   result	   of	   the	   first	   generation	   post	   colonist	  governments;	  indeed	  Zartmann	  holds	  that	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  second	  or	  third	  generation	   post-­‐colonial	   regime	   that	   brings	   about	   the	   failure	   of	   a	   State.	   The	  international	  community	  stepped	  in	  and	  tried	  to	  recreate	  the	  Westphalian	  model	  without	  considering	  why	  the	  States	  had	  failed	  and	  what	  possible	  changes	  could	  be	  made	  to	  ensure	  there	  was	  no	  repeat.24	  	  	  	  	  
2.2 Somalia	  and	  its	  colonisation	  Before	   the	   coming	   of	   the	   Europeans	   to	   the	   African	   Continent	   Somalia	   did	   not	  exist.	  The	  area	  currently	  known,	  as	  Somalia	  was	  a	   collection	  of	  different	   tribes	  distributed	   unevenly	   throughout	   an	   area	   that	   covered	   parts	   of	   Kenya,	   Eritrea,	  Ethiopia,	   and	   Djibouti.25	  This	   demarcation	   of	   borders	   split	   between	   different	  States,	  leading	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  dislocation	  amongst	  the	  different	  tribes.26	  	  	  The	   British	   were	   the	   first	   colonisers,	   taking	   over	   an	   area	   now	   known	   as	  Somaliland	  from	  their	  base	  in	  Ethiopia.	  The	  thrust	  of	  the	  British	  was	  secondary	  to	   their	   colonisation	   of	   Kenya	   and	  Uganda,	   relying	   on	  what	  was	   known	   as	   the	  British	   Somaliland	   Protectorate	   as	   a	   source	   of	   meat.27	  The	   French	  managed	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Robert	  Rotberg	  “Failed	  States	  in	  a	  World	  of	  Terror”	  2002	  81	  Foreign	  Affairs	  127	  at	  p	  128.	  
23	  At	  p	  128.	  
24	  Herbst,	  above	  n	  4	  at	  pp124-­‐5.	  
25	  Said	  Samatar	  Somalia:	  a	  Nation	  in	  Turmoil	  (The	  Minority	  Rights	  Group,	  London,	  1991)	  at	  p11.	  
26	  At	  p14.	  	  
27	  At	  p15.	  
	   	   Chapter	  2	  
	   22	  
acquire	   the	   area	   known	   today	   as	   Djibouti,	   as	   a	  way	   of	   controlling	   coffee	   from	  Ethiopia	  into	  the	  Mediterranean.	  	  The	   Italians	   saw	   a	   possibility	   of	   developing	   a	   significant	   colony	   as	   a	   part	   of	   a	  resettlement	   programme	   from	   the	   Italian	   mainland	   and	   as	   a	   way	   of	   relieving	  pressure	  on	  an	  increasing	  population.	  28	  The	  Italians	  pushed	  the	  British	  out	  in	  the	  1920s	   and	   then	  Britain	   returned	   to	   control	   the	   area	   during	  WWII.	   The	  United	  Nations	   (UN)	   returned	   some	   areas	   to	   Italian	   control	   post	   WWII	   and	   the	  remainder	   as	   a	   British	   protectorate.	   Independence	   was	   gained	   for	   both	   the	  British	  and	  Italian	  protectorates	  in	  1960.	  The	  two	  former	  protectorates	  became	  unified	  within	  that	  same	  year.	  	  	  	  	  The	   colonists	  were	   not	   interested	   in	   building	   up	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   people	   or	  culture;	   colonisation	   was	   about	   utilisation	   of	   the	   land	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	  colonisers.	  The	  people	  and	  the	  land	  were	  secondary	  considerations.	  	  	  Ethiopia	  was	  also	   interested	   in	  gaining	  direct	  access	   to	   the	  coast.	  However,	   it’s	  efforts	  only	  succeeded	   in	  gaining	  control	  of	   the	  Haud	  pastureland	  and	  dividing	  the	   Ogaaden	   people	   between	   itself,	   Kenya	   and	   Somalia.29	  This	   has	   left	   some	   3	  million	   Somali	   people	   separated	   from	   their	   clansmen	   and	   geographic	  homeland.30	  The	  French	  relinquished	  control	  of	  Djibouti	  in	  1977.	  	  	  In	  1969,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  coup,	  Siyaad	  Barre	  took	  control	  of	  Somalia	  and	  remained	  in	   power	   until	   he	   was	   ousted	   in	   1990.	   The	   resultant	   demise	   of	   a	   central	  government	  in	  Somalia	  led	  to	  a	  destructive	  civil	  war	  as	  many	  factions	  fought	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  At	  p31.	  	  
29	  Samatar,	  above	  n	  25	  at	  p15.	  	  	  
30	  At	  p15.	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control	  of	   the	  spoils	  of	  national	   leadership.	  The	  state	  of	   internal	   strife,	   and	   the	  inability	   of	   one	   faction	   to	   gain	   ascendency	   for	   any	   length	   of	   time,	   led	   to	   the	  nation	  being	  declared	  a	  failed	  State.	  	  The	   UN,	   the	   African	   Union,	   (AU),	   and	   the	   United	   States,	   (US),	   have	   backed	  successive	   attempts	   at	   forming	   governments.	   The	   reach	   of	   these	   governments	  has	   failed	   to	   extend	   beyond	   some	   of	   the	   suburbs	   of	  Mogadishu,	   the	   capital	   of	  Somalia.	   The	   Islamic	   Courts	   Union,	   (ICU),	   had	   effective	   control	   over	   parts	   of	  southern	  Somalia	  during	  2006.	  The	  ICU	  was	  forcefully	  removed	  after	  six	  months	  by	   the	   Ethiopian	   forces	   supported	   by	   the	   US.	   Two	   regions	   have	   been	   able	   to	  create	  some	  form	  of	  stability,	  Somaliland	  in	  the	  northwest,	  which	  has	  functioned	  independently	   since	   the	   mid	   1990s,	   and	   Puntland	   in	   the	   north.	   Both	   of	   these	  areas	  are	  under	  effective	  tribal	  control.	  	  	  While	  there	  has	  been	  this	  failure	  of	  government	  and	  fighting	  for	  control,	  Somalia	  has	   suffered	   from	   natural	   disasters	   as	   well.	   The	   fighting	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	  disrupted	   the	   ability	   of	   rural	   people	   to	   grow	   sufficient	   food,	   which	   led	   to	   a	  significant	  famine.	   In	  2004	  there	  was	  a	  tsunami	  that	  decimated	  the	  coastline	  of	  Somalia	  destroying	  fishing	  vessels	  and	  villages.	  	  	  To	  the	  international	  community’s	  credit	   it	  has	  been	  willing	  to	  spend	  more	  than	  twenty	  years	  since	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Barre	  government	  engaging	  with	  Somalia,	  which	  has	  endured	  the	  ignominy	  of	  being	  the	  poster	  State	  of	  a	  collapsed	  State.31	  This	  engagement	  has	  led	  to	  the	  recent	  establishment	  of	  a	  State	  constitution	  and	  the	   creation	   of	   a	   special	   assembly	   brought	   together	   by	   the	   elders,	   not	   those	  specifically	  seeking	  political	  appointment.32	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Fragile	  States	  index,	  above	  n	  3,	  Somalia	  has	  moved	  to	  number	  6	  on	  the	  list,	  supplanted	  by	  South	  Sudan	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  list.	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  It	  has	  been	  suggested	   that	   the	  UN	  should	  adopt	  a	   trustee	  model	   to	  guide	   these	  failed	  African	  States	  to	  maturity	  as	  full	  and	  vibrant	  members	  of	  the	  international	  community.33	  Gordon	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  measure	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  the	  re-­‐institution	  of	  colonisation	  but	  under	  a	  different	  guise.34	  Considering	  the	  strength	  of	  opposition	  by	  Somalis	  displayed	  towards	  the	   last	  major	  peace	  keeping	  effort	  by	  the	  UN	  and	  specifically	  the	  US,	  it	  is	  doubtful	  that	  there	  would	  ever	  be	  national	  acceptance	  in	  Somalia	  of	  this	  idea.	  	  The	   failure	   of	   African	   States	   can	   been	   seen	   as	   being	   contributed	   to	   through	   a	  number	  of	  factors	  both	  external	  and	  internal,	  including	  deep	  seated	  sociological	  issues,	  as	  well	  as	  historical,	  political,	  natural	  and	  geographical.35	  	  The	   term	   failed	  State,	  both	  describes	   the	  result	  of	   the	  process	  and	   implies	   that	  there	  is	  a	  set	  standard	  for	  successful	  States	  based	  on	  the	  Weberian	  State	  model.36	  The	   term	   is	   based	   on	   two	   assumptions,	   the	   lack	   of	   political	   and	   economic	  capacity	   to	   survive	   and	   secondly,	   that	   this	   is	   a	   result	   of	   poor	   internal	  governance.37	  	   The	   successful	   State	   is	   one	   in	   which	   the	   State	   supplies	   political	  goods	   for	   it’s	   citizens	   and	   also	   enjoys	   protection	   from	   intervention	   by	   other	  international	   institutions	   or	   States. 38 	  The	   causes	   of	   State	   failure	   include	  geographical,	   physical,	   historical	   and	  political	   factors	   and	   in	   the	   case	   of	  Africa,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  “Somali	  Assembly	  Endorses	  Draft	  Constitution”	  	  (2012)	  <www.aljazeera.co/news/africa/2012/08/201281101033529886.html>	  
33	  Herbst,	  above	  n	  4	  at	  p125.	  
34	  Ruth	  Gordon	  “Saving	  Failed	  States:Sometimes	  a	  Neocolonialist	  Notion”	  1997	  12	  Am.U.J.Int'l	  &	  Pol'y	  at	  p926.	  	  
35	  Teresa	  Andersson	  “State	  Responsibility	  During	  State	  Failure	  -­‐	  A	  Question	  of	  Attribution	  and	  State	  Definition”	  (University	  of	  Lund,	  2005)	  at	  p11.	  
36	  Pureza	  and	  others,	  above	  n	  8	  at	  pp1-­‐3.	  
37	  Pureza	  and	  others,	  above	  n	  8	  at	  p2.	  
38	  Robert	  Jackson	  Quasi	  States,	  Sovereignty,	  International	  Relations	  and	  the	  Third	  World	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  1990)	  at	  p29	  as	  cited	  by	  Pureza	  and	  others,	  above	  n	  8	  at	  p3.	  The	  principle	  of	  non-­‐intervention.	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errors	   by	   both	   colonial	   powers	   and	   the	   mistakes	   made	   by	   the	   Cold	   War	  protagonists.39	  	  	  	  Having	   briefly	   outlined	   the	   concept	   of	   a	   failed	   State	   and	   some	   of	   the	   possible	  causes,	  it	  is	  relevant	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  State	  to	  set	  the	  parameters	  of	  what	  a	  State	  is.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Woodward,	  above	  n	  21	  cited	  by	  Pureza	  and	  others,	  above	  n	  8	  at	  p4-­‐5.	  
	   	   Chapter	  2	  
	   26	  
3 The	  State	   	   	  	  With	   the	   completion	   of	   the	   process	   of	   the	   Peace	   of	   Westphalia	   in	   1648	   the	  recognition	   of	   a	   secular	   international	   community	   was	   acknowledged. 40 	  The	  creation	  of	  this	  political	  entity	  finally	  gave	  rulers	  the	  ability	  to	  decide	  matters	  of	  internal	  governance	  of	  the	  people	  within	  a	  geographically	  defined	  area,	  without	  reference	   to	   the	   Holy	   Roman	   Empire.41	  At	   the	   time	   this	   was	   occurring	   there	  developed	  two	  strains	  of	  thought,	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  people	   within	   a	   geographic	   area	   and	   those	   who	   had	   a	   right	   to	   rule,	   (social	  contract),	  and	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  geographic	  unit	  and	  the	  people	  within	  it	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  economic	  unit.42	  To	  smooth	  relations	  between	  these	  newly	  created	  entities	  and	  to	  help	  them	  recognise	  others	  of	   their	  kind,	  a	  set	  of	  characteristics	  were	  developed.43	  These	  characteristics	  included	  a	  geographically	  defined	  area,	  a	  population,	   and	   some	   form	   of	   government. 44 	  Having	   established	   these	  characteristics,	   a	   set	   of	   rules	   were	   established	   that	   governed	   the	   interactions	  between	   these	   entities,	   that	   were	   agreed	   to	   by	   all	   the	   entities,	   to	   limit	   any	  possible	   abuse	   of	   power,	   both	   within	   the	   entity	   and	   between	   entities.45	  These	  rules	   did	   not	   initially	   include	   the	   Americas,	   Africa	   or	   Asia	   and	   were	   entirely	  Euro-­‐centric	   as	   a	   consequence.46	  That	   there	   existed	   at	   the	   time	   other	   political	  entities	   of	   a	   non-­‐European	   kind	   created	   difficulties	   for	   the	   European	   States	  entering	   into	   relations	  with	   these	   so	   called	   ‘non-­‐civilised’	   entities.47	  In	   order	   to	  become	  recognised	  by	  the	  European	  States	  a	  set	  of	  conditions	  were	  created	  that	  ensured	   non-­‐European	   ‘States’	   could	   be	   recognised.	   These	   conditions	   included	  the	  creation	  of	  governments,	  laws	  and	  administration	  modelled	  on	  the	  European	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Matthew	  Craven	  “Statehood,	  Self	  Determination	  and	  Recognition”	  in	  Malcolm	  Evans	  (ed)	  
International	  Law	  (3rd	  ed,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  2010)	  at	  p210.	  
41	  At	  p	  210.	  
42	  At	  p210.	  
43	  At	  p210.	  
44	  At	  p210.	  
45	  At	  p212.	  
46	  At	  p212	  refers	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Martens	  and	  Kluber	  who	  referred	  to	  the	  rules	  as	  the	  Public	  Law	  of	  Europe.	  	  
47	  At	  p213.	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examples.48	  These	   conditions	   were	   eventually	   laid	   down	   in	   Article	   1	   of	   the	  Montevideo	   Convention	   of	   1933,49	  that	   for	   a	   State	   to	   have	   legal	   personality	   at	  international	   law	   it	   should	   possess;	   territory,	   a	   permanent	   population,	   a	  government	   and	   the	   capacity	   to	   enter	   relations	   with	   other	   States.	   Craven	  suggests	  that	  each	  of	  these	  is	  somewhat	  flawed	  and	  the	  convention	  omits	  some	  of	   the	   more	   important	   factors	   such	   as	   legitimacy,	   independence	   and	   self-­‐determination.50	  	  	  While	  a	  State	  may	  possess	  the	  four	  characteristics	  of	  a	  State	  the	  last	  requirement	  prior	  to	  acceptance	  as	  a	  State	  is	  recognition	  by	  other	  States.	  Here	  the	  process	  is	  divided	   into	   two	  theories,	  either	   the	  declarative	  or	   the	  constitutive	   theory.	  The	  declarative	  theory	  posits	  that	  the	  action	  of	  a	  State	  in	  claiming	  that	  it	  is	  a	  State,	  in	  that	  it	  possesses	  the	  four	  criteria	  under	  the	  Montevideo	  Convention,	  is	  sufficient	  for	   statehood.	   This	   State	   then	   expects	   other	   States	   to	   regard	   it	   as	   such.51	  	   The	  declarative	   theory	   requires	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   four	   criteria	   is	   determined	  before	  other	  States	  can	  begin	  relations	  with	  the	  State.52	  The	  constitutive	  theory	  is	  the	   action	  of	   the	   recognising	   State	   establishing	   the	   legal	   existence	  of	   the	  other	  State	  through	  the	  formation	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  or	  by	  entering	   into	  a	  treaty	  with	  the	  State	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  conferring	  status	  on	  that	  State	  as	  a	  State.53	  Once	  a	  State	  has	  been	  recognised	  under	  the	  constitutive	  process	  it	  is	  confirmation	  that	  the	  four	  criteria	  are	  present	  and	  the	  entity	  is	  a	  State.	  Crawford	  would	  claim	  that	  this	  moves	   the	  process	  of	   recognition	   from	  one	  of	   legitimacy	   to	  effectiveness.54	  Brownlie	   defines	   effectiveness	   as	   the	   actual	   and	   effective	   exercise	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  At	  p213.	  
49	  Montevideo	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  and	  Duties	  of	  States,	  26	  December	  1933.	  This	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  Americas.	  It	  has	  been	  seen	  as	  codification	  of	  customary	  international	  law.	  	  
50	  Craven,	  above	  n	  40	  at	  p220.	  
51	  At	  p241.	  
52	  At	  p210.	  
53	  At	  p259.	  
54	  James	  Crawford	  The	  Creation	  of	  States	  in	  International	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  2006)	  at	  p4.	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jurisdiction.55	  Lauterpacht,	   cited	   by	   Rich,	   would	   further	   confuse	   the	   picture	   of	  recognition	  by	  claiming	   that	   it	   is	  an	  act	  of	  political	  policy	  and	  not	  one	  of	   law.56	  	  Cassese	  claims	  that	  the	  constitutive	  theory	  is	  fallacious	  in	  that	  it	  fails	  to	  take	  note	  of	   the	  effectiveness	  principle,57	  disregards	  the	  principle	  of	   the	  equality	  of	  States	  as	  it	  is	  requiring	  another	  State	  to	  grant	  legitimacy	  and	  that	  it	  flies	  in	  the	  face	  of	  logic	   in	   that	   some	   States	   could	   recognise	   the	   new	   State	   and	   others	   decline	   to	  recognise	  it	  giving	  the	  new	  State	  a	  split	  personality	  at	  law.58	  	  	  Kosovo	   is	   an	  example	  of	   a	   split	  personality	  State.	  The	  Kosovar	  Albanians	  were	  under	   a	   programme	   of	   repression	   and	   displacement	   by	   Yugoslavia.59	  The	   UN	  Security	  Council,	  (UNSC),	  under	  Resolution	  1244,	  which	  authorised	  the	  creation	  of	   a	   military	   presence	   in	   Kosovo60	  and	   the	   installation	   of	   a	   civil	   presence	   to	  oversee	   the	   interim	   administration	   for	   Kosovo,	   United	   Nations	   Interim	  Administration	   Mission	   in	   Kosovo,	   (UNMIK),	   that	   would	   ‘provide	   transitional	  administration	  while	  establishing	  and	  overseeing	  the	  development	  of	  provisional	  self-­‐governing	  institutions.’61	  	  	  On	   the	   17	   February	   2008	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   Kosovo	   Assembly	   declared	  independence.62	  This	  act	  set	  of	  a	  spate	  of	  recognition	  by	  States	  that	  by	  2010	  had	  reached	  62.63	  There	  were	  however,	  conditions	  attached	  to	  this	  recognition	  in	  that	  it	   was	   a	   unique	   and	   not	   a	   precedent	   setting	   act,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   fact	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Ian	  Brownlie	  Principles	  of	  Public	  International	  Law	  (7th	  ed,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  2008)	  at	  p112.	  
56	  R	  Rich	  “Symposium:	  Recent	  Developments	  in	  the	  Practice	  of	  State	  Recognition,	  Recognition	  of	  States:	  The	  Collapse	  of	  Yugoslavia	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union”	  1993	  4	  E.J.I.L.	  36	  at	  p55.	  
57	  Charles	  de	  Visscher	  Theory	  and	  Reality	  in	  International	  Law	  (A	  Pedone,	  Paris,	  1953)	  Chapter	  IV.	  The	  effectiveness	  principle	  is	  that	  which	  in	  law	  in	  general	  grants	  rights	  and	  obligations	  specifically,	  should	  be	  effective.	  	  
58	  Antonio	  Cassesse	  International	  Law	  (2nd	  ed,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford,	  2005)	  at	  p74.	  
59	  Christine	  Gray	  “The	  Use	  of	  Force	  and	  the	  International	  Legal	  Order”	  in	  Malcom	  Evans	  (ed)	  
International	  Law	  (3rd	  ed,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  2010)	  at	  p621.	  
60United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  SC	  Res	  1244	  S/RES/1244	  (1999)	  	  
61	  UNSCR,	  above	  n	  60	  at	  paragraph	  10.	  
62	  Kosovo	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  	  (17	  February	  2008)	  
63	  Craven,	  above	  n	  40	  at	  p239.	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independence	   was	   part	   of	   a	   proposal	   by	   the	   Special	   Representative,	   Matti	  Ahtissari	   that	  would	   lead	  to	  a	  political	  solution	  to	  the	  problem.64	  Russia,	  Serbia,	  Spain,	  and	  Greece	  all	  declined	  to	  recognise	  Kosovo.	  Russia	  utilised	  its	  veto	  in	  the	  SC	  to	  thwart	  any	  attempt	  by	  Kosovo	  to	  be	  made	  a	  member	  of	  the	  UN.65	  In	  reality	  it	  doesn’t	  matter	  whether	  the	  theory	  applied	  is	  the	  either	  the	  constitutive	  or	  the	  declarative	  there	  is	  still	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  the	  status	  of	  Kosovo.	  Other	  aspects	  of	  Kosovo’s	  statehood	  will	  be	  discussed	  below.	  	  	  While	  there	  is	  still	  uncertainty	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  clear	  definition	  of	  a	  State	  a	  closer	  examination	  of	  the	  four	  criteria	  may	  provide	  some	  clarity.	  66	  	   	  	  
3.1.1 Territory	  States	   are	   political	   entities	   that	   are	   established	   within	   defined	   territorial	  boundaries.	   These	   boundaries	   at	   the	   time	   of	   recognition	   may	   not	   be	   either	  contiguous	  or	  clearly	  delimited	  or	  of	  some	  predetermined	  size.67	  When	  States	  fail	  their	   borders	   are	   not	   called	   in	   to	   question.68	  Modern	   States	   come	   into	   being	   in	  one	   of	   two	   ways,	   either	   through	   international	   agents,	   States	   or	   organisations,	  allowing	  non-­‐State	  entities	  to	  gain	  legitimate	  statehood	  or	  through	  the	  action	  of	  entities	   with	   similar	   characteristics	   following	   each	   other	   in	   gaining	   statehood.	  Decolonisation	  of	  Africa	  and	  the	  break	  up	  of	  the	  former	  Balkan	  and	  USSR	  States	  are	  examples	  of	  this	  in	  action.69	  The	  problem	  for	  Kosovo	  is	  that	  it	  formed	  part	  of	  Serbia	  and	  would	  need	  to	  be	  seceded	  from	  that	  State.	  This	  would	  be	  in	  breach	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  At	  p210.	  
65	  Malcolm	  Shaw	  International	  Law	  (6th	  ed,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2008)	  at	  p453.	  
66	  Crawford,	  above	  n	  54	  at	  p37.	  
67	  At	  p46.	  Crawford	  identifies	  Israel	  as	  a	  State	  that	  lacked	  clear	  boundaries	  when	  it	  was	  formed.	  	  
68	  Daniel	  Thürer	  “The	  "Failed	  State"	  and	  International	  Law”	  1999	  836	  International	  Red	  Cross	  Review	  at	  p12.	  
69	  Alexander	  Cooley	  “Kosovo's	  Precedents:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Sovereign	  Emergence	  and	  its	  alternatives”	  2008	  Policy	  Memo	  7	  PONARS	  Eurasia	  1	  at	  p2	  and	  at	  p3	  identifies	  the	  break	  up	  of	  the	  former	  USSR	  and	  Yugoslavia	  as	  two	  other	  examples	  in	  the	  1990s,	  both	  of	  which	  have	  caused	  some	  concerns	  for	  Western	  European	  States	  as	  they	  were	  more	  correctly	  federations	  of	  autonomous	  States.	  	  
	   	   Chapter	  2	  
	   30	  
the	   principle	   of	   uti	   posseditis,	   which	   has	   been	   confirmed	   as	   customary	  international	   law,	   (CIL),	   by	   the	  Yugoslavia	  Arbitration	  Commission,	  which	  held	  that,	  	   ‘…whatever	   the	   circumstances,	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	  must	   not	  involve	   changes	   to	   existing	   frontiers	   at	   the	   time	   of	   independence	   (uti	  
posseditis)	  except	  where	  the	  States	  concerned	  agree	  otherwise.’70	  	  The	  advisory	  opinion	  of	  22	  July	  2010	  Accordance	  with	  International	  Law	  of	  the	  Unilateral	   Declaration	   of	   Independence	   in	   Respect	   of	   Kosovo	   avoided	  commenting	   on	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   State	   and	   the	   opinion	   at	   paragraph	   83	   dealt	  briefly	  with	  the	  secession	  as	  it	  felt	  that	  it	  was	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  question	  asked	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly,	   (GA),	  of	   the	  UN.71	  In	   the	   instance	  of	  Somaliland	  and	  its	  secession	  from	  Somalia	  as	  a	  failed	  State,	  British	  Somaliland	  was	  accorded	  recognition,	   if	  only	   for	   four	  days,	  prior	   to	   it	  becoming	  a	  part	  of	   the	  Republic	  of	  Somalia,	   so	   has	   it’s	   borders	   acknowledged	   at	   an	   international	   level	   as	   it	   was	  recognised	  by	  the	  US,	  amongst	  others	  as	  a	  State.72	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Yugoslavia	  Peace	  Conference,arbitration	  Commission,	  Opinions,	  2	  (Right	  to	  self	  determination	  of	  
Serbs	  in	  Croatia	  and	  Bosnia	  Herzegovina)	  92	  ILR	  167	  at	  p168.	  
71	  Accordance	  of	  International	  Law	  of	  the	  Unilateral	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  in	  Respect	  of	  Kosovo	  (Request	  for	  Advisory	  Opinion)	  I.C.J.	  Reports	  p40;	  at	  paragraph	  83.	  The	  claim	  to	  territory	  by	  Kosovo	  breaches	  the	  principle	  of	  uti	  posseditis	  juris,	  in	  that	  it	  creates	  a	  change	  to	  the	  boundaries	  of	  an	  existing	  State,	  which	  in	  this	  case	  was	  Serbia.	  
72	  Crawford,	  above	  n	  54	  at	  p90.	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3.1.2 Population	  Not	  a	   contentious	   issue.	  There	   is	   a	  wide	  variation	   in	   the	   sizes	  of	  population	  of	  States	  ranging	  from	  a	  few	  hundred,	  Vatican	  City	  through	  to	  billions	  in	  China.73	  In	  the	   context	   of	   the	   failed	   State,	   even	   though	   there	  might	   be	   fluctuations	   in	   size	  due	   to	  refugees	   leaving	   the	   territory,	   there	   is	  no	  affect	  on	   the	  status	  of	  a	  State.	  Once	   statehood	   has	   been	   recognised	   in	   a	   political	   entity	   changes	   to	   the	  population	   do	   not	   alter	   the	   status	   of	   the	   State. 74 	  At	   the	   time	   of	   Kosovo’s	  independence	   declaration	   it	   had	   a	   population	   of	   approximately	   1.9	   million	  people.	  	  	  
3.1.3 Government	  This	   criterion	   is	   slightly	  more	   contentious	   than	   the	   other	   two.	  More	   than	   just	  government	   is	   required;	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   effective	   government.75	  There	   is	   a	   fair	  degree	   of	   flexibility	   in	   the	   application	   of	   this	   criterion,	   as	   some	   governments	  have	   been	   in	   doubt	   as	   to	   their	   ability	   to	   control	   a	   territory	   beyond	   the	   urban	  area.	  The	  example	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo	  is	  an	  example	  where	  two	  factions	  were	  fighting	  for	  control	  shortly	  after	  the	  grant	  of	   independence.76	  The	   flexibility	  with	  which	   the	   requirement	   to	   have	   an	   effective	   government	   is	  applied	   relates	   to	   the	   standing	   of	   the	   State	   concerned.	   New	   States	   have	   this	  requirement	  applied	  more	  rigorously	  than	  States	  bordering	  on	  extinction.77	  This	  criterion	  is	  subject	  to	  value	  judgments	  as	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  control	  the	  government	  has	   over	   a	   population,	   territory	   and	   the	   maintenance	   of	   law	   and	   order.78	  A	  government	   needs	   to	   be	   effective,	   however,	   there	   is	   a	   suggestion	   that	   for	   new	  States,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   a	   democratic	   government.	   The	   European	   Community’s,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  At	  p52.	  
74	  Giorgetti,	  above	  n	  16	  at	  p55.	  
75	  Crawford,	  above	  n	  54	  at	  p56.	  
76	  Crawford,	  above	  n	  54	  at	  p56.	  
77	  At	  p59	  	  
78	  At	  p56.	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(EC),	   guidelines,79	  for	   the	   recognition	   of	   new	   States	   from	   the	   Socialist	   Federal	  Republic	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  (SFRY),	  laid	  down	  democratic	  government	  as	  a	  condition	  for	   recognition.80	  The	   condition	   in	   no	   way	   detracts	   from	   those	   existing	   States	  who	  have	  chosen	  a	  different	   form	  of	  government.	  The	  UN	  controlled	  Kosovo	  at	  the	   time	  of	   its	   independence	  but	  was	   independent	  of	  Serbia.	   It	  did	  not	  have	  an	  independent,	  effective,	  government.	  	  
3.1.4 Entering	  into	  international	  relations	  The	   last	   criterion,	   entering	   into	   international	   relations	   appears	   to	   be	   the	  conflation	  of	   two	   conditions,	  81	  independence	  and	  effective	  government	  without	  which	  a	  State	   cannot	  enter	   into	   relationships	  with	  other	  States.	  Kosovo	  having	  declared	   itself	   independent	   would	   be	   able	   to	   enter	   into	   relations	   with	   other	  States.	  This	  would	  however	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  States	  that	  have	  recognised	  it	  and	  therefore	  not	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  right.	  	  	  The	   codification	   of	   the	   criteria	   for	   statehood	   has	   been	   consistent	   if	   not	  consistently	   applied.82	  With	   the	   break	   up	   of	   the	   USSR	   and	   the	   SFRY	   some	  confusion	  has	  been	  created.	  The	  EC	  guidelines	  mentioned	  above	  created	  in	  effect	  a	  new	  set	  of	  pre-­‐conditions	   for	   state	   recognition.83	  The	  new	  conditions	   include;	  recognition	   of	   the	   self	   determination	   of	   peoples,	   democratic	   government	   only	  acceptable,	   respect	   for	   human	   rights	   and	  minorities,	   nuclear	   disarmament	   and	  nuclear	  non-­‐proliferation,	  and	  the	  requirement	  that	  States	  wishing	  to	  join	  the	  EC	  from	  the	  SFRY	  had	  to	  state	  their	  desire	  to	  be	  recognised	  by	  a	  specific	  date.84	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  D	  Turk	  “Declaration	  on	  the	  ‘Guidelines	  on	  the	  Recognition	  of	  New	  States	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union’	  (16	  December	  1991)	  ”	  1993	  4(1)	  E.J.I.L.	  
80	  Turk,	  above	  n	  79.	  In	  both	  the	  preamble	  and	  Annex	  1	  it	  is	  made	  clear	  that	  a	  pre-­‐condition	  for	  recognition	  is	  a	  democratic	  government	  as	  being	  the	  only	  acceptable	  form	  of	  government.	  	  
81	  Crawford,	  above	  n	  54	  at	  p62.	  
82	  Cedric	  Ryngaert	  and	  Sven	  Sobrie	  “Recognition	  of	  States:	  International	  Law	  or	  Realpolitik?	  The	  Practice	  of	  Recognition	  in	  the	  Wake	  of	  Kosovo,	  South	  Ossetia	  and	  Abkhazia”	  2011	  24	  L.J.I.L	  467	  at	  p477.	  
83	  See	  Annex	  1	  	  
84	  See	  Annex	  2	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focus	  on	  the	  democratic	  form	  of	  government,	  while	  not	  breaching	  the	  UN	  Charter	  in	  relation	  to	  non-­‐interference,	  as	  the	  entities	  were	  not	  yet	  States,	  presupposes	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  form	  of	  effective	  government	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  acceptance	  of	   various	   forms	   following	   decolonisation.85	  While	   these	   preconditions,	   applied	  only	  to	  the	  SFRY	  and	  USSR,	  it	  is	  not	  inconceivable	  that	  they	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  other	  States	  seeking	  recognition.	  It	  would	  take	  a	  majority	  of	  States	  that	  form	  part	  of	   the	   UN	   to	   utilise	   these	   new	   conditions	   for	   them	   to	   be	   accepted	   as	   CIL.	   The	  purpose	   behind	   establishing	   the	   original	   Montevideo	   criteria	   was	   for	   the	  establishment	   of	   some	   consistency	   and	   as	   a	   defence	   against	   what	   could	   be	  doubtful	   claims	   of	   statehood. 86 	  It	   is	   important	   to	   recognise	   the	   difference	  between	  Montevideo	  criteria,	  which	  need	  to	  exist	  before	  a	  State	  can	  be	  called	  a	  State,	   and	   the	   act	   of	   recognition	  of	   an	   entity	   that	  possesses	   those	   criteria,	   as	   a	  State.	  The	  result	  of	  the	  break	  up	  of	  these	  two	  former	  federal	  republics	  is	  that	  the	  consistency	   once	   aimed	   for	   has	   become	   less	   predictable,	   less	   legal	   and	   more	  political.87	  It	   has	   been	   suggested	   that	   the	  balance	  between	  politics	   and	   law	  has	  been	  upset.88	  The	  move	  away	  from	  the	  four	  accepted	  criteria	  while	  not	  signalling	  their	  end	  is	  a	  move	  towards	  value	   judgments	  and	  away	  from	  consistency,	   from	  legal	  recognition,	  to	  political	  recognition.89	  	  The	  concept	  of	  recognition	  was	  further	  confused	  when	  three	  of	  the	  States	  of	  the	  former	   USSR,	   Latvia,	   Lithuania	   and	   Estonia	   were	   not	   so	   much	   recognised,	   as	  their	  former	  status	  as	  sovereign	  States	  was	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  US	  and	  by	  the	  EC.90	  The	   break	   up	   of	   the	   former	   SFRY	   lead	   to	   Croatia	   and	   Slovenia	   declaring	  independence	  and	  inviting	  other	  States	  to	  form	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  them.91	  The	   Ukraine	   followed	   a	   different	   path	   by	   holding	   a	   referendum	  where	   a	   90%	  majority	   voted	   for	   a	   Declaration	   of	   Independence.	   Following	   the	   declaration	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Ryngaert	  and	  Sobrie,	  above	  n	  82	  at	  p475.	  
86	  Rich,	  above	  n	  56	  at	  p55.	  
87	  Ryngaert	  and	  Sobrie,	  above	  n	  82	  at	  p477	  and	  Rich,	  above	  n	  56	  at	  p63.	  
88	  Rich,	  above	  n	  56	  at	  p56.	  
89	  At	  p39.	  
90	  Rich,	  above	  n	  56	  at	  p37-­‐8	  
91	  At	  p39.	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Canada	   immediately	   recognised	   the	   new	   State.92	  As	   a	   condition	   of	   recognition	  there	  was	  a	  requirement	  to	  abide	  by	  nuclear	  non-­‐proliferation	  by	  the	  securing	  of	  existing	  nuclear	  arms	  and	  a	  requirement	  to	  follow	  other	  treaties	  relating	  to	  arms	  control.93	  Georgia	   provided	   another	   level	   of	   complexity	   for	   the	   international	  community	   as	   the	   former	   USSR	   broke	   up	   and	   some	   of	   the	   previous	   republics	  became	  members	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  of	  Independent	  States,	  (CIS).	  Georgia	  at	  the	  time	  was	  undergoing	  internal	  turmoil	  and	  was	  not	  able	  to	  meet	  the	  criterion	  under	   the	   Montevideo	   Convention.	   This	   did	   not	   stop	   the	   US	   from	   recognising	  Georgia	  as	  a	  new	  State.	  Two	  questions	  are	  raised	  by	  this	  process;	  1)	  When	  a	  State	  is	  recognised	  by	  a	  single	  State	   is	   it	  a	  State?	  2)	  When	  a	  State	   is	  recognised	  with	  attendant	  conditions	  and	  fails	  to	  adhere	  to	  those	  conditions	  post	  recognition	  is	  it	  still	  a	  State?	  The	  answer	  to	  these	  questions	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  At	  p41.	  	  
93	  At	  p	  41.	  Although	  the	  Montevideo	  Convention	  Art	  6	  would	  suggest	  that	  additional	  conditions	  to	  state	  recognition	  are	  not	  legally	  binding.	  
	   	   Chapter	  2	  
	   35	  
4 Legal	  consequences	  of	  the	  grant	  of	  Statehood	  	  There	  are	   five	  principles	   that	  are	  accepted	  as	   the	   legal	   consequences	   that	   flow	  from	  statehood;	  external	  personality;	  internal	  affairs	  of	  State	  are	  inviolable;	  not	  subject	   to	   international	   process	   or	   jurisdiction	   without	   consent;	   that	   entities	  described	   as	   States	   are	   equal;	   derogations	   from	   these	   principles	   are	   not	  accepted.94	  	  	  The	  equality	  of	  States	  is	  an	  area	  that	  while	  legally	  correct,	  is	  politically	  a	  fiction.95	  	  Equality	   is	  differentiated	  when	  States	   ratify	   conventions	  or	   treaties	   that	  assign	  certain	  voting	  rights	  to	  some	  members	  or	  the	  weight	  that	  a	  member	  State’s	  vote	  carries	  is	  greater	  than	  other	  States.96	  	  While	  all	  States	  might	  be	  legal	  equals	  their	  influence	  and	  voice	  within	  international	  relations	  varies	  considerably.	  	  	  Having	   been	   recognised	   by	   the	   international	   community	   as	   being	   a	   State	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  understand	  the	  legal	  consequences	  that	  follow	  recognition.	  High	  on	  the	  list	  is	  the	  fact	  of	  acceptance	  that	  the	  sovereignty	  is	  recognised	  and	  the	  State	  is	  now	   able	   to	   join,	   without	   issue,	   the	   international	   community.97	  Sovereignty	  implies	   that	   a	   State	   has	   legislative,	   judicial	   and	   executive	   authority	   over	   its	  territory	  as	  well	  as	  its	  choice	  of	  political,	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  systems.98	  	  A	  State	  is	  limited	  only	  by	  the	  international	  obligations	  taken	  on	  by	  treaties	  it	  is	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Crawford,	  above	  n	  54	  at	  p41.	  Where	  doubt	  exists	  courts	  or	  international	  tribunals	  lean	  towards	  deciding	  in	  the	  favour	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  States	  to	  act.	  	  
95	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Art	  2(1)	  specifies	  that	  all	  members	  are	  sovereign	  equals.	  This	  notion	  of	  equality	  of	  States	  is	  more	  formal	  than	  a	  moral	  principle	  as	  States	  acknowledge	  when	  they	  sign	  the	  Charter	  that	  there	  are	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  under	  Art	  23(1)	  and	  that	  other	  States	  only	  attain	  membership	  on	  a	  two	  year	  basis.	  	  
96	  Brownlie,	  above	  n	  55	  at	  pp289-­‐298.	  The	  international	  Monetary	  Fund	  and	  the	  UN	  are	  two	  examples	  cited.	  States	  consent	  to	  these	  differences	  when	  they	  sign	  the	  treaty.	  
97	  Wallace-­‐Bruce,	  above	  n	  15	  at	  p55.	  
98	  Shaw,	  above	  n	  65	  at	  p1148.	  The	  United	  Nations	  Charter	  Art	  2(7)	  holds	  that	  the	  UN	  does	  not	  have	  the	  right	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  matters	  that	  are	  essentially	  under	  the	  domestic	  jurisdiction	  of	  a	  State.	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signatory	  to,	  and	  by	  international	  obligations	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐interference	   in	   the	   affairs	   of	   other	   States	   and	   by	   custom. 99 	  This	   view	   of	  sovereignty	  is	  today	  under	  threat	  as	  international	  law	  surrounding	  human	  rights	  are	  being	  used	  as	  an	  avenue	  of	  interference	  in	  domestic	  affairs.100	  	  The	  actions	  of	  many	  transnational	  organisations	  also	  extend	  across	  borders,	  particularly	  in	  the	  area	   of	   telecommunications	   and	   banking	   or	   finance. 101 	  These	   organisations,	  institutions	  and	  treaties	   limit	   the	  control	  a	  State	  has	  over	   its	   internal	  affairs	  by	  holding	  the	  State	  to	  conform	  to	  externally	  imposed	  conditions.102	  	  The	  articles	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties,	  Art	  6	  states,	  “Every	  State	   possess	   capacity	   to	   conclude	   treaties.’103	  This	   creates	   for	   the	   State	   that	  ratifies	  the	  treaty	  a	  series	  of	  both	  rights	  and	  obligations	  that	  have	  legal	  force.	  The	  CIL	  principle	  of	  pacta	  sunt	  servanda	  holds	  that	  agreements	  are	  binding.	  	  	  States	   also	  have	   the	   ability	   to	   join	   international	   organisations.	  The	  UN	  Charter	  Art	   3	   recognises	   the	   right	   of	   States	   who	   were	   the	   original	   participants	   to	   the	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  International	  Organisation	  to	  be	  known	  as	  original	  members.	  104	  Art	   4	   creates	   the	   right	   of	   membership	   for	   other	   States	   willing	   to	  accept	  the	  obligations	  of	  the	  Charter.105	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  At	  p1147.	  
100	  Shaw,	  above	  n	  65	  at	  p648.	  
101	  Wallace-­‐Bruce,	  above	  n	  15	  at	  p55.	  
102	  Shaw,	  above	  n	  65	  at	  p260.	  States	  are	  not	  the	  only	  holders	  of	  legal	  personality;	  it	  has	  long	  been	  acknowledged	  that	  both	  organisations	  and	  individuals	  have	  legal	  personality	  at	  international	  law.	  The	  right	  of	  an	  institution	  to	  legal	  personality	  is	  determined	  by	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  including	  but	  not	  exclusively,	  its	  constitutional	  status	  and	  its	  powers	  and	  practice.	  This	  practice	  is	  further	  refined	  by	  the	  institutions	  ability	  to	  sign	  treaties	  or	  enter	  into	  relations	  with	  States	  or	  other	  institutions.	  
103	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  UNTS	  vol.	  1155,	  p	  331	  (opened	  for	  signature	  23	  May	  1969,	  entered	  into	  force	  27	  January	  1980)	  
104	  UN	  Charter	  Art	  3.	  
105	  UN	  Charter	  Art	  4.	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A	  State	  becomes	  responsible	  for	  its	  actions	  as	  a	  result	  of	   joining	  treaties	  and	  at	  CIL.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  breach	  of	  a	  treaty	  the	  State	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  that	  act.106	  In	   the	   Spanish	   Zone	   of	  Morocco	   Claims	   it	   was	   held	   that,	   ‘	   Responsibility	   is	   the	  necessary	   corollary	   of	   a	   right.	   All	   rights	   of	   an	   international	   character	   involve	  international	  responsibility.’107	  	  	  The	  creation	  of	  the	  Responsibility	  of	  States	  for	  Internationally	  Wrongful	  Acts,108	  (Responsibility	   of	   States),	   is	   a	   guideline	   for	   States	   as	   to	   the	   limits	   of	   their	  responsibility	   and	   was	   adopted	   by	   the	   UN	   in	   2002. 109 	  Chapter	   1	   of	   the	  Responsibility	  of	  States	  assigns	  responsibility	  for	  the	  act	  to	  the	  State	  and	  defines	  what	   a	  wrongful	   act	   of	   a	   State	   is.	   The	   draft	   of	   the	   Responsibility	   of	   States	   has	  been	   recognised	   by	   the	   international	   Court	   of	   Justice	   in	   the	   Gabičikovo-­‐
Nagymoros	   Project	   where	   the	   court	   recognised	   the	   attribution	   of	   State	  responsibility	  for	  failing	  to	  respect	  obligations	  under	  treaty.110	  	  As	  mentioned	   above	   States	   are	  bound	  by	   the	  UN	  Charter	  Art	   7	   and	  by	   the	  CIL	  principle	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  in	  the	  domestic	  affairs	  of	  other	  States.	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Brownlie,	  above	  n	  55	  at	  p434.	  
107	  Spanish	  Zone	  of	  Morocco	  Claims	  (Great	  Britain	  v.	  Spain)	  (1924)	  2	  R.I.A.A	  615	  at	  p641,	  cited	  by	  Brownlie,	  above	  n	  55	  at	  p435.	  
108	  Responsibility	  of	  States	  for	  Internationally	  Wrongful	  Acts,	  Report	  of	  the	  ILC	  on	  the	  Work	  of	  its	  Fifty	  third	  Session,	  UN	  GAOR,	  56	  Sess,	  Supp	  No	  10	  UN	  Doc	  A/56/10	  Y.I.L.C.,	  (2001),	  vol.II	  (Part	  two)	  A/56/49(Vol.	  I)/Corr.4.	  
109	  Resolution	  adopted	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  GA	  Res	  56/83,	  A/RES/56/83	  2002	  The	  draft	  articles	  were	  commended	  to	  governments	  at	  paragraph	  3.	  There	  is	  some	  preambular	  comment	  regarding	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  articles	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  convention	  but	  this	  has	  not	  as	  yet	  transpired.	  
110	  Gabčikovo-­‐Nagymoros	  Project	  (Hungary	  v	  Slovakia)	  [1997]	  ICJ	  Rep	  7	  at	  p38	  paragraph	  47.	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5 The	  failed	  State-­‐	  definitions,	  terms,	  examples	  	  There	  are	  numerous	  political	  definitions	  of	  a	  failed	  State	  that	  indicate	  some	  form	  of	  legal	  consequences,	  there	  is	  however,	  no	  single	  legal	  definition.111	  The	  Fragile	  States	  index	  uses	  twelve	  indices	  to	  determine	  what	  constitutes	  a	  fragile	  or	  failed	  State	   however;	   it	   does	   not	   specify	   the	   legal	   consequences	   of	   such	   a	  determination.112	  	  	  The	   term	   ‘failed	   States’	   was	   first	   used	   in	   1992.113	  Koskenmaki	   claims	   that	   the	  phenomenon	   defies	   definition	   due	   to	   the	   complex	   nature	   of	   the	   process	   of	  failure.	  He	  is	  certain	  is	  that	  it	  places	  the	  State	  institution	  in	  doubt.114	  Others	  have	  asserted	   that	   there	   lack	   of	   a	   clear	   definition	   as	   the	   different	   terms	  used	   imply	  different	  meanings	  to	  different	  users.115	  The	  consequent	  use	  of	  the	  term	  has	  given	  rise	   to	   various	   degrees	   of	   failure	   to	   describe	   the	   descent	   of	   a	   State	   from	   an	  implied	   condition	   of	   success	   to	   weak,	   failing,	   failed	   and	   collapsed	   States.	   The	  three	  major	   factors	  of	   economic,	  political	   and	   social	  upheaval	   are	  not	   in	  doubt	  when	   referring	   to	   a	   failed	   State.	   What	   is	   in	   doubt	   is	   the	   extent	   of	   upheaval	  required	  before	  a	  State	  is	  declared	  as	  ‘failed’	  and	  the	  legal	  consequences	  that	  are	  attached	   to	   the	   term.116	  	   There	   may	   be	   reasons	   as	   to	   why	   there	   is	   no	   clear	  definition	  of	  a	  failed	  State.	  A	  clear	  definition	  might	  limit	  the	  methods	  of	  response	  available	   to	   the	   international	   community	   or	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   the	   term	   itself	  raises	  too	  many	  challenges	  to	  be	  quantifiably	  defined	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way.	  There	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Rotberg,	  above	  n	  22	  at	  p129.	  Donald	  Potter	  “State	  Responsibility,	  Sovereignty	  and	  Failed	  States”	  (paper	  presented	  to	  Australian	  Political	  Studies	  Association	  Conference,	  Adelaide,	  29	  September	  –	  1	  October	  2004)	  16	  at	  p3.	  
112	  Fragile	  States	  index,	  above	  n	  3.	  The	  Fragile	  States	  index	  was	  created	  as	  a	  collaboration	  between	  Foreign	  Policy	  and	  the	  Fund	  for	  Peace.	  It	  is	  annually	  updated	  and	  based	  on	  social	  economic,	  and	  political	  factors.	  
113	  Gerald	  Helman	  and	  Steven	  Ratner	  “Saving	  Failed	  States”	  1992-­‐1993	  89	  Foreign	  Policy	  at	  p3.	  
114	  Rikkai	  Koskenmaki	  “Legal	  Implications	  From	  State	  Failure	  in	  Light	  of	  the	  Case	  of	  Somalia”	  2004	  73	  Nord.	  J.	  Int'l	  L	  1	  at	  p2.	  
115	  Wallace-­‐Bruce,	  above	  n	  15	  at	  p58.	  
116	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  p5.	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is	  a	  definite	  lack	  of	  supply	  of	  public	  goods	  to	  the	  citizens	  of	  a	  failed	  State.117	  Public	  goods	   are	   described	   as	   the	   provision	   of	   national	   and	   individual	   security	   and	  public	  order;	  inviolable	  contracts,	  independent	  judiciary;	  provision,	  organisation	  and	   regulation	   of	   logistical	   and	   communication	   infrastructure;	   medical	   care;	  education	   and	   social	   services;	   regulation	   and	   supply	   of	   water	   and	   energy	   and	  environmental	   protection.	   The	   supply	   of	   public	   goods	   is	   the	  main	   reason	   that	  governments	   exist. 118 	  Certainly	   there	   is	   a	   reduction	   in	   the	   ability	   of	   the	  government	   to	   govern	   effectively	   and	   there	   is	   also	   a	   consequent	   loss	   of	  government	   institutions.119 	  Any	   attempt	   at	   a	   legal	   definition	   must	   be	   quite	  narrow	   and	   must	   encapsulate	   this	   loss	   of	   effective	   government.120	  It	   has	   been	  suggested	   that	   the	   loss	   of	   effective	   government	   may	   disqualify	   a	   State	   from	  existence	  as	  a	  legally	  identifiable	  entity.121	  Currently	   the	   only	   legally	   acceptable	   way	   of	   a	   State	   loosing	   its	   existence	   is	  through	   the	   process	   of	   dissolution	   or	   extinction,	   both	   of	   which	   require	   the	  former	  State	  to	  be	  either	  integrated	  in	  to	  a	  single	  new	  State	  or	  dissolved	  into	  two	  new	   entities	   that	   take	   over	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   previously	   existing	   State.122	  	  Having	   briefly	   outlined	   the	   confusing	   situation	   regarding	   the	   status	   of	   a	   failed	  State	  and	  the	  consequences	  alluded	  to,	  it	  will	  be	  beneficial	  to	  further	  examine	  the	  terms	   that	   cover	   the	   field	  of	   State	   failure	   to	  determine	   just	  what	   a	   failed	   State	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be.	  	  Weak	  States	  have	  been	  described	  as	  States	  in	  which	  there	  is	  a	  current	  challenge	  to	  the	  control	  of	  the	  existing	  government,	  there	  are	  low	  levels	  of	  public	  order,	  the	  borders	  are	  not	  secure	  and	  there	  is	  an	  inability	  to	  maintain	  the	  delivery	  of	  public	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  Rotberg,	  above	  n	  22	  at	  p131.	  
118	  Rotberg,	  above	  n	  22	  at	  p	  131.	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  these	  are	  distinctly	  western	  public	  goods	  and	  may	  not	  be	  viewed	  in	  the	  same	  light	  by	  constituents	  of	  African	  or	  Asian	  States.	  	  
119	  Wallace-­‐Bruce,	  above	  n	  15	  at	  p58.	  
120	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  p2.	  
121	  At	  p6.	  
122	  Shaw,	  above	  n	  65	  at	  pp960-­‐965.	  The	  amalgamation	  of	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  and	  the	  German	  Democratic	  Republic	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  one,	  amalgamation,	  and	  the	  SFRY	  as	  an	  instance	  where	  a	  State	  failed	  to	  exist	  as	  it	  dissolved	  into	  a	  number	  of	  other	  States,	  Bosnia,	  Croatia	  and	  Slovenia	  and	  a	  new	  SFRY	  admitted	  to	  the	  UN	  in	  2000.	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goods.123	  While	  these	  States	  are	  teetering	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  failure,	  not	  all	  descend	  into	  failure,	  some	  stay	  weakened	  and	  others	  manage	  to	  recover.124	  	  Examples	  of	  the	   first	   are	   Chad,	   Kyrgyzstan	   and	   Russia,	   and	   Colombia,	   Sri	   Lanka	   and	  Zimbabwe	  are	  examples	  of	  the	  second.	  	  While	  the	  term	  failing	  State	  has	  been	  used,	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  definition	  or	  attempt	  to	  describe	  what	  constitutes	  a	  failing	  State.	  This	  term	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  States	  that	  are	  either	   in	   the	  process	  of	   failing	  or	   to	  States	   that	  are	  at	   risk	  of	   failing.125	  This	  term	  is	  unable	  to	  take	  account	  of	  States	  that	  may	  be	  failing	  in	  one	  area	  or	  in	  several	  but	  not	  at	  risk	  of	  total	  failure.126	  As	  is	  discussed	  below	  the	  descriptor	  of	  a	  State	  without	  effective	  government	   clearly	   stipulates	   the	   condition	  of	   the	  State	  and	  makes	  links	  back	  to	  the	  four	  criterion	  under	  the	  Montevideo	  Convention	  that	  guide	  State	  creation.	  	  Should	  a	  failed	  State	  be	  unable	  to	  halt	  its	  decline,	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  next	  step	  is	   to	  descend	   into	  the	  ultimate	  of	  State	  of	   failure,	  a	  collapsed	  State.	  A	  collapsed	  State	   occurs	   when	   structures	   of	   legitimate	   power,	   law	   and	   political	   order	   fall	  apart.	  What	   is	   left	   is	   a	   State	  unable	   to	  provide	   itself	  with	  basic	  public	   goods.127	  These	   goods	   are	   supplied	   instead	   by	   ad	   hoc	   means.128	  States	   are	   viewed	   as	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  Edward	  Newman	  “Weak	  States,	  State	  Failure	  and	  Terrorism”	  2007	  19	  Terrorism	  and	  Political	  Violence	  at	  p422.	  Supported	  by	  Dominic	  Lisanti	  “Do	  Failed	  States	  Really	  Breed	  Terrorists?:	  An	  Examination	  of	  Terrorism	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  Comparing	  Statistical	  Approaches	  with	  A	  Fuzzy	  Set	  Qualitative	  Comparative	  Analysis”	  (Paper	  presented	  to	  CAPERS,	  New	  York	  University,	  14	  May	  2010	  2010)	  at	  p21.	  Bridget	  Coggins	  “Does	  State	  Failure	  Cause	  Terrorism?	  An	  Empirical	  Analysis	  (1999-­‐2008)”	  2014	  J.	  Conflict	  Resol	  at	  p24.	  This	  article	  also	  relies	  on	  quantitative	  analysis	  and	  indicates	  the	  same	  result	  as	  Lisanti,	  failed	  States	  do	  not	  necessarily	  harbour	  or	  cause	  terrorism	  unless	  there	  are	  multiple	  interceding	  factors.	  
124	  Rotberg,	  above	  n	  22	  at	  p131.	  
125	  James	  Putzel	  and	  Jonathan	  Di	  John	  Meeting	  the	  Challenges	  of	  Crisis	  States	  (London	  School	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science,	  London,	  2012)	  at	  p6	  Chapter	  2	  describe	  Malawi,	  Tanzania	  and	  Zambia	  as	  examples	  of	  this	  type	  of	  State.	  
126	  Putzel	  and	  Di	  John,	  above	  n	  125	  at	  p6.	  
127	  Terence	  Lyons	  and	  Ahmed	  Samatar	  Somalia:	  State	  Collapse,	  Multilateral	  Intervention	  and	  Strategies	  for	  Political	  Reconstruction	  Occasional	  Papers	  (Brookings	  Institute,	  Washington	  D.C,	  1995)	  at	  p1.	  
128	  Andersson,	  above	  n	  35	  at	  p10.	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threat	   to	  peace	  and	  security	  as	   they	  are	  seen	  as	  a	  breeding	  ground	   for	  disease,	  refugee	   flows,	   arms	   trafficking,	   transnational	   crime,	   environmental	  destruction	  and	   regional	   instability.129	  Collapsed	   States	   are	   alleged	   to	   be	   a	   sanctuary	   and	  training	  facility	  for	  terrorists.130	  	  Lack	  of	  effective	  government,	  as	  has	  been	  stated	  above,	   has	   been	   suggested	   as	   disqualifying	   a	   State	   from	   legal	   existence.131	  But	  lack	   of	   effective	   government	   is	   not	   one	   of	   the	   currently	   accepted	  methods	   for	  extinction	   of	   a	   State.	   This	   would	   raise	   innumerable	   questions	   as	   to	   what	   an	  effective	   government	   is	   and	   would	   by	   necessity	   require	   an	   international	  organisation	  to	  oversee	  the	  ineffective	  governments	  and	  to	  advise	  and	  adjudicate	  with	   States	   who	   challenge	   their	   classification.	   It	   has	   been	   suggested	   that	  collapsed	   States	   are	   rare	   and	   very	   extreme	   versions	   of	   a	   failed	   State	   in	  which	  there	  is	  total	  absence	  of	  any	  authority.132	  	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case	  then	  by	  this	  measure	  alone	   Somalia	   is	   not	   a	   collapsed	   State	   as	   it	   has	   two	   autonomous	   regions,	  Somaliland	   and	  Puntland,	  where	   regional	   governmental	   control	   exists.	   Even	   at	  the	   very	  worst	   of	   times	   over	   the	   past	   23	   years	   there	   has	   always	   existed	   some	  form	   of	   government	   in	   Somalia,	   that	   its	   reach	   and	   ability	   have	   been	   severely	  limited	  is	  certainly	  not	  grounds	  for	  the	  legal	  extinction	  of	  the	  State.	  There	  have	  been	  no	  attempts	  to	  take	  over	  the	  existing	  boundaries	  by	  any	  group;	  the	  internal	  civil	  war	  has	   focused	  on	   the	  control	  of	   the	  existing	  area.	  Although,	  as	  has	  been	  previously	  discussed,	  Somaliland	  had	  its	  borders	  recognised.	  	  Certainly	  there	  has	  been	   limited	   effective	   government	   control	   of	   Somalia,	   there	   has	   been	   internal	  civil	  conflict	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  by	  the	  government	  has	  ceased,	  but	  all	   of	   these	   have	   taken	   place	   within	   a	   relatively	   limited	   area	   in	   the	   southern	  region	  of	  Somalia.	  Semi	  effective	  government	  has	  continued	  in	  both	  Somaliland	  and	   Puntland.	   It	   would	   therefore	   be	   erroneous	   to	   classify	   Somalia	   as	   a	   failed	  State	  or	  even	  a	  collapsed	  State.	  Its	  borders	  are	  still	  intact,	  it	  still	  has	  a	  population,	  it	  has	  pockets	  of	  effective	  government,	  and	  the	  government	  that	  has	  been	  created	  through	  UN	  efforts	  has	  not	  seemed	  intent	  on	  establishing	  international	  relations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Kenneth	  Menkhaus	  Somalia:	  State	  Collapse	  and	  the	  Threat	  of	  Terrorism	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  2004)	  at	  p7.	  
130	  John	  Yoo	  “Fixing	  Failed	  States”	  2011	  99	  CLR	  95	  at	  pp103,	  108.	  Yoo	  only	  provides	  the	  example	  of	  Afghanistan	  and	  the	  freedom	  that	  Al	  Qaeda	  had	  to	  operate.	  
131	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  p6.	  
132	  Rotberg,	  above	  n	  22	  at	  p133.	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That	  the	  UN	  is	  working	  with	  successive	  iterations	  of	  central	  government	  would	  suggest	  that	  Somalia	  is	  still	  recognised	  as	  a	  State	  regardless	  of	  the	  disruption	  to	  its	  internal	  functioning.	  	  While	  the	  above	  descriptors	  of	  a	  failed,	  failing	  and	  collapsed	  State	  help	  to	  identify	  a	  failed	  State,	  none	  of	  the	  writers	  continue	  on	  to	  describe	  the	  consequences,	  either	  political	  or	  legal,	  for	  a	  failed	  State.	  The	  legal	  consequences	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  a	  deeper	  discussion	  below.	  The	  two	  major	  stumbling	  blocks	  to	  any	  concerted	  activity	  by	  the	  international	  community	  are	  found	  in	  Art	  2(7)	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter	  and	  the	  strong	  hold	  that	  States	  created	  after	  WWII,	  following	  decolonisation,	  have	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  sovereignty.133	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  Ryngaert	  and	  Sobrie,	  above	  n	  82	  at	  p9.	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6 What	  has	  actually	  failed?	  	  The	  preceding	  discussion	  has	  identified	  the	  main	  features	  of	  a	  failed	  State	  are	  the	  inability	   of	   the	   government	   to	   provide	   public	   goods,	   the	   deterioration	   of	   the	  basic	   government	   institutions	   and	   challenges	   to	   the	   remnants	   of	   government.	  The	   State	   borders,	   while	   still	   intact,	   have	   become	   slightly	  more	   porous	   as	   the	  failure	  of	  government	  institutions	  tasked	  with	  keeping	  them	  secure	  have	  all	  but	  evaporated.134	  	  If	  we	  analyse	  the	  situation	  we	  find	  that	  all	  that	  has	  really	  failed	  is	  the	  government.	  Of	  the	  three	  other	  Montevideo	  criteria	  two	  are	  still	  functioning,	  borders	  and	  population	  and	  the	  third,	  the	  ability	  to	  for	  international	  relations	  is	  affected	  through	  the	  lack	  of	  effective	  government.	  There	  could	  be	  an	  argument,	  that	   the	   UN	   has	   worked	   with	   various	   iterations	   of	   Somali	   government,	   which	  would	   tend	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   government	   has	   not	   failed	   and	   that	   those	  institutions	  representing	  Somalia,	  the	  Transitional	  Federal	  Government,	  (TFG)	  or	  the	   Transitional	   National	   Government,	   (TNG),	   could	   indeed	   form	   international	  relations.	  By	  careful	  analysis	  then	  we	  find	  that	  even	  though	  the	  label,	  failed	  State	  has	  been	  applied,	  all	   four	  criteria	  under	  the	  Montevideo	  Convention	  are	  able	  to	  function.	  From	  a	  legal	  perspective	  then	  the	  State	  still	  exists.	  What	  is	  lacking	  is	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  those	  governments	  mentioned	  above,	  to	  take	  any	  form	  of	  control	  over	  more	   than	  a	   few	  suburbs	  of	   the	   capital	   city.	  This	  has	  not	   stopped	   the	  UN	  from	   consistently	   supporting	   the	   continued	   statehood	   and	   sovereignty	   of	  Somalia	  in	  its	  resolutions	  on	  the	  situation	  in	  Somalia.135	  	  This	  would	  support	  the	  argument	  that	  those	  governments	  could	  negotiate	  international	  treaties	  or	  form	  international	   relationships.	   The	   recognition	   of	   a	   State	   through	   the	   avenue	   of	  effective	   government	   raises	   then	   the	   spectre	   of	   governmental	   recognition	   as	  opposed	   to	   State	   recognition.	   Crawford	   argues	   that	   an	   effective	   central	  government	  keeps	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  a	  political	  entity	  as	  a	  State	  and	  that	  lack	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  W	  Brooks	  Why	  Failed	  States	  Matter:	  The	  Case	  of	  Somalia	  (United	  States	  Army	  War	  College,	  Carlisle,	  United	  States)	  at	  p15	  
135	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  SC	  Res.	  1474,	  S/RES/1474(2003)	  preamble.	  This	  is	  the	  first	  UNSCR	  that	  recognises	  the	  sovereignty,	  territorial	  integrity,	  political	  independence	  and	  unity	  of	  Somalia	  some	  12	  years	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Barre	  government.	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effective	  government	   indicates	  that	  the	  entity	  may	  not	  be	  a	  State.136	  There	   is	  no	  legal	  basis	  for	  this	  argument	  apart	  from	  the	  inclusion	  of	  effective	  government	  as	  a	  criterion	  for	  State	  creation.	  But	  the	  practice	  of	  States	  would	  indicate	  that	  even	  this	  is	  doubtful.137	  	  	  Basing	   the	   concept	   of	   a	   failed	   State	   on	   the	   lack	   of	   effective	   government	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  flawed	  argument	  lacking	  in	  any	  legal	  support	  in	  CIL.	  The	  term,	  failed	  State,	   is	   little	  more	   than	  a	  political	  descriptor	   that	   lacks	  any	   legal	  basis.	  Basing	  the	  description	  of	  a	  failed	  State	  on	  the	  lack	  of	  effective	  government	  is	  also	  flawed,	  as	  lack	  of	  effective	  government	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  State.	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  Crawford,	  above	  n	  54	  at	  p60.	  
137	  The	  cases	  of	  Georgia	  and	  the	  DRG	  mentioned	  above	  are	  but	  two	  examples	  of	  where	  States	  have	  not	  had	  effective	  government	  at	  the	  time	  of	  creation,	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6.1 The	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘failed	  State’	  as	  distinct	  from	  situations	  giving	  rise	  to	  
threats	  to	  peace	  and	  security	  	  Failed	  States	  have	  been	  branded	  as	   threats	   to	   international	  peace	  and	  security.	  The	   UN,	   in	   its	   first	   resolution	   on	   the	   crisis	   in	   Somalia,	   stipulated	   there	   was	   a	  threat	  and	  quoted	  the	  humanitarian	  crisis	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  that	  threat,	  yet	  failed	  to	  clarify	  how	  this	  threat	  would	  manifest	  itself	  or	  who	  indeed	  would	  be	  affected.138	  	  The	  determination	  that	  a	  situation	  is	  a	  threat	  to	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  allows	   the	  UN	   to	  act	  militarily	  and	  apply	  sanctions	   to	  States	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  Article	  39,	  which	  gives	   the	   right	   to	   the	  UN	   to	  determine	  either	   a	   ‘threat	   to	   the	  peace	  or	  a	  breach	  of	   the	  peace’	   and	   to	  make	   recommendations	  or	  decide	  what	  measures	  are	  to	  be	  taken	  under	  Art	  41,	  (sanctions),	  or	  Art	  42,	  (military	  action).139	  	  The	   actual	   threat	   is	   not	   defined	   to	   allow	   maximum	   flexibility	   to	   the	   Security	  Council,	   (SC)	   and	  General	   Assembly,	   (GA),	  when	  making	   determinations	   under	  this	   heading.140	  In	   their	   early	   format	   threats	   to	   peace	   were	   focused	   around	  interstate	   conflict.	   Since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   the	   flexibility	   of	   the	   SC	   in	  making	   their	   determinations	   has	   expanded	   to	   include	   humanitarian	  emergencies,	  overthrow	  of	  democratically	  elected	  leaders,	  extreme	  repression	  of	  civilian	  populations	  and	  refugees	  flows	  threatening	  regional	  security.141	  	  The	  ability	  to	  respond	  more	  flexibly	  has	  allowed	  for	  expansion	  to	  cover	  nuclear	  proliferation,	  arms	  trafficking	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction,	  pandemics,	  climate	  change	   and	   what	   must	   be	   the	   ultimate	   extension	   of	   a	   threat	   to	   peace,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	  Items	  relating	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Somalia	  SC	  Res.	  733,	  S/RES/733(1992)	  cited	  by	  Neyire	  Akpinarli	  The	  Fragility	  of	  the	  "failed	  State"	  Paradigm	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  Leiden,	  2012)	  at	  p	  39.	  
139	  UN	  Charter	  articles	  39,	  40	  and	  41.	  
140	  Max	  Planck	  Encylopedia,	  Peace,	  threats	  to,	  2009)	  §4.	  
141	  At	  §7.	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determination	   that	   ‘terrorism’,	   which	   at	   its	   very	   essence	   is	   no	   more	   than	   a	  concept,	  is	  a	  threat	  to	  international	  peace.142	  	  When	  we	  consider	  the	  threats	  listed	  above	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  threats	  exist,	   not	   in	   the	   fact	   of	   a	   failed	   State,	  143	  but	   rather	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   loss	   of	  effective	   government.	   Zartman	   maintains	   that	   not	   all	   failed	   States	   exhibit	   the	  same	  problems	   and	   not	   all	   pose	   a	   threat	   to	   peace	   and	   security.144	  By	  making	   a	  quick	  comparison	  between	  Afghanistan	  and	  Somalia	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  that	  one	  was	   taken	   over	   by	   a	   religious	   group	   that	   sought	   to	   bring	   control	   to	   an	   entire	  country,	  while	   the	  other	   lacked	  any	   form	  of	   government	  or	   control.	  The	  major	  threat	   to	   peace	   and	   security	   posed	   to	   the	   international	   community	   by	  Afghanistan	   was	   from	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   terrorist	   group	   Al	   Qaeda.	   While	  Somalia	  had	  a	  non-­‐terrorist	   faction,	   the	   ICU,	   instil	  some	  form	  of	  government	   in	  the	  southern	  part	   it	  did	  not	  spread	  to	  the	  wider	  regions.	  Chomsky	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  has	   applied	   the	   features	   that	   express	   the	   term,	   failed	   State	   to	   the	  United	  States	  to	  show	  how	  the	  term	  is	  of	  little	  value.145	  The	  most	  commonly	  used	  ground	  for	  a	  failed	  State	  to	  constitute	  a	  threat	  to	  peace	  is	  that	  it	  will	  be	  used	  to	  harbour	  terrorists.146	  This	   threat	   was	   used	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   US	   backed	   Ethiopian	  invasion	   of	   southern	   Somalia	   in	   2006	   when	   the	   government	   of	   the	   ICU	   was	  ousted	   from	  Mogadishu.147	  However,	   as	   has	   been	   shown	   above	   failed	   States	   do	  not	  of	  their	  own	  accord	  harbour	  terrorists,	  those	  that	  do	  are	  more	  the	  exception	  than	  the	  rule.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  At	  §12	  where	  UNSCR	  1373	  (2001)	  is	  cited	  suggesting	  that	  the	  move	  has	  been	  made	  from	  concrete	  acts	  to	  the	  future	  possibility	  of	  a	  terrorist	  act.	  
143	  H	  Tuerk	  “The	  Resurgence	  of	  Piracy:	  A	  Phenomenon	  of	  Modern	  Times”	  (2009)	  UN	  Audiovisual	  Library	  of	  International	  Law	  <www.legal.un.org/avl/ls/Tuerk_LOS.html>	  
144	  Zartman,	  above	  n	  16	  at	  p7.	  
145	  Noam	  Chomsky	  The	  Abuse	  of	  Power	  and	  the	  Assault	  on	  Democracy	  (Henry	  Holt,	  New	  York,	  2007).	  
146	  Menkhaus,	  above	  n	  129	  at	  p9.	  R	  Baker	  “Challenges	  to	  the	  Traditional	  Concepts	  of	  Sovereignty”	  2000	  20	  Public	  Administrative	  Development	  at	  p8.	  M	  Silva	  “Somalia:	  State	  Failure,	  Piracy,	  and	  the	  Challenge	  to	  International	  Law”	  2009-­‐2010	  50	  Va.	  J.Int'l	  L.	  553	  at	  p556.	  
147	  Menkhaus,	  above	  n	  129	  at	  p74.	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7 Legal	  consequences	  of	  being	  a	  failed	  State	   	  	  While	   the	   subject	   of	   State	   failure	   has	   generated	   vast	   quantities	   of	   academic	  thought	  and	  writing,	  the	  very	  narrow	  field	  of	  inquiry	  into	  the	  legal	  consequences	  flowing	   from	   the	   declaration	   of	   a	   State	   as	   a	   failed	   State	   appears	   to	   be	   under	  researched.148	  This	   could	   be	   because	   the	   focus	   of	   international	   law,	   as	   far	   as	  States	   are	   concerned,	   is	   with	   their	   creation	   and	   extinction,	   not	   their	   ongoing	  health	   and	   welfare.149	  This	   could	   be	   attributable	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   more	  influential	   States	   have	   overlooked	   the	   history	   of	   their	   own	   rise	   to	   a	   place	   of	  influence	  that	  has	  included	  civil	  war	  and	  revolution.150	  This	  lack	  of	  preparedness	  for	   the	   possibility	   that	   other	   States	   may	   experience	   ‘growing	   pains	   ‘	   on	   the	  journey	   to	   full	  maturity	   has	   created	  problems	   for	   the	   international	   legal	   order	  that	   are	   both	   complex	   and	   challenging.151	  International	   law	   has	   only	   envisaged	  the	  extinction	  of	  a	  State	  as	  the	  singular	  method	  by	  which	  a	  State	  looses	  its	  legal	  personality.152	  That	   a	   State	   could	   possible	   exist	   without	   a	   government	   has	   not	  been	   contemplated.153	  It	   could	   be	   that	   international	   law	   has	   been	   too	   slow	   to	  adapt	  to	  what	  has	  become	  a	  significant	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  last	  20	  years	  and	  as	  yet	   has	   not	   had	   time	   to	   develop	   the	   principles	   and	   processes	   to	   effectively	  respond	  to	  a	  State	  with	  ineffective	  government.154	  If	  it	  is	  accepted	  that	  a	  State	  has	  an	   ineffective	   government,	   does	   this	   put	   the	   State	   outside	   international	   law,155	  has	  it	  lost	  the	  capacity	  to	  act	  as	  a	  subject	  of	  international	  law	  or	  has	  it	  retained	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148	  Giorgetti,	  above	  n	  16	  at	  p43.	  
149	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  p2.	  
150	  The	  US	  (War	  of	  Independence	  1775-­‐1783),	  (Civil	  War	  1861-­‐1865)	  and	  both	  the	  UK	  and	  France,	  which,	  after	  becoming	  States	  experienced	  internal	  strife	  and	  revolution.	  (England	  1642-­‐1651	  and	  France	  1789-­‐1799).	  
151	  Andersson,	  above	  n	  35	  at	  p10.	  
152	  Wallace-­‐Bruce,	  above	  n	  15	  at	  p66.	  
153	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  p1.	  
154	  Wallace-­‐Bruce,	  above	  n	  15	  at	  p54.	  
155	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  p1.	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that	   legal	   capacity	   and	   just	   lost	   the	   ability	   to	   exercise	   it;156	  and	   do	   the	   rules	   of	  international	  law	  apply	  or	  are	  there	  some	  new	  ways	  of	  dealing	  with	  an	  outlier	  of	  a	  State?157	  	  These	  are	  some	  of	   the	  questions	  surrounding	  the	   legal	  consequences	   for	  States	  without	   effective	   government.	   This	   section	   will	   briefly	   look	   at	   the	   way	  international	  law	  has	  been	  applied	  across	  a	  range	  of	  circumstances	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  discern	  how	  States	  have	  been	  affected	  by	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term,	  failed	  State.	  	  There	   is	   an	   assumption	   of	   effectiveness	   combined	   with	   the	   principle	   of	  continuity	  that	  protects	  a	  State	   from	  extinction.158	  There	   is	  also	  protection	  from	  intervention	   in	  domestic	  affairs	  by	  other	  States	  under	   the	  UN	  Charter	  Art	  2(7).	  When	   internal	   affairs	   develop	   an	   international	   character	   through	   refugees	  exiting	  the	  country	  or	  the	  development	  of	  a	  massive	  humanitarian	  crisis,159	  then	  there	   is	   room	   under	   Chapter	   VII	   of	   the	   UN	   Charter	   to	   intervene	   as	   discussed	  above.	  This	  has	  however,	  not	  stopped	   the	  action	  by	  Ethiopia	  and	   the	  US	  acting	  without	  UN	  sanction	  and	  overthrowing	  the	  ICU	  in	  Mogadishu.	  Thürer	  maintains	  that	   currently	   the	   UN	   finds	   itself	   drawn	   between	   two	   possible	   principles,	   the	  sovereignty	   and	   equality	   of	   States	   and	   the	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination.160	  He	  suggests	  the	  UN	  has	  opted	  for	  the	  right	  of	  self-­‐determination,	  albeit	  supported	  by	  UN	   intervention,	   to	   avoid	   humanitarian	   crises	   and	   rebuild	   the	   State	   without	  effective	  government.161	  	  A	  failed	  State	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  international	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  A	  State	  with	  ineffective	  government	  should	  be	  protected	  from	  outside	  forces	  by	  the	  prohibition	  on	  the	  use	  of	  force162	  and	  by	  the	  desire	  of	  the	  UN	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156	  Thürer,	  above	  n	  68	  at	  p3.	  
157	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  p4.	  
158	  At	  p16.	  
159	  Wallace-­‐Bruce,	  above	  n	  15	  at	  pp57-­‐8.	  
160	  Thürer,	  above	  n	  68	  at	  p4.	  
161	  At	  p4.	  
162	  UN	  Charter	  Chapter	  1	  Art	  2(4).	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to	  maintain	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  and	  to	  avoid	  breaches	  of	  the	  peace	  by	  resolving	  issues,	  which	  might	  lead	  to	  breaches	  of	  the	  peace.163	  	  	  While	   the	   UN	   has	   declared	   that	   Somalia	   has	   suffered	   from	   a	   total	   loss	   of	  government,164	  it	  has	  gone	  on	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  sovereignty,	  territorial	  integrity,	  political	   independence	   and	   unity	   are	   still	   intact.165	  This	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   an	  advisory	  to	  Somaliland	  and	  Puntland	  that	  the	  UN	  would	  not	  support	  any	  action	  for	   secession	   initiated	   by	   these	   two	   regions.	   The	   UN	   has	   used	   Chapter	   VII	   in	  Somalia	   to	   breach	   its	   sovereignty,	   to	   address	   the	   problem	   of	   piracy,	   however,	  there	   is	   a	   codicil	   that	   requires	   consent	   of	   the	   Somalia	   government	   to	   forces	  cooperating	   with	   the	   government,	   to	   allow	   them	   to	   encroach	   on	   that	  sovereignty.166	  This	  action	  is	  taken	  to	  avoid	  the	  member	  States	  taking	  unilateral	  action	  and	  breaching	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  Somalia.	  The	  action	  by	  the	  UN	  is	  based	  on	  four	  grounds;	  1)	  Gross	  breaches	  of	  human	  rights	  or	  infringements	  of	  internal	  democracy	   are	   threats	   to	   peace	   and	   security;	   2)	   Under	   Chapter	   VII	   Art.	   39	   to	  restore	  peace	  by	  military	  means	  if	  necessary;	  3)	  Securing	  internal	  peace	  extends	  to	   the	   holding	   by	   military	   force,	   airports,	   ports,	   transport	   facilities	   and	  infrastructure	  to	  enable	  humanitarian	  aid	  to	  be	  distributed;	  4)	  The	  parties	  to	  the	  conflict	  are	  to	  be	  addressed	  as	  if	  they	  were	  inter-­‐State	  parties.167	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163	  UN	  Charter	  Chapter	  1	  Art	  1(1).	  
164	  Letter	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  to	  the	  Security	  Council,	  UN	  Doc.	  S/24868	  30	  November	  1992	  	  (1992)	  at	  paragraph	  6	  and	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  SC	  Res	  897,	  S/RES/897	  (1994)	  preamble.	  	  
165	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  SC	  Res.	  1474,	  S/RES/1474(2003),	  above	  n	  135	  
166	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  SC	  Res.1816,	  S/RES/1816	  (2008)	  in	  the	  preamble	  states	  ‘…adopted	  unanimously	  with	  Somalia’s	  consent.’	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  
SC	  Res.1851,	  S/RES/1851	  (2008)	  authorises	  member	  states	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  TFG…for	  which	  advanced	  notification	  has	  been	  provided…may	  undertake	  all	  necessary	  measures…’,	  Sec	  Res	  1851	  limited	  the	  possibility	  of	  this	  action	  for	  12	  months	  but	  there	  have	  been	  several	  extensions	  to	  that	  initial	  period,	  UNSCR	  1897,	  UNSCR	  1950,	  UNSCR	  2020,	  UNSCR	  2077,	  UNSCR	  2125	  	  	  	  
167	  Thürer,	  above	  n	  68	  at	  pp5-­‐6.	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Government	  to	  government	  relations	  cease	  yet	  formal	  State	  diplomatic	  relations	  continue,	   although	  how	   this	   is	   achieved	   is	   not	   explained	   by	  Koskenmaki	   if	   the	  representative	  of	  the	  State,	  the	  government,	  ceases	  to	  be	  effective.168	  	  Problems	  for	  nationals	  of	  a	   failed	  State	  arise	  when	  they	  attempt	  to	  either	   leave	  their	   own	   country	   of	   having	   left	   seek	   to	   revalidate	   their	   visas	   as	   the	  representatives	  of	  their	  home	  State	  lack	  validity	  with	  the	  receiving	  State	  and	  for	  those	  wishing	   to	   leave	   their	   home	   country	   find	   that	   diplomatic	  missions	   have	  been	   withdrawn	   due	   to	   the	   danger	   posed	   by	   the	   internal	   upheaval.169 	  The	  diplomats	  of	  the	  State	  who	  have	  been	  working	  in	  the	  overseas	  missions	  also	  face	  their	  own	  problems,170	  as	  there	  is	  no	  one	  authorised	  to	  pay	  them	  and	  pay	  for	  the	  upkeep	  of	  the	  mission	  and	  its	  facilities,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  authorised	  body	  to	  issue	  a	  notice	  of	   recall.171	  The	  receiving	  State	  can	  seek	   to	  have	   them	  recalled,	  however,	  there	   is	   no	   effective	   government	   to	   issue	   the	  notice	   of	   recall.	   Since	   the	  August	  2012	  elections	  in	  Somalia	  embassies	  have	  been	  established	  in	  Europe,	  Asia	  and	  the	  US	  all	  manned	  by	  Ambassadors.172	  	  The	   issue	   of	   UN	   representation	   is	   covered	   by	   the	   UN	   Charter	   Art	   4(1),	   which	  states	   that	  only	  states	  can	   join	   the	  UN.173	  A	  problem	  arises	   if	   there	  are	  multiple	  organisations	   trying	   to	   become	   the	   government.	   Expulsion	   from	   the	   UN	   is	  covered	  under	  Art	  6	   for	  a	  State	   that	  persistently	  violates	   the	  principles.	  One	  of	  those	  principles	  relates	  to	  failure	  to	  pay	  financial	  contributions	  under	  Art	  19,	  for	  which	  the	  consequences	  are	  loss	  of	  vote	  if	  the	  arrears	  amount	  to	  more	  than	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  p8.	  
169	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  pp9-­‐11.	  Koskenmaki	  cites	  R	  Howel	  “Link	  to	  World	  Imperilled.	  Somalia's	  UN	  Mission	  Penniless”	  New	  York	  Newsday	  (New	  York,	  	  1992)	  see	  also,	  M	  Pflanz	  “Britain	  Reopens	  Somali	  Embassy	  After	  22	  Years”	  The	  Telegraph	  (UK,	  	  2013).	  Koskenmaki	  also	  cites	  United	  Nations	  Office	  IRIN	  Special	  Report	  on	  Mogadishu,	  United	  Nations	  Office	  for	  the	  Co-­‐Ordination	  of	  Humaniatrian	  affairs,	  IRIN-­‐CEA	  	  	  
170	  At	  pp9	  -­‐11	  cites	  Somali	  Diplomat	  Case	  No	  8B536/92,	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany,	  Superior	  Adminsitrative	  Court	  (OVG)	  of	  North	  Rhine	  Westphalia	  11	  February	  (1992)	  	  94	  ILR	  (1994)	  pp567-­‐608).	  The	  diplomat	  applied	  for	  social	  Security	  assistance	  from	  the	  German	  authorities	  after	  Somalia	  had	  suspended	  all	  payments	  to	  its	  diplomats	  in	  September	  1990.	  
171	  At	  pp9-­‐11.	  
172	  “Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Somalia”	  	  	  <www.mfa.somaligov.net/Somal%20Embassies.html.>	  
173	  UN	  Charter	  Art	  4(1).	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previous	  two	  years	  contributions.	  Currently	  Somalia	  is	  shown	  as	  not	  having	  met	  its	  financial	  obligations,	  however,	  it	  is	  still	  able	  to	  vote	  until	  the	  cessation	  of	  the	  68th	   session.174	  	   It	   would	   seem	   that	   that	   the	   UN	   processes	   lack	   the	   ability	   to	  determine	  whether	  a	  failed	  State	  can	  loose	  their	  representation	  when	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  an	  effective	  government.175	  	  	  Apart	   from	   the	  UN	  and	   the	  minimal	   effects	   of	   the	   loss	   of	   effective	   government	  states	   also	   face	   the	   loss	   of	   standing	   in	   judicial	   proceedings.	   In	   the	  Republic	   of	  
Somalia	  v.	  Woodhouse	  Drake	  &	  Carey	  (Suisse)	  S.A	  and	  others	  1992	  it	  was	  held	  that	  the	  lawyers	  for	  Somalia	  were	  unable	  to	  represent	  the	  state	  as	  there	  was	  no	  one	  to	   authorise	   them	   to	   do	   so.	   176 	  The	   State’s	   ability	   to	   conclude	   treaties	   is	  diminished	  due	  177	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  recognised	  entity	  with	  authority	  to	  commit	  the	  state.	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  earlier	  that	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  TFG	  and	  the	  TNG	  could	   well	   conclude	   treaties,	   as	   they	   are	   representatives	   of	   a	   State.	  While	   the	  state	   has	   lost	   the	   ability	   to	   conclude	   treaties	   it	   is	   still	   under	   obligations	   or	  previously	  signed	  treaties	  under	  the	  principle	  of	  continuity.178	  	  The	  new	  effective	  government	  will	  deal	  with	  breaches	  of	  obligations	  of	  existing	  treaties	  once	  it	  is	  in	  place.179	  The	   state	   also	   faces	   the	   permanent	   loss	   of	   any	   diplomatic	   or	   State	  property,	  which	  may	   be	   sold	   and	   the	   funds	   held	   until	   there	   is	   a	   new	   effective	  government	  installed.180	  	  The	   individuals	   of	   a	   State	   with	   ineffective	   government	   are	   hampered	   by	   the	  apparent	  powerlessness	  of	  human	  rights	   treaties.	  These	  are	  established	  for	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174	  Resolution	  adopted	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  GA	  Res	  68/5,	  A/RES/68/5	  2013	  
175	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  p17.	  
176	  Republic	  of	  Somalia	  v	  Woodhouse	  Drake	  &	  Carey	  (Suisse)	  S.A.	  and	  Others	  1992	  3	  WLR	  744	  at	  746,	  D.	  
177	  At	  p18.	  
178	  At	  p20.	  
179	  At	  p20.	  
180	  At	  p19.	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protection	  of	  the	  individual	  from	  action	  by	  the	  State	  against	  them181	  and	  would	  in	  the	  event	  of	  state	  failure	  be	  suspended	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  state	  structures.182	  In	   human	   rights	   treaties	   both	   the	   object	   and	   the	   protector	   of	   the	   treaty	   is	   the	  state.	  With	  an	  absence	  of	   any	   state	   structure	   in	   a	   failed	  State,	   the	  protagonists	  are	   civilians	   or	   non-­‐State	   actors	   and	   are	   therefore	   outside	   the	   realm	   of	   the	  treaty.183	  Should	   one	   of	   the	   parties	   become	   the	   new	   effective	   government,	   it	   is	  plausible	   that	   both	   they	   and	   their	   opposition	   could	   be	   held	   liable	   for	   abuses	  carried	  out	  by	  both.	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  a	  de	  facto	  suspension	  of	  the	  treaty	  is	  in	   place	   while	   there	   is	   no	   effective	   government	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	   de	   jure	  suspension.	  There	  could	  be	  some	  protection	  under	  Common	  Article	  3	  of	  the	  four	  Geneva	  Conventions,	  which	  hold	  that	  acts	  of	  violence	  such	  as	  murder,	  mutilation,	  torture,	  taking	  of	  hostages,	  humiliating	  and	  degrading	  acts,	  and	  the	  carrying	  out	  of	  sentences	  without	  due	  process	  are	  prohibited.184	  These	  apply	  to	  armed	  conflict	  not	  of	  an	  international	  character	  so	  could	  cover	  the	  case	  of	  civil	  war	  disturbances	  of	  the	  nature	  seen	  in	  Somalia.	  Koskenmaki	  acknowledges	  the	  weakness	  of	  human	  rights	   treaties	   and	   suggests	   the	   possible	   application	   of	   human	   rights	   norms	   to	  the	  situation	  of	  a	  State	  with	  ineffective	  government.185	  Thürer	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  suggests	   that	   Common	   Article	   3	   provides	   the	   minimum	   standard	   in	   all	  circumstances	  following	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Disko	  Tadic,	  Decision	  on	  the	  Defence	  Motion	  
for,	   Interlocutory	   Appeal	   on	   Jurisdiction	   1995	   (Tadic). 186 	  The	   human	   being	  approach	   is	   surpassing	   the	   state	   centric	   approach	   to	   human	   rights. 187	  Enforcement	   against	   actors	   who	   have	   perpetrated	   human	   rights	   abuses	   is	   of	  limited	   success,	   as	   these	   require	   a	   state	   organisation.	   Abuses	   carried	   out	   in	  situations	   similar	   to	   Somalia	   are	   normally	   the	   result	   of	   unsupervised	   soldiers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181	  Thürer,	  above	  n	  68	  at	  p6.	  	  
182	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  p24.	  
183	  At	  p23.	  
184	  Geneva	  Convention	  III	  Relative	  to	  the	  Treatment	  of	  Prisoners	  of	  War	  (opened	  for	  signature	  12	  August	  1949	  entered	  into	  force	  21	  October	  1950)	  Art	  3(1)(a)-­‐(d).	  
185	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  p26.	  
186	  Prosecutor	  v	  Tadic	  (Decision	  on	  the	  Defence	  Motion	  for	  Interlocutory	  Appeal	  on	  Jurisdiction)	  I.L.M.	  Vol	  35,	  1996	  at	  p54	  paragraph	  97,	  cited	  by	  Thürer,	  above	  n	  68	  at	  p8	  fn19.	  
187	  Thürer,	  above	  n	  68	  at	  p8.	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who	  are	  lacking	  in	  a	  direct	  chain	  of	  command	  and	  clear	  orders.188	  There	  are	  two	  approaches	   that	   have	   worked	   with	   a	   degree	   of	   success	   in	   bringing	   the	  perpetrators	   to	   account.	   The	   ad	   hoc	   tribunals	   created	   after	   the	   Rwanda	   and	  Serbian	  atrocities	  and	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court,	  (ICC).189	  Individuals	   can	   be	   held	   responsible	   for	   transgressions	   of	   elements	   of	   human	  rights	   treaties,	   as	   there	   appears	   to	   be	   universal	   jurisdiction	   for	   some	   crimes	  against	  human	  rights.190	  These	  crimes	  form	  the	  backbone	  of	  so-­‐called	  war	  crimes,	  torture,	   genocide,191	  mass	   murder,	   rape	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   sexual	   violation.	  These	   crimes	   can	   be	   tried	   in	   special	   courts	   as	   mentioned	   above	   or	   the	   ICC.192	  Following	   Tadic	   the	   responsibility	   for	   individuals	   and	   their	   actions	   has	   been	  specifically	  identified.193	  This	  responsibility	  is	  tempered	  by	  the	  requirement	  for	  it	  to	   be	   at	   a	   higher	   level	   for	   unorganised	   groups	   than	   for	   organised	   military	  groups.194	  	  	  Not	  only	  is	  the	  State	  still	  under	  obligations	  based	  on	  previous	  treaties	  signed	  by	  effective	   governments,	   it	   is	   also	   still	   responsible	   for	   violations	   of	   international	  law	   as	   the	   legal	   capacity	   of	   the	   State	   continues.195	  This	   though	   is	   of	   limited	  assistance	  in	  the	  case	  of	  States	  with	  ineffective	  government,	  the	  major	  actors	  are	  operating	   for	   private	   benefit	   and	   there	   is	   no	   government	   to	   be	   held	  responsible.196	  The	   Responsibility	   of	   States	   for	   Internationally	  Wrongful	   Acts197	  Art	  9	  assumes	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  government	  and	  state	  institutions,	  non	  of	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188	  At	  p9	  and	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  p27.	  
189	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  pp28-­‐32.	  
190	  Thürer,	  above	  n	  68	  at	  p10.	  
191	  Convention	  on	  the	  Prevention	  and	  Punishment	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  Genocide	  (adopted	  9	  December	  1948	  entered	  into	  force	  12	  January	  1951)	  
192	  Brownlie,	  above	  n	  55	  at	  pp	  399-­‐417.	  
193	  Rome	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  (adopted	  17	  July	  1998	  entered	  into	  force	  1	  July	  2002)	  
194	  Prosecutor	  v	  Dusko	  Tadic	  (Appeal	  judgment)	  ICTY	  Appeals	  Chamber	  IT-­‐94-­‐1-­‐A,	  15	  July	  1999	  cited	  by	  Andersson,	  above	  n	  35	  at	  p19.	  
195	  Andersson,	  above	  n	  35	  
196	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  p32.	  
197	  Responsibility	  of	  States	  for	  Internationally	  Wrongful	  Acts,	  above	  n	  108	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operate	  in	  a	  State	  with	  ineffective	  government,	  and	  particularly	  not	  in	  Somalia.198	  If	   the	  actors	  who	  have	  committed	  human	  rights	  breaches	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   the	  government	  can	  prove	  that	   they	  were	  not	  acting	   in	  or	  exercising	  governmental	  authority,	   in	  a	  situation	  that	  called	  for	  the	  exercise	  of	  authority,	  the	  State	  could	  conceivable	   escape	   responsibility.	   If	   however,	   the	   reverse	   were	   true	   then	   the	  State	  will	  be	  held	  responsible.199	  In	  Somalia	  the	  actions	  of	  f	  those	  claiming	  to	  be	  acting	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Coast	  Guard	  are	  fulfilling	  a	  governmental	  role.	  When	  they	  hold	  fishing	  vessels	  to	  ransom	  or	  to	  extract	  licensing	  fees,	  then	  the	  liability	  falls	  on	  the	  State.200	  Where	  there	  is	  no	  such	  claim	  and	  the	  alleged	  pirates	  are	  acting	  for	  individual	   gain,	   the	   responsibility	   will	   not	   be	   attributable	   to	   the	   state.	   The	  actions	   of	   an	   individual	   may	   be	   attributable	   to	   the	   state	   where	   the	   State	   has	  failed	  to	  take	  some	  measures	  to	  stop	  an	  action	  by	  an	  individual	  or	  group.	  Where	  there	  is	  no	  state	  to	  take	  action	  there	  must	  be	  some	  political	  will	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  new	  government	  to	  take	  responsibility	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  those	  who	  have	  create	  the	  strife	  and	  civil	  unrest	  post	  the	  institution	  of	  an	  effective	  government.201	  This	  is	  a	  two-­‐step	  process	  with	  there	  being	  an	  act	  or	  omission	  that	  is	  attributable	  to	  the	  State	  and	  secondly	  that	  the	  act	  or	  omission	  was	  an	  international	  obligation	  of	  the	   State.	  202	  The	   State	   has	   a	   defence	   in	   suggesting	   that	   its	   responsibility	   was	  negated	  by	  force	  majeure	  and	  the	  civil	  emergency	  is	  that	  force.203	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  p33.	  
199	  For	  further	  discussion	  see	  Jörg	  Manfred	  Mössner,	  “Privatpersonen	  als	  Verursacher	  völkerrechtlicher	  Delikte”,	  und	  Joachim	  Wolf,	  “Zurechnungsfragen	  bei	  Handlungen	  von	  Privatpersonen”,	  Zeitschrift	  für	  ausländisches	  und	  öffentliches	  Recht	  und	  Völkerrecht	  ,	  1985,	  pp.	  232	  ff.	  cited	  by	  Thürer,	  above	  n	  68	  endnote	  22.	  Also	  see	  Responsibility	  of	  States	  for	  Internationally	  Wrongful	  Acts	  Article	  8	  bis.	  n	  108	  
200	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  on	  Draft	  Articles	  on	  Responsibility	  of	  States	  for	  
Internationally	  Wrongful	  Acts	  with	  Commentaries	  GA	  Res	  56/10.	  A/RES/56/10	  2001	  at	  p49	  cites	  the	  incidence	  of	  the	  Republican	  Guard	  following	  the	  revolution	  in	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran	  as	  cited	  in	  Kenneth	  P	  Yeager	  v	  The	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran	  (Iran	  -­‐	  US)	  C.T.R	  vol	  17	  p92	  (1987)	  at	  pp101-­‐2.	  
201	  Andersson,	  above	  n	  35	  at	  p16.	  
202	  Responsibility	  of	  States	  for	  Internationally	  Wrongful	  Acts	  Art	  2.	  
203	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114	  at	  p34.	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Compensation	   can	   be	   sought	   for	   any	   losses	   incurred	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   act	   or	  omission; 204 	  however,	   the	   chances	   of	   recovery	   of	   compensation	   from	   an	  impoverished	  State	  with	  ineffective	  government	  would	  be	  limited.	  	  	  
7.1 Does	  State	  failure	  allow	  for	  extinction	  of	  the	  state?	  Extinction	   for	  a	  State	   is	   available	  under	   three	   conditions;	  dismemberment	   into	  smaller	  States;	  incorporation	  into	  a	  larger	  State	  and	  annexation	  into	  one	  or	  more	  States.205	  More	   is	   required	   for	   extinction	   to	   occur	   than	   significant	   changes	   in	  territory,	  government	  or	  population	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  all	  three.206	  State	  failure	  or	  collapse,	  however	  defined,	  involves	  only	  the	  loss	  of	  effective	  government	  and	  its	  subsequent	  ability	  to	  maintain	  its	  rights	  and	  obligations	  at	  international	  law.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204	  At	  p34.	  
205	  Crawford,	  above	  n	  54	  at	  pp700-­‐1.	  
206	  At	  pp700-­‐1.	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8 Possible	  secession	  of	  Somaliland	  	  	  As	   the	   State	  with	   ineffective	   government	   looses	   all	   cohesion	   it	   is	   possible	   that	  more	  autonomous	  regions	  might	  turn	  their	  thoughts	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  secession	  as	  a	  means	  of	  separating	  themselves	  from	  the	  destructive	  force	  of	  State	  collapse.	  Recent	   examples	   of	   this	   phenomenon	   include	   Ethiopia/Eritrea,	   Sudan/South	  Sudan,	  Indonesia/East	  Timor	  and	  Macedonia/Kosovo.	  The	  Sudanese	  example	  is	  the	   one	   most	   linked	   to	   State	   failure,	   the	   others	   provide	   examples	   of	   the	  complicated	  and	  often	  harrowing	  process	  that	  secession	  involves.207	  Kosovo	  is	  an	  example	  of	  where	  an	  autonomous	  or	  separatist	  territory	  has	  become	  a	  sovereign	  polity.208	  	  Secession	  exists	  as	  a	  method	  of	  State	  creation	  and	  has	  been	  utilised	  successfully	  and	  commonly	   since	  1776	   to	  approximately	  1914.209	  It	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  method	   of	   creation	   of	   a	   state	   by	   use	   or	   threat	   of	   force	  without	   consent	   of	   the	  former	  sovereign.210	  A	  key	  component	  of	  secession	  is	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  new	  entity	  by	  third	  party	  States.211	  Problems	  occur	  where	  the	  recognising	  State	  is	  not	  the	  State	  from	  which	  the	  new	  State	  is	  seceded.212	  Where	  the	  initial	  State	  has	  not	  formally	   recognised	   the	   seceding	   State,	   recognition	   by	   a	   third	   State	   could	   be	  construed	   as	   forcing	   the	  mother	   State	   to	   recognise	   the	   new	   entity,	   as	  was	   the	  case	  with	  Spain	  and	  its	  former	  colonies	  in	  South	  America.213	  	  Somaliland	  was	  a	  former	  British	  Protectorate	  that	  was	  declared	  independent	  on	  26	  June	  1960	  prior	  to	   its	   incorporation	   in	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  Somalia	  some	  five	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207	  B	  de	  Villiers	  “The	  Breakup	  of	  Sudan”	  Brief	  (Australia,	  	  2011)	  at	  p9	  
208	  Cooley,	  above	  n	  68	  at	  p2.	  It	  is	  noted	  however,	  that	  Kosovo	  is	  arguably	  a	  unique	  situation.	  
209	  Crawford,	  above	  n	  54	  at	  p375.	  
210	  At	  p375.	  
211	  At	  p376.	  
212	  At	  p376.	  
213	  At	  p	  377.	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days	   later.214	  Somaliland	   had	   negotiated	   away	   its	   sovereignty	   to	   achieve	   this.215	  Following	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Barre	  government	  in	  Somalia,	  Somaliland	  declared	  independence	   on	   the	   17	   May	   1991	   and	   created	   its	   own	   institutions	   of	  governance	  and	  developed	  political	  stability.216	  Somaliland	  adopted	  a	  provisional	  constitution	  following	  a	  referendum	  in	  February	  1997	  and	  a	  final	  constitution	  on	  the	  31	  May	  2001.217	  	  During	  the	  course	  of	  the	  break	  up	  of	  both	  the	  USSR	  and	  the	  SFRY	  legal	  principles	  were	  followed	  that	  allowed	  the	  formation	  of	  new	  States	  where	  those	  States	  had	  previously	   been	   independent. 218 	  Latvia,	   Lithuania	   and	   Estonia	   had	   been	  recognised	   as	   independent	   sovereign	   States	   in	   the	   1920s. 219 	  This	   earlier	  recognition	   made	   their	   later	   recognition	   as	   States	   much	   easier.220	  	   The	   only	  obvious	   legal	   reason	   as	   to	   why	   Somaliland	   cannot	   be	   recognised	   as	   an	  independent	   State	   is	   that	   of	   territorial	   integrity.	   Territorial	   integrity	   is	   an	  accepted	  principle	  of	  international	  law	  and	  noted	  in	  the	  UN	  Charter	  and	  the	  1960	  Colonial	  Declaration,	  the	  1966	  International	  Covenants	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  1970	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Principles	  of	  International	  Law	  and	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  rule	   of	   international	   law.221	  This	   view	   has	   been	   strongly	   held	   onto	   by	   States	   in	  Africa	  where	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  the	  colonially	  defined	  territory	  is	  held	  in	  some	  primacy.222	  There	  has	  been	  widespread	  disapproval	  of	  attempts	   to	  secede	  in	   several	   African	   States	   such	   as	   the	   former	   Belgian	   Congo,	   Nigeria	   and	   the	  Sudan. 223 	  Although	   in	   more	   recent	   times	   the	   split	   of	   Sudan	   and	   the	  Eritrea/Ethiopia	  secession	  has	  challenged	  this,	  as	  discussed	  earlier.	  So	  while	  the	  practice	  may	  be	  against	  secession	  happening	  it	  has	  still	  occurred.	  The	  reasoning	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214	  At	  p90.	  It	  was	  recognised	  by	  the	  US	  prior	  to	  its	  assimilation	  into	  Somalia.	  
215	  Wallace-­‐Bruce,	  above	  n	  15	  at	  p66.	  
216	  Wallace-­‐Bruce,	  above	  n	  15	  at	  p67.	  
217	  Crawford,	  above	  n	  54	  at	  p413.	  
218	  Wallace-­‐Bruce,	  above	  n	  15	  at	  p68.	  
219	  Rich,	  above	  n	  56	  at	  pp37-­‐8.	  
220	  Robert	  Rotberg	  When	  States	  Fail:	  Causes	  and	  Consequences	  (Princeton	  University	  Press.,	  Princeton,	  2004)	  at	  p310	  cited	  by	  Andersson,	  above	  n35	  at	  p42.	  
221	  Shaw,	  above	  n	  65	  at	  p	  522.	  	  
222	  At	  p526.	  	  
223	  At	  p526.	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behind	   the	   lack	   of	   recognition	   by	   the	   international	   community	   seems	   to	   be	  founded	  in	  political	  pragmatism.224	  One	  of	  the	  strong	  arguments	  for	  the	  ability	  to	  secede	   is	   lodged	   in	   the	   concept	   of	   self-­‐determination	   of	   peoples.	   Shaw	   argues	  that	   self-­‐determination	   fits	   within	   the	   concept	   of	   territorial	   integrity	   as	   he	  suggests	   that	   it	   cannot	   apply	   once	   a	   territory	   gains	   sovereignty	   and	  independence.225	  He	   does	   however	   suggest	   that	   ‘extreme	   circumstances’	   would	  override	   this. 226 	  The	   collapse	   of	   a	   State	   or	   the	   sustained	   loss	   of	   effective	  government	  must	  surely	  fit	  within	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘extreme	  circumstances.’	  One	  of	  the	  major	  drawbacks	  to	  the	  recognition	  for	  Somaliland	  is	  the	  apparent	  lack	  of	  an	  effective	  government	  in	  the	  State	  from	  which	  they	  wish	  to	  secede,	  as	  this	  would	  be	  required	  for	  them	  to	  be	  recognised.	  In	  support	  of	  the	  secession	  of	  Somaliland	  is	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  secession	  of	  both	  South	  Sudan	  and	  Eritrea,	  neither	  of	  which	  has	  created	  the	  rush	  of	  copycat	  secessions	  that	  has	  been	  much	  feared.227	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224	  Wallace-­‐Bruce,	  above	  n	  15	  at	  p	  68.	  
225	  Shaw,	  above	  n	  65	  at	  p523.	  	  
226	  At	  p523.	  
227	  Wallace-­‐Bruce,	  above	  n	  15	  at	  p69.	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9 Conclusion	  	  The	  concept	  of	  a	  failed	  State	  provides	  numerous	  challenges	  to	  the	  international	  community	  and	  for	  the	  State	  unfortunate	  enough	  to	  be	   labelled	  one.	  One	  of	  the	  major	   causes	   of	   these	   challenges	   is	   that	   terminology	   around	   States	   with	  ineffective	  government	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  clearly	  defined	  legal	  status.	  There	  is	  much	  debate	  over	  the	  various	  terms	  utilised	  by	  the	  writers	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  sliding	  scale	  of	  failure	  does	  not	  enhance	  the	  situation.	  Indeed	  writers	  have	  called	  for	  the	  banishment	  of	   the	   term	  from	  the	   international	   lexicon	   for	   just	   those	  reasons.228	  The	  use	  of	  the	  term	  helps	  keep	  the	  afflicted	  State	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  international	  relations	  and	  does	  not	  assist	  the	  State.229	  	  The	  inability	  of	  the	  international	  community,	  including	  international	  institutions	  to	  conceive	  of	  something	  other	  than	  a	  functioning	  State	  as	  part	  of	  the	  community,	  is	  a	  hindrance	   to	   the	  efficient,	   legitimate,	  processes	  required	   to	  assist	   the	  State	  from	  reconstituting	  itself	  in	  a	  functioning,	  non-­‐threatening	  manner.	  Recognition	  needs	   to	   be	   paid	   to	   history	   and	   acknowledge	   the	   process	   of	   gaining	   and	  maintaining	  statehood	  is	  one	  fraught	  with	  difficulties	  and	  has	  been	  dealt	  with	  at	  various	  times	  by	  a	  number	  of	  current	  members	  of	  the	  international	  community	  in	   their	   past.	   The	   lack	   of	   clear	   principles	   and	   approaches	   to	   respond	   to	   these	  crises	  leads	  to	  less	  than	  satisfactory	  approaches	  being	  taken.230	  	  	  It	   is	   clear	   that	   any	  measure	   taken	   to	   remove	   the	  word	   State	   from	   the	  political	  entity	   will	   only	   create	   more	   problems	   that	   it	   will	   solve.	   The	   process	   of	  decertification	  has	  been	  suggested,	  but	   in	  a	   community	   that	   is	   founded	  on	  and	  functions	   on	   the	   State	   as	   the	  major	   actor	   in	   international	   relations,	   this	  would	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228	  S	  Eisenstrager	  “Failed	  State	  or	  Failed	  Label?	  The	  concealing	  concept	  and	  the	  case	  of	  Somalia”	  (2012)	  e-­‐International	  Realtions	  at	  p8.	  
229	  At	  p8.	  
230	  Koskenmaki,	  above	  n	  114.	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only	   serve	   as	   an	   intimidatory	   approach	   when	   what	   is	   needed	   is	   conciliatory	  approach.	  231	  This	  would	   raise	   the	   issue	   of	   naming	   the	   decertified	   entity	  with	   a	  new	   label	   and	   assigning	   legal	   consequences	   that	   follow	   from	   its	   usage.	  Something	  that	  has	  not	  to	  date	  been	  achieved	  for	  the	  label	  of	  a	  failed	  State.	  In	  an	  increasingly	   interdependent	   world	   of	   state	   communities	   perhaps	   it	   is	   time	   to	  suggest	  that	  the	  barrier,	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  state,	  be	  removed	  altogether.	  While	  the	  State	   still	   exists	   control	   is	   and	   responsibility	   is	   limited	   to	  what	   is	   ‘ours’,	   in	   an	  internal	  sense,	  as	  opposed	  to	  what	  we	  all	  share,	  in	  an	  external,	  global	  sense.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .	  	  	  	  .	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231	  Herbst,	  above	  n	  4	  at	  p143.	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Chapter	  3	  
Illegal	  Fishing	  	   I	  am	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  I	  was	  paradise,	  I	  was	  pure	  Tropical	  trees,	  beautiful	  beaches	  I	  was	  perfection	  I	  assure	  (Helwaa)1	  
Introduction	  Illegal,	   Unreported	   and	   Unregulated	   (IUU)	   fishing	   is	   a	   serious	   global	   problem	  that	  removes	  approximately	  USD4Billion	  –	  USD9Billion	  per	  year	  from	  worldwide	  fisheries.2	  The	  majority,	   some	  USD2.75Billion	  –	  USD7.25Billion,	   comes	   from	  the	  Exclusive	  Economic	  Zones	  (EEZ)	  of	  coastal	  States.3	  The	  removal	  of	  former	  fishing	  grounds	   from	   global	   access	   and	   the	   restructuring	   of	   seas	   into	   the	   EEZ,	   over	  which	   coastal	   States	   were	   granted	   jurisdiction	   with	   the	   advent	   of	   the	   United	  nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea,4	  (UNCLOS),	  increased	  pressure	  on	  the	  fishing	   stocks	   available	   within	   the	   new	   zones.5	  These	   changes	   combined	   with	  improved	   fishing	   technologies	   that	   have	   increased	   the	   quantity	   of	   catch	   per	  vessel	  and	  increased	  investment	  in	  the	  industry	  have	  created	  an	  over	  capacity	  of	  fishing	   vessels.6	  Over	   capacity	   of	   fishing	   vessels,	   and	   the	   over	   exploitation	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Cachia,	  above	  Chapter	  1	  n	  1.	  
2	  H	  Knight	  Closing	  the	  Net:	  Stopping	  illegal	  fishing	  on	  the	  high	  seas	  (High	  Seas	  Task	  Force,	  London,	  2006)	  at	  p3.	  
3	  High	  Seas	  Task	  Force,	  above	  n	  2	  at	  p3.	  
4	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  UNTS	  I	  31363,	  (opened	  for	  signature	  10	  December	  1982,	  entered	  into	  force	  16	  November	  1994)	  	  
5	  Elliot	  Anderson	  “It's	  a	  Pirates	  Life	  for	  Some:	  The	  Development	  of	  an	  Illegal	  Industry	  in	  Response	  to	  an	  Unjust	  Global	  Power	  Dynamic”	  2010	  17(2)	  Ind.	  J.	  Global	  Legal	  Studies	  at	  p327.	  
6	  Rachael	  Baird	  “Illegal,	  Unreported	  and	  Unregulated	  Fishing:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Legal,	  Economic	  and	  Historical	  Factors	  Relevant	  to	  its	  Development	  and	  Persistence”	  2004	  5	  Melbourne	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  1	  at	  p2	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fishing	   stocks	   has	   led	   to	   higher	   competition	   for	   diminishing	   amounts	   of	   fish.	  States	  with	  distance	   fishing	   fleets	  have	  been	  squeezed	  out	  of	   lucrative	  areas	  as	  EEZs	   became	  more	   operative.7	  	   The	   combination	   of	   these	   problems	   along	  with	  the	   increased	   global	   demand	   for	   fish,	   increases	   in	   the	   return	   on	   fish	   catch,	  increased	   pressure	   on	   already	   over	   exploited	   fish	   stocks	   and	   undermines	  sustainable	  fisheries	  management.8	  The	  higher	  rate	  of	  exploitation	  of	  fish	  stocks	  the	   greater	   the	   rate	   of	   illegal	   fishing.9	  This	   increased	   rate	   of	   illegal	   fishing	   is	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  new	  or	  alternative	  fishing	  opportunities.10	  	  	  A	  disproportionate	   amount	  of	   the	   losses	   that	   occur	   through	   IUU	   fishing	   comes	  from	  developing	   countries,	   in	   particular	   about	  USD1Billion	   from	   sub	   –Saharan	  Africa.11	  IUU	   fishing	   is	  particularly	  prevalent	  where	  poor	  governance	   leads	   to	  a	  failure	  of	   state	  control	  over,	  not	  only	   those	   foreign	  vessels	   licensed	   to	   fish,	  but	  also	   local	   artisanal	   fishers.12	  The	   coastal	   waters	   of	   developing	   countries,	   like	  Somalia,	   are	   particularly	   vulnerable	   as	   they	   lack	   the	   resources	   to	   effectively	  patrol	   their	   sovereign	   jurisdictions.	   The	   problem	   is	   exacerbated	  when	   there	   is	  ineffective	  government	  and	  those	  resources,	  or	  public	  goods,	  offered	  by	  the	  State	  have	  disappeared	  altogether.13	  	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  Somalia	  government	  collapsed	  in	  1991,	  and	   since	   that	   time	   incidents	   of	   illegal	   fishing	   have	   become	   escalated.	   Vessels	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  At	  p9	  cites	  China,	  European	  States,	  Japan	  and	  Korea.	  
8	  Stefan	  Flotham	  and	  others	  “Closing	  Loopholes:	  Getting	  Illegal	  Fishing	  Under	  Control”	  (2010)	  <www.sciencexpress.org/20	  May	  2010/page1/10.1126/science.1190245>	  
9	  Mssra	  Stokke	  and	  Davor	  Vidas	  Regulating	  IUU	  Fishing	  or	  Combating	  IUU	  Operations	  IUU	  Workshop	  (Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development,	  2004)	  at	  p8.	  
10	  David	  Agnew	  and	  others	  “Estimating	  the	  Worldwide	  Extent	  of	  Illegal	  Fishing”	  2009	  4(2)	  PLos	  One	  at	  p5.	  
11	  Knight,	  above	  n	  2	  at	  p3.	  
12	  Agnew	  and	  others,	  above	  n	  10.	  
13	  Mahamuda	  Bawumia	  and	  Rashid	  Sumaila	  “Fisheries,	  Ecosystems	  and	  Piracy:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  Somalia”	  2010	  Working	  Paper	  (2010-­‐04)	  The	  University	  of	  British	  Columbia	  at	  p6.	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allegedly	  involved	  come	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  global	  fishing	  nations.14	  This	  is	  not	  surprising	   as	   Somalia’s	   nutrient	   rich	   waters	   are	   home	   to	   some	   of	   the	   most	  productive	   fish	   stocks	   in	   the	   world.15	  The	   value	   of	   fish	   stocks	   taken	   from	   the	  waters	   off	   Somalia	   by	   foreign	   fleets	   is	   estimated	   in	   excess	   of	   some	   USD300	  million	  annually.16	  
	  The	  abundance	  of	   fish	  has	  been	  utilised	  by	  two	  main	  tribal	  groups,	   the	  Banjuni	  and	   the	   Amarari17	  peoples,	   who	   are	   descended	   from	   the	   Arabian,	   Indian	   and	  Persian	  seafaring	  settlers	  who	  arrived	  over	  1000	  years	  ago.18	  These	  early	  settlers	  were	  joined	  by	  clans	  from	  inland	  Somalia	  as	  part	  of	  a	  government	  resettlement	  programme	  following	  two	  major	  droughts	  in	  1974	  and	  1986.19	  The	  resettlement	  was	  to	  help	  replace	  the	  major	  source	  of	  protein	  that	  had	  been	   lost	   through	  the	  demise	   of	   livestock.	   The	   resettled	   people	   developed	   into	   large	   fishing	  communities	  who	   started	   to	   reap	   the	   rich	   harvest	   from	   the	   seas	   of	   the	   Indian	  Ocean.20	  
	  The	   aftermath	   of	   the	   drought	   in	   1974	  was	   so	   severe	   that	   Somalia	   invested	   in	  establishing	   an	   industrial	   fishing	   fleet	   with	   the	   USSR	   called	   SOMALFISH	   in	   an	  effort	   to	   replace	   lost	   protein.21	  This	   venture	   was	   short	   lived,	   being	   terminated	  when	  Ethiopia	  and	  Somalia	  went	  to	  war	  against	  each	  other	   in	  1975	  forcing	  the	  USSR	   to	   side	   with	   one	   of	   its	   client	   States.22	  The	   decision	   by	   Russia	   to	   choose	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Ishaan	  Tharoor	  “How	  Somalia's	  Fishermen	  Became	  Pirates”	  (2009)	  <www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8559,1892376,00.html>	  at	  p2.	  
15	  Bawumia	  and	  Sumaila,	  above	  n	  13	  at	  p7.	  	  
16	  Johann	  Hari	  “You	  are	  being	  lied	  to	  about	  pirates:	  Some	  are	  clearly	  just	  gangsters.	  But	  others	  are	  trying	  to	  stop	  illegal	  dumping	  and	  trawling”	  (2009)	  United	  Kingdom	  at	  p2.	  There	  is	  no	  external	  validation	  of	  this	  figure.	  
17	  Agnew	  and	  others,	  above	  n	  10	  at	  p5.	  
18	  At	  p5.	  
19	  Mohammed	  Waldo	  “The	  Two	  Piracies	  in	  Somalia:	  Why	  the	  World	  Ignores	  the	  Other”	  Wardheer	  
News	  (8	  January	  2009)	  at	  p3.	  
20	  Emmanuel	  Sone	  “Piracy	  in	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa:	  The	  Role	  of	  Somalia's	  Fishermen”	  (Naval	  Postgraduate	  School,	  2010)	  at	  p14.	  
21	  At	  p14.	  
22	  At	  p14.	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Ethiopia,	  and	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  Russia’s	  support,	  contributed	  to	  the	  consequent	  decline	   in	   fish	   catch.23	  This	   initial	   fishing	  venture	  was	   replaced	  with	  another	   in	  1981;	   the	   joint	   Italian	   and	   Somalian	   venture	   SOMITFISH.24	  This	   venture	   was	  replaced	   after	   two	   years	   with	   another	   joint	   Italian	   venture	   SHIFCO	   with	   five	  trawlers	  being	  donated	  by	   the	   Italian	  government,	  which	   lasted	   through	   to	   the	  loss	   of	   effective	   government	   in	   Somalia	   in	   1991. 25 	  These	   ventures	   were	  responsible	  for	  the	  industrialisation	  of	  the	  Somalian	  fishing	  industry,	  taking	  the	  catch	   from	   a	   mere	   6000	   tonnes	   in	   1974	   to	   almost	   24,000	   tonnes	   in	   199126	  generating	  approximately	  USD15	  million	  worth	  of	  exports	  in	  1990.27	  	  The	   loss	   of	   government,	   mentioned	   previously,	   with	   the	   attendant	   absence	   of	  patrol	  and	  enforcement	  vessels,28	  combined	  with	  the	  sudden	  erasure	  of	  taxation	  for	   foreign	   fleets,29	  created	   the	   conditions	   for	   Somalia’s	   coastline	   to	   become	   a	  haven	   for	   foreign	   fishing	   fleets	   to	   fish	   illegally.	   These	   conditions	   were	   taken	  advantage	  of	  by	   the	  European	  and	  Asian	   fishers	  particularly,	  who	  were	  able	   to	  deplete	  Somalia’s	  fish	  stocks,	  a	  reason	  given	  for	  the	  cause	  of	  poverty	  and	  social	  decay	   in	   coastal	   towns. 30 	  The	   number	   of	   vessels	   fishing	   illegally	   has	   been	  estimated	   at	   between	   200	   and	   800	   vessels	   depending	   on	   the	   source.31	  The	  writers	   of	   the	   Marine	   Resource	   Assessment	   Group	   report	   allege	   that	   these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  N	  Van	  Zalinge	  “Summary	  of	  Fisheries	  and	  Resources	  Information	  for	  Somalia”	  in	  M	  Sanders	  (ed)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Workshop	  on	  the	  Assessment	  of	  the	  Fishery	  Resources	  in	  the	  Southwest	  
Indian	  Ocean(SWIOP/WP/41)	  (Food	  and	  Agriculure	  Organization	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme.,	  Albion,	  Mauritius,	  2010)	  at	  p1.	  
24	  Sone,	  above	  n	  20	  at	  p14.	  
25	  At	  p14.	  
26	  “Fisheries	  and	  Aquaculture	  Country	  Profiles-­‐Somalia	  ”	  	  (2005)	  <www.fao.org/fishery/countrysector/FI-­‐CP_SO/3/en;	  cited	  by	  Sone,	  above	  n	  20	  at	  p15.	  	  
27	  Aaron	  Arky	  “Trading	  Nets	  for	  Guns:	  The	  Impact	  of	  Illegal	  Fishing	  on	  Piracy	  in	  Somalia”	  (Naval	  Postgraduate	  School,	  2010)	  at	  p15.	  
28	  Anderson,	  above	  n	  5	  at	  p327.	  
29	  Arky,	  above	  n	  27	  at	  p7.	  
30	  Anderson,	  above	  n	  5	  at	  p327.	  
31	  Sone,	  above	  n	  20	  at	  p28.	  In	  1998	  Sone	  cites	  approximately	  300	  vessels	  and	  Leigh	  Phillips	  “The	  European	  Roots	  of	  Somali	  Piracy”	  EU	  Observer	  (21	  April	  2009)	  at	  p2,	  2004	  estimated	  at	  700	  vessels.	  Review	  of	  Impacts	  of	  Illegal,	  Unreported	  and	  Unregulated	  Fishing	  on	  Developing	  Countries	  	  (Marine	  Resources	  Assessment	  Group,	  London,	  2005)	  at	  p166.	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vessels	   are	   fishing	   illegally.32	  The	  methods	   used	   by	   these	   vessels,	   such	   as	   deep	  bottom	   trawling	   and	   dynamiting,	   have	   damaged	   the	   environmental	   base	   that	  supports	  the	  valuable	  fish	  species	  of	  Somalia.33	  	  Illegal	   fishing	  has	   caused	  a	  decline	   in	   the	   local	  Somali	   catch	   from	  some	  25,500	  tons	  to	  20,600	  tons.	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  the	  possible	  illegal	  catch	  is	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	   90,000	   tons	   per	   year.34	  As	   alluded	   to	   earlier,	   the	   vessels	   involved	   in	   illegal	  fishing	   come	   from	   a	   range	   of	   countries	   including,	   China,	   France,	   Germany,	  Honduras,	   India,	   Italy,	   Japan,	   Kenya,	   Korea,	   Pakistan,	   Portugal,	   Russia,	   Saudi	  Arabia,	  Spain,	  Sri	  Lanka,	  Taiwan,	  Thailand,	  United	  Kingdom,	  and	  the	  Yemen.	  As	  would	  be	  expected,	   these	   illegal	   fishers	  are	  no	   respecters	  of	   the	   coastal	   State’s	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  established	  zones	  out	  to	  200M	  as	  it	  is	  alleged	  that	  some	  fish	  well	  within	  the	  12M	  territorial	  sea	  zone	  and	  even	  in	  sight	  of	  artisanal	  fishing	  nets	  close	  to	  shore.35	  	  Illegal	  fishing	  has	  been	  defined	  under	  the	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organisation	  of	  the	   United	   Nations	   Plan	   of	   Action	   to	   Prevent	   Deter	   and	   Eliminate	   Illegal,	  Unreported	  and	  Unregulated	  Fishing,	  (FAO	  IPOA-­‐IUU),36	  Art	  3.1	  –	  3.1.3,	  as	  being	  conducted	  by	  national	  or	  foreign	  vessels	  in	  waters	  under	  jurisdiction	  of	  a	  state,	  without	  permission	  of	  that	  state	  or	  in	  contravention	  of	  its	  laws	  and	  regulations.37	  	  It	  also	  applies	  to	  vessels	  that	  conduct	  fishing	  in	  a	  Regional	  Fisheries	  Management	  Organisations,	  (RFMO),	  where	  the	  flag	  State	  is	  a	  party	  to	  the	  RFMO,	  but	  operates	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  MRAG,	  above	  n	  31	  at	  p166.	  
33	  D	  Duda	  and	  T	  Szubrycht	  “The	  Somali	  Piracy:	  New	  or	  Old	  Challenge	  for	  International	  Community”	  2009	  3(3)	  International	  Journal	  on	  Maritime	  Navigation	  and	  Safety	  of	  Sea	  Transportation	  at	  p346.	  Gabobe	  Musse	  and	  Mahamud	  Tako	  “Illegal	  Fishing	  and	  Dumping	  Hazardous	  Wastes	  Threaten	  the	  Development	  of	  Somali	  Fisheries	  and	  the	  Marine	  Environments”	  (Tropical	  Aquaculture	  and	  Fisheries,	  Teregganu	  Malaysia,	  7-­‐9	  Sept	  1999	  1999)	  at	  p4.	  
34	  MRAG,	  above	  n	  31	  at	  p	  113.	  
35	  Musse	  and	  Tako,	  above	  n	  33	  at	  p4.	  
36	  Food	  and	  Agricultural	  Organization	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  International	  Plan	  of	  	  Action	  to	  Prevent,	  Deter	  and	  Eliminate,	  Illegal,	  Unreported	  and	  Unregulated	  Fishing	  (Rome	  2001).	  
37	  FAO	  IPOA-­‐IUU,	  Art	  3.1.	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in	  contravention	  of	   the	  measures	  of	   that	  RFMO	  or	  of	   the	  relevant	  provisions	  of	  the	   applicable	   international	   law.38	  Although	   both	   Unreported	   and	   Unregulated	  are	   included	   in	   the	  acronym	  IUU,	   the	   term	   is	  used	   in	   this	   thesis	  with	   the	  more	  narrow	  definition	  as	  contained	  under	  the	  FAO	  IPOA-­‐IUU	  article	  for	  illegal	  fishing.	  	  	  The	   incursion	   into	   Somalia’s	   coastal	   waters	   by	   foreign	   fishing	   vessels	   has	  generated	   a	   variety	   of	   responses	   from	   Somalians.	   These	   responses	   have	  included,	  resorting	  to	  piracy,39	  the	  creation	  of	  alleged	  Coast	  Guards	  by	  warlords,40	  and	   regional	   governments	   employing	   Private	   Security	   Companies,	   (PSCs),	   to	  perform	  Coast	  Guard	  duties	  on	  their	  behalf.41	  	  Further	  complicating	  the	  issue	  of	  illegal	  fishing	  off	  the	  Somali	  coast	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  specific,	  verifiable	  and	  accurate	  data	  in	  relation	  to	  illegal	  fishing.	  There	  are	  two	  possible	  causes	  for	  this;	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  illegal	  fishing	  creates	  an	  aversion	  to	  reporting	  on	  these	  activities	  and	  the	  current	  security	  situation	  in	  Somali	  that	  precludes	   the	   gathering	   of	   accurate	   data.	   There	   are	  many	   claims	   about	   illegal	  fishing	   and	   the	   numbers	   of	   vessels	   involved	   as	   discussed	   above.42	  There	   is	   no	  indication	  however	  as	  to	  how	  these	  figures	  are	  reached.	  There	  is	  no	  indication	  of	  the	  distances	  from	  shore	  of	  these	  vessels,	  what	  zones	  they	  were	  allegedly	  in	  or	  if	  they	  may	  have	  been	  fishing	  in	  an	  RFMO.	  	  It	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  to	  review	  the	  international	  fisheries	  framework	  with	   particular	   emphasis	   on	   how	   it	   is	   designed	   to	   eliminate	   illegal	   fishing	  through	  the	  obligations	  and	  rights	  of	  States	  in	  treaties	  and	  soft	  law	  agreements.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  FAO	  IPOA-­‐IUU,	  Art	  3.1.2.	  
39	  Edward	  Allison	  and	  Ingrid	  Kelling	  “Fishy	  Crimes:	  The	  Societal	  Costs	  of	  Poorly	  Governed	  Marine	  Fisheries	  (paper	  presented	  at	  NTS	  Asia	  Workshop,	  Singapore,	  November	  2009)”;	  at	  p3.	  
40	  Arky,	  above	  n	  27	  at	  p39.	  
41	  Stig	  Hansen	  “Private	  Security	  &	  Local	  Politics	  in	  Somalia”	  2008	  35	  Review	  of	  African	  Political	  Economy	  585	  at	  pp587,	  590,	  594.	  
42	  Sone	  and	  Phillips	  above	  n	  31.	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It	   will	   then	   examine	   the	   state	   of	   Somalia’s	   maritime	   zones	   as	   they	   currently	  appear	   and	   explain	   how	   the	   current	   lack	   of	   clarity	   contributes	   to	   the	   issue	   of	  illegal	  fishing	  and	  examines	  some	  possible	  interpretations	  of	  how	  these	  apply	  in	  Somalia.	  It	  will	  also	  compare	  various	  responses	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  illegal	  fishing	  by	  the	  international	  community,	  regional	  Somali	  governments	  and	  the	  artisanal	  fishers,	   to	   assess	   the	   legality	   of	   those	   responses.	   Finally	   the	   chapter	  will	   offer	  some	  suggestions	  for	  possible	  improvements	  to	  the	  international	  legal	  regime	  to	  minimise	   the	  problem	  of	   illegal	   fishing	  specifically	  around	   the	  coast	  of	  Somalia	  and	  generally	  for	  the	  international	  community.	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10 Framework	  of	  fisheries	  management	  	  The	  waters	  off	   the	   coast	  of	  Somalia	  are	  home	   to	  a	  valuable	  maritime	  resource,	  especially	   high	   value	   fish	   stocks	   like,	   lobster,	   mackerel	   and	   tuna,	   with	   an	  estimated	   annual	   value	   of	   USD5	   million.43	  Any	   reduction	   in	   access	   to	   these	  valuable	  fish	  stocks	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia	  directly	  affects	  the	  livelihood	  of	  	  the	  artisanal	   fishers.44	  The	  value	  of	   fish	  stocks	   taken	   from	  the	  waters	  of	  Somalia	  by	  foreign	  illegal	  fleets	  is	  estimated	  in	  excess	  of	  USD300	  million.45	  	  The	   vessels	   involved	   in	   illegal	   fishing	   utilise	   loopholes	   in	   the	   existing	   fisheries	  regime	  to	  flout	  any	  and	  all	  regulations	  covering	  fishing	  to	  maximise	  their	  profits	  on	  the	  high	  value	  fish	  stocks.46	  	  	  The	   international	   fishing	   regime	   is	   governed	   by	   various	   articles	   within	   the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea,	  (UNCLOS),	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	   agreements	   and	   treaties	   supported	   by	   municipal	   law.	  47	  Somalia	   ratified	   the	  UNCLOS	  in	  1989	  just	  prior	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  effective	  government.	  	  	  UNCLOS	  creates	  and	  codifies	  the	  zones	  and	  establishes	  the	  limits	  of	  jurisdiction	  for	  sovereign	  coastal	  States.	  The	  various	  zones	  under	  UNCLOS	  are,	  the	  territorial	  sea,	  the	  contiguous	  zone,	  the	  exclusive	  economic	  zone,	  the	  continental	  shelf	  and	  the	  high	  seas.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Food	  and	  Agricultural	  Organization	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  “Profil	  De	  La	  Pêche	  	  Par	  Pays”	  	  <www.fao.org/fi/oldiste/en/SOM/profile.htm	  >	  at	  p2.	  
44	  Agnew	  and	  others,	  above	  n	  10	  at	  p3.	  
45	  Tharoor,	  above	  n	  14	  at	  p2.	  
46	  Stokke	  and	  Vidas,	  above	  n	  9	  at	  p27.	  
47	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  UNTS	  I	  31363,	  (opened	  for	  signature	  10	  December	  1982,	  entered	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  16	  November	  1994)	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The	   territorial	  sea	   is	  codified	  under	  Arts	  2,	  3	  and	  4	   the	  UNCLOS.	  Art	  2	  extends	  State	  sovereignty	  from	  a	  States	  land	  territory	  out	  in	  to	  the	  adjacent	  waters	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  territorial	  sea.	  Sovereignty	  is	  constrained	  in	  this	  area	  under	  Art	  2.3	  to	  that	  created	  under	  the	  convention	  and	  by	  international	  law.	  Art	  3	  establishes	  the	  right	  of	  a	  sovereign	  State	  to	  establish	  a	  territorial	  sea	  up	  to	  a	  maximum	  limit	  of	   12M	   from	   the	   baselines	   as	   determined	   under	   the	   convention.	   Baselines	   are	  established	   under	   Art	   7	   of	   UNCLOS	   and	   normally	   extend	   from	   the	   low	   water	  mark.	  In	  cases	  where	  the	  coastline	  is	  indented	  or	  cut	  into,	  then	  it	  is	  acceptable	  to	  adopt	  a	  straight-­‐line	  measure	  between	  appropriate	  points	  of	  land.48	  The	  adoption	  of	   the	   straight-­‐line	   measure	   was	   the	   result	   of	   the	   Anglo-­‐Norwegian	   Fisheries	  case.49	  This	  was	  a	  challenge	  by	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  to	  Norway	  over	  their	  use	  of	  straight	  line	  measuring	  to	  establish	  baselines	  in	  areas	  where	  rocky	  outcrops	  had	  been	   used	   to	  measure	   the	   baseline	   and	   thus	   extend	   the	   seaward	   extent	   of	   its	  coastal	  zones.	  Art	  7	  codifies	  the	  right	  of	  innocent	  passage	  for	  vessels	  of	  all	  states	  through	  the	  territorial	  sea.	  Art	  19(1)	  defines	  innocent	  passage	  as	  passage	  that	  is	  not	  prejudicial	  to	  the	  peace,	  good	  order	  or	  security	  of	  the	  coastal	  State.	  Art	  19(2)	  defines	  a	  number	  of	  acts	  that	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  prejudicial	  to	  the	  peace,	  good	  order	  or	  security	  of	  a	  coastal	  State.	  Art	  19(2)(i)	  declares	  fishing	  activities	  as	  one	  of	   those	   acts.	   Art	   25(1)	   gives	   a	   coastal	   State	   the	   power	   to	   take	   the	   steps	  necessary	   in	   its	   territorial	   sea	   to	   prevent	   passage,	   which	   is	   not	   innocent.	   Art	  27(1)	  allows	  a	   coastal	   State	   to	  exercise	   criminal	   jurisdiction	  onboard	  a	   foreign	  vessel	  passing	  through	  its	  territorial	  sea	  by	  conducting	  an	  arrest	  or	  investigation	  if	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  crime	  extend	  to	  the	  coastal	  State,	  (Art	  27(1)(a)),	  or	  if	  the	   crime	   is	   of	   such	   a	   nature	   to	   disturb	   the	   peace	   of	   the	   country	   or	   the	   good	  order	  of	  the	  territorial	  sea,	  (Art	  27(1)(b)).	  	  	  Art	  34	  of	   the	  UNCLOS	  codifies	   the	  contiguous	  zone,	  which	  extends	  out	   to	  24M	  from	   the	   baseline	   used	   to	   create	   the	   territorial	   sea.	   This	   zone	   empowers	   the	  coastal	   State	   to	   regulate	   customs,	   immigration,	   fiscal	   and	   sanitary	   laws	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  UNCLOS	  Art	  7.	  	  
49	  Fisheries	  (United	  Kingdom	  v	  Norway)	  I.C.J	  Reports	  [1951]	  p116	  at	  133.	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regulations	   within	   its	   territory	   or	   territorial	   sea	   and	   to	   punish	   those	   who	  infringe	  within	  the	  territory	  or	  territorial	  sea.	  	  	  The	  Exclusive	  Economic	  Zone	   is	   created	  under	  Art	  55,	   and	  Art	  56	   the	  UNCLOS	  creates	   the	   rights	   and	   duties	   of	   the	   coastal	   State	   in	   relation	   to	   that	   zone.	   The	  rights	  that	  are	  created	  give	  the	  coastal	  State	  exclusive	  sovereign	  rights	  to	  exploit	  and	  explore,	  conserve	  and	  manage	  the	  natural	  resources	  of	   that	  zone	   including	  living	   resources,	   Art	   56(1)(a).	   Art	   56(1)(b)(iii)	   establishes	   jurisdiction	   for	   the	  protection	  and	  preservation	  of	  the	  marine	  environment.	  	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  language	  contained	  in	  the	  UNCLOS	  has	  in	  a	  small	  way	  contributed	  to,	  not	  only	  the	  over	  exploitation	  of	  fisheries	  by	  coastal	  States,50	  but	  also	   to	   the	   damage	   done	   by	   illegal	   fishers. 51 	  Art	   56(1)(a)	   UNCLOS	   grants	  ‘…sovereign	   rights	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   exploring	   and	  exploiting,	   conserving	   and	  managing	  the	  natural	  resources…’	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  exploiting	  carries	  with	  it	  negative	  connotations,	  more	  associated	  with	  making	  use	  unfairly	  or	  mainly	   for	  one’s	  advantage,	   to	  cash	   in	  on,	  abuse,	   impose	  on,	   leverage,	  milk,	  use,	  and	  trade	  on.52	  Although	   the	   use	   of	   this	   phrase	   is	   minimised	   by	   the	   addition	   of	   the	  ‘conserve	   and	  manage’	   functions,	   they	   follow	   later	   in	   the	   article	   and	   could	   be	  seen	   as	   not	   being	   of	   equal	   importance.	   Flotham	   holds	   that	   the	   greater	   the	  amounts	   of	   exploitation	   the	   greater	   the	   amount	   of	   illegal	   catch.53	  The	   action	   of	  exploitation	   is	   further	   mitigated	   by	   Art	   61	   UNCLOS,	   which	   deals	   with	  conservation	  of	  the	  living	  resources	  of	  the	  EEZ.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  R	  Willmann,	  K	  Kelleher	  and	  R	  Arnason	  The	  Sunken	  Billions:	  The	  Economic	  Justification	  for	  
Fisheries	  Reform	  (The	  World	  Bank,	  Washington,	  2009)	  at	  p3.	  
51	  Allison	  and	  Kelling,	  above	  n	  39	  at	  p1.	  
52	  Eric	  Partridge	  Webster	  Universal	  Dictionary,	  at	  p491.	  
53	  Flotham	  and	  others,	  above	  n	  8	  at	  p1.	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Art	   57	   establishes	   the	   breadth	   of	   the	   EEZ	   at	   a	  maximum	   of	   200M	   established	  from	  the	  same	  baseline	  as	  the	  territorial	  sea.	  There	  is	  no	  statement	  in	  UNCLOS	  as	  to	   when	   an	   EEZ	   exists	   although	   Art	   75	   stipulates	   that	   the	   geographical	  coordinates	  need	  to	  be	  notified	  on	  maps	  and	  charts	  and	  also	  be	  deposited	  with	  the	   Secretary	   General	   of	   the	   UN.	   Art	   75(2)	   requires	   that	   the	   geographic	  coordinates	  charts	  and	  maps	  be	  publicly	  declared.	  For	  an	  EEZ	  to	  exist	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  expressly	  proclaimed.	  The	  right	  to	  an	  EEZ	  is	  not	  a	  default	  right	  that	  exists	  on	  the	   ratification	   of	   the	   UNCLOS.	   Art	   58(1)	   establishes	   the	   rights	   and	   duties	   of	  other	   States	   in	   the	   EEZ.	   These	   rights	   pertain	   to	   navigation	   and	   overflight,	   the	  laying	  of	  submarine	  cables	  and	  pipelines,	  and	  other	  internationally	  lawful	  uses	  of	  the	   sea	   related	   to	   those	   freedoms.	   Art	   61(1)	   grants	   the	   power	   for	   the	   coastal	  State	  to	  determine	  the	  allowable	  catch	  of	   living	  resources	  in	  the	  EEZ.	  Art	  61(2)	  requires	   the	   coastal	   State	   to	   take	   into	   account	   scientific	   evidence	   when	  determining	   the	   conservation	   and	   management	   measures	   to	   ensure	   that	   over	  exploitation	  does	  not	  take	  place.	  These	  measures	  should	  be	  instituted	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  levels	  can	  be	  maintained	  that	  allow	  for	  the	  maximum	  sustainable	  yield.	  Any	   measures	   taken	   should	   take	   into	   account	   the	   needs	   of	   coastal	   fishing	  communities	  and	  developing	  States,	   (Art	  61(3)).	  Art	  62(1)	   requires	   the	  coastal	  State	  to	  seek	  to	  gain	  optimum	  utilization	  of	  the	  living	  resources	  without	  affecting	  its	   duties	   under	   Art	   61.	   Art	   62(2)	   and	   (3)	   relate	   to	   the	   determination	   of	   the	  ability	   of	   the	   State	   to	   harvest	   the	  maximum	   allowable	   catch	   and	   to	   give	   other	  States,	   particularly	   developing	   States	   the	   right	   to	   harvest	   excess	   capacity,	  although	   this	   is	   constrained	   by	  Art	   71	   in	   the	   case	   of	   States	  whose	   economy	   is	  overwhelmingly	   dependent	   on	   exploitation	   of	   living	   resources	   of	   the	   EEZ.	  UNCLOS	  Art	  73	  creates	  the	  right	  for	  the	  coastal	  States	  to	  enforce	  their	  municipal	  law	  regarding	  fisheries.	  	  	  The	  next	  zone	  codified	  under	  UNCLOS	  is	  the	  continental	  shelf.	  Art	  76	  defines	  the	  continental	  shelf	  as	  compromising	  the	  seabed	  and	  subsoil	  of	  the	  submarine	  areas	  that	  extend	  beyond	  the	  territorial	  sea	  to	  the	  outer	  edge	  of	  the	  continental	  margin	  or	  to	  a	  distance	  of	  200M	  from	  the	  baseline	  used	  to	  establish	  the	  territorial	  sea.	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The	  breadth	  of	  the	  continental	  shelf	   is	  constrained	  under	  Art	  76(5)	  to	  no	  more	  than	  350M	  from	  the	  baselines	  or	  100M	  from	  the	  2,500	  metre	  isobath,	  which	  is	  a	  line	  connecting	  the	  depth	  of	  2,500	  metres.54	  The	  coastal	  State	  exercises	  exclusive	  rights	  of	  exploration	  and	  exploitation	  over	  the	  natural	  resources,	  (Art	  77	  (1)(2)),	  which	   include	   mineral	   and	   non-­‐living	   resources	   of	   the	   seabed	   and	   sedentary	  species	  which	  are	  either	  immobile	  or	  unable	  to	  move	  except	  in	  constant	  contact	  with	  the	  seabed.	  	  The	  next	  zone	  is	  the	  high	  seas,	  (HS),	  created	  under	  Art	  86	  of	  the	  UNCLOS	  as	  being	  that	  part	  of	  the	  oceans	  that	  do	  not	  form	  part	  of	  the	  EEZ,	  territorial	  sea,	  internal	  waters	  of	  a	  State	  or	  the	  archipelagic	  seas	  of	  an	  archipelagic	  State.55	  The	  freedoms	  that	  exist	   to	  operate	  on	  the	  HS	  are	  spelled	  out	   in	  Art	  87	   including	  Art	  87(1)(e)	  which	  includes	  the	  freedom	  to	  fish,	  which	  is	  constrained	  under	  Art	  87(2)	  to	  pay	  regard	   to	   the	   rights	   of	   other	   States,	   under	   this	   article,	   to	   exercise	   the	   same	  freedom	  and	  the	  rights	  under	  the	  UNCLOS	  in	  this	  area.56	  	  	  This	   obligation	   applies	   to	   the	   HS	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   coastal	   states	   that	   have	  greater	   powers	   of	   enforcement	   and	   control.	   The	   obligation	   to	   report	   has	   been	  described	   as	   more	   of	   a	   concept	   than	   a	   reality	   and	   as	   the	   prime	   reason	   why	  vessels	  register	  under	  flags	  of	  convenience,	  (FOC),	  States	  who	  refuse	  to	  exercise	  control	  over	  illegal	  fishing	  vessels	  registered	  to	  them.57	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  failure	  of	   this	  article	   to	  stop	   illegal	   fishing	   is	   the	  prohibition	  on	  non-­‐flag	  States	  investigating	   the	   breaches	   of	   the	   international	   fishing	   regime,	   if	   a	   flag	   State	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Somalia	  has	  only	  recently	  submitted	  on	  its	  intention	  to	  claim	  a	  continental	  shelf	  out	  to	  the	  350M	  limit.	  	  <www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/som74_14/Somalia_Executive_Summary_2014.pdf>.	  
55	  UNCLOS	  Art	  87	  
56	  UNCLOS	  Art	  87(2)	  
57	  Ryan	  Cantrell	  “Finding	  Nemo	  and	  Eating	  Him:	  The	  Failure	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  Force	  Internationalisation	  of	  the	  Negative	  Social	  Costs	  that	  Result	  from	  Overfishing”	  2006	  5	  Wash.	  U.	  Global	  Stud.	  L.	  Rev.	  381	  at	  p388.	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refuses	   to	  meet	   their	  obligations	   there	   is	  nothing	  a	  non-­‐flag	  State	  can	  do.58	  The	  resistance	  by	  flag	  States	  to	  enforce	  these	  obligations	  is	  related	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  
pacta	  tertiis,	  where	  these	  States	  refuse	  to	  comply	  with	  their	  obligations,	  as	  they	  believe	  that	  the	  international	  community	  is	  regulating	  municipal	  law.59	  	  	  	  Closely	  linked	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  FOC	  is	  the	  requirement	  that	  there	  be	  a	  genuine	  link	  between	  the	  flag	  State	  and	  the	  vessel	  registered.60	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  in	  the	  
M/V	  Saiga	   that	   the	   absence	   of	   exercise	   of	   jurisdiction	   amounted	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   a	  genuine	   link.	  61	  The	   International	  Tribunal	   for	   the	  Law	  of	   the	  Sea,	   (ITLOS),	  held	  that	  absence	  of	  proper	  jurisdiction	  and	  control	  does	  not	  equate	  to	  an	  absence	  of	  a	  genuine	  link	  and	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  vessel	  to	  fly	  the	  State	  flag	  under	  which	  it	  is	  registered.62	  The	   genuine	   link	   requirement	   has	   not	   been	   defined	   under	   the	  UNCLOS	  or	  a	   set	  of	   criteria	  created	   for	  establishing	   the	  requirement.63	  This	  has	  led	  to	  the	  situation	  where	  a	  genuine	  link	  can	  be	  as	  little	  as	  a	  post	  office	  box	  in	  the	  flag	   State	   used	  by	   the	   registered	   owners.64	  In	   the	  Grand	  Prince	   ITLOS	  held	   that	  the	   registration	   of	   the	   vessel	   under	   the	   flag	   of	   Belize	   contained	   an	   element	   of	  fiction65	  and	  was	  insufficient	  to	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  vessel	  was	  registered	  to	   fly	   the	   flag	   of	   that	   State.66	  Further	   attempts	   to	  more	   closely	   define	   this	   link	  have	  been	  defeated	  as	  efforts	  to	  establish	  the	  1986	  UN	  Convention	  on	  Conditions	  for	   the	   Registration	   of	   Ships,	   which	   would	   have	   clearly	   enunciated	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Flotham	  and	  others,	  above	  n	  8	  at	  p14.	  
59	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties,	  above	  Chapter	  2	  n	  103,	  pacta	  tertiis	  nec	  nocent	  nec	  
prosunt.	  A	  treaty	  does	  not	  create	  rights	  or	  obligations	  for	  a	  third	  State	  without	  its	  consent.	  
60	  UNCLOS	  Art	  91(1)	  	  ‘Ships	  have	  the	  nationality	  of	  the	  State	  whose	  flag	  they	  are	  entitled	  to	  fly.	  There	  must	  exist	  a	  genuine	  link	  between	  the	  State	  and	  the	  ship.’	  
61	  The	  M/V	  Saiga	  (No	  2)	  Unreported	  ITLOS	  Case	  No	  2	  (1	  July	  1999)	  at	  paragraphs	  [82]-­‐[83].	  
62	  Baird,	  above	  n	  6	  at	  p16.	  
63	  Baird,	  above	  n	  6	  at	  p18	  fn90.	  The	  link	  was	  quite	  tenuous	  in	  the	  M/V	  Siaga	  (No	  2),	  where	  the	  vessel	  was	  owned	  by	  a	  Cypriot	  shipping	  company,	  managed	  by	  a	  Scottish	  firm	  and	  crewed	  by	  Ukrainians.	  
64	  Stokke	  and	  Vidas,	  above	  n	  9	  at	  p7.	  
65	  The	  Grand	  Prince	  (Belize	  v	  France)	  (No	  8)	  ITLOS	  No	  8	  at	  paragraph	  [85].	  
66	  At	  paragraph	  [85].	  Kathleen	  Gray,	  Fiona	  Legg	  and	  Emily	  Andrews-­‐Chouicha	  Fish	  Piracy:	  
Combating	  Illegal,	  Unreported	  and	  Unregulated	  Fishing	  (OECD,	  2004)	  at	  p389.	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conditions,	  failed.67	  In	  a	  move	  to	  tighten	  up	  this	  loophole,	  states	  such	  as	  Australia,	  require	   vessels	   to	   be	   owned	   by	   Australian	   companies	   to	   fish	   under	   permit	   or	  statutory	  fishing	  rights.68	  	  Arts	  117-­‐119	  cover	  the	  conservation	  and	  management	  of	  the	  living	  resources	  on	  the	   HS.	   These	   articles	   cover	   the	   duty	   of	   States	   to	   adopt	   measures	   for	   the	  conservation	   of	   the	   living	   resources	   of	   the	   HS	   as	   far	   as	   their	   nationals	   are	  concerned,	   the	   cooperation	   of	   States	   in	   conservation	   and	   management	   of	   the	  living	   resources	   and	   the	   conservation	   of	   living	   resources	   on	   the	   HS.	   Art	   197	  requires	   further	   conservation	  measures	   be	   carried	   out	   on	   a	   regional	   basis	   by	  implementing	   international	   rules	   and	   standards	   and	   recommended	   practices	  and	  procedures	  for	  the	  protecting	  and	  preservation	  of	  the	  marine	  environment.	  	  While	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  does	  not	  apply	  directly	  to	  the	  fisheries,	  the	  
Southern	  Blue	  Fin	  Tuna	  cases	  (New	  Zealand	  v	  Japan)(Australia	  v	  Japan)	  stated	  at	  paragraph	  70,	  	  
‘Considering	  that	  the	  conservation	  of	  the	  living	  resources	  of	  the	  sea	  is	  an	  element	  in	  the	  protection	  and	  preservation	  of	  the	  marine	  environment.’69	  	  Art	  64	  along	  with	  Art	  63	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  Agreement	   for	  the	  Implementation	  of	  the	   Provisions	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   the	   Sea	   of	   10	  December	   1982,	   Relating	   to	   the	   Conservation	   and	   Management	   of	   Straddling	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  for	  the	  Registration	  of	  Ships	  (open	  for	  signature	  from	  the	  1	  May	  1986	  to	  the	  30	  April	  1987	  in	  New	  York,	  (not	  effective	  as	  yet).	  The	  Convention	  will	  come	  into	  force	  12	  months	  after	  the	  date	  on	  which	  not	  less	  than	  40	  States,	  the	  combined	  tonnage	  of	  which	  amounts	  to	  at	  least	  25	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  world	  tonnage,	  have	  become	  Contracting	  Parties	  to	  it	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  18.	  
68	  Stokke	  and	  Vidas,	  above	  n	  9	  at	  p23.	  
69	  Southern	  Blue	  Fin	  Tuna	  (New	  Zealand	  v	  Japan)(Australia	  v	  Japan)	  (Order	  for	  Provisional	  
Measures)	  ITLOS	  3	  &	  4,	  38	  ILM	  1624	  at	  paragraph	  70.	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Fish	  Stocks	  and	  Highly	  Migratory	  Fish	  Stocks,70	  (FSA).	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  agreement	  is	  to	  address	  the	  inadequacies	  of	  high	  seas	  fisheries	  management,	  address	  issues	  of	   unregulated	   fishing,	   overcapitalisation,	   and	   excessive	   fleet	   size,	   vessel	  reflagging	   to	   escape	   controls,	   insufficiently	   selective	   gear,	   unreliable	   databases	  and	   lack	   of	   cooperation	   between	   States.71	  There	   have	   been	   to	   date	   only	   80	  signatories	  to	  the	  agreement,	  which	  is	  only	  binding	  on	  the	  contracting	  parties.72	  Somalia	   is	   not	   a	   signatory	   to	   this	   agreement	   as	   it	   was	   formulated	   after	   the	  collapse	  of	  the	  government	  in	  1991.	  The	  species	  of	  fish	  stock	  that	  is	  covered	  by	  this	  agreement	  and	  most	  applicable	  to	  the	  waters	  off	  Somalia’s	  coast	  is	  tuna.73	  	  	  Art	  5(b)	  of	  the	  FSA	  requires	  states	  to	  utilise	  the	  best	  scientific	  evidence	  to	  inform	  conservation	   and	  management	   practices	   and	   to	   take	   account	   especially	   of	   the	  needs	  of	  developing	  States,	  which	  is	  further	  reinforced	  by	  Art	  5(h),	  prevention	  of	  overfishing	   and	   Art	   5(i)	   which	   asks	   states	   to	   be	   cognizant	   of	   the	   interests	   of	  artisanal	  and	  subsistence	  fishers.	  These	  three	  articles	  together	  would	  appear	  to	  provide	   sufficient	   protection	   for	   the	   fishers	   of	   Somalia,	   although	   the	   FSA	   is	  limited	  to	  the	  control	  of	  fisheries	  on	  the	  HS,	  there	  are	  requirements	  under	  Arts	  6	  and	  7	  that	  apply	  to	  conservation	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  State.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	   that	   the	   uncertainty	   over	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   territorial	   sea	   of	   Somalia	  would	  see	  articles,	  5(b),	  5(h)	  and	  5(i)	  be	  applied,	  either	  to	  the	  very	  high-­‐water	  mark	  on	  Somalia’s	  coast	  or	  to	  the	  3M	  territorial	  limit	  once	  claimed.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  The	  Agreement	  for	  the	  Implementation	  of	  the	  Provisions	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  of	  10	  December	  1982,	  Relating	  to	  the	  Conservation	  and	  Management	  of	  Straddling	  Fish	  Stocks	  and	  Highly	  Migratory	  Fish	  Stocks	  (opened	  for	  signature	  4	  December	  1995,	  effective	  11	  December	  2001)	  
71	  FSA	  above	  n	  70	  at	  p2.	  
72	  “UN	  Division	  for	  Ocean	  Affairs	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea.”	  	  	  <www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratification.html#agreement%20for%20implementation%20of%20provisions%20of%20the%20Convention%20relating%20to%20the%20conservation%20and%20management%20of%20straddling%20fish%20stocks%20and%20highly%20migratory%20fish%20stocks,	  >	  
73	  The	  UNCLOS	  Annex	  1.	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In	   compliance	  with	  Art	  61(2)	  of	   the	  UNCLOS	  and	  Art	  26(2)	  of	   the	  FSA,	  RFMOs	  have	   been	   established	   across	   large	   portions	   of	   the	   HS	   including	   the	   Pacific,	  Antarctic	  and	  Indian	  Ocean.	  There	  are	  two	  RFMOs	  in	  the	  region	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia,	   the	   Indian	  Ocean	  Tuna	  Commission,74	  (IOTC),	   and	   the	  Southern	   Indian	  Ocean	   Fisheries	   Agreement,75	  (SIOFA).	   The	   major	   problems	   that	   Somalia	   faces	  with	  these	  agreements	  is	  that	  they	  came	  into	  being	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Barre	  government	  and	  therefore	  Somalia	  is	  not	  a	  contracting	  party	  and	  secondly,	   it	   is	  specifically	  for	  tuna	  type	  species	  and	  the	  other	  lucrative	  fish	  stocks;	  lobster	  and	  shrimp	  are	  overlooked.	  	  	  	  The	  area	  covered	  by	  the	  IOTC	  is	  that	  under	  the	  FAO	  statistical	  areas	  51	  and	  57;	  the	  area	  pertinent	  to	  Somalia	  is	  area	  51,	  the	  western	  side	  major	  fishing	  area	  and	  sub	   areas	   3	   and	   5.	   There	   is	   no	   indication	   that	   these	   areas	   exclude	   the	   200M	  zones	  in	  the	  agreement	  or	  under	  FAO	  statistical	  areas	  51(3)	  and	  (5).	  The	  IOTC	  is	  reliant	   on	   the	   implementation	  of	   conservation	   and	  management	  measures	   and	  the	  imposition	  of	  penalties	  for	  violations	  of	  the	  measures	  agreed	  to	  under	  Art	  IX	  (1)-­‐(8)	   within	   national	   legislation.	   Each	   State	   still	   retains	   its	   rights	   under	   the	  UNCLOS	  to	  exploit	  resources	  in	  its	  waters	  up	  to	  200M	  from	  its	  coast.	  	  SIOFA	  applies	  in	  this	  region	  but	  stops	  200M	  from	  the	  coastline	  of	  States.	  	  The	  fish	  caught	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia	  must	  be	  taken	  to	  port	  and	  then	  to	  market	  to	   be	   sold.	   It	   is	   on	   arrival	   at	   these	   ports	   that	   the	   Agreement	   on	   Port	   State	  Measures	   to	  Deter,	   Eliminate	   and	   Prevent	   Illegal,	   Unreported	   and	  Unregulated	  Fishing	   comes	   into	   play. 76 	  Art	   13(c)	   provides	   detail	   as	   to	   what	   authorised	  inspectors	   are	   able	   to	   examine,	   including	  all	   areas	  of	   the	  vessel,	   the	   fish	   catch,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  The	  Agreement	  for	  the	  Establishment	  of	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  Tuna	  Commission	  (opened	  for	  signature	  27	  October	  1995,	  entered	  in	  to	  force	  27	  March	  1996).	  
75	  Southern	  Indian	  Ocean	  Fisheries	  Agreement	  (opened	  for	  signature	  7	  July	  2006,	  not	  yet	  in	  force).	  
76	  Agreement	  on	  Port	  State	  Measures	  to	  Deter,	  Eliminate	  and	  Prevent	  Illegal,	  Unreported	  and	  Unregulated	  Fishing	  (opened	  for	  signature	  on	  the	  22	  November	  2009,	  not	  yet	  in	  force),	  out	  of	  28	  signatories	  only	  4	  ratifications	  so	  far.	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nets	   and	   equipment	   and	   documents	   and	   other	   records	   to	   ensure	   compliance	  with	  relevant	  conservation	  and	  management	  measures.	  The	  measures	  have	  been	  criticised	   for	   their	   lack	   of	   transparency,	   accountability	   and	   global	   reach. 77	  Flotham	  further	  identifies	  the	  lack	  of	  vessel	  information	  and	  lack	  of	  compliance	  by	   ports	   as	   significant	   challenges	   to	   port	   States.78	  Port	   State	   effectiveness	   is	  limited	   by	   the	   requirement	   to	   notify	   the	   flag	   State	   and	   leave	   the	   decision	   to	  prosecute	   to	   it,	   if	   evidence	   that	   a	   vessel	   has	   been	   involved	   in	   illegal	   fishing	   is	  found,	  (Art	  15).	  	  The	   other	   main	   treaty	   regulating	   conservation	   and	   management	   of	   global	  fisheries	   that	   is	   legally	   binding	   on	   signatories	   is	   the	   Agreement	   to	   Promote	  compliance	   with	   International	   Conservation	   and	   Management	   measures	   by	  Fishing	  Vessels	  on	   the	  High	  Seas,	   (Compliance	  Agreement).	  79	  Initially	  signed	  by	  25	  states,	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  this	  agreement	  indicated	  that	  of	  33	   signatories,	   16	   failed	   to	   curb	   illegal	   fishing	   utilising	   this	   agreement.80	  The	  major	   challenge	   to	   this	   agreement	   is	   the	   ability	   of	   FOC	   to	   fail	   to	   regulate	   their	  fishing	  fleets.81	  	  There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   ‘soft	   law’82	  agreements	   that	   aim	   to	   regulate	   fishing	  globally,	  including	  the	  FAO	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  Responsible	  Fisheries,83	  (Code	  of	  Conduct),	   and	   the	   FAO	   IPOA-­‐IUU.	   Both	   of	   these	   agreements	   are	   voluntary	   and	  have	  had	  limited	  uptake.	  The	  FOA	  IPOA-­‐IUU	  suffers	  from	  the	  same	  limitations	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Flotham	  and	  others,	  above	  n	  8	  at	  p1.	  
78	  At	  p2.	  
79	  Agreement	  to	  Promote	  Compliance	  with	  International	  Conservation	  and	  Management	  Measures	  by	  Fishing	  Vessels	  on	  the	  High	  Seas	  (opened	  for	  signature	  24	  November	  1993	  entered	  into	  force	  24	  April	  2003)	  
80	  Agnew	  and	  others,	  above	  n	  10	  at	  p4.	  
81	  Flotham	  and	  others,	  above	  n	  8	  at	  p16.	  
82	  Shaw	  Chapter	  2	  n	  65	  p117-­‐8.	  Soft	  law	  is	  not	  law,	  but	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  code	  of	  practice	  or	  standards,	  or	  guidelines	  that	  may	  be	  ultimately	  converted	  into	  legally	  binding	  rules.	  
83	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  Responsible	  Fisheries	  (adopted	  31	  October	  1995)	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other	   agreements	   and	   treaties	   in	   that	   FOC	   States	  manage	   to	   easily	   thwart	   the	  intentions	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  limit	  illegal	  fishing.84	  	  	  It	   can	   be	   seen	   that	   although	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   binding	   and	   non-­‐binding	  instruments	   to	   regulate	   fishing	  both	  within	   the	   territorial	   jurisdiction	  of	  States	  and	  on	  the	  HS,	   they	  all	  require	  a	   functioning	  State	  to	   implement	  the	  provisions	  and	   to	   actively	   police	   those	   provisions	   with	   sufficient	   resources	   to	   curb	   the	  activities	   of	   those	   determined	   to	   fish	   illegally.	   Although	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	  provisions	  where	   states	   could	   exercise	   some	   form	  of	   control	   over	   their	   fishing	  fleets	  to	  limit	  the	  actions	  of	  illegal	  fishers,	  the	  loopholes	  that	  currently	  exist	  make	  it	  easy	  for	  these	  regulations	  to	  be	  avoided.	  It	  has	  also	  been	  suggested	  that	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  to	  reign	  in	  both	  nationals	  and	  national	  fishing	  fleets	  that	  are	  determined	  to	  continue	  illegal	  fishing.85	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  Flotham	  and	  others,	  above	  n	  8	  at	  p7.	  
85	  Cantrell,	  above	  n	  57	  at	  p400.	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11 Does	  the	  Lack	  of	  a	  declared	  EEZ	  contribute	  to	  the	  illegal	  
fishing	  problem?	  	  
11.1 Somalia’s	  existing	  zones.	  For	  illegal	  fishing	  to	  occur	  according	  to	  the	  definition	  in	  the	  FAO	  IPOA-­‐IUU	  there	  must	  be	  some	  form	  of	  control	  over	  a	  particular	  zone	  of	  water	  by	  either	  a	  coastal	  State	  or	  some	  form	  of	  international	  organisation.	  This	  requires	  a	  clear	  definition	  of	  the	  zone	  and	  limits	  imposed	  on	  the	  controlling	  State	  or	  organisation.	  For	  any	  IUU	   operator,	   the	   abstract	   legal	   construction	   of	   coastal	   State	   jurisdiction	   in	  coastal	  zones	  matters	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  effective	  physical	  control	  at	  sea	  can	  be	   expected. 86 	  In	   the	   case	   of	   Somalia	   this	   delimitation	   and	   the	   extent	   of	  jurisdiction	  is	  anything	  but	  clear.	  	  	  Somalia,	  prior	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  UNCLOS,	  claimed	  a	  territorial	  sea	  with	  an	   outer	   limit	   200M	   from	   its	   coast	   under	   Somali	   Law	   37	   (Territorial	   Sea	   and	  Ports	   (Somalia)	   Art	   (1)	   in	   1972.87	  	   As	   mentioned	   above	   Somalia	   ratified	   the	  UNCLOS	  in	  1989.	  Maintaining	  a	  claim	  of	  a	  200M	  territorial	  sea	  is	  in	  direct	  conflict	  with	   international	   law	   as	   under	   CIL	   12M	   is	   the	   accepted	  maximum	   limit	   for	   a	  territorial	   sea.	   Somalia	   at	   the	   time	   of	   ratification	   of	   the	   UNCLOS	   entered	   no	  objections	  or	  declarations.88	  It	  has	  persisted	  in	  maintaining	  that	  its	  territorial	  sea	  extends	  to	  200M,	  and	  has	  declined	  to	  repeal	  its	  claim	  of	  a	  200M	  territorial	  sea.89	  	  	  It	   could	   possibly	   be	   claimed	   that	   Somalia	   was	   a	   persistent	   objector	   as	   to	   the	  extent	   of	   its	   territorial	   sea.	   A	   persistent	   objector	   is	   a	   state	   that	   persistently	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Stokke	  and	  Vidas,	  above	  n	  9	  at	  p27.	  
87	  Somali	  Law	  37	  (Territorial	  Sea	  and	  Ports)	  1972	  Somalia,	  Art.	  1.	  
88	  “UN	  Conventions	  and	  Agreements.”	  	  	  <www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreeements/convention_declarations.htm.>	  
89	  U.S.	  v	  Salad	  779	  F.Supp.	  2d	  503	  E.D.	  (Va	  2011).	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objects	  to	  a	  rule	  of	  CIL	  as	  it	  is	  being	  formed	  and	  is	  not	  bound	  by	  that	  rule.90	  The	  claim	   to	   be	   a	   persistent	   objector	   however	   needs	   to	   be	   compared	  with	   Britain	  who	  during	   the	   late	  1960s	   issued	  several	  declarations	   that	   it	  did	  not	  recognise	  territorial	  seas	  over	  more	  than	  3M.91	  Somalia	  has	  not	  followed	  the	  example	  set	  by	  Norway	   in	   the	  Fisheries	   case	  and	  expressed	   its	  objection	   to	   the	  12M	   territorial	  sea	  zone	  as	  codified	  by	  the	  UNLCOS.	  Unlike	  Peru	  in	  the	  Asylum	  case,	  Somalia	  has	  ratified	   the	   UNCLOS,	   so	   that	   ground	   of	   establishing	   its	   cause	   as	   a	   persistent	  objector	   is	   also	   denied	   to	   it.	   It	   is	   strongly	   suggested	   that	   Somalia	   is	   unable	   to	  claim	   to	   be	   a	   persistent	   objector	   as	   there	   is	   no	   credible	   evidence	   that	   it	   has	  raised	  any	  objection	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  12M	  limit	  for	  a	  territorial	  sea.	  	  There	   is	   the	  possibility	   that	  Somalia’s	   claim	  to	  a	  200M	  territorial	   sea	   is	  part	  of	  regional	  customary	  law	  or	  tradition.	  This	  concept	  was	  recognised	  as	  existing	  in	  the	  Rights	   of	   Passage	   case	  where	   the	   International	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   (ICJ),	   held	  that	  the	  standard	  of	  proof	  required	  to	  establish	  custom	  needed	  to	  be	  of	  a	  higher	  standard	   than	   that	   required	   to	  establish	  CIL	  and	   that	   the	  activity	  needed	   to	  be	  accepted	  by	  a	  state	  or	  states	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  legal	  obligation	  or	  right.92	  This	  compares	  with	  CIL	  where	   a	   consensus	  of	   a	  majority	   or	   substantial	  minority	   of	  interested	  States	  can	  be	  sufficient	   to	  create	  new	  CIL.93	  This	  concept	   is	   linked	   to	  the	  theory	  that	  a	  State	  is	  bound	  to	  that	  which	  it	  consents.94	  While	  there	  are	  some	  States	  still	  claiming	  a	  200M	  territorial	  sea	   it	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  argue	  that	   these	  states	   form	   a	   region	   as	   they	   are	   spread	   across	   the	   both	   Africa	   and	   Latin	  America.95	  These	   claims	   to	   200M	   territorial	   sea	   are	   not	   reflective	   of	   CIL	   or	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Ted	  Stein	  “The	  Approach	  of	  the	  Different	  Drummer:	  The	  Principle	  of	  the	  Persistent	  Objector	  in	  International	  Law”	  1985	  26	  Harv.Int’l	  L.	  J.	  at	  p457.	  Fisheries	  (United	  Kingdom	  v	  Norway),	  above	  nError!	  Bookmark	  not	  defined.	  at	  p131	  and	  Columbian-­‐Peruvian	  asylum	  (Colombia	  v	  Peru)	  
(1950)	  I.C.J.	  Reports,1950,	  p266	  at	  [89]	  
91	  R	  R	  Churchill	  and	  A	  V	  Lowe	  The	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  (3rd	  ed,	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  Manchester,	  1999)	  at	  p78.	  
92	  Rights	  of	  Passage	  over	  Indian	  Territory	  (Portugal	  v	  India)	  (1960)	  I.C.J.	  Reports	  6	  at	  p44.	  
93	  H	  Thirlway	  “The	  Sources	  of	  International	  Law”	  in	  Malcom	  Shaw	  Chapter	  2	  n	  65	  at	  p92.	  
94	  At	  p92	  and	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties,	  above	  Chapter	  2	  n	  103.	  
95	  Donald	  Rothwell	  and	  Tim	  Stephens	  The	  International	  Law	  of	  The	  Sea	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  Oxford	  and	  Portland,	  2010)	  at	  p72	  cite	  Benin,	  Congo,	  Ecuador,	  El	  Salvador,	  Liberia	  and	  Peru.	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law	  as	  stipulated	  in	  the	  UNCLOS	  and	  have	  been	  opposed	  by	  States.96	  It	  could	  be	  argued	   that	   these	   claims	   to	   200M	   are	   in	   fact	   divergent	   practice	   as	   opposed	   to	  either	   establishing	   a	   new	   norm	   or	   breaches	   of	   international	   law.	   Divergent	  practice	  has	  been	  held	  to	  be	  a	  breach	  of	  international	  law	  in	  the	  Nicaragua	  case.97	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  Somalia	  is	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  UNCLOS	  Art	  57	  as	  the	  limit	  set	  there	  for	  a	  territorial	  sea	  is	  200M.	  The	  court	  however,	  seems	  to	  have	  given	  itself	  some	   leeway	   in	   its	   decision	   by	   adopting	   the	   use	   of	   the	  word	   ‘generally’	  which	  would	  indicate	  that	  there	  are	  some	  times	  when	  state	  conduct	  is	  not	  a	  breach	  of	  a	  rule	  but	  is	  practice	  that	  has	  either	  been	  accepted	  by	  some	  states	  as	  being	  valid	  or	  is	   a	   developing	   custom.	  At	   one	  point	   in	   time	   the	   Latin	  American	   States	   almost	  uniformly	  claimed	  a	  200M	  territorial	  sea	  and	  this	  action	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  regional	  custom	  that	  may	  not	  be	  universally	  accepted.98	  As	  indicated	  above	  the	  concept	  of	  a	   regional	   custom	   is	   disputed	   and	   was	   raised	   in	   the	   Asylum	   case	   where	   the	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  custom	  was	  challenged	  by	  the	  court	  as,	  	   ‘The	  court	  cannot	  therefore	  find	  that	  the	  Colombian	  Government	  has	  proved	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  custom.	  But	  even	  if	  it	  could	  be	  supposed	  that	  such	  a	  custom	  existed	  between	  certain	  Latin-­‐American	  States	  only…’99	  	  The	  Organisation	  of	  African	  Unity,	   (OAU),	   encouraged	  African	  States	   to	   claim	  a	  200M	  territorial	  sea	  as	  part	  of	   the	  process	  of	  protecting	  security	  and	  economic	  development	   of	   African	   States100	  with	   the	   hope	   of	   developing	   regional	   stability	  and	  strength,	  unfortunately	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  a	  uniform	  territorial	  sea	  did	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  At	  p73.	  
97	  Case	  Concerning	  Military	  and	  Paramilitary	  Activities	  in	  and	  Against	  Nicaragua	  (Nicaragua	  v	  
United	  States	  of	  America)	  (1986)	  I.C.J.	  Reports	  14.	  
98	  Thirlway,	  above	  n	  93	  at	  p94.	  This	  regional	  custom	  existed	  between	  1945	  and	  1960.	  
99	  Columbian-­‐Peruvian	  asylum	  (Colombia	  v	  Peru)	  (1950),	  above	  n	  90	  at	  pp277-­‐8.	  
100	  Nasila	  Rembe	  A	  Study	  of	  the	  Contribution	  of	  the	  African	  States	  to	  the	  Third	  United	  Nations	  
Conference	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  (Sijthoff	  &	  Noordhoff,	  Alphen	  aan	  den	  Rijn,	  1980)	  citing	  OAU	  (CM/RES	  250	  Art	  2(extend	  sovereignty	  from	  territorial	  sea	  up	  to	  limits	  of	  continental	  shelf)	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occur.101	  Somalia’s	  claim	  to	  200M	  territorial	  sea	  is	  compromised	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	   is	  unable	  to	  effectively	  police	  the	  zone.	  Part	  of	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  claim	  for	   a	   territorial	   sea	   was	   based	   on	   effective	   control	   over	   sovereign	   territory,	  including	  the	  sea	  zones.102	  	  This	  state	  of	  uncertainty	  then	  brings	  into	  question	  the	  current	  ability	  of	  Somalia	  to	  exercise	  its	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  alleged	  illegal	  fishing	  vessels	  operating	  off	  its	  coast.	  It	  has	  been	  held	  that	  this	  confusion	  over	  the	  limits	  of	  Somalia’s	  jurisdiction	  has	   created	   the	   possibility	   that	   the	   HS	   extend	   to	   the	   Somali	   coast.103	  	   The	  uncertainty	  is	  further	  clouded	  by	  Somaliland	  Fishery	  Law	  No	  24	  of	  27	  November	  1995.104	  This	  legislation	  addresses	  the	  inconsistencies	  between	  the	  UNCLOS	  and	  Somali	  Law	  No	  37.	  Somaliland	  law	  is	  in	  the	  process	  of	  being	  updated	  so	  that	  Art	  2	  of	  the	  Somaliland	  Constitution,105	  which	  defines	  maritime	  zones,	  is	  in	  harmony	  with	  the	  UNCLOS.	  The	  process	  also	  recognises	  the	  impossibility	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  200M	  territorial	  sea	  due	  to	  the	  closeness	  of	  the	  Yemen.	  The	  intention	  is	  to	  align	  the	   three	   main	   zones	   with	   Djibouti	   and	   Yemen	   bringing	   them	   back	   to	   12M	  territorial	  sea,	  24M	  contiguous	  zone	  and	  200M	  EEZ	  until	  agreement	   is	  reached	  with	  Yemen	  and	  a	  new	  boundary	  delimited.	  Art	  2	  of	  the	  Constitution	  states	  that	  the	   EEZ	   will	   be	   at	   its	   minimum	   11M	   and	   at	   it’s	   maximum	   30M.	   Until	   the	  agreement	  is	  reached	  with	  Yemen	  on	  boundaries,	  the	  boundary	  will	  be	  a	  median	  point	  drawn	   from	   the	  baselines	  used	  by	  each	  State	   to	  determine	   it’s	   territorial	  sea.	  The	  process	  of	  delimitation	   is	   further	  repeated	   in	  Art	  2	  of	  Fishery	  Law	  No	  24.	  The	  effectiveness	  of	  this	  law	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  Somaliland	  while	  having	  claimed	  independence,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  that	  has	  not	  been	  recognised,	  Somalia	  is	  still	  seen	  as	  the	  State.	  As	  stated	  in	  the	  section	  on	  the	  continental	  shelf	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  At	  p94.	  Had	  this	  occurred	  there	  would	  be	  grounds	  for	  arguing	  that	  Somalia’s	  claim	  to	  200M	  territorial	  sea	  was	  part	  of	  the	  regional	  custom.	  
102	  Rothwell	  and	  Stephens,	  above	  n	  97	  at	  p73.	  
103	  Jack	  Lang	  Report	  of	  the	  Special	  Adviser	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  on	  Legal	  Issues	  Related	  to	  
Piracy	  off	  the	  Coast	  of	  Somalia	  S/2011/30	  (United	  Nations	  2011)	  at	  Annex1	  p30	  paragraph	  [89]	  where	  it	  was	  declared	  that	  Somalia	  was	  deprived	  of	  both	  a	  territorial	  sea	  and	  an	  exclusive	  economic	  zone.	  There	  is	  however,	  no	  supporting	  reasoning	  as	  to	  why	  this	  should	  be	  so.	  
104	  Somaliland	  Fishery	  Law	  No	  24.	  
105	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Somaliland	  (adopted	  30	  April	  2000).	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the	  recent	   lodging	  of	  a	  claim	  by	  Somalia	  would	  also	   include	   the	  waters	  around	  Somaliland	  and	  be	  attributable	  to	  Somalia.	  	  Seeking	   to	   gain	   some	   clarity	   over	   the	   maritime	   zones	   of	   Somalia,	   the	  international	   maritime	   Organisation,	   (IMO),	   has	   produced	   a	   table	   of	   existing	  maritime	   laws	   relevant	   to	   security	   and	   maritime	   enforcement.106	  This	   table	  identifies	   eleven	  pieces	  of	   legislation,	   of	  which	   seven	  are	   identified	  as	  being	   in	  force,	   of	   which	   two	   are	   applicable	   to	   Somaliland	   and	   three	   to	   Puntland.	   The	  status	  of	  the	  remaining	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  is	  described	  as	  being	  unclear.	  There	  is	  no	  authority	  for	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  these	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  apart	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  participants	  in	  a	  maritime	  law	  enforcement	  workshop	  mentioned	  them.	  	  The	  UN	  has	  taken	  a	  different	  perspective	  by	  authorising	  states	  to	  enter	  Somalian	  territorial	   seas	   through	   the	   use	   of	   Security	   Council	   resolutions.	   The	   TFG,	   UN	  Security	   Council	   and	   navies	   operating	   as	   part	   of	   counter	   piracy	   operations	  subscribe	   to	   a	   12M	   territorial	   sea.107	  The	   action	   by	   the	   UN,	   and	   accepted	   by	  navies	  operating	  in	  the	  area,	   indicates	  that	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  possibility	  that	  the	  UN	  accepts	  Somalia	  has,	  not	  a	  200M	  territorial	   sea,	  but	  a	  200M	  EEZ.	  This	   then	  allows	   for	   the	   freedom	  of	  navigation,	   as	   codified	  under	  Art	  87(1)	   the	  UNCLOS,	  through	   the	  EEZ	  by	  other	   states	   including	   the	  navies	  of	   States	   involved	   in	   anti	  piracy	  operations.	  This	  also	  allows	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  pirates	  within	  the	  zone	  as	  if	  they	  were	  on	  the	  HS.	  The	  pursuit	  of	  fishing	  vessels	  may	  be	  continued	  into	  the	  HS	  from	   the	   territorial	   sea	  of	   Somalia	   in	   accord	  with	  Art	  111(2)	   the	  UNCLOS,	   and	  this	   right	   may	   also	   be	   applied	   to	   illegal	   fishing	   vessels	   where	   the	   vessel	   is	  suspected	  of	  breaching	  Art	  58(3)	   the	  UNCLOS,	   and	   the	  duty	   to	   follow	   the	   laws	  and	   regulations	   of	   the	   coastal	   State	   under	   Art	   111(1).	   The	   power	   to	   visit	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  “Table	  of	  Somali	  Laws	  Relevant	  to	  Maritime	  Law	  Enforcement	  (prepared	  on	  18	  March	  2013)”	  	  (2013)	  www.imo.org/search/results.aspx?k=table%20of%20Somali520Laws%20Relevant%20to%20Maritime%20Law%20Enforcement.	  While	  some	  of	  the	  documents	  are	  readily	  accessible,	  others	  particularly	  those	  relating	  to	  Puntland,	  are	  only	  available	  in	  Somali.	  
107	  J	  Ashley	  Roach	  “Countering	  Piracy	  off	  the	  Coast	  of	  Somalia”	  2010	  104	  A.	  J.	  I.	  L.	  at	  p402.	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board	  a	  vessel	   is	  conferred	  on	  states	  when	  operating	  within	  the	  EEZ	  under	  Art	  110	  the	  UNCLOS,	  however,	  this	  right	  is	  limited	  to	  piracy	  or	  specifically	  where	  the	  vessel	  is	  without	  nationality	  which	  may	  apply	  in	  cases	  of	  illegal	  fishing	  if	  vessels	  are	  trying	  to	  avoid	  recognition,	  (Art	  110(d)).	  If	  the	  area	  claimed	  by	  Somalia	  as	  it’s	  territorial	  sea	  is	  treated	  by	  the	  UN	  as	  a	  territorial	  sea	  then	  this	  limits	  the	  rights	  of	  visit	  and	  boarding	  of	  vessels	  and	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  Somalia	  applies	  and	  only	  its	  vessels	  may	  operate	  to	  police	  its	  laws	  and	  regulations	  within	  the	  territorial	  sea.	  The	  coastal	  State	  may,	   in	  a	  territorial	  sea,	  prevent	  the	   infringement	  of	   fisheries	  laws	   and	   regulations,	   as	   these	   are	   a	   breach	   of	   the	   right	   of	   innocent	   passage	  granted	  under	  Art	  19	  the	  UNCLOS.	  	  While	   acknowledging	   the	   existence	   of	   Somalian	   jurisdiction	   over	   a	   band	   of	  maritime	  waters	  that	  could	  be	  classed	  as	  territorial	  seas	  the	  UN	  has	  avoided	  any	  direct	   reference	   to	   territorial	   seas	   and	   instead	  used	   the	   somewhat	   vague	   term	  ‘territorial	  waters’	   that	   lacks	  any	   legal	  consequence	  or	  definition.	  108	  	  The	  use	  of	  the	   term	   has	   effectively	   sidestepped	   the	   discussion	   over	  whether	   there	   is	   any	  claim	   by	   Somalia	   to	   territorial	   waters	   and	   the	   breadth	   of	   the	   sea	   over	   which	  Somalia	  has	  jurisdiction.	  It	  could	  be	  implied	  that	  the	  UN	  was	  acknowledging	  that	  under	  UNCLOS,	  Somalia	  has	  an	  inherent	  right	  to	  a	  territorial	  sea,	  it	  was	  just	  the	  boundaries	   that	  were	   in	  dispute.	  This	   lack	  of	   clarity	  does	  not	  make	   the	  matter	  any	  easier	  for	  the	  naval	  vessels	  operating	  in	  the	  waters	  around	  Somalia	  as	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  specification	  as	  to	  the	  point	  at	  which	  they	  should	  obtain	  authorisation	  to	  enter	  Somalia’s	  territorial	  waters,	  is	  it	  the	  12M	  boundary	  under	  UNCLOS	  or	  at	  the	  outer	  limits	  of	  the	  200M	  territorial	  sea	  as	  claimed	  by	  Somalia?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  SC	  Res.1816,	  S/RES/1816	  (2008)	  SC	  9344	  (entry	  into	  sovereign	  waters	  to	  interdict	  pirates),	  Security	  council	  authorises	  States	  to	  use	  land	  based	  operations	  in	  Somalia	  as	  part	  of	  the	  fight	  against	  piracy	  off	  the	  coast,	  unanimously	  adopting	  
United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  SC	  Res.1851,	  S/RES/1851	  (2008)	  SC/9541	  (allows	  incursion	  into	  sovereign	  waters	  of	  Somalia	  as	  well	  as	  authorising	  incursions	  onto	  land.),	  preamble,	  Background,	  Art	  3,	  art	  7(a)	  and	  (b).	  Statements	  made	  by	  Indonesia	  recognised	  that	  the	  resolution	  applied	  only	  within	  the	  territorial	  waters	  of	  Somalia,	  Libya	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  resolution	  applied	  within	  the	  territorial	  waters	  and	  jurisdiction	  of	  Somalia	  thereby	  acknowledging	  that	  the	  area	  was	  under	  the	  local	  jurisdiction	  of	  Somalia.	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As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   the	   Lang	   report	   suggests	   that	   Somalia	   is	   deprived	   of	   a	  territorial	  sea	  and	  an	  EEZ.109	  However,	  Somalia	  is	  entitled	  to	  a	  minimum	  of	  a	  3M	  territorial	   sea	   as	   this	   was	   the	   minimum	   claimed	   by	   Somalia	   in	   its	   modern	  history.110	  The	  claims	  by	  the	  Lang	  report	  seems	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  earlier	  claim	  that	   Somalia	   had	   jurisdiction	  over	   territorial	  waters	   and	   in	   the	   absence	  of	   any	  other	   claims	   to	  maritime	   zones	   by	   Somalia	   the	   HS	   have	   been	   extended	   to	   the	  coast	  of	  Somalia.	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  currently	  alleged	  illegal	  fishing	  could	  be	  conducted	  by	  any	  state	  to	  the	  same	  boundaries.	  Any	  fishing	  by	  foreign	  vessels	  would	   consequently	  not	  be	   illegal.	  This	   cannot	  be	   the	   case,	  because	  until	  1991	  Somalia	  was	   licensing	   foreign	   vessels	   to	   fish	   in	   its	   waters.111	  Either	   the	   Somali	  government	  was	   operating	   a	   large-­‐scale	   fraud	   based	   on	   fraudulent	   licences	   or	  both	  parties	  accepted	  that	  Somalia	  was	  exercising	  its	  rights	  obtained	  under	  the	  UNCLOS	  within	  its	  territorial	  waters.	  A	  later	  UN	  report	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  still	  some	  legal	  ambiguity	  around	  the	  status	  of	  Somalia’s	  waters.112	  	  The	  Lang	  report	  focuses	  on	  the	  legal	  issues	  surrounding	  piracy	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia,	  while	  the	  second	   report	   looks	   specifically	   at	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   natural	   resources	   of	  Somalia	  including	  it’s	  fish	  stock	  and	  the	  allegations	  of	  illegal	  fishing.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  resolution	  to	  the	  territorial	  sea	  problem	  will	  only	  come	   about	   when	   Somalia’s	   elected	   constitutional	   government	   has	   made	  application	  to	  delimit	   it’s	  EEZ	  and	  a	  continental	  shelf.113	  There	  has	  been	  neither	  an	  adoption	  of	   these	   limits	  nor	  a	   change	   in	   the	  national	   legislation.	  Once	   these	  procedural	  matters	  have	  been	  resolved	  then	  a	  territorial	  sea	  and	  an	  EEZ	  can	  be	  defined	   in	   limits	   that	   accord	   with	   the	   UNCLOS.	   To	   this	   end,	   action	   has	   been	  started	   by	   Somalia	   against	   Kenya	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   solve	   a	   dispute	   over	   the	   sea	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  Lang,	  above	  n	  103.	  
110	  Churchill	  and	  Lowe,	  above	  n	  93	  at	  p81.	  
111	  Arky,	  above	  n	  27	  at	  p2.	  
112	  Report	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  Somali	  Natural	  Resources	  and	  Waters	  	  S/2011/661	  (2011).	  
113	  Somalia	  has	  submitted	  a	  claim	  for	  a	  continental	  shelf	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  Norway.	  
	   	   Chapter	  3	  
	   86	  
boundaries	  between	  the	  two	  states.114	  In	  the	  interim,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  Somalia’s	   territorial	   sea	   extends	   out	   to	   the	   12M	   limit	   as	   allowed	   under	   the	  UNCLOS.	  The	  court	  of	  first	  instance	  in	  Salad115	  identified	  that	  Somalia	  has	  ratified	  the	  UNCLOS,	  although	  there	  may	  be	  some	  doubt	  about	  the	  ratification	  as	  it	  was	  concluded	   in	   1994.116	  UNCLOS	   supersedes	   national	   law	   and	   it	   is	   the	   duty	   of	  ratifying	  States	  to	  bring	  national	   law	  into	  conformity	  with	  the	  treaty.	  The	  court	  also	   identified	   that	  UNCLOS	   can	  be	   accepted	   as	   CIL	   as	   it	   has	   been	   ratified	   and	  consistently	  acted	  on	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  States,	  some	  162	  to	  date,	  excluding	  the	  US.	  The	  case	  could	  only	  be	  considered	  informative	  in	  its	  application	  outside	  the	  boundaries	  of	   the	  US.	  While	   the	  12M	   limit,	   is	  not	   the	  default	  position	  as	   to	   the	  distance	  of	  a	   territorial	   sea,	  Somalia	  has	  previously	   legitimately	  claimed	  a	  12M	  territorial	  sea.117	  Prior	  then,	  to	  it’s	  claim	  for	  a	  territorial	  sea	  of	  200M,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  assert	  that	  there	  was	  a	  desire	  to	  extend	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  Somalia	  out	  to	  12M.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  territorial	  sea	  of	  Somalia	  that	  complies	  with	  both	  CIL	  and	  the	  UNCLOS	  is	  12M.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  “Somalia	  institutes	  proceedings	  against	  Kenya	  with	  regard	  to	  "a	  dispute	  concerning	  maritime	  delimitation	  in	  the	  Indian	  Ocean"	  No	  2014/27”	  (press	  release,	  28	  August	  2014).	  
115	  U.S.	  v	  Salad,	  above	  n	  89,	  a	  US	  case	  with	  regard	  to	  suspected	  pirates	  who	  were	  captured	  some	  400M	  from	  Somalia’s	  coast	  after	  murdering	  four	  victims	  some	  40M	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia.	  The	  defence	  argued	  that	  the	  acts	  took	  place	  within	  the	  territory	  of	  Somalia	  and	  that	  the	  US	  lacked	  authorisation	  for	  the	  extraterritorial	  application	  of	  two	  sections,	  murder	  under	  18	  U.S.C.A	  §1111	  where	  the	  offence	  occurred	  within	  the	  special	  maritime	  and	  territorial	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  firearms	  offences	  under	  §924	  which	  relates	  to	  the	  illegal	  possession	  of	  firearms.	  	  
116	  Report	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  Somali	  Natural	  Resources	  and	  Waters,	  above	  n	  112	  at	  p7.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  ratification	  Somalia	  was	  without	  an	  effective	  government.	  
117	  Rembe,	  above	  n	  101	  at	  p	  92.	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12 Responses	  to	  illegal	  fishing	   	  
12.1 Somalia’s	  response	  to	  illegal	  fishers.	  	  As	  has	  been	  stated,	  Somalia	  is	  a	  state	  with	  ineffective	  government	  and	  therefore	  lacks	   the	   ability	   to	   make	   either,	   State-­‐to-­‐State	   representations	   regarding	   the	  illegal	  fishing	  or	  to	  make	  representations	  to	  international	  organisations	  that	  will	  be	   acknowledged	   as	   coming	   from	   the	   State	   of	   Somalia.	   This	   however,	   has	   not	  stopped	   organisations	   within	   Somalia	   making	   representations	   to	   the	   Italian	  Foreign	  Minister	  in	  1992	  seeking	  to	  have	  illegal	  fishing	  stopped.	  Further	  appeals	  have	   been	   made	   to	   the	   Arab	   League,	   EU,	   OAU	   and	   UN	   in	   1995,	   all	   seeking	  assistance	  in	  closing	  down	  illegal	  fishing.118	  	  	  
12.2 Regional	  responses	  within	  Somalia	  All	   three	  regions	  of	  Somalia,	  Puntland,	  Somaliland	  and	  the	  TFG,	  (south	  western	  area),	  have	  responded	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  to	  the	  incidents	  of	  illegal	  fishing	  off	  their	   coasts.	   Since	  1991	  each	   region	  has	  employed	  private	   security	   companies,	  (PSCs,	  discussed	  later	  in	  Chapter	  5),	  to	  assist	  in	  policing	  regional	  fisheries.119	  The	  benefits	   or	   otherwise	   of	   employing	   PSCs	   have	   been	   debated	   and	   the	   benefits	  generally	   outweigh	   the	   deficits.120	  Benefits	   range	   from	   the	   infusion	   of	   external	  skills,	   technology	  and	   resources,	   to	   fill	   a	   legitimate	  un-­‐met	  need	  due	   to	   lack	  of	  capability,	   through	   to	   allowing	   weaker	   bodies	   to	   protect	   natural	   resources	   or	  provide	  public	  goods	  that	  would	  not	  otherwise	  be	  provided.121	  They	  also	  provide	  access	  to	   international	  networks	  that	  are	  beyond	  the	  ability	  of	  poorer	  States	  to	  access.122	  On	   the	   other	   side	   of	   the	   ledger,	   PSCs	   inhibit	   the	   development	   of	   the	  relevant	  resources	  by	  the	  employing	  body	  and	  can	  also	  damage	  the	  relationship	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  Bawumia	  and	  Sumaila,	  above	  n	  13	  at	  p2.	  
119	  Hansen,	  above	  n	  41	  at	  p565.	  
120	  At	  p586	  citing	  M	  Small	  “Privitisation	  of	  Security	  and	  Military	  Functions	  in	  Africa”	  Accord	  Occasional	  Paper	  1(2)	  (2006).	  
121	  At	  p586.	  
122	  At	  p586.	  
	   	   Chapter	  3	  
	   88	  
with	   national	   people,	   as	   being	   employed	   they	   can	   operate	   outside	   democratic	  control.123	  	  The	   TFG	   has	   had	   several	   attempts	   at	   employing	   PSCs	   to	   provide	   maritime	  security.	   Since	   2005	   two	   companies	   have	   been	   employed,	   Top	   Cat	   and	  Northbridge,	  with	  varying	  results.124	  The	  major	  stumbling	  block	  for	  both	  of	  these	  organisations	   was	   their	   inability	   to	   arrange	   sufficient	   finance,	   either	   through	  their	  own	  resources,	  or	  through	  the	  TFG	  access	  to	  foreign	  funding.125	  In	  the	  end	  neither	   of	   these	   two	   companies	   have	   provided	   the	   much-­‐needed	   security	   for	  maritime	  resources.126	  	  	  Puntland	  has	  tried	  various	  PSCs	  to	  protect	  the	  resource	  rich	  waters	  off	  its	  coast,	  Hart	   Security,	   Somalia	   Canadian	   Coast	   Guard,	   SOMCAN	   and	   Al	   Habibi	   Marine	  Services.	  Hart	  Security	  was	  employed	  with	  consistently	  good	  results	  in	  the	  early	  stage	   of	   its	   employment.127 	  The	   major	   issue	   facing	   both	   Hart	   Security	   and	  Puntland,	   was	   the	   legal	   status	   of	   the	   security	   company	   should	   it	   apprehend	  vessels	  fishing	  illegally.	  Puntland	  is	  not	  recognised	  as	  a	  State	  at	  international	  law.	  Any	   action	  by	  Hart	   in	   exercising	   aspects	   of	   its	   contract	   related	   to	   detention	   of	  illegal	  fishing	  vessels	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  piracy	  or	  sea	  robbery	  depending	  where	  the	   actions	   took	   place.128	  Hart	   detained	   a	   Spanish	   fishing	   vessel	   the	   Albacora	  
Quatro	  off	  the	  Puntland	  Coast.	  The	  owners	  of	  the	  vessel	  challenged	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  action.	  The	  matter	  was	  settled	  through	  international	  arbitration.	  	  	  Art	   110	   of	   UNCLOS	   confers	   a	   ‘right	   of	   visit’	   on	   warships	   where	   there	   are	  reasonable	  grounds	   for	  suspecting	  that	  a	  vessel	   is	  engaged	   in	  one	  or	  more	  of	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  Hansen,	  above	  n	  41	  at	  p586.	  
124	  At	  pp591-­‐4.	  	  
125	  At	  pp591-­‐4.	  
126	  At	  p587.	  
127	  At	  p587.	  
128	  At	  p	  587.	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limited	   number	   of	   activities.129	  There	   is	   no	   ‘right	   of	   visit’	   on	   the	  HS	   for	   vessels	  that	  are	  not	  warships	  or	  for	  vessels	  believed	  to	  be	  illegally	  fishing.	  There	  is	  under	  Art	   73	   a	   right	   to	   board	   a	   vessel	   within	   the	   EEZ	   in	   the	   exercise	   of	   the	   State’s	  sovereign	   right	   to	   conserve	   and	   manage	   the	   living	   resources.	   Art	   96	   confers	  immunity	   from	   jurisdiction	   on	   States	   other	   than	   the	   flag	   State	   if	   on	   non-­‐commercial	  government	  service.	  The	  vessels	  used	  by	  Hart	  could	  be	  perceived	  to	  be	  on	  commercial	  service	  due	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  contract	  between	  Hart	  and	  Puntland.	  	  	  Somali	  Law	  No	  23	  covers	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  Somalian	  waters	  and	  empowers	  the	  Navy	   under	   Art	   13	   as	   the	   only	   legitimate	   body	   authorised	   to	   enforce	   the	   law.	  Hart	   was	   not	   contracted	   by	   Somalia	   to	   replace	   its	   navy,	   so	   the	   actions	   in	  detaining	  vessels	  would	  not	  be	  authorised.	  	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  pirates	  from	  Somalia,	  that	  the	  PSCs	  might	  be	  able	  to	  claim	  to	  be	  operating	  as	  privateers.130	  The	  Hague	  Convention	  of	  1907 131 	  Chapter	   VII	   Arts	   1-­‐8	   clarified	   this	   practice.	   Traditionally	   letters	   of	  marque	   and	   reprisal	   were	   issued	   by	   the	   government	   of	   the	   day.132	  Letters	   of	  marque	  were	   issued	   to	  private	   vessels,	   known	  as	  privateers,	   in	   time	  of	  war	   to	  bolster	  naval	  capacity.133	  The	  letter	  of	  marque	  granted	  the	  right	  to	  board	  a	  vessel	  and	   recover	   cargos	   previously	   taken	   from	   the	   boarding	   vessel,	   as	   long	   as	   the	  vessel	  boarded	  was	  either	  involved	  in	  the	  original	  theft	  or	  from	  the	  same	  port.134	  The	  vessels	  recovering	  cargo	  were	  either	  allowed	  to	  keep	  the	  property	  obtained	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Art	  110	  specifies	  piracy,	  slave	  trade,	  unauthorised	  broadcasting,	  the	  vessel	  is	  without	  nationality	  or	  maybe	  flying	  a	  foreign	  flag	  but	  is	  of	  the	  same	  nationality	  as	  the	  warship.	  	  
130	  Bawumia	  and	  Sumaila,	  above	  n	  13	  at	  p1.	  James	  Brown	  Pirates	  and	  Privateers:	  Managing	  the	  
Indian	  Ocean's	  Private	  Security	  Boom	  (Lowy	  Institute	  for	  International	  Policy,	  Sydney,	  2012)	  at	  p8.	  
131	  Hague	  Convention	  of	  1907	  (opened	  for	  signature	  18	  October	  1907	  entered	  into	  force	  1910)	  
132	  Theodore	  Richard	  “Reconsidering	  the	  Letter	  of	  Marque:	  Utilising	  Private	  Security	  Providers	  Against	  Piracy”	  2010	  39	  Pub.	  Cont.	  L.	  J.	  at	  p415.	  
133	  K	  Sorenson	  State	  Failure	  on	  the	  High	  Seas	  -­‐	  Reviewing	  the	  Somali	  Piracy	  (Swedish	  Defence	  Agency,	  Stockholm,	  2008)	  at	  p26.	  
134	  At	  p27.	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or	   were	   to	   share	   it	   with	   the	   sovereign.135	  The	   use	   of	   letters	   of	   marque	   and	  privateers	   started	   as	   two	   separate	   practices.	   Overtime	   the	   boundaries	   became	  blurred	   and	   they	   became	   indistinct	   from	   each	   other.136	  The	   blurring	   of	   the	  practices	  was	  compounded	  when	  they	  were	  employed	  at	  times	  outside	  a	  state	  of	  war	   being	   declared	   as	   they	   were	   used	   to	   disrupt	   the	   trade	   of	   competitors,	  particularly	   between	   Britain	   and	   France. 137 	  The	   sovereign	   originally	   issued	  letters	  of	  marque,	  over	   time	   the	  practice	  degenerated	  and	   those	  of	   lesser	  rank,	  including	  despot	  State	  governors,	  mid	  level	  military	  officers	  and	  Latin	  American	  revolutionaries	   also	   started	   using	   them.138	  The	   main	   users	   of	   both	   letters	   of	  marque	  and	  privateers	  agreed	   in	  1856	   in	   the	  Paris	  Declaration	   to	  outlaw	   their	  use.139	  There	  is	  no	  scope	  for	  Hart	  to	  claim	  that	  they	  were	  acting	  as	  privateers,	  as	  Britain	   was	   a	   signatory	   to	   the	   Paris	   Declaration,	   and	   if	   the	   Hart	   vessels	   were	  registered	  under	  the	  British	  flag,	  then	  Art	  1	  of	  the	  Paris	  Declaration	  would	  bind	  them.	  	  Puntland	   also	   employed	   both	   SOMCAN	   and	  Al	  Habibi	  Marine	   Services.	   Both	   of	  these	  organisations	  were	  not	  as	  successful	  as	  Hart.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  SOMCAN,	  it	  was	  a	   clan-­‐based	   organisation	   supported	   by	   the	   then	   President,	   Yusuf,140	  and	  when	  the	   presidency	   changed	   in	   2008,	   SOMCAN	   lost	   its	   support.	   This	   was	   further	  hampered	  by	  their	  attempts	  to	  fund	  their	  operations	  by	  using	  licensing	  fees;	  this	  became	   nothing	   more	   than	   a	   protection	   racket.141	  Al	   Habibi	   signed	   a	   contract	  with	   Puntland	   in	   2005	   that	   lasted	   until	   2008.	   Its	   success	   included	   a	   two-­‐day	  period	   when	   it	   is	   reported	   that	   13	   vessels	   from	   Yemeni	   and	   Egypt	   were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  At	  p26.	  
136	  At	  p27	  
137	  Sorenson,	  above	  n	  133	  at	  p26.	  
138	  Eugene	  Kontorovich	  “The	  Piracy	  Analogy:	  Modern	  Universal	  Jurisdiction's	  Hollow	  Foundation”	  2004	  45	  Harv.	  Int’l	  L.	  J.	  183	  at	  p222.	  	  
139	  Declaration	  of	  Paris	  Respecting	  Maritime	  Law	  (signed	  16	  April	  1856)	  Art	  1	  ‘Privateering	  is	  and	  remains	  abolished.’	  	  
140	  Hansen,	  above	  n	  41	  at	  p588.	  
141	  Richard,	  above	  n	  132	  at	  p452.	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apprehended	   for	   illegal	   fishing. 142 	  Al	   Habibi’s	   downfall	   was	   associated	   with	  allegations	  that	  its	  members	  had	  taken	  part	  in	  piracy.143	  	  Somaliland	  took	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  PSCs.	  Somaliland	  employed	  the	  services	  of	  Nordic	  Crisis	  Management,	  (NCM),	  not	  to	  carry	  out	  operational	  activities,	  but	  to	   develop	   security	   systems	   that	   complied	  with	   international	   standards	   set	   by	  the	  IMO	  and	  the	  UN.144	  NCM	  was	  funded	  through	  aid	  provided	  by	  the	  Norwegian	  Government	  so	  did	  not	  suffer	  from	  the	  same	  setbacks	  as	  the	  other	  companies.145	  NCM	  was	   also	   contracted	   to	   report	   on	   the	   feasibility	   of	   the	   development	   of	   a	  coastguard.146	  	  PSCs	  involved	  in	  establishing	  maritime	  security	  for	  Somalia	  and	  its	  regions	  have	  met	  a	  number	  of	   logistical	  problems	   that	  have	  reduced	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  companies	  in	  supplying	  quality	  security	  for	  the	  fisheries	  off	  Somalia’s	  coast	  and	  reducing	  the	  incidents	  of	  illegal	  fishing.	  The	  major	  legal	  hurdle	  is	  establishing	  the	  extent	   of	   legitimate	   authority	   that	   the	   PSCs	   have	   to	   act	   on	   behalf	   of	   non-­‐sovereign	   entities	   in	   carrying	   out	   basic	   governmental	   tasks	   in	   the	   form	   of	  security	  over	  national	  fisheries.	  There	  has	  been	  significant	  discussion	  regarding	  the	  actions	  of	  pirates	  as	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  their	  actions	  being	  sanctioned	  in	  a	  form	  similar	  to	  the	  privateers	  of	  old.147	  However,	  the	  Paris	  Declaration	  still	  stands	  as	  outlawing	  the	  practice.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  Hansen,	  above	  n	  41	  at	  p590.	  
143	  Richard,	  above	  n132	  at	  p415.	  
144	  Hansen,	  above	  n	  41	  at	  p594.	  
145	  At	  p594.	  
146	  Hansen,	  above	  n	  41	  at	  p594.	  
147	  Arky,	  above	  n	  27	  at	  p26	  and	  Bawumia	  and	  Sumaila,	  above	  n	  13	  at	  p7.	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12.3 International	  community’s	  response	  to	  Somalia’s	  problem	  of	  illegal	  
fishing	  While	   there	   may	   exist	   a	   number	   of	   measures	   at	   international	   law	   for	   the	  international	   community	   to	   directly	   assist	   Somalia	   in	   the	   protection	   of	   its	  fisheries	   there	   is	   no	   clear	   and	   concerted	   policy	   enunciated	   through	   the	   UN	  directing	  member	  States	   to	   increase	   their	  efforts	   to	  utilise	   the	  measures	  stated	  below.	  The	  closest	  that	  any	  international	  body	  has	  come	  to	  assisting	  Somalia	  is	  in	  the	  mandate	  given	  to	  European	  Union	  Naval	  Force,	  (EU	  NAVFOR),	  which	  calls	  for	  vessels	  to	  the	  ‘…monitoring	  of	  fishing	  activities	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia.’148	  There	  have	   been	   instances	   where	   pirates	   have	   detained	   fishing	   vessels	   for	   illegal	  fishing,	  but	  when	  released	  there	  has	  been	  no	  follow	  up	  activity	  by	  the	  European	  authorities.149	  	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  main	  reason	  behind	  this	  apparent	  lack	  of	  activity	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  general	   lack	  of	  political	  will	  and	  the	  hesitancy	  to	  become	  involved	   in	   the	   affairs	   of	   another	   state.150	  It	   is	   not	   suggested	   that	   other	   states	  actively	  patrol	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Somalian	  government,	  rather	  that	   the	   measures	   made	   available	   under	   the	   UNCLOS,	   FSA,	   RFMO	   and	   other	  treaties	   and	   agreements	   that	   focus	  on	  duties	   and	   responsibilities	   of	   flag	   States	  and	  port	  States	  are	  put	  into	  practice	  to	  minimise	  their	  State’s	  involvement	  with	  illegal	   fishing	   and	   consequently	   make	   it	   harder	   for	   illegal	   fishers	   to	   continue	  their	  business.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148	  EU	  NAVFOR	  Mandate	  <eunavfor.eu/mission/>	  
149	  	  “Is	  the	  EU	  protecting	  illegal	  fishing	  vessels	  in	  Somalia	  waters?”	  The	  Business	  Daily	  (18	  September	  2010)	  The	  fishing	  vessel	  Alakrana	  was	  detained	  by	  pirates	  in	  2009	  and	  after	  several	  attempts	  by	  the	  Spanish	  Army	  to	  release	  the	  hostages,	  was	  finally	  released	  on	  the	  payment	  of	  USD4million.	  
150	  Cantrell,	  above	  n	  57	  at	  p400.	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Art	  56(2)	  of	   the	  UNCLOS	  constrains	   the	   coastal	   State	   in	  exercising	   its	   rights	   to	  have	   regard	   to	   the	   rights	  and	  duties	  of	  other	  States	  and	   to	  be	   compatible	  with	  provisions	  of	  the	  Convention.	  	  Art	  58(3)	  requires	  other	  States	  when	  exercising	  their	  rights	  and	  performing	  their	  duties	  within	  the	  EEZ	  to	  have	  regard	  to	  the	  rights	  and	  duties	  of	  the	  coastal	  State	  and	   requires	   them	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   laws	   and	   regulations	   adopted	   by	   the	  coastal	  State	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  convention	  and	  international	  law.	  	  UNCLOS	  Art	  62(4)	  directs	  nationals	  of	  other	  States	  who	   fish	  within	   the	  EEZ	   to	  comply	   with	   conservation	  measures	   and	  with	   the	   laws	   and	   regulations	   of	   the	  coastal	   State,	   with	   specific	   mention	   made	   of	   licensing	   (4)(a),	   quotas	   (4)(b),	  equipment	  and	  seasonal	  regulation	  (4)(c),	   the	  size	  and	  age	  of	   fish	   to	  be	  caught	  (4)(d),	   the	   reporting	   of	   catch	   and	   effort	   statistics,	   and	   vessel	   position	   reports	  (4)(e),	  the	  placement	  of	  observers	  on	  vessels	  by	  the	  coastal	  states	  (4)(g),	  and	  the	  landing	  of	  catch	  by	  licensed	  vessels	  in	  ports	  of	  the	  coastal	  State	  (4)(h)	  and	  lastly	  enforcement	  procedures	  (4)(k).	  	  	  Art	   64	   of	   the	   UNCLOS	   creates	   the	   responsibility	   for	   coastal	   States	   and	   other	  states	  whose	  national’s	  fish	  in	  the	  region	  for	  highly	  migratory	  fish	  species	  to	  co-­‐operate	   to	   ensure	   the	   conservation	   of	   those	   fish	   species	   and	   to	   promote	  optimum	   utilisation	   of	   such	   species	   throughout	   the	   region,	   both	   within	   and	  outside	  EEZs	  of	  those	  states.	  	  The	  control	  of	  fishing	  vessels	  is	  vested	  in	  the	  responsibilities	  outlined	  under	  Art	  94	  of	   the	  UNCLOS	   that	  stipulates	   the	  responsibility	   to	  exercise	   jurisdiction	  and	  control	  over	  vessels	  flying	  a	  State’s	  flag,	  Art	  94(1)	  and	  Art	  94(5)	  that	  requires	  the	  observance	   of	   international	   regulations	   procedures	   and	   practices,	   and	   to	   take	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necessary	   steps	   to	   ensure	   their	   observance.	   Under	   the	   UNCLOS	   Art	   94(6)	   flag	  States	  are	  required	  to	  investigate	  if	   it	   is	  reported	  to	  them	  by	  another	  State	  that	  one	   of	   their	   vessels	   is	   not	   under	   proper	   jurisdiction	   and	   effective	   control.	   The	  standard	  for	  effective	  control	  is	  the	  due	  diligence	  requirement,	  which	  requires	  a	  higher	  standard	  where	  the	  activity	  involves	  greater	  risk,	  it	  is	  suggested	  that	  high	  risk	  exists	  where	  there	  is	  limited	  control	  over	  natural	  resources,151	  such	  as	  exists	  off	  the	  Coast	  of	  Somalia.	  Due	  diligence	  requires	  not	  only	  having	  the	  legislation	  in	  place	  at	  a	  national	  level	  but	  also	  requires	  enforcement	  of	  that	  legislation.	  If	  there	  was	  a	  consistent	  practice	  of	  breaches	  of	  coastal	  State	  laws	  by	  a	  vessel	  it	  would	  be	  arguable	  that	  the	  flag	  State	  was	  not	  exerting	  its	  best	  efforts	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  was	  falling	  short	  of	  the	  requirement	  for	  effective	  control	  of	  vessels	  flying	  its	  flag.	  The	  precautionary	   principle,	   discussed	   fully	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   supports	   the	   duty	   to	  control	  lawfulness	  of	  the	  fishing	  activities	  of	  vessels	  flying	  the	  flag	  of	  a	  State.	  	  	  Owners	  intent	  on	  illegal	  fishing	  easily	  thwart	  these	  responsibilities	  as	  they	  seek	  out	   states	   that	   are	   particularly	   lax	   in	   meeting	   their	   obligations	   under	   this	  article.152	  The	   FSA	   and	   the	  Compliance	  Agreement	   specify	   flag	   State	   duties	   that	  are	   widely	   accepted	   and	   so	   would	   form	   part	   of	   the	   generally	   accepted	  international	  regulations,	  procedures	  and	  practices.	  Art	  58(2)	  applies	  Art	  94(1)	  to	  the	  EEZ.	  	  Art	  5	  FSA	  assigns	   responsibility	  of	   the	   flag	   State	   to	  be	   concurrent	  with	   coastal	  States.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  Pulp	  Mills	  on	  the	  River	  Uruguay	  (Argentina	  v	  Uruguay)	  (Judgment)	  I.C.J.	  Reports	  at	  paragraph	  197	   ‘An	  obligation	  to	  act	  with	  due	  diligence	  in	  respect	  of	  activities	  which	  take	  place	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  and	  control	  of	  each	  party.	  It	  is	  an	  obligation,	  which	  entails	  not	  only	  the	  adoption	  of	  appropriate	  rules	  and	  measures,	  but	  also	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  vigilance	  in	  their	  enforcement	  and	  the	  exercise	  of	  administrative	  control	  applicable	  to	  public	  and	  private	  operators,	  such	  as	  the	  monitoring	  of	  activities	  undertaken	  by	  such	  operators,	  to	  safeguard	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  other	  party.	  The	  responsibility	  of	  a	  party…	  would	  therefore	  be	  engaged	  if	  it	  was	  shown	  that	  it	  had	  failed	  to	  act	  diligently	  and	  thus	  take	  all	  appropriate	  measures	  to	  enforce	  its	  relevant	  regulations	  on	  a	  public	  or	  private	  operator	  under	  its	  jurisdiction.	  	  
152	  Cantrell,	  above	  n	  57	  at	  p384.	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  Under	   the	   FSA	   Arts	   18	   and	   19	   establish	   both	   duties	   of	   the	   flag	   State	   and	   the	  compliance	   and	   enforcement	   requirements	   of	   a	   flag	   State.	   Art	   18(1)	   ensures	  compliance	   with	   regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   conservation	   and	   management	  measures	   by	   vessels	   flying	   the	   State	   flag	   and	   that	   the	   vessels	   do	   not	   act	   to	  undermine	  effectiveness	  of	  such	  measures.	  Art	  18(2)	  limits	  issuance	  of	   licences	  to	   cases	  where	   the	   State	   can	   effectively	   exercise	   its	   responsibilities	   under	   the	  UNCLOS	  and	  FSA	  towards	  its	  vessels.	  Art	  18(3)	  stipulates	  a	  range	  of	  measures	  to	  be	   taken	   with	   regards	   vessels	   flying	   its	   flag	   including	   establishment	   of	  regulations,	  the	  prohibition	  on	  fishing	  on	  the	  high	  seas	  unless	  licensed,	  to	  ensure	  that	   vessels	   do	   not	   conduct	   unauthorised	   fishing	   within	   areas	   controlled	   by	  other	  States,	  the	  establishment	  of	  records	  of	  vessels	  licensed	  to	  fish	  on	  the	  high	  seas,	   and	   the	   appropriate	   marking	   of	   vessels	   and	   gear.	   Other	   requirements	  include	   reporting	   of	   catch	   and	   vessel	   position,	   verification	   of	   the	   catch,	  monitoring,	  control	  and	  surveillance	  of	  fishing	  vessels.	  FSA	  Art	  19	  requires	  that	  States	   ensure	   compliance	   with	   regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	   conservation	   and	  management	  measures,	   investigation	   of	   alleged	   violations	   of	   regional	   and	   sub-­‐regional	  conservation	  and	  management	  measures,	   the	  provision	  of	   information	  from	   the	  vessel	   to	   investigating	  authorities	  and	   if	   sufficient	  evidence	  warrants,	  passing	   on	   to	   appropriate	   authorities	   evidence	   with	   a	   view	   to	   instituting	  proceedings.	  	  Articles	  34	  -­‐50	  of	  the	  FAO	  IPOA-­‐IUU	  cover	  flag	  State	  responsibilities.	  These	  cover	  fishing	  vessel	  registrations,	  Arts	  34-­‐41,	  records	  of	  fishing	  vessels,	  Arts	  42-­‐42	  and	  authorisations	  to	  fish,	  Arts	  43-­‐50.	  	  	  Under	   the	   Code	   of	   Conduct	   Arts	   8.1	   assigns	   duties	   to	   all	   States,	   8.2	   flag	   State	  duties	   are	   assigned	   and	   Art	   8.3	   assigns	   port	   State	   duties.	   This	   is	   as,	   has	   been	  stated	  earlier,	  a	  voluntary	  code	  with	  limited	  uptake.	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  The	  matter	   of	   obligations	  of	   flag	   States	   and	   their	   liabilities	   for	   IUU	   fishing	   and	  violation	  of	  coastal	  State	  law	  is	  currently	  under	  discussion	  at	  ITLOS	  as	  the	  result	  of	   a	   request	   from	   the	   Sub-­‐Regional	   Fisheries	   Commission	   for	   an	   advisory	  opinion.153	  	  The	  UN,	   through	   its	  agencies	  the	  UN	  Development	  Programme,	  (UNDP),	  United	  Nations	   Environment	   Programme,	   (UNEP),	   and	   the	   Special	   Envoy	   to	   Somalia	  over	   a	   period	   of	   ten	   years	   from	   1998-­‐2008	   became	   aware	   of	   the	   problem	   of	  illegal	   fishing	   and	   still	   there	   was	   no	   mention	   of	   the	   problem	   in	   any	   Security	  Council	   Resolutions	   focussed	   on	   stopping	   piracy.154	  It	   was	   not	   until	   2011	   and	  UNSCR	  2020	  that	  any	  kind	  of	  directive	  for	  States	  to	  investigate	  illegal	  fishing	  was	  mentioned.155	  	  
12.3.1 Is	  Piracy	  a	  legitimate	  response	  to	  illegal	  fishing?	  The	   shortest	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   is	   no.	   However,	   this	   fails	   to	   examine	   the	  needs	   of	   those	   who	   are	   deprived,	   not	   only	   of	   the	   protection	   afforded	   by	   a	  functioning	  State	  over	  the	  access	  to	  territorial	  fish	  stocks,	  but	  also	  of	  the	  very	  fish	  stocks	  themselves	  by	  those	  who	  would	  seek	  to	  take	  maximum	  advantage	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  enforcement	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  effective	  government.	  The	  lack	  of	   protection	   forced	   the	   local	   fishermen	   to	   take	  matters	   into	   their	   own	   hands,	  arming	   themselves	   and	   acting	   as	   vigilantes	   by	   confronting	   illegal	   fishing	   fleets	  and	  demanding	  some	  form	  of	  compensation	  for	  the	  taking	  of	  fish	  stocks.156	  Some	  fishermen	  recognised	  that	  piracy	  was	  not	  the	  best	  approach	  due	  to	  the	  negative	  consequences;	  however,	  they	  accepted	  that	  these	  consequences	  might	  highlight	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  Request	  for	  an	  Advisory	  Opinion	  Submitted	  by	  the	  Sub-­‐Regional	  Fisheries	  Commission	  (SRFC)	  (9	  
April	  2013)	  ITLOS	  Case	  No	  21.	  
154	  Kontorovich,	  above	  n	  138	  at	  p21.	  
155	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  SC	  Res	  2020	  6663	  S/RES/2020	  (2011)	  operative	  paragraph	  24,	  where	  States	  are	  urged	  to	  positively	  consider	  investigating	  allegations	  of	  illegal	  fishing.	  (Author	  emphasis	  added).	  
156	  Anderson,	  above	  n	  5	  at	  p	  327.	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the	  inequity	  of	  the	  situation	  regarding	  illegal	  fishers.157	  Cronji	  supports	  this	  view,	  arguing	   that	   vigilantism	   is	   the	   action	   of	   citizens	   taking	   the	   law	   into	   their	   own	  hands	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   failure	   of	   state	   structures	   to	   maintain	   the	   supply	   of	  security.158	  This	  conflict	  over	   the	   fish	  stocks,	  while	  possibly	   legally	   indefensible,	  highlights	  the	  wider	  global	  conflict	  between	  the	  haves	  and	  the	  have	  nots,	  in	  the	  sense	   that	   the	   local	   fishers	   are	   seeking	   to	   survive,	  while	   the	   illegal	   fishers	   are	  seeking	  to	  advance	  their	  economic	  status,	  albeit	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  those	  less	  able	  to	  defend	  themselves.159	  Anderson	  suggests	  that	  an	  illegal	  option	  chosen,	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  legal	  alternatives,	  is	  unsupportable.160	  	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  cloak	  their	  activities	  with	  some	  form	  of	   legitimacy	  and	  also	  to	  deceive	  the	  illegal	  fishers,	  several	  of	  the	  vigilante	  groups	  labelled	  themselves	  as	  Coast	   Guards.161	  Cronji	   claims	   that	   the	   alleged	   pirates	   using	   this	   guise	   started	  attacking	  illegal	  fishing	  vessels	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.162	  As	  an	  aid	  to	  their	  legitimacy	  these	  groups	  gave	  themselves	  names	   like	   the	   ’Kismayo	  Volunteer	  Coast	  Guard’,	  ‘National	  Volunteer	  Coast	  Guard’,	  or	   the	   ‘Somali	  Marines’.163	  The	  contribution	  of	  illegal	   fishing	   to	   piracy	   and	   the	   expansion	   of	   piracy	  will	   be	   covered	   at	   greater	  depth	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	  Sone,	  above	  n	  20	  at	  p44.	  
158	  D	  Cronji	  “The	  Pirates	  of	  Somalia,	  Maritime	  Bandits	  or	  Warlords	  of	  the	  High	  Seas?”	  (Stellenboch	  University,	  2009)	  at	  p53.	  
159	  Allison	  and	  Kelling,	  above	  n	  39	  at	  p329.	  
160	  Anderson,	  above	  n	  5	  at	  p354.	  
161	  Cronji,	  above	  n	  158	  at	  p54.	  
162	  At	  p55.	  
163	  Arky,	  above	  n	  27	  at	  p13.	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13 Does	  the	  international	  community	  have	  a	  basis	  to	  assist	  
Somalia	  to	  police	  its	  waters?	  	  It	   would	   appear	   from	   the	   discussion	   on	   the	   international	   fishing	   framework	  above	  that	  there	  is	  sufficient	  scope	  for	  the	  international	  community	  to	  indirectly	  assist	   Somalia	   through	   the	   application	   of	   existing	   international	   treaties	   and	  agreements.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case	  why	  has	  there	  been	  no	  concerted	  attention	  paid	  to	  the	   problem	   of	   illegal	   fishing	   off	   the	   coast	   of	   Somalia?	   It	   has	   been	   shown	   that	  cooperation	   amongst	   states	   in	   addressing	   the	   problem	   of	   illegal	   fishing	   has	  limited	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  menace	  to	  the	  conservation	  and	  replenishment	  of	  fish	  stocks.164	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	  understand	   the	  very	  nature	  of	  global	   fisheries	   to	  understand	  why	  the	  existing	   framework	   is	   failing.	  Fishing	  takes	  place	   in	  areas	  of	   the	  world	  that	  are	  beyond	  the	  gaze	  of	  national,	  regional	  and	  international	  bodies	  where	  the	  ability	  to	  effectively	  monitor	  and	  control	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  trade	  is	  severely	  limited	  by	  the	  sheer	  size	  of	  the	  area	  involved.	  It	  is	  also	  beyond	  the	  capability	  of	  one,	  or	  of	  many	  navies	   to	  effectively	  patrol	   such	  a	  vast	  area	  on	  a	   regular	  basis	  and	   to	   identify	   all	   the	   vessels	   involved.	   The	   pre-­‐existing	   attitude	  where	   it	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  impossible	  to	  seriously	  diminish	  the	  availability	  of	  existing	  stocks	  still	  prevails	  to	  some	  extent	  today.	  This	  motivates	  those	  involved,	  both	  legal	  and	  illegal	   fishers,	   to	   catch	   as	  much	   as	   they	   can	   while	   they	   can	   and	   is	   even	  more	  prevalent	   where	   fish	   stocks	   are	   already	   heavily	   depleted.	   This	   has	   led	   to	   the	  ‘tragedy	  of	  the	  commons’	  of	  the	  HS.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  short-­‐term	  focus	  on	  profit	   for	  today	  with	  little	  consideration	  given	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  an	  increasing	  global	  population	  for	  fish	  protein.165	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164	  Kevin	  Riddle	  “Illegal,	  Unreported	  and	  Unregulated	  Fishing:	  Is	  International	  Cooperation	  Contagious?”	  2006	  37	  O.D.	  and	  I.L.	  at	  p	  265.	  
165	  At	  p266.	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Illegal	   fishing	   is	   still	   viewed	   more	   as	   a	   problem	   of	   conservation	   than	   one	   of	  criminality.166	  The	  political	  will	  to	  tackle	  the	  problem	  as	  one	  of	  criminality,	  in	  that	  the	  resources	  necessary	  to	  seek	  out	  and	  bring	  to	  justice	  the	  offenders,	  appears	  to	  be	  lacking.	  While	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  have	  developed	  specific	  legislation	  to	  control	  all	  aspects	  of	  fisheries	  and	  fisheries	  management167	  the	  cost	  of	  running	  these	  systems	  has	  seen	   them	  outsource	  some	  of	   the	  management	  and	   focus	  on	  more	  of	  the	  catch	  reporting	  and	  less	  on	  the	  patrolling	  and	  surveillance.168	  These	  systems	  are	  limited	  to	  apprehending	  those	  who	  are	  at	  the	  operational	  end	  of	  the	  illegal	   fishing	   regime,	   while	   those	   involved	   in	   the	   logistical	   and	   marketing	  segments	   of	   illegal	   fishing,	   the	   more	   transnational	   aspects,	   escape	  apprehension.169	  Both	  nations	  have	  attempted	  to	  control	  this	  end	  of	  the	  operation	  by	   requirements	   to	   have	   smaller	   portions	   of	   foreign	   ownership	   of	   companies	  involved	   in	   fishing.170	  The	   inability	   to	   pursue	   the	   major	   beneficiaries	   of	   illegal	  fishing	   is	   made	   easier	   by	   their	   ability	   to	   hide	   behind	   a	   corporate	   veil	   by	  registering	   their	   vessels	   to	   FOC	  States	   and	  utilising	  no	  more	   than	   a	  postal	   box	  address	  as	  the	  genuine	  link	  between	  the	  owner	  and	  the	  State.	  It	  also	  appears	  that	  fewer	  resources	  are	  invested	  in	  pursuing	  these	  criminals,	  who	  have	  created	  the	  illegal	   enterprise	   from	   the	   beginning,	   than	   is	   put	   into	   the	   discovery	   and	  apprehension	  of	  those	  at	  the	  operational	  end	  of	  the	  process.	  	  FOC	   States	   are	   a	  major	   contributor	   to	   the	   ease	   of	   operation	   by	   illegal	   fishers.	  UNCLOS	  Art	  94,	  mentioned	  above,	  establishes	  the	  obligations	  for	  flag	  States,	  yet	  does	   not	   create	   penalty	   provisions	   for	   those	   states	   that	   fail	   to	   meet	   their	  obligations.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  these	  states	  are	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  treaty	  yet	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166	  Gray,	  Legg	  and	  Andrews-­‐Chouicha,	  above	  n	  66	  at	  p124.	  
167	  Gray,	  Legg	  and	  Andrews-­‐Chouicha,	  above	  n	  66	  at	  p	  124.	  
168	  Saving	  Fish	  and	  Fishers:	  Towards	  Sustainable	  and	  Equitable	  Governance	  of	  the	  Global	  Fishing	  
Sector.	  	  (World	  Bank	  Agricuilture	  and	  Rural	  Development.,	  2004)	  at	  p32.	  	  
169	  Stokke	  and	  Vidas,	  above	  n	  9	  at	  p22.	  
170	  Ignacio	  Escobar	  “The	  Development	  and	  Enforcement	  of	  National	  Plans	  of	  Action:	  The	  Spanish	  Case”	  in	  Kathleen	  Gray	  (ed)	  Fish	  Piracy:	  Combating	  Illegal,	  Unreported	  and	  Unregulated	  Fishing	  (OECD,	  2004)	  at	  p343.	  Riddle,	  above	  n	  164	  at	  p274	  lists	  a	  sample	  of	  vessels	  prosecuted	  by	  the	  U.S.,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  subsequent	  prosecution	  action	  against	  the	  FOC	  for	  allowing	  vessels	  flying	  their	  flag	  to	  breach	  agreements.	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is	   impossible	   to	   locate	   one	   state	   brought	   to	   account	   for	   its	   failure	   to	  meet	   its	  obligations	  under	  the	  UNCLOS.	  The	  only	  time	  there	  is	  any	  mention	  of	  a	  flag	  State	  is	  when	   there	   is	   an	   attempt	   by	   an	   organisation	   to	   have	   a	   vessel	   released	   after	  being	  apprehended	  for	   illegal	   fishing	  and	  the	  setting	  of	  a	  bond	  for	  the	  vessel	   is	  raised.	  Then	  the	  flag	  State	  is	  called	  in	  to	  seek	  release	  of	  the	  vessel.	   	  	  Cooperation	   amongst	   East	   African	   States	   to	   target	   illegal	   fishing	   has	   been	  proposed	  along	  the	  same	  lines	  as	  the	  Maritime	  Organisation	  for	  West	  and	  Central	  Africa,	   (MOWCA),	   that	   came	   into	   being	   in	   1975	   and	   met	   in	   2006	   to	   focus	   its	  attention	  on	   illegal	   fishing	  as	  a	   threat	   to	  maritime	  security.	  There	   is	  within	   the	  network	  a	  commitment	  to	  cooperatively	  manage	  port	  and	  vessel	  security	  along	  with	   safety	   of	   navigation	   and	   environmental	   protection.171	  The	   East	   African	  States	  have	  responded	  in	  similar	  fashion	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Djibouti	  Code	  of	  Conduct	   in	   2009,	   however	   its	   focus	   is	   primarily	   on	   anti-­‐piracy	   actions	   than	   a	  much	   broader	   spectrum	   to	   include	   illegal	   fishing.172	  It	   could	   be	   said	   that	   the	  blanket	  use	  of	  the	  term	  maritime	  security	  operations	  could	  include	  illegal	  fishing	  patrols	  over	  large	  areas	  of	  coastline,	  however,	  the	  East	  African	  States	  involved	  in	  signing	  the	  code	  are	  not	  well	  endowed	  with	  naval	  or	  coast	  guard	  resources	  that	  may	   be	   able	   to	   conduct	   extended	   patrols	   to	   limit	   illegal	   fishing.173	  Like	   many	  other	  agreements	  though	  this	  one	  is	  not	  legally	  binding	  and	  at	  the	  time	  of	  signing	  only	  nine	  States	  had	  agreed	  to	  its	  implementation.174	  	  	  Arts	  8(3)	   and	  8(4)	  of	   the	  FSA	  apply	   to	   vessels	   of	   flag	   States	   fishing	  on	   the	  HS,	  where	  conservation	  measures	  adopted	  by	  the	  RFMOs	  apply.	  The	  two	  articles	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  FSA’s	  otherwise	  general	  duty	  to	  co-­‐operate	  by	  becoming	  a	  member	  of	  the	  RFMO	  or	  by	  applying	  the	  measures	  in	  question.	  These	  measures	  seem	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  James	  Kraska	  and	  Brian	  Wilson	  “Maritime	  Piracy	  in	  East	  Africa”	  2009	  62(2)	  J.	  Int'l	  Aff.	  at	  p62.	  
172	  J	  Kraska	  and	  B	  Wilson	  “Combating	  Pirates	  of	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Aden:	  The	  Djibouti	  Code	  and	  the	  Somali	  Coast	  Guard.”	  2009	  52(10)	  Ocean	  and	  Coastal	  Management	  at	  p4.	  
173	  At	  p5.	  
174	  At	  p4.	  
	   	   Chapter	  3	  
	   101	  
be	  quite	  ineffective	  as	  three	  of	  the	  most	  common	  offenders	  for	  illegal	  fishing	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia,	  France,	  Spain	  and	  Indonesia	  are	  all	  members	  of	  the	  FSA.	  	  Art	  21	  of	  the	  FSA	  specifies	  enforcement	  measures	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  monitor	  the	   vessels	   fishing	   in	   a	   regional	   or	   sub-­‐regional	   area.	   These	   include	   a	   right	   to	  board	  and	  inspect	  vessels	  flying	  the	  flag	  of	  a	  party	  to	  the	  FSA,	  whether	  or	  not	  that	  vessel	  is	  a	  party	  to	  or	  a	  member	  of	  the	  regional	  or	  sub-­‐regional	  agreement.	  	  This	   right	   to	   board	   is	   a	   further	   expansion	   of	   the	   right	   granted	   under	   Art	   110	  UNCLOS	  that	  limits	  the	  right	  to	  board	  to	  naval	  vessels.	  Under	  the	  FSA	  the	  right	  to	  board	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  naval	  vessels,	  but	  is	  conditional	  on	  the	  inspection	  taking	  place	  by	  an	  authorised	  inspector.	  The	  rights	  of	  the	  boarding	  party	  are	  limited	  to	  gathering	  evidence	  and	  do	  not	  extend	  as	  far	  as	  the	  rights	  associated	  with	  Art	  73	  the	  UNCLOS	  which	  empowers,	  within	   the	  EEZ,	   the	   right	  of	  arrest	  of	   the	  vessel.	  Under	  Art	  21	  FSA	  any	  evidence	  of	   illegality	  or	  overfishing	  or	   fishing	  without	   a	  licence	   can	   only	   be	   reported	   to	   the	   flag	   State,	   which	   retains	   the	   prosecutorial	  right	  over	   its	  sovereign	  vessels.	  This	   level	  of	  control	  was	  argued	  for	  by	  the	  flag	  States	  as	  a	  means	  of	  protecting	  the	  reach	  of	  their	  sovereignty.175	  This	  right	  under	  Art	  21	  could	  well	  empower	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  naval	  operations	  in	  the	  GOA	  or	  the	   Indian	  Ocean	   seeking	   out	   pirates,	   to	   inspect	   fishing	   vessels	   in	   the	   area	   off	  Somalia’s	  coast	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  protect	  the	  fish	  stocks	  of	  Somalia.	  This	  would	  be	  conditional	   on	   having	   authorised	   inspectors	   on	   board	   and	   the	   naval	   vessels	  belonged	  to	  State	  parties	  to	  the	  FSA.	  	  	  Art	  23	  FSA	  creates	  a	  set	  of	  measures	   to	  be	  utilised	  by	  port	  States	   to	  police	   the	  conservation	  and	  management	  measures	  of	  the	  regional	  and	  sub-­‐regional	  bodies.	  These	  measures	  extend	  to	  inspection	  of	  documents,	  fishing	  gear,	  and	  catch	  when	  vessels	  are	  voluntary	  in	  port.	  While	  other	  port	  State	  measures	  have	  existed	  since	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  Cantrell,	  above	  n	  57	  at	  p393.	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1978,	   including	   the	   Paris	   Memorandum	   of	   understanding,176	  these	   measures	  have	  been	  directed	  at	   vessel	   safety.	  The	  port	   State	  measures	  under	   this	   article	  are	   focussed	   specifically	   on	   fishing.	   The	   power	   exists	   under	   this	   article	   to	  prohibit	   landings	  and	  transhipment	  of	  catch	  where	   it	  has	  been	  established	  that	  the	   catch	   has	   been	   taken	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   under	   mines	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  regional	   or	   sub-­‐regional	   conservation	   and	   management	   measures. 177 	  The	  downside	   of	   these	  measures	   however,	   is	   that	   it	  may	   force	   vessels	   to	   seek	   out	  Ports	  of	  Convenience,	   (POC),178	  or	   to	   tranship	   the	   illegal	   catch	  at	   sea	  and	  mix	   it	  with	   legitimate	   catch	   and	   thus	   evade	   the	   control	   measures	   or	   by	   utilising	   a	  differently	  flagged	  vessels	  to	  which	  the	  catch	  has	  been	  transhipped	  or	  the	  illegal	  vessel	  changing	  flags	  before	  arrival	  at	  port.179	  	  Art	  24	  FSA	  requires	  states	  to	  take	  cognizance	  of	  the	  special	  needs	  of	  developing	  States	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   conservation	   and	   management	   of	   straddling	   and	  migratory	   fish	   stocks.	  While	   the	   general	   thrust	   of	   this	   article	   is	   in	   relation	   to	  assisting	  developing	  States	  to	  establish	  fisheries	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  the,	  UNDP	  and	   other	   similar	   organisations,	   Art	   24	   (2)(B)	   highlights	   the	   need	   to	   avoid	  adverse	   impacts	  on	  and	  ensure	  access	   to,	   fisheries	  by	  small	   scale	  and	  artisanal	  fishers.	  It	  is	  these	  small	  scale	  and	  artisanal	  fishers	  who	  are	  the	  very	  ones	  directly	  affected	  by	   the	  action	  of	   the	   illegal	   fishers	  and	  the	   inaction	  of	   the	   international	  community	   in	   assisting	   in	   policing	   the	   coastal	   waters	   off	   Somalia.	   It	   is	   not	  suggested	   that	   states	   should	   operate	   in	   the	   sovereign	   zones	   of	   Somalia	   to	  apprehend	  illegal	  fishers,	  it	  is	  suggested	  that	  part	  of	  assisting	  with	  conservation	  of	   the	   valuable	   fishing	   resource	   could	   be	   undertaken	   by	   the	   application	   of	  political	  will	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  port	  State	  controls.	  This	  would	  reduce	  the	  benefits	  of	   illegal	   fishing	   to	   those	  who	  consistently	   infringe	  Art	  25(3)(c)	  which	  covers	   assistance	   to	   developing	   States	   specifically	   in	   the	   area	   of	   monitoring,	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  Paris	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding,	  (adopted	  2	  December	  1980).	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  FSA	  Art	  23(3).	  
178	  Allison	  and	  Kelling,	  above	  n	  39	  at	  p29.	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  Allison	  and	  Keeling,	  above	  n	  39	  at	  p28.	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control	   and	   surveillance,	   compliance	   and	  enforcement,	   adding	   further	   strength	  to	  the	  duty	  outlined	  in	  Art	  24.	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  main	  drawbacks	  of	  RFMO	  is	  the	   length	  of	  time	  that	   it	   takes	  to	  make	  any	  sort	  of	  decision	  as	  the	  bodies	  only	  meet	  once	  every	  12	  months	  and	  reaching	  agreement	   can	   be	   a	   process	   drawn	   out	   over	   several	   years.180	  This	   problem	   of	  glacial	   decision	   making	   is	   further	   compounded	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   not	   even	   all	  members	  adhere	  to	  the	  conservation	  and	  management	  measures,	  nor	  fulfil	  their	  responsibilities	  as	  flag	  States.181	  	  	  It	   should	   be	   possible	   for	   RFMO	   to	   establish	   a	   set	   of	   preconditions	   for	   those	  wanting	   to	  become	  members,	   for	   example,	   displaying	   a	  willingness	   to	   exercise	  it’s	   responsibilities	   as	   a	   flag	   State,	   having	  national	   fisheries	   legislation	   in	  place	  that	   follows	   the	   aims	  of	   conservation	   and	  management	  measures	  of	   the	  RFMO	  the	   state	  wishes	   to	   join,	   have	  developed	  and	   implemented	  a	  National	  POA-­‐IUU	  and	   be	   displaying	   active	   anti-­‐IUU	  measures	   within	   its	   own	   jurisdiction.	  While	  this	  may	  be	  counter	   to	   the	  concept	  of	  getting	  as	  many	  States	   in	  as	  possible,	  by	  making	  conditions	  for	  joining	  or	  remaining	  a	  member	  quite	  stringent	  it	  will	  add	  some	   backbone	   to	   the	   organisation	   and	   indicate	   to	   global	   members	   and	   the	  international	  community	  that	  the	  process	  or	  protection	  of	  the	  fisheries	  resource	  for	  future	  generations	  is	  taken	  seriously.	  	  In	   line	  with	   the	  above	  suggestion	  RFMO	  could	  develop	  a	  series	  of	  enforcement	  measures	  for	  States	  that	  are	  members	  and	  fail	  to	  meet	  their	  existing	  obligations	  in	   any	   of	   the	   major	   areas	   of	   contention,	   particularly,	   FOC	   and	   PSC.	   If	   PSC	  measures	   are	   breached	   and	   a	   vessel	   is	   impounded	   currently	   the	   port	   State	   is	  required	  to	  send	  information	  to	  the	  flag	  State	  for	  further	  action.	  This	  leaves	  the	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  Stokke	  and	  Vidas,	  above	  n	  9	  at	  p26.	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FOC	  States	  the	  ability	  to	  take	  no	  further	  action	  and	  the	  illegal	  fishers	  to	  continue	  with	  their	  business	  with	  little	  or	  no	  impediment.	  Granting	  the	  right	  on	  joining	  an	  RFMO	   to	   port	   States	   to	   institute	   legal	   proceedings	   against	   illegal	   fishers	   from	  different	  State	  parties	  or	   flag	  States,	  while	  certainly	  contentious,	  would	   further	  reinforce	  the	  concept	  that	  food	  security	  globally	  is	  taken	  seriously.	  Those	  states	  that	  join	  the	  RFMO	  would	  be	  required	  to	  agree	  to	  the	  condition,	  that	  in	  this	  area	  only,	   they	  would	   need	   to	   be	  willing	   to	   surrender	   their	   sovereignty.	  While	   it	   is	  acknowledged	  that	  there	  are	  currently	  POC	  that	  might	  take	  the	  vessels	  unwilling	  to	   take	   the	  risk	  of	  being	  prosecuted,	   it	  will	  narrow	  the	   field	  as	   to	  where	   illegal	  fishers	   can	   tranship	   their	   stocks	   and	   combined	   with	   trade	   measures	   against	  those	   states	   that	   harbour	   POC,	  will	   limit	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   these	   POC.	  While	  member	   States	   are	   able	   to	   flout	   the	   existing	   regime	   it	   downgrades	   the	  effectiveness	   of	   the	   agreements	   and	   the	   conservation	   and	   management	  measures.	  	  It	   has	   been	   estimated	   that	   the	   global	   cost	   of	   piracy	   is	   anywhere	   between	  USD16Billion	  -­‐	  USD18Billion	  annually.182	  The	  benefit	  to	  pirates	  is	  in	  the	  region	  of	  USD120Million	  per	  year.183	  The	  costs	  to	  both	  Puntland	  and	  South	  Central	  Somalia	  of	  establishing	  effective	  coast	  guards	  through	  the	  use	  of	  PSC	  were	  estimated	  at	  between	  USD60	  –	  USD75	  Million	  per	  year.	  It	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  if	  some	  form	  of	  tax	  were	   established,	   in	   a	   legitimate	   sense,	   through	   the	   IMB	   or	   the	   maritime	  industry,	   that	   covered	   the	   costs	   of	   developing	   a	   functioning	   coast	   guard,	   this	  would	  reduce	  the	  necessity	  of	  Somali	   fishermen	  to	  resort	   to	  piracy,	  protect	   the	  artisanal	  fishers	  from	  illegal	  foreign	  fishing	  fleets,	  provide	  both	  income	  and	  jobs	  for	   those	  dependent	  on	   the	  sea	   for	  a	   living	  and	  start	   to	  reduce	   the	   incidents	  of	  piracy	  on	  both	  fishing	  vessels	  and	  commercial	  vessels	  plying	  the	  waters	  off	   the	  coast	  of	  Somalia.	  The	   long-­‐term	  benefit	   for	  Somalia	   is	   that	   its	   fishery	  would	  be	  protected	  and	  the	  potential	  would	  exist	  to	  re-­‐develop	  an	  estimated	  USD15Million	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  Pirate	  Trails:	  Tracking	  the	  Illicit	  Financial	  Flows	  from	  Pirate	  Activities	  Off	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  	  (World	  Bank,	  2013).	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  Paul	  Salopek	  “Off	  the	  lawless	  coast	  of	  Somalia,	  questions	  of	  who	  is	  pirating	  who”	  Chicago	  
Tribune	  (Chicago,	  10	  October	  2008.)	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fishing	  industry.184	  The	  protection	  of	  the	  industry	  might	  not	  enable	  the	  figure	  to	  be	  reached	  immediately	  as	  fish	  stocks	  will	  need	  time	  to	  recover,	  however,	  in	  the	  longer	   term	   the	   recovery	   could	   well	   enable	   the	   taxes	   raised	   by	   the	   IMB	   or	  maritime	  industry	  to	  be	  repaid.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  in	  essence	  the	  tax	  is	  little	  more	  than	  protection	  money	  by	  another	  name,	  however,	  unlike	  the	  ransoms	  paid	  to	  the	  pirates	  the	  tax	  will	  avoid	  the	  wastage	  associated	  with	  ransoms	  that	  end	  up	  in	  warlords	  pockets	  and	  be	  utilised	  to	  assist	  in	  bringing	  Somalia	  out	  of	  years	  of	  poverty	  in	  a	  much	  more	  peaceful	  manner.	  	  While	  the	  possibility	  of	  States	  signing	  up	  to	  soft	  law	  approaches	  to	  the	  control	  of	  illegal	  fishing	  has	  come	  to	  an	  end	  and	  the	  time	  to	  add	  stronger	  set	  of	  measures	  to	  this	   problem	   has	   arrived.	   Soft	   law	   approaches,	   FAO	   IPOA-­‐IUU	   being	   one,	   may	  have	  been	  an	  inducement	  to	  sign	  up	  to	  less	  onerous	  conditions	  to	  control	  illegal	  fishing.	  The	  scale	  of	   illegal	   fishing	  internationally	   is	  so	   large	  and	  detrimental	  to	  conservation	  measures	  that	  try	  to	  protect	   fish	  species	  from	  extinction,	  that	  any	  measure	  that	  allows	  states	  to	  opt	  out	  or	  diminish	  their	  commitments	  no	  longer	  has	   a	   part	   to	   play	   in	   the	   international	   framework.	   The	   parties	   that	   opt	   out	   of	  agreements	   and	   float	   outside	   effective	   regulation	   are	   amongst	   the	   biggest	  barriers	   to	   the	   effective	   management	   of	   regional	   and	   HS	   fisheries. 185 	  The	  problems	  of	  overfishing	  and	  illegal	   fishing	  have	  grown	  beyond	  the	  resources	  of	  states	  and	  regional	  bodies	  to	  effectively	  control.	  It	  is	  suggested	  that	  the	  future	  of	  global	   fish	   stocks	   is	   dependent	   on	   greater	   levels	   of	   global	   cooperation	   and	   a	  willingness	   to	   sacrifice	   short-­‐term	   financial	   gain	   for	   long	   term	   sustainability.	  While	  it	  is	  not	  suggested	  that	  the	  ‘pacta	  tertiis’	  rule	  be	  overturned,	  it	  is	  suggested	  that	  higher	  international	  bodies	  are	  brought	  to	  bear	  to	  cover	  areas	  traditionally	  seen	   as	   the	   commons.	   It	   has	   been	   the	   failure	   of	   states	   to	   willingly	   curtail	   the	  excesses	  of	  national	  fishing	  fleets	  that	  has	  assisted	  in	  the	  depletion	  of	  fish	  stocks.	  Unfortunately	   the	   price	   to	   pay	   for	   a	   lack	   of	   self-­‐control	   is	   external	   regulation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184	  Sone,	  above	  n	  20	  at	  p15	  versus	  the	  estimated	  USD94	  Million	  taken	  by	  illegal	  fishers,	  or	  the	  USD300	  Million	  suggested	  by	  Tharoor,	  above	  n	  14.	  
185	  Kevin	  Bray	  A	  Global	  Review	  of	  Illegal,	  Unreported	  and	  Unregulated	  (IUU)	  Fishing	  (Australian	  Government	  in	  Cooperation	  with	  the	  FAO,	  Sydney,	  Australia,	  2000)	  at	  p2.	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This	  does	  not	  in	  any	  way	  diminish	  the	  sovereign	  right	  of	  a	  State	  to	  establish	  its	  own	  fishing	  laws	  to	  cover	  territorial	  waters	  under	  its	  jurisdiction,	  it	  creates	  a	  set	  of	  conditions,	  should	   the	   fishing	  vessels	  of	  a	  state	  wish	   to	  enjoy	   the	  benefits	  of	  long	  term	  access	  to	  globally	  shared	  fish	  stocks.	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14 Conclusion	  	  Somalia	  is	  the	  author	  of	  its	  own	  downfall	  in	  relation	  to	  illegal	  fishing	  by	  failing	  to	  clearly	  establish	   the	   limits	  of	   its	   territorial	   sea	   in	  compliance	  with	   the	  UNCLOS	  and	  define	  the	  extent	  of	  its	  EEZ.	  This	  is	  however,	  a	  matter	  of	  relative	  simplicity	  for	  the	  newly	  elected	  constitutional	  government,	  should	  they	  wish	  to	  protect	  the	  ability	   of	   traditional	   fishers	   and	   the	   nascent	   fishing	   industry,	   of	   submitting	  documentation	  to	  the	  UN	  that	  declares	  the	  extent	  of	  these	  zones.	  	  Illegal	   fishing	   is	   not	   just	   a	   problem	   for	   Somalia	   but	   also	   a	  worldwide	   problem	  that	   is	   increasing	   as	   fish	   stocks	  diminish.	  While	   there	   is	   a	   raft	   of	   regulation	   to	  limit	  illegal	  fishing,	  the	  number	  of	  loopholes	  that	  exist	  in	  the	  various	  agreements	  still	   allows	   illegal	   fishers	   to	   operate	   with	   relative	   impunity.	   Unless	   there	   is	   a	  significant	  change	  in	  attitude	  by	  states	  that	  assist	  those	  parties	   involved	  by	  not	  implementing	   their	   obligations	   and	   duties	   under	   the	   various	   agreements,	   this	  problem	  will	  continue	  until	  the	  last	  fish	  is	  caught.	  	  While	  responses	  of	   the	  regions	  of	  Somalia	  to	  the	  practice	  of	   illegal	   fishing	  have	  displayed	  a	  level	  of	  concern	  about	  the	  fisheries	  it	  falls	  on	  the	  government	  to	  take	  the	   necessary	   steps	   to	   actively	   seek	   funding	   for	   establishing	   an	   effective	   coast	  guard	  to	  patrol	  the	  extensive	  coastline.	  	  	  It	  is	  perhaps	  the	  global	  community	  who	  needs	  to	  take	  some	  responsibility	  for	  the	  poor	  response	  to	  this	  issue.	  International	  attention	  was	  attracted	  to	  the	  problem	  when	   local	   fishers	   attempted	   to	   protect	   not	   only	   their	   income,	   but	   also	   their	  access	  to	  life	  saving	  quantities	  of	  protein,	  by	  resorting	  to	  piracy.	  By	  failing	  to	  live	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up	   to	   the	  obligations	  and	  duties	  many	  of	   the	  European	  nations	  have	  agreed	   to,	  under	   the	   fisheries	   framework,	   they	   have	   created	   some	   of	   the	   conditions	   that	  have	  fed	  the	  practice	  of	  illegal	  fishing	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia	  which	  has	  in	  turn	  fed	   the	   piracy	   problem.	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Chapter	  4	  
Hazardous	  Waste	  Dumping	  in	  Somali	  Waters.	  	   I	  am	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  	  Nations	  are	  crossing	  my	  Borders	  They	  are	  dumping	  nuclear	  waste	  	  Into	  my	  beautiful	  waters	  (Helwaa)1	  
Introduction	  Somalia	  has	  been	  a	  target	  of	  waste	  dumping	  since	  the	  late	  1980s.2	  	  The	  dumping	  has	   occurred	   in	   the	   waters	   off	   the	   coast	   and	   in	   many	   places	   throughout	   the	  country.	  Somalia	  has	  been	  described	  as	  the	  one	  of	  the	  three	  largest	  waste	  dumps	  in	  the	  world.3	  It	  has	  been	  alleged	  that	  some	  of	  this	  waste	  has	  been	  transported	  to	  Somalia	   by	   the	  Ndrangheta	  mafia	   of	   Italy	   as	  part	   of	   a	   trade	   in	   guns	   and	  waste	  deal.4	  In	   the	   early	   1990s	   investigations	   carried	   out	   by	   an	   Italian	   television	  journalist	   revealed	   the	   trade,	   however	   she	   was	   assassinated	   before	   the	   full	  complexity	  of	  the	  trade	  could	  be	  exposed.5	  The	  full	  extent	  of	  the	  dumping	  did	  not	  become	  apparent	  until	  after	  the	  2004	  tsunami	  that	  washed	  rusting	  containers	  on	  to	  the	  northern	  beaches	  of	  Somalia.6	  These	  containers	  leaked	  a	  mix	  of	  toxic	  ooze	  that	   caused	   a	   range	   of	   health	   problems	   from	   mouth	   bleeds	   to	   unusual	   skin	  disorders	  to	  breathing	  issues	  and	  cancers.7	  	  As	   a	   response	   to	   these	   reported	   deaths	   the	   United	   Nations	   Environmental	  Programme,	  (UNEP),	  carried	  out	  an	  investigation	  that	   lead	  them	  to	  believe	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Cachia,	  above	  Chapter	  1	  n	  1.	  2	  Chris	  Milton	  “Somalia	  Used	  as	  Toxic	  Dumping	  Ground”	  (2009)	  <http://www.theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/268581/somalia_used_as_toxic_dumping_ground.html>	  12.	  
3	  	  J	  Pina	  “Poor	  Countries	  -­‐	  the	  North's	  Radioactive	  Dump”	  (2001)	  Rom;	  at	  	  p1.	  
4	  At	  p1.	  
5	  Peter	  Eichstadt	  Pirate	  State:	  Inside	  Somalia's	  Terrorism	  at	  Sea.	  (Lawrence	  Hill	  Books,	  Chicago,	  2010)	  at	  p40.	  
6	  	  See	  Hari,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  15.	  
7	  Milton,	  above	  n2.	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the	  issue	  raised	  two	  important	  points.	  The	  dumping	  was	  in	  violation	  of	  treaties	  covering	  hazardous	  waste	  dumping	  and	  secondly	  that	  it	  was	  questionable	  that	  a	  legitimate	   contract	   to	   dump	  waste	   could	   be	   signed	   during	   a	   time	   of	   civil	   war	  when	  the	  government	  was	  factionalised	  and	  unable	  to	  oversee	  the	  efficient	  and	  environmentally	   sound	   disposal	   of	   waste.8	  The	   UNEP	   report	   further	   went	   to	  identify	  why	  Somalia	  is	  a	  waste	  disposal	  site.	  The	  reasons	  identified	  in	  the	  UNEP	  were,	  political	  instability,	  the	  availability	  of	  dumping	  sites	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  public	  awareness	  about	  environmental	  issues	  as	  the	  people	  were	  too	  busy	  trying	  to	  eke	  out	  a	  living	  amidst	  poverty	  and	  extreme	  social	  problems	  caused	  by	  the	  internal	  conflict.9	  The	  first	  attempt	  at	  toxic	  waste	  dumping	  in	  Africa	  was	  recorded	  as	  occurring	  in	  1980	  when	  the	  US	  tried	  to	  deposit	  waste	   in	  Sierra	  Leone	   for	  an	  alleged	  sum	  of	  $24	  Million.10	  The	   cost	   differential	   at	   the	   time	   was	   $250	   per	   ton	   in	   the	   US,	   as	  against	  $40	  per	  ton	  in	  Africa.11	  This	  highlights	  the	  profit	  motive	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  this	  most	  toxic	  of	  activities.12	  An	  example	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Africa	  is	  used	  as	  a	  dumping	  ground,	  is	  that	  of	  a	  local	  farmer	  in	  Nigeria	  who	  agreed	  to	  the	  use	  of	  his	   backyard	   at	  US$100	  per	  month	   for	   the	  dumping	  of	   hazardous	  waste	   by	   an	  Italian	   company.	   Told	   that	   the	   waste	   was	   fertilizer,	   later	   examination	   of	   the	  chemical,	   after	   it	   had	   leaked	   out	   of	   the	   drums	   onto	   his	   land,	   revealed	   that	   it	  contained	  polychlorinated	  biphenyls	  (PCBs)	  and	  asbestos.13	  The	  list	  of	  materials	  that	   dumped	   since	   that	   time	   has	   included	   non-­‐nuclear	   industrial	   waste	   and	  uranium	   wastes	   from	   the	   US	   and	   chemical	   and	   industrial	   waste	   from	   Italy.14	  International	   traders	   in	  waste	  have	  been	  able	   to	  benefit	   substantially	   from	   the	  North/South	  movement	  of	  waste	  that	  is	  too	  difficult,	  too	  expensive,	  or	  too	  toxic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  UNEP	  “United	  Nations	  Rapid	  Environmental	  Desk	  Assessment”	  2005	  at	  p133.	  	  
9	  At	  page	  p135.	  	  
10	  B	  Logan	  “An	  Assessment	  of	  the	  Environmental	  and	  Economic	  Implications	  of	  Toxic	  Waste	  Disposal	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  ”	  1991	  25(1)	  J.	  W.	  Tat	  p63.	  	  
11	  Jennifer	  Clapp	  “The	  Illicit	  Trades	  in	  Hazardous	  Wastes	  and	  CFCs:	  International	  Responses	  to	  Environmental	  "Bads"”	  in	  H.	  Friman	  and	  Peter	  Andreas	  (eds)	  Illicit	  Global	  Economy	  &	  State	  Power	  (Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Publishers	  Inc.,	  Maryland,	  1999)	  at	  p106.	  
12	  Jennifer	  Clapp	  “NGOs	  and	  the	  International	  Toxic-­‐Waste	  Disposal	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa”	  1994	  3(17)	  Journal	  of	  Environment	  and	  Development	  at	  p17.	  
13	  New	  African,	  253,	  October	  1988	  p22.	  
14	  Filomina	  Steady	  Environmental	  Justice	  in	  the	  New	  Millenium:	  Global	  Perspectives	  on	  Race,	  
Ethnicity	  and	  Human	  Rights	  (Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  New	  York,	  2009)	  at	  p53.	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to	   process	   efficiently	   in	   the	   countries	   of	   origin.15	  The	   recognition	   that	   the	   true	  costs	  of	  disposal,	  needed	  to	  avoid	  the	  cost	  of	  harming	  human	  and	  animal	  health	  and	  the	   long-­‐term	  damage	  to	  the	  soil	  and	  to	  drinking	  water,	  need	  to	  be	  met	  by	  the	  disposer.16	  This	  waste	  has	  brought	  with	  it,	  not	  financial	  benefits	  as	  promised	  by	  the	  traders,	  or	  a	  source	  of	  resources	  much	  needed	  by	  the	  developing	  nations,	  but	   instead	   disease,	   impoverishment,	   misery,	   and	   in	   some	   cases,	   death.	   The	  argument	   that	  waste	   transfer	  brings	  access	   to	  otherwise	  unavailable	   resources	  has	  been	  criticised	  by	  Cheyne	  who	  suggests	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  even	  legitimate	  dumping	   or	   transfer	   of	   industrial	   waste	   are	   extremely	   doubtful.17	  One	   of	   the	  arguments	   used	   to	   justify	   such	   dumping	   is	   that	   African	   countries	   have	   spare	  assimilative	  capacity,	  a	  notion	  that	  flies	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  and	   the	   polluter	   pays	   principle	   widely	   used	   in	   Multilateral	   Environmental	  Agreements	  (MEAs).	  18	  	  	  It	  has	  been	  estimated	  that	  90	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  hazardous	  waste	  is	  generated	  by	  the	  developed	   world	   and	   that	   98	   per	   cent	   of	   that	   figure	   is	   generated	   by	   the	  Organisation	   for	   Economic	   Co-­‐operation	   and	   Development,	   (OECD),	   countries	  Most	  of	  the	  trade	  in	  hazardous	  waste	  is	  between	  industrialised,	  OECD	  countries,	  who	  have	  adopted	  similar	  standards	  for	  treating	  the	  waste.	  At	  least	  20	  per	  cent	  of	   the	   trade	   is	  between	   the	  OECD	  and	  developing	  countries.19	  The	   tightening	  of	  the	  hazardous	  waste	  regime	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  and	  the	  desire	  for	  waste	  to	  
be	   treated	  within	   the	   country	   of	   generation,	   has	   stimulated	   a	   trade	   in	   hazardous	  
waste	   across	   borders	   and,	   perhaps	  more	   perniciously,	   from	   the	   developed	   to	   the	  developing	   world. 20 	  The	   stringent	   controls	   placed	   on	   the	   movements	   of	  hazardous	  waste	   have	   generated	   a	   significant	   illicit	   trade	   as	   disposers	   seek	   to	  lower	  their	  costs	  and	  generate	  higher	  profits.21	  Various	  figures	  have	  been	  quoted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  At	  p59.	  
16	  Ilona	  Cheyne	  “Africa	  and	  the	  International	  Trade	  in	  Hazardous	  Wastes”	  1994	  6	  A.J.I.C.L	  493	  at	  p496.	  	  The	  ‘polluter	  pays’	  principle	  discussed	  below.	  
17	  At	  p496.	  
18	  At	  p495.	  Assimilative	  capacity	  is	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  state	  to	  absorb	  the	  waste	  before	  it	  reaches	  levels	  classified	  as	  pollution.	  
19	  Clapp,	  above	  n	  12	  at	  p19.	  
20	  Clapp,	  above	  n	  11	  at	  p106.	  
21	  At	  p106.	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for	   the	   difference	   in	   disposal	   rates	   between	   the	   developed	   world,	   $3000	   per	  tonne	  and	  the	  developing	  world,	  $2.50	  per	  tonne,	  depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  waste	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  its	  hazardous	  content.22	  The	  volumes	  of	  illicit	  trade	  are	  hard	  to	  estimate	   as	   the	   majority	   of	   it	   is	   occurs	   outside	   the	   awareness	   of	   government	  bodies23	  and,	   not	   surprisingly,	   by	   criminal	   organisations	   that	   actively	   work	   to	  defeat	  surveillance	  of	  their	  activities.24	  The	   trade	   in	   hazardous	   waste	   is	   an	   outward	   sign	   of	   the	   continuing	   push	   for	  limitless	   economic	   growth	  desired	  by	   the	  developed	  world,	  which	   leads	   to	   the	  creation	   at	   both	   international	   and	   national	   levels	   of	   social	   and	   economic	  inequality	  based	  on	   race	   and	   class.25	  This	   inequality	  has	  negative	  human	   rights	  consequences. 26 	  The	   desire	   for	   growth	   is	   a	   continuation	   of	   a	   pattern	   of	  domination	   of	   the	   global	   South	   by	   the	   global	   North	   that	   has	   its	   genesis	   in	   the	  colonial	   and	   imperialistic	   exploitation	   of	   natural	   resources	   and	   labour	   of	   the	  South.27	  This	  inequality	  at	  state	  level	  is	  reinforced	  by	  environmental	  racism,	  the	  process	  of	   apportioning	   the	   burdens	   of	   environmental	   degradation. 28 	  Environmental	  racism	   also	   covers	   a	   much	   wider	   perspective	   of	   racial	   discrimination	   in	  environmental	  policies,	  laws	  and	  practices	  with	  the	  attendant	  concepts	  of	  human	  rights	   issues,	   injustice,	   social	   inequality	   and	   disproportionality.	   However,	   it	   is	  more	  overt	  than	  that.	  The	  former	  governor	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  commented	  that,	  ‘I	   think	   the	  economic	   logic	  behind	  dumping	  a	   load	  of	   toxic	  waste	   in	   the	  lowest-­‐wage	  country	  is	  impeccable	  and	  we	  should	  face	  up	  to	  that.’29	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Logan,	  above	  n	  10	  at	  p64.	  	  
23	  Clapp,	  above	  n11,	  p96.	  Logan,	  above	  n10	  at	  p64	  suggests	  that	  the	  financial	  benefits	  of	  the	  trade	  and	  costs	  associated	  with	  it	  are	  hard	  to	  determine	  due	  to	  its	  furtive	  nature.	  
24	  At	  p97.	  Don	  Liddick	  “The	  Traffic	  in	  Garbage	  and	  Hazardous	  Wastes:	  an	  overview”	  2010	  13	  Trends	  Organ	  Crim	  134	  at	  p136.	  
25	  Steady,	  above	  n	  14	  at	  p5.	  
26	  At	  p53	  
27	  At	  p6.	  Clapp,	  above	  n	  12	  at	  p23.	  	  
28	  At	  p53.	  
29	  	  “Let	  Them	  Eat	  Pollution”	  Economist	  (London,	  England,	  February	  8	  1992)	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He	  was	  perhaps	  echoing	  a	  belief	  held	  by	  many	  in	  the	  developed	  world.	  This	  last	  comment	  while	  evidencing	  some	  economic	  logic	  certainly	  indicates	  that	  there	  is	  an	  element	  of	  expendability,	  the	  concept	  that	  some	  races	  are	  more	  expendable	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  profit	  than	  others	  are.30	  	  Overwhelmingly	  the	  burden	  of	  both	  environmental	  racism	  and	  expendability	  has	  been	   borne	   by	   African	   communities	   as	   a	   continuation	   of	   the	   process	   of	   neo-­‐colonisation	   conducted	   by	   multinational	   corporations.	   	   Instead	   of	   removing	  resources,	   the	   neo-­‐colonisers	   are	   exporting	   to	   African	   nations	   waste	   that	   is	  causing	   long	   terms	   effects	   through	   environmental	   degradation	   and	   toxic	  pollution. 31 	  Africa	   has	   become	   a	   focus	   of	   these	   exports	   due	   to	   weak	  environmental	   laws,	   pollution	   control	   agencies	   lacking	   in	   manpower,	   lack	   of	  technical	  skills	  and	  adequate	  facilities	  and	  insufficient	  legal	  support.32	  Lax	  custom	  controls	  and	  over	  importations	  of	  hazardous	  waste,	  compounded	  by	  the	  need	  for	  foreign	  exchange	  to	  counter	  the	  effects	  of	  poverty,	  famine,	  and	  war,	  have	  fuelled	  the	   importing	   of	   waste.	  33	  Logan	   suggests	   that	   for	   it	   to	   be	   classified	   as	   a	   trade	  there	   to	  be	  some	   form	  of	  exchange	  of	  goods,34	  he	  argues	   that	   the	   ‘trade’	   is	  only	  transactional.	  Logan	  bases	  this	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  African	  nations	  are	  only	  supplying	  a	  lease	  of	  their	  ground	  for	  a	  specified	  purpose.	  This	  could	  be	  in	  perpetuity	  as	  the	  damage	  caused	  by	  the	  toxic	  pollutants	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  be	  remediated.35	  Logan	  appears	   to	  base	  his	   interpretation	  of	   trade	  on	   a	   very	   simplistic	   formula	  where	  one	   set	   of	   goods	   is	   exchanged	   for	   another.	   There	   is	   a	   concept	   of	   trade	   that	  involves	  swapping	  money	  for	  service,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  lease	  of	  land.	  It	  is	  therefore	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  ‘trade’	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  trade.	  It	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  to	  highlight	  the	  existing	  hazardous	  waste	  treaties	  established	  either	  prior	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Barre	  government	  or	  brought	  into	  being	   since	   that	   time	   and	   analyse	   whether	   or	   not	   these	   treaties	   could	   have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Steady,	  above	  n	  14	  at	  p48.	  
31	  Steady,	  above	  n	  14	  at	  p6.	  	  
32	  Roberto	  Sanchez	  “International	  Trade	  in	  Hazardous	  Wastes:	  A	  Global	  Problem	  with	  Uneven	  Consequences	  for	  the	  Third	  World”	  1994	  3	  Journal	  of	  Environmental	  Development	  139	  at	  p140.	  	  
33	  Clapp,	  above	  n	  12	  at	  p19.	  
34	  Logan,	  above	  n	  10	  at	  p72.	  	  
35	  At	  p72.	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provided	  sufficient	  protection	  for	  Somalia’s	  environment.	  This	  analysis	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  obligations	  of	  states	  to	  oversee	  and	  regulate	  the	  movement	  of	  hazardous	  waste	  and	  the	  controls	  that	  should	  be	  in	  place	  to	  prevent	  the	  transfer	  of	  waste	  to	  vulnerable	  states	  like	  Somalia.	  If	  there	  are	  gaps	  in	  the	  legislation	  or	  conventions	  suggestions	  are	  made	  as	  to,	  how	  these	  can	  be	  improved	  to	  prevent	  the	  traffic	  in	  waste	   to	   states	   of	   the	   South.	   Somalia’s	   inability	   to	  protect	   its	   environment	  has	  been	  directly	  affected	  by	  its	  lack	  of	  effective	  government.	  It	  is	  postulated	  that	  the	  strength	  of	   international	  conventions	  and	  agreements	  should	  be	  robust	  enough	  to	  protect	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  of	  the	  international	  community.	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15 Are	  Somalia’s	  waters	  protected	  by	  International	  hazardous	  
waste	  conventions?	  
	  It	  doesn’t	  take	  long	  to	  locate	  hazardous	  waste	  dumping	  conventions	  that	  would	  have	  been,	  and	  still	  are,	  applicable	  to	  Somalia’s	  situation.	  These	  range	  from	  The	  United	   Nations	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   the	   Sea	   through	   to	   the	   Basel	  Convention	  and	  on	   to	   the	  most	   relevant,	   the	  London	  Dumping	  Convention	  and	  it’s	   Protocol.	   The	   breadth	   of	   these	   agreements	   should	   offer	   plenty	   of	   scope	   to	  protect	  the	  waters	  off	  Somalia’s	  coast	  from	  the	  dumping	  of	  waste,	  carried	  out	  by	  legitimate	  businesses	  and	  by	  illegal	  operators.	  	  	  
	  
15.1 UNCLOS	  Somalia	   ratified	   the	   UNCLOS	   and	   is	   entitled	   to	   the	   protection	   this	   convention	  offers.	  36	  The	   power	   of	   the	   convention	   lies	  with	   individual	   States	   creating	   their	  own	  domestic	  law	  derived	  from	  the	  various	  articles	  of	  the	  UNCLOS.37	  	  UNCLOS	  is	  not	  an	  MEA,	  as	  its	  primary	  function	  is	  to	  regulate	  access	  to	  the	  oceans	  for	  States	  as	   well	   as	   to	   provide	   rules	   for	   their	   use.	   One	   of	   the	   areas	   covered	   is	   that	   of	  environmental	   protection	   broadly	   covered	   under	   Part	   XII	   Article	   192	   that	  provides	   a	   general	   obligation	   for	   parties	   to	   protect	   and	   preserve	   the	   marine	  environment.38	  This	   general	   obligation	   is	   further	   reinforced	   by	   Art	   194,	   which	  outlines	  measures	  necessary	  to	  prevent,	  reduce	  and	  control	  pollution	   including	  the	  minimisation	  of	  the	  release	  of	  toxic,	  harmful,	  or	  noxious	  substances	  through	  dumping.39	  This	   indicates	   that	   there	   is	   an	  obligation	  not	   only	   on	   coastal	   States,	  but	   also	   on	   flag	   States	   to	   prevent	   vessels,	   which	   fall	   under	   their	   control	   or	  jurisdiction,	   from	   carrying	   out	   dumping	   that	   is	   not	   allowed	   under	   the	  conventions	  discussed	  below.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  UNCLOS,	  above	  Chapter	  3,	  at	  n	  47.	  	  
37	  UNCLOS	  Art	  210.	  
38	  UNCLOS	  Art	  192.	  
39	  UNCLOS	  Art	  194(3)(a).	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  Pollution	  is	  defined	  under	  Art	  1(4)	  of	  the	  UNCLOS	  as,	  ‘The	  introduction	  into	  the	  marine	  environment	  by	  man	  of	  any	  substance	  that	  results	  in,	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  result	  in,	  harmful	  effects	  on	  living	  resources	  and	  marine	  life	  and	  causes	  hazards	  to	  human	  health.	  Dumping	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  deliberate	  disposal	  of	  wastes	  or	  other	  matter	  from	  vessels.40	  	  	  From	  the	  foregoing	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  prevention	  and	  reduction	  of	  harm	  as	  opposed	  to	  creating	  mechanisms	  whereby	  harm	  that	  is	  caused	  can	  be	  cleaned	   up	   and	   the	   victim	   compensated	   along	   with	   a	   punitive	   regime	   for	   the	  agent	  or	  agents	  responsible	  for	  the	  harm.41	  	  Any	   action	   taken	   to	   prevent	   and	   reduce	   harm	   is	   guided	   by	   the	   precautionary	  principle,	   which	   despite	   its	   omission	   from	   the	   UNCLOS	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	  interpretation	  of	  Arts	  192	  and	  194	   through	   the	  subsequent	  practice	  of	  States.42	  The	   precautionary	   principle	   or	   approach	   comes	   out	   of	   the	   Declaration	   of	   the	  Second	   International	  North	   Sea	  Conference	   on	   the	  Protection	   of	   the	  North	   Sea	  and	  is	  based	  on	  the	  German	  Law	  of	  Vorsorgeprincip.43	  The	  core	  characteristic	  of	  the	  precautionary	  approach	  (PA)	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  scientific	  proof,	  a	  lack	  of	  full	  scientific	  certainty	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  activity	  on	  the	  environment.44	  In	  operation,	   the	  PA	   takes	   two	  approaches	   to	  dealing	  with	  uncertainty,	   either	   the	  evidentiary	   presumption	   or	   burden	   of	   proof. 45 	  When	   the	   PA	   is	   applied	   to	  dumping,	  the	  allowable	  dumping	  of	  waste	  is	  placed	  under	  some	  form	  of	  control	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  UNCLOS	  Art	  5(a)(i).	  
41	  Patricia	  Birnie,	  Alan	  Boyle	  and	  Catherine	  Redgwell	  International	  Law	  &	  the	  Environment	  (3rd	  ed,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford,	  2009)	  at	  p383.	  
42	  Request	  for	  an	  Examination	  of	  the	  Situation	  in	  Accordance	  with	  Paragraph	  63	  of	  the	  Court's	  Judgement	  in	  the	  1974	  Nuclear	  Tests	  Case,	  (Weeramantry	  Dissenting	  Opinion)	  pp288,	  342	  ICJ	  Reports;	  106	  ILR,	  pp1,64,	  where	  the	  principle	  is	  described	  as	  gaining	  increasing	  support	  as	  part	  of	  the	  international	  law	  of	  the	  environment.	  
43	  David	  Freestone	  and	  Ellen	  Hey	  The	  Precautionary	  Principle	  and	  International	  Law:	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Implementation.	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  Boston,	  1996)	  at	  p4	  
44	  Simon	  Marr	  The	  Precautionary	  Principle	  in	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  The	  Hague:	  New	  York,	  2003)	  at	  p9.	  
45	  At	  p15.	  Here	  he	  notes	  these	  take	  several	  forms,	  from	  an	  obligation	  to	  conduct	  environmental	  impact	  assessments	  (EIAs)	  through	  to	  the	  requirement	  to	  produce	  evidence	  that	  the	  activity	  is	  not	  harmful	  and	  including	  the	  banning	  of	  an	  activity	  until	  scientific	  certainty	  exists,	  pp.	  15	  –	  16.	  The	  burden	  of	  proof	  assumes	  that	  human	  action	  is	  harmful	  and	  therefore	  activities	  are	  regulated	  before	  harm	  occurs	  or	  as	  discussed	  above	  an	  EIA	  is	  sufficient.	  P17.	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to	  limit	  the	  dumping,	  even	  though	  science	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  prove	  a	  causal	  link	  between	  the	  substance	  and	  pollution.46	  The	  Oslo	  Convention	  of	  1972,	  which	  was	  the	  leading	  dumping	  convention	  at	  the	  time,	  provides	  is	  an	  example	  of	  this.47	  The	  PA	  suggests	  that	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  environment	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  less	  of	   the	   ‘assimilate	   and	  disperse’	   approach,48	  to	  one	  of	   elimination,	  minimisation,	  and	   containment,	  49	  where	   the	   focus	   is	   on	   reuse,	   recycle	   or	   treatment	   of	  waste,	  before	   dumping	   occurs.50	  The	   PA	   is	   stated	   clearly	   in	   the	   Rio	   Declaration	   on	  Environment	  and	  Development	  Principle	  15,	  ‘In	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  environment,	  the	  precautionary	  approach	  shall	  be	  widely	  applied	  by	  States	  according	  to	  their	  capabilities.	  Where	  there	  are	  threats	  of	   serious	  or	   irreversible	  damage,	   lack	  of	   full	   scientific	   certainty	  shall	   not	   be	   used	   as	   a	   reason	   for	   postponing	   cost-­‐effective	  measures	   to	  prevent	  environmental	  degradation.’51	  	  The	  precautionary	  approach	  adopts	  the	  philosophy	  that	  positive	  action	  may	  be	  required	  in	  advance	  of	  science	  providing	  sufficient	  proof	  that	  harm	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  caused.	  	  Another	  means	   of	   implementing	   the	   precautionary	   approach	   is	   the	   suggestion	  that	  environmental	  impact	  assessments	  (EIAs)	  take	  place	  before	  the	  dumping	  of	  hazardous	  waste	  as	  opposed	  to	  after	  to	  avoid	  the	  possible	  occurrence	  of	  negative	  environmental	  effects.52	  EIAs,	   articulated	   in	   Art	   206	   of	   the	   UNCLOS,	   are	   the	   process	   of	   assessing	   the	  impact	  the	  proposed	  dumping	  of	  hazardous	  waste	  will	  have	  and	  is.	  The	  process	  of	  assessing	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  environment	  before	  any	  dumping	  suggests	  that	  if	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Freestone	  and	  Hey,	  above	  n	  43	  at	  p5.	  	  
47	  Oslo	  Convention,	  (opened	  for	  signature	  29	  December	  1972,	  effective	  30	  August	  1975),	  1046	  UNTS	  120.	  (9323	  UNTS	  3	  11ILM,	  262	  (1972).	  This	  convention	  is	  confined	  to	  the	  North	  Atlantic.	  
48	  ‘Assimilate	  and	  disperse’	  is	  where	  the	  sea	  was	  viewed	  as	  being	  able	  to	  take	  all	  the	  waste	  dumped	  into	  it	  without	  effecting	  its	  levels	  of	  pollution	  
49	  Birnie,	  Boyle	  and	  Redgwell,	  above	  n	  41	  at	  p138.	  	  
50	  Marr,	  above	  n	  44	  at	  p123.	  The	  recycling,	  reusing	  or	  treatment	  are	  conditional	  on	  not	  causing	  undue	  risk	  to	  human	  health	  or	  disproportionate	  cost.	  
51	  Rio	  Declaration	  on	  Environment	  and	  Development,	  (Rio	  De	  Janeiro,	  3	  -­‐14	  June	  1992)	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Environment	  and	  Development	  (UNCED).	  
52	  Birnie,	  Boyle,	  and	  Redgwell,	  above	  n	  41	  at	  p383.	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the	  negative	  effects	  are	  too	  significant	  that	  the	  dumping	  will	  not	  be	  sanctioned.	  If	  there	   is	   insufficient	  evidence	   to	   confirm	   that	   the	  effects	  are	  minor	   then	   the	  PA	  would	  suggest	  that	  dumping	  either	  does	  not	  happen	  or	  the	  onus	  is	  on	  the	  State	  wishing	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  dumping	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  effects	  are	  minor.	  EIAs	  occur	  when	   the	  effects	  of	   transboundary	  pollution	  could	  be	  significant	  as	  opposed	   to	  minor	  or	  transitory.	  An	  obligation	  to	  carry	  out	  an	  EIA	  arises	  once	  the	  threshold	  of	  foreseeability	  is	  met.	  Birnie	  et	  al	  argue	  that	  it	  be	  carried	  out	  before	  or	  as	  part	  of	  any	  planning	  process,	  not	  once	  science	  reveals	  that	  harm	  is	  foreseeable.53	  The	  requirement	  under	  Art	  206,	  which	  requires	  the	  assessment	  of	  potential	  effects	  of	  planned	  activities	  that	  may	  cause	  substantial	  pollution	  or	  significant	  and	  harmful	  changes	   to	   the	   marine	   environment	   by	   States	   who	   become	   aware	   of	   these	  proposed	  activities	  in	  areas	  under	  their	  jurisdiction	  or	  control	  and	  to	  report	  the	  results	   in	  accord	  with	  Art	  205.	  This	   requirement	   to	  conduct	  an	  EIA	   is	   found	   in	  the	  Basel	  Convention	  Art	  4(2)(f)	  which	  requires	  information	  regarding	  proposed	  movements	  of	  transboundary	  waste	  be	  notified	  to	  States	  concerning	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  movement	  on	  human	  health	  and	  the	  environment.54	  The	   precautionary	   approach	   was	   approved	   by	   the	   ICJ	   in	   the	   Pulp	   Mills	   Case	  (Argentina	  v	  Uruguay)	  Advisory	  Opinion	  No17:	  ‘…prima	  facie	  an	  obligation	  to	  conduct	  an	  EIA	  and	  to	  show	  no	  harm	  would	  result	   to	   the	  marine	  environment;	   there	  exists	   international	   support	   for	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  inter-­‐generational	  equity.	  Further	   support	   for	   the	   notion	   that	   states	   should	   not	   cause	   or	   permit	  serious	  damage	  in	  accord	  with	  Principle	  21	  of	  the	  Stockholm	  Declaration	  1972	  ‘.55	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Birnie,	  Boyle,	  and	  Redgwell,	  above	  n	  41	  at	  p171.	  	  
54	  The	  Basel	  Convention	  on	  the	  Control	  of	  Transboundary	  Movements	  of	  Hazardous	  Wastes	  and	  Their	  Disposal	  (opened	  for	  signature	  22	  March	  1989,	  entered	  into	  force	  5	  May	  1992).	  	  
55	  Pulp	  Mills	  on	  the	  River	  Uruguay	  (Argentina	  v	  Uruguay)	  (Judgment)	  I.C.J.	  Reports	  p83	  at	  paragraph	  204.	  Where	  the	  courts	  stated,	  ‘	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  obligation	  to	  protect	  and	  preserve,	  under	  Art	  41	  (a)	  of	  the	  Statute	  has	  to	  be	  interpreted	  in	  accordance	  with	  practice,	  which	  in	  recent	  years	  has	  gained	  so	  much	  acceptance	  among	  States	  that	  it	  may	  now	  be	  considered	  a	  requirement	  under	  general	  international	  law	  to	  undertake	  an	  environmental	  impact	  assessment	  where	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  the	  proposed	  industrial	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This	  decision,	  and	  the	  decision	  in	  ITLOS	  Advisory	  Opinion	  No	  17,	  provides	  clear	  guidance	  that	  the	  PA	  is	  evolving	  as	  CIL.	  56	  	  	  Art	  210	  deals	  directly	  with	  pollution	  by	  dumping	  and	  establishes,	  (1)	  that	  States	  shall	  adopt	  laws	  and	  regulations	  to	  prevent,	  reduce	  and	  control	  pollution	  of	  the	  marine	   environment,	   (2)	   that	   other	   measures	   maybe	   taken	   as	   necessary	   to	  address	   pollution,	   (3)	   that	   dumping	   is	   not	   carried	   out	   without	   competent	  permission	   of	   states,	   and	   (4)	   that	   global	   rules	   and	   regulations,	   standards,	  practices	  and	  procedures,	  such	  as	  the	  London	  Dumping	  Convention	  1972	  and	  the	  London	   Protocol	   1996,	   should	   be	   endeavoured	   to	   be	   established.	   Lastly	   it	  identifies	   that	   dumping	   within	   the	   territorial	   sea,	   EEZ	   and	   on	   the	   Continental	  shelf	  of	  a	  State	  shall	  not	  be	  carried	  out	  without	  prior	  approval	  of	  the	  coastal	  State	  and	  that	  the	  national	  laws,	  regulations	  and	  measures	  are	  no	  less	  effective	  in	  the	  prevention,	   reduction	   and	   control	   of	   pollution	   than	   the	   global	   rules	   and	  standards.	   	  A	   fine	   reading	  of	  Art	  210	   suggests	   that	   there	   is	   an	   acceptance	   that	  pollution	   will	   occur	   by	   the	   inclusion	   of	   the	   terms,	   both	   ‘reduce’	   and	   ‘control’	  following	   the	   direction	   to	   ‘prevent’.	   The	   standards	   for	   national	   rules	   on	  reduction,	   prevention,	   and	   control	   of	   pollution	   are	   to	   be	   no	   less	   effective	   than	  those	   found	   in	   global	   rules	   and	   standards,57 	  such	   as	   the	   London	   Dumping	  Convention58	  (LDC).	   	  A	  measure	  of	  the	  control	  available	  to	  Somalia,59	  is	  available	  by	   the	   inclusion	   of	   the	   requirement	   that	   national	   laws	   and	   regulations	   will	  ensure	   that	  dumping	   is	  not	   carried	  out	  unless	  permission	  has	  been	  granted	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  activity	  may	  have	  significant	  adverse	  impact	  in	  a	  transboundary	  context,	  in	  particular,	  on	  a	  shared	  resource.’	  
56	  Responsibilities	  and	  Obligations	  of	  States	  Sponsoring	  Person	  and	  Entities	  with	  Respect	  to	  Activities	  in	  the	  Area.	  (Advisory	  Opinion	  No	  17	  1	  November	  2011)	  paragraph	  135;	   	  
‘	   The	  Chamber	  observes	  that	  the	  precautionary	  approach	  has	  been	  incorporated	  into	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  international	  treaties	  and	  other	  instruments,	  many	  of	  which	  reflect	  the	  formulation	  of	  Principle	  15	  of	  the	  Rio	  Declaration.	  In	  the	  view	  of	  the	  Chamber,	  this	  has	  initiated	  a	  trend	  towards	  making	  this	  approach	  part	  of	  customary	  international	  law.’	  The	  tribunal	  then	  went	  on	  to	  say,	  ‘…the	  obligation	  to	  apply	  a	  precautionary	  approach	  as	  reflected	  in	  Principle	  15	  of	  the	  Rio	  Declaration	  and	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Nodules	  Regulations	  and	  the	  Sulphides	  Regulations;	  this	  obligation	  is	  also	  to	  be	  considered	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  due	  diligence	  obligations	  of	  the	  sponsoring	  State	  and	  applicable	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  two	  Regulations.’	  
57	  UNCLOS	  Art	  201(6).	  	  
58	  London	  Convention	  on	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Marine	  Pollution	  by	  Dumping	  of	  Wastes	  and	  Other	  Material	  and	  Their	  Disposal	  (opened	  for	  signature	  on	  29	  December	  1972	  entered	  into	  force	  30	  August	  1975).	  
59	  UNCLOS	  	  above	  Chapter	  3,	  at	  n	  47.	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competent	  authorities	  of	  the	  State.60	  This	  would	  preclude	  dumping	  off	  the	  coast	  of	   Somalia,	   as	   there	   is	   no	   effective	   government	   to	   give	   that	   permission.	   	   This	  permission	  is	  known	  as	  prior	  informed	  consent	  (PIC)	  and	  forms	  a	  central	  part	  of	  the	   principles	   of	   hazardous	   waste	   management	   under	   MEAs.61	  Prior	   informed	  consent	  is	  the	  process	  whereby	  the	  importing	  State	  is	  notified	  by	  the	  exporting	  State	  of	  the	  impending	  export	  or	  import	  of	  waste.	  The	  importing	  State	  needs	  to	  supply	  its	  consent	  to	  the	  exporting	  State	  before	  exports	  can	  start.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  requirement	   that	   there	   is	   confirmation	   of	   the	   contract	   between	   exporter	   and	  disposer	   and	   that	   the	   disposal	   will	   take	   place	   in	   an	   environmentally	   sound	  manner.	  Kummer	  argues	  that	  the	  requirement	  of	  PIC	  is	  evolving	  into	  CIL.62	  There	  is	   an	   obligation	   on	   States	   to	   exercise	   due	   diligence	   with	   regard	   to	   activities	  within	  their	  territories	  and	  under	  their	  control.	  It	  is	  debatable	  as	  to	  whether	  this	  extends	   to	   the	   exporting	   State	   in	   the	   case	   of	   transboundary	   hazardous	   waste	  movement.63	  	  The	   requirement	   that	  States	  under	  Art	  210(1)	  establish	   laws	  and	  regulations	   to	   prevent,	   reduce	   and	   control	   marine	   pollution	   and	   Art	   210(3),	  which	  requires	  that	   the	   laws	  so	  established	  ensure	  that	  dumping	   is	  not	  carried	  out	  without	   permission	   of	   the	   importing	   State.	   It	  must	   follow	   that	   there	   is	   an	  obligation	   to	   carry	   out	   checks	   on	   the	   regulations	   and	   the	   competency	   of	   the	  processes	  involved.	  This	  would	  of	  itself	  generate	  a	  requirement	  of	  checking	  that	  the	  documentation	   at	   both	   ends	   of	   the	  process	   is	   genuine	   and	   gives	   rise	   to	   an	  exercise	   of	   due	   diligence.	   This	   permission	  was	   given	   to	   an	   Italian	   company	   to	  dump	   waste	   off	   the	   coast	   of	   Somalia.	   The	   permission	   granted	   by	   a	   former	  member	  of	  the	  Barre	  government.64	  It	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  argue	  that	  under	  Art	  210	  3)	  a	  former	  member	  of	  government	  is	  a	  ‘competent	  authority	  of	  the	  state’	  even	  if	  there	  was	   domestic	   legislation	   empowering	   a	   government	   official	   to	   issue	   the	  relevant	  consent.65	  To	  support	  the	  argument	  that	  a	  ‘former’	  Government	  Minister	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  UNCLOS	  Art(3).	  	  
61	  Marr,	  above	  n	  44	  at	  p14.	  
62	  Katherine	  Kummer	  International	  Management	  of	  Hazardous	  Wastes	  (Clarendon	  Press,	  Oxford,	  1995)	  at	  p21.	  
63	  At	  p20.	  
64	  	  “Toxic	  Waste	  Adds	  to	  Somalia's	  Woes”	  New	  Scientist	  (19	  September	  1992)	  at	  p5.	  
65	  Competent	  authorities	  of	  state	  include	  those	  ministries	  and	  officials	  with	  legally	  delegated	  or	  invested	  authority	  capacity	  or	  power	  to	  perform	  a	  designated	  function.	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still	  retained	  the	  authority	  to	  issue	  the	  consent	  it	  would	  have	  to	  be	  argued	  that	  the	   collapsed	   government	   of	   Said	   Barre	   was	   still	   the	   duly	   elected	   official	  government	   of	   Somalia.	   That,	   that	   government	   lacks	   effectiveness,	   would	   not	  remove	   the	   fact	   that	   it	  was	  still	   the	  government	  of	   the	  day.	   	  The	  official	   in	   this	  case	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  government	  of	  Ali	  Mahdi	  Mohammed,	  a	  warlord	  who	  had	   taken	   part	   in	   the	   ousting	   of	   the	   Said	   Barre	   government.	   The	   foregoing	  example	   surely	  provides	   sufficient	  proof	   that	   if	   an	  obligation	  exists	   to	   exercise	  due	   diligence,	   then	   in	   this	   case,	   it	   was	   not	   exercised	   by	   the	   exporting	   State.	  Further	   Art	   210(5)	   requires	   that	   due	   consideration	   be	   given	   to	   other	   states	  which,	  by	  their	  geographic	  situation,	  may	  be	  adversely	  affected	  by	  the	  dumping.66	  It	  has	  been	  stated	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  dumping	  toxic	  waste	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia	  is	  of	   concern	   to	  other	   States	   as	   the	   affects	   flow	  out	   to	  other	   south-­‐eastern	   states	  due	   to	   current	   flows.67	  These	   affects	   include	  waste	   uranium	  which	   poisons	   the	  fish	  stocks	  that	  other	  countries,	  like	  Kenya	  to	  Somalia’s	  south,	  rely	  on	  as	  part	  of	  the	   protein	   supply	   and	   export	   trade.68	  Somalia	   has	   been	   unable	   to	   create	   the	  necessary	  domestic	  legislation	  to	  regulate	  dumping	  within	  its	  territorial	  waters.	  Had	  it	  been	  able	  to	  create	  the	  legislation	  it	   is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  the	  necessary	  resources	  to	  police	  its	  substantial	  coastline,	  to	  interdict	  those	  vessels	  that	  dump	  waste	  within	   the	   territorial	  waters	  of	  Somalia,	  would	  have	  been	  available.	  This	  suggests	   that	   due	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   Somalia	   as	   a	   State	   without	   effective	  government,	  it	  is	  incapable	  of	  complying	  with	  its	  international	  law	  obligations.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  port	  States	  and	  flag	  States	  under	  Art	  216,	  and	  Art	  218,	  suggest	  that	   there	   are	   measures	   that	   could	   have	   been	   taken	   before	   the	   vessels	   that	  carried	   out	   the	   dumping	   arrived	   in	   the	   territorial	   waters	   of	   Somalia.	   These	  include	   flag	   States	   ensuring	   that	   their	   vessels	   abide	   by	   the	   applicable	  international	   rules	   and	   standards	   to	   prevent,	   reduce,	   and	   control	   hazardous	  waste	  dumping.	  Enforcement	   is	   the	   responsibility	   of	   either	   the	   coastal	   State,	   if	  the	  dumping	  occurs	  within	  its	  territorial	  waters,	  or	  the	  flag	  State	  or	  to	  the	  State	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  UNCLOS	  Art	  210(5).	  	  
67	  Saeed	  Shabazz	  “Somali	  Piracy	  Connected	  to	  Toxic	  Dumping,	  Illegal	  Fishing”	  (2008)	  at	  p1.	  	  
68	  Sitawa	  Kimuna	  “Hazardous	  Waste	  Transfer	  to	  Africa:	  Implications	  for	  the	  Poor	  and	  Marginalised”	  2004	  7(1)	  Sustainable	  Communities	  Review	  at	  p50.	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in	  which	  the	  waste	  is	  loaded,	  (Art	  217(1)(a),	  (b)	  or	  (c)).	  As	  has	  been	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	   flag	  States	   labelled,	  as	  FOC	  are	   loath	  to	  enforce	  measures	  on	  vessels	  flying	  their	   flag.	  The	  measures	  applied	  to	  port	  States,	  Art	  218,	  relate	  more	  to	   information	  coming	  to	  hand	  regarding	  dumping	  that	  has	  occurred	  and	  grant	   the	  port	   State	   the	   right	   to	   carry	  out	   investigations.69	  These	   investigations	  can	   be	   related	   to	   dumping	   that	   has	   occurred	   outside	   the	   internal	   waters,	  territorial	   sea,	  or	  EEZ	  of	  a	   foreign	  State.	  For	  dumping	   that	  has	  occurred	  within	  those	   aforementioned	   zones,	   a	   request	   is	   required	   from	   the	   State	   that	   has	  suffered	  the	  damage.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Somalia,	  this	  is	  particularly	  restrictive,	  as	  the	  government	   and	   its	  maritime	  ministry	  were	   not	   functioning	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	  alleged	  dumping.	  The	  measures	  granted	  under	  Art	  218	  do	  not	  however	  extend	  to	  a	  port	  State	  from	  which	  a	  vessel	  is	  departing	  with	  a	  toxic	  cargo	  that	  is	  destined	  be	  dumped	  at	  sea	  or	  within	   the	  territory	  of	  another	  state.	   	   In	   this	   instance,	  Art	  216	  would	  be	  of	  benefit	  as	   it	   covers	  under	  Art	  216(1)(c)	   the	   loading	  of	  wastes	  within	  a	  states	  territory	  or	  its	  off	  shore	  terminals.	  Under	  Art	  218(3)	  a	  flag	  State	  may	  request	  of	  a	  port	  State	  that	  it	  investigates	  a	  discharge	  by	  a	  vessel	  outside	  the	  internal	  waters,	  territorial	  sea	  or	  EEZ	  of	  the	  port	  State	  irrespective	  of	  where	  the	  discharge	   occurred.	  While	   the	   definition	   of	   dumping	   contained	   in	   the	  UNCLOS	  Art	  1(a)(i)	  and	  (ii)	   is	  quite	  specific	  regarding	  the	  exclusion	  of	  waste	  discharged	  from	  a	  vessel	  in	  its	  normal	  operations.	  Art	  1(b)(i)	  covers	  wastes	  or	  other	  matter	  transported	   by	   or	   to	   vessels	   operating	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   disposal	   or	  treatment	   of	   those	   wastes	   or	   other	   matter	   on	   such	   vessels.	   This	   would	   then	  suggest	  that	  the	  discharging	  of	  any	  waste	  or	  matter,	  not	  in	  the	  normal	  course	  of	  operation	  of	  the	  vessel,	  falls	  within	  the	  ‘dumping’	  definition	  and	  as	  such	  Art	  218	  could	  be	  said	  to	  cover	  discharge	  of	  waste	  from	  vessels	  other	  than	  in	  the	  normal	  course	  of	  operation.70	  	  The	  obligation	  then	  falls	  on	  the	  flag	  State	  to	  pursue	  known	  incidents	  of	  discharging	  waste	  wherever	  it	  occurs.71	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  UNCLOS	  Art	  218(1).	  	  
70	  Shabtai	  Rosenne	  and	  Alexander	  Yankov	  United	  Nations	  law	  of	  the	  Sea,	  Commentary,	  Articles	  
192-­‐278	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  Dordrecht,	  1990);	  at	  p271.	  There	  is	  no	  particular	  meaning	  attached	  to	  discharging.	  
71	  See	  the	  discussion	  above	  in	  Chapter	  3	  regarding	  the	  reluctance	  by	  flag	  States,	  and	  particularly	  FOC	  States,	  to	  investigate	  incidents	  in	  relation	  to	  vessels	  flying	  their	  flags.	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Somalia	   would	   have	   appeared	   to	   breach	   the	   requirement	   to	   develop	   national	  laws	  under	  Art	  210(1)	  of	  UNCLOS	  along	  with	  Art	  210(2)	  that	  requires	  States	  to	  take	  measures	  to	  prevent,	  reduce	  and	  control	  pollution	  by	  its	  failure	  to	  provide	  an	  efficient	  either	  Coast	  Guard	  or	  Navy	  to	  police	  its	  waters.	  Somalia	  would	  also	  be	  in	  breach	  of	  Art	  216(1)(a)	  for	  its	  failure	  to	  enforce	  the	  international	  rules	  and	  standards	  with	   regard	   dumping	   in	   its	   territorial	   sea,	   EEZ,	   or	   continental	   shelf	  along	  with	  breaches	  of	  Art	  220(3).	  Those	   parties	   that	   allowed	   vessels	   to	   dump	   waste	   without	   the	   consent	   of	   a	  competent	  authority	  and	  prior	  approval	  of	  the	  coastal	  state	  committed	  breaches	  of	  Art	  210(3).	  Port	  States	  are	  in	  breach	  of	  Art	  210(1)(c)	  for	  failure	  to	  enforce	  the	  same	  international	  standards	  and	  rules	  against	  vessels	  loading	  hazardous	  waste	  at	  their	  ports	  where	  prerequisite	  permits	  and	  consents	  have	  not	  obtained.	  Port	  States	  would	  also	  be	  in	  breach	  for	  their	  failure	  under	  Art	  218(1)	  for	  their	  failure	  to	  institute	  proceedings	  where	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  there	  has	  been	  dumping	  of	  waste	  outside	   the	   territorial	   sea	  or	  EEZ	  of	   the	  port	  State.	  Flag	  States	  of	  vessels	  involved	   in	  dumping	  are	   in	  breach	  of	  Art	  216(1)(b)	   for	   their	   failure	   to	  enforce	  applicable	   international	   rules	   and	   standards	   against	   vessels	   flying	   their	   flags.	  Flag	  States	  would	  be	  in	  breach	  of	  Art	  217(1)	  for	  their	  failure	  to	  provide	  effective	  enforcement	  of	  international	  rules	  and	  standards.	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15.2 London	  Dumping	  Convention	  1972	  and	  Protocols	  1996.	  The	   London	   Convention	   on	   the	   Prevention	   of	  Marine	   Pollution	   by	  Dumping	   of	  Wastes	   and	   Other	   Matter	   197272	  (LDC)	   came	   into	   being	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   UN	  Conference	  on	  the	  Human	  Environment	  (June	  1972)	  Stockholm.	  Somalia,73	  is	  not	  a	   signatory	   to	   the	   LDC	   and	   is	   not	   a	   signatory	   to	   the	   1996	   Protocol	   to	   the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Marine	  Pollution	  by	  the	  Dumping	  of	  Wastes	  and	  Other	  Matter	  197274	  (Protocol).	  The	  LDC	  represents	  the	  international	  standards	  referred	   to	   in	  Art	  210	  of	   the	  UNCLOS,	  and	   is	   therefore	  binding	  on	  Somalia	  and	  binding	  on	  other	  parties	  that	  may	  be	  operating	  in	  Somali	  waters.	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  LDC	   is	  articulated	   in	  Art	  1	  as	  being	   the	  prevention	  of	  pollution	  of	   the	  sea	   from	  dumping	  of	  wastes	   that	  causes	  a	  hazard	  to	  human	  health,	   living	  resources,	  and	  marine	   life.	   The	   waste	   stream	   is	   divided	   into	   three	   separate	   categories,	   Art	  4(1)(a)	  material	  that	  is	  prohibited	  from	  being	  dumped,	  Art	  4(1)(b),	  material	  that	  requires	  a	  special	  permit	  to	  be	  dumped	  and	  Art	  4(1)(c),	  material	  that	  requires	  a	  general	  permit	  to	  be	  dumped.	  The	  material	  that	  is	  classified	  under	  Art	  4(1)(a)	  is	  clearly	   set	   out	   in	   Annex	   1	   and	   material	   mentioned	   in	   Art	   4(1)(b)	   is	   listed	   in	  Annex	   II.	  Annex	   I	   includes	  mercury	  and	  cadmium,	  persistent	  plastics,	   crude	  oil	  and	   its	   distillates,	   radioactive	   material	   and	   materials	   used	   for	   biological	   and	  chemical	   warfare.	   Annex	   II	   consists	   of	   several	   chemical	   compounds	   such	   as	  copper	   lead,	   nickel,	   zinc	   etc.,	   and	   scrap	   metal.	   Dumping	   is	   defined	   under	   Art	  3(1)(a)	   as	   being	   the	   process	   of	   deliberate	   disposal	   at	   sea	   of	   wastes	   or	   other	  matter	   from	   vessels…	   at	   sea.	   Annex	   I	   materials	   are	   prohibited	   from	   being	  dumped.	  Annex	   II	  material	  may	  only	  be	  dumped	  under	  a	  special	  permit	   issued	  under	   Article	   4(1)(b)	   for	   Annex	   II	   materials	   and	   any	   other	   waste	   under	   Art	  4(1)(c).	   Art	   6(1)(c)	   requires	   the	   parties	   to	   keep	   records	   of	   the	   nature	   and	  quantities	  of	  matter	  permitted	  to	  be	  dumped	  and	  the	  location,	  time	  and	  method	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  London	  Convention	  on	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Marine	  Pollution	  by	  Dumping	  of	  Wastes	  and	  Other	  Material	  and	  Their	  Disposal	  (opened	  for	  signature	  on	  29	  December	  1972	  entered	  into	  force	  30	  August	  1975	  above	  n56.	  
73Report	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  Somali	  Natural	  Resources	  and	  Waters,	  above	  Chapter	  3,	  n	  112	  at	  p18	  paragraph	  69	  
74	  1996	  Protocol	  to	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Marine	  Pollution	  by	  Dumping	  of	  Wastes	  and	  Other	  Matter,	  1972.	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of	  dumping.	  Art	  6(2)	  requires	  contracting	  parties	  to	  issue	  prior	  special	  or	  general	  permits	   by	   the	   appropriate	   authority	   for	   matter	   loaded	   in	   its	   territory	   and	  intended	  for	  dumping	  or	  for	  matter	  intended	  for	  dumping	  but	  loaded	  on	  a	  vessel	  registered	  in	  its	  territory,	  when	  the	  loading	  occurs	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  a	  State	  not	  a	  party	  to	  the	  LDC.	  	  Article	   7	   covers	   the	   application	   of	   the	   LDC	   to	   all	   vessels	   registered	   to	   a	  contracting	  party.	  Art	  7(1)(a),	  vessels	   loading	  matter	   that	   is	   to	  be	  dumped,	  Art	  7(1)(b),	  and	  vessels	  under	  its	  jurisdiction	  believed	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  dumping	  Art	  7(1)(c).	   Art	   7(2)	   requires	   parties	   to	   take	   within	   their	   territory	   appropriate	  measures	  to	  prevent	  and	  punish	  conduct	  in	  contravention	  of	  the	  convention.	  	  
	  The	  LDC	  was	   followed	  by	   the	  Protocol.	  The	  Protocol	  was	  developed	  under	   the	  LDC	   and	   is	   supportive	   of	   Art	   210	   of	   the	   UNCLOS,	   which	   requires	   states	   to	  cooperate	  on	  a	  global	  or	  regional	  basis	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  international	  rules	  and	   standards	   and	   recommended	   practices	   and	   procedures	   for	   the	   protection	  and	   preservation	   of	   the	   marine	   environment.	   The	   Protocol	   was	   designed	   to	  modernise	  the	  LDC	  and	  will	  ultimately	  replace	  it.	  The	  Protocol	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  2006.75	  To	  date	  Somalia	  is	  not	  a	  signatory	  to	  the	  Protocols.	  87	  parties	  including	  the	   France,	   Germany,	   Italy,	   Japan,	   People’s	   Republic	   of	   China,	   UK,	   and	   the	   US,	  have	   signed	   the	   Protocol.	   The	   Protocol	   reflects	   the	   global	   shift	   towards	  precaution	   and	  prevention	   in	   relation	   to	  hazardous	  waste	  management	   and	   as	  such	   it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   Protocol	   forms	   part	   of	   CIL76	  and	   is	   therefore	  binding	   on	   Somalia.	   CIL	   is	   a	   possible	   by	   product	   of	   treaties	  which	   are	   binding	  only	  on	  contracting	  parties	  but	  set	  out	  to	  establish,	  not	  restrictive	  practices,	  but	  to	  have	  a	  general	  effect.77	  While	  the	  general	  rule	  is	  that	  non-­‐parties	  to	  a	  treaty	  are	  not	  bound	  by	  its	  terms,78	  where	  treaties	  reflect	  rules	  of	  CIL	  then	  non-­‐parties	  are	  bound.79	  The	  changes	  to	  the	  LDC	  brought	  by	  the	  Protocols	  are	  noticeable	  under	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Convention-­‐on-­‐the-­‐Prevention-­‐of	  Marine-­‐Pollution-­‐by-­‐Dumping-­‐of-­‐Wastes-­‐and-­‐Other-­‐Matter.aspx	  
76	  Thirlway,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  93.	  
77	  Shaw,	  above	  Chapter	  2,	  n	  65	  at	  p95.	  	  
78	  North	  Seas	  Continental	  Shelf	  (Federal	  Republic	  Germany/Denmark)(Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany/Netherlands)(Judgment)	  [1969]	  ICJ	  Reports	  [41	  ILR29]	  at	  pp3,	  25.	  
79	  Shaw,	  above	  Chapter	  2,	  n	  65	  at	  p95.	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Art	  4(1)(.1)	  where	  the	  emphasis	  is	  now	  on	  a	  total	  prohibition	  of	  dumping	  except	  for	  some	  non-­‐organic	  material	  as	  classified	  under	  Annex	  I.	  Matter	  that	  is	  allowed	  to	   be	   dumped	   has	   to	   comply	  with	   specific	   conditions	   as	   listed	   under	   Annex	   II	  which	   in	   general	   terms	   require	   the	   proposed	  material	   to	   go	   through	   an	   audit	  which	  is	  designed	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  absolute	  minimum	  of	  waste	  is	  dumped	  and	  the	   bulk	   is	   either	   recycled	   in	   some	   form	   or	   disposed	   of	   through	   some	   other	  means	  excluding	  incineration	  at	  sea.	  These	  new	  procedures	  reversed	  the	  burden	  of	   proof	   on	   the	   bodies	   wishing	   to	   dump	  waste	   by	   ensuring	  material	   that	   was	  dumped	  was	  as	  innocuous	  as	  possible,	  a	  reversal	  of	  the	  LDC	  process.80	  	  Art	   2	   of	   the	  Protocol	   refers	   to	   the	  objectives	  being	   to	   ‘eliminate	  pollution’	   and	  also	  under	  art	  4(1)(.1),	  mentioned	  above,	  where	  the	  term	  used	  is	  ‘shall	  prohibit’	  indicating	  a	  strong	  command	  or	  duty	  for	  the	  prohibition	  to	  take	  place.	  Like	  the	  specific	  articles	  in	  the	  UNCLOS,	  there	  is	  in	  the	  LDC	  Art	  6,	  that	  expects	  parties	  to	  ‘not	   allow’	   the	   export	   of	  wastes	  or	  other	  matter	   to	   countries	   for	  dumping.	  The	  language	  used	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  all	  that	  strong.	  A	  total	  prohibition	  or	  a	  ‘ban’	  on	  material	  leaving	  a	  party’s	  ports	  would	  perhaps	  serve	  a	  greater	  purpose	  than	  a	  seemingly	  mild	  ‘not	  allow’.	  The	  Basel	  Convention,	  uses	  slightly	  stronger	  language	  under	  its	  general	  obligations	  Art	  4(1)(b)	  where	  the	  term	  ‘prohibit	  or	  not	  permit	  the	  export’	  is	  used	  which	  indicates	  a	  stronger	  inclination	  to	  stop	  waste	  leaving	  a	  party’s	  ports	  or	  jurisdiction.	  The	  material	  that	  has	  ended	  up	  in	  the	  waters	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia	  had	  to	  start	  somewhere.	  It	  would	  be	  expected	  with	  the	  weight	  of	  prohibition	  and	  desire	  to	  stop	  the	  dumping	  of	  waste	  that	  these	  collected	  articles	  would	  ensure	  State	  parties	  were	  proactive	  in	  stopping	  waste	  leaving	  their	  ports	  unless	  sanctioned.	  Unfortunately	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  information	  available,	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  report	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  the	  UN,	  the	  security	  situation	  does	  not	  allow	   for	  a	   thorough	   investigation	   in	  Somalia	   to	  verify	  whether	   there	  has	  been	  illegal	  dumping.81	  The	  Protocol	  codifies	  the	  precautionary	  principle,	  Art	  3(1)	  and	  the	  polluter	  pays	  principle	  in	  Art	  3(2).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Birnie	  above	  n	  41	  at	  p189.	  
81	  Report	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  Somali	  Natural	  Resources	  and	  Waters,	  	  above	  Chapter	  3,	  n	  112	  at	  p17	  paragraph	  63.	  
Chapter	  4	  	  
	   127	  
Art	  9(1)(.1)	   specifies	   that	  parties	   should	  designate	  an	  appropriate	  authority	   to	  issue	   permits.	   There	   is	   no	   direction	   as	   to	   what	   constitutes	   an	   appropriate	  authority,	   although	   it	   can	   be	   assumed	   that	   is	   more	   than	   likely	   a	   government	  official	  or	  branch	  of	  government	  with	  delegated	  powers	   to	   issue	  certificates	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  government.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  waste	  dumped	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia	  there	  is	  a	  distinct	  lack	  of	  due	  diligence.82	  	  In	  a	  similar	  vane	  is	  Art	  10	  (1)(.1).	  Each	  party	   is	   to	  apply	  measures	   required	   to	   implement	   the	  protocol	  with	   respect	   to	  vessels	   registered	   in	   its	   territory	   and	   flying	   its	   flag.	   Article	   10(1)(.2)	   covers	  vessels	   loading	   in	  a	  contracting	  party’s	   territory,	  wastes	  that	  are	  to	  be	  dumped	  or	  incinerated	  at	  sea.	  If	  vessels,	  that	  are	  either	  locally	  flagged	  or	  foreign	  flagged	  but	  loading	  waste	  in	  a	  port	  of	  a	  party	  to	  the	  protocols,	  leaves	  without	  complying	  with	   the	   requirement	   to	   have	   PIC	   to	   dump	  waste	   or	   any	   form	   of	   certification	  covering	   the	   waste	   then	   this	   is	   suggestive	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   thoroughness	   in	   the	  application	  of	  the	  Protocol	  and	  due	  diligence.	  It	  could	  also	  suggest	  that	  criminal	  groups	   are	   operating	   the	   waste	   dumping	   and	   are	   deliberately	   avoiding	   the	  constraints	  of	  the	  LDC	  and	  the	  Protocol	  for	  their	  own	  financial	  gain.	  	  Art	  12	  of	  the	  Protocol	  suggests	  regional	  cooperation	  as	  a	  means	  of	  protecting	  the	  marine	  environment.	  The	  article	  promotes	  the	  adoption	  of	  agreements	  as	  a	  form	  of	  co-­‐operation	  but	  does	  not	  specify	  any	  other	  steps	  that	  may	  be	  taken.	  A	  more	  specific	   and	   detailed	   article	   outlining	   specific	   active	   steps	   that	   could	   be	   taken	  which	   could	   involve	   joint	   naval/coastguard/police/customs	   operations,	   to	  interdict	  vessels	  suspected	  of	  dumping	  waste	  within	  the	  territory	  of	  party	  States	  would	  enhance	  this	  article	  and	  give	  more	  teeth	  to	  signatories	  to	  deter	  those	  who	  would	   actively	   avoid	   dumping	   restrictions.	   There	   is	   no	   suggestion	   that	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	   inability	   of	   a	   State	   to	   conduct	   its	   own	  operations	   that	   others	   could	  work	  together	  to	  prevent	  dumping	  occurring	  in	  another	  states	  territory.	  	  While	   Art	   15	   addresses	   the	   need	   to	   deal	   with	   responsibility	   and	   liability	   in	  accordance	  with	   international	   law	  regarding	   state	   responsibility	   for	  damage	   to	  the	   environment	   of	   other	   States,	   the	   undertaking	   to	   develop	   procedures	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  That	  the	  permits	  were	  issued	  by	  a	  ‘former	  Minister’	  indicates	  a	  lack	  of	  thoroughness.	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regarding	  liability	  arising	  from	  dumping	  has	  not	  apparently	  progressed	  and	  the	  matter	   is	   still	   to	   be	   addressed.	   This	   lack	   of	   ability	   to	   assign	   responsibility	   and	  liability,	   either	   to	   the	   flag	   State	   or	   a	   port	   State	   from	   impinges	   severely	   on	  Somalia’s	  ability	   to	   seek	  compensation	   for	   those	  who	  have	   lost	   their	   life	  or	   for	  the	  damage	  caused	  to	  the	  environment	  through	  the	  dumping	  of	  waste.	  Although	  a	   designated	   liability	   regime	   under	   the	   Protocol	   has	   yet	   to	   be	   adopted,	   the	  general	  principles	  of	   state	   responsibility	  apply	  where	  a	  breach	  of	   international	  law	  can	  be	  identified.83	  	  One	  of	   the	  major	  weaknesses	  of	   the	  LDC	   is	   in	   the	  area	  of	  compliance	  control.	  84	  This	  weakness	  is	  due	  to	  the	  limited	  number	  of	  staff	  assigned	  to	  assess	  how	  well	  parties	  are	  implementing	  the	  convention.85	  This	  lack	  of	  auditing	  shows	  up	  in	  the	  poor	   reporting	   of	   dumping	   permits	   over	   a	   period	   of	   18	   years	   where	   half	   the	  parties	  failed	  to	  lodge	  reports.86	  The	  poor	  reporting	  could	  possibly	  indicate	  that	  parties	   do	   not	   see	   compliance	   with	   the	   convention,	   especially	   the	   reporting	  requirement	  under	  Art	  5(4),	  as	  a	  major	  task.	  The	  last	  year	  for	  which	  figures	  are	  available,	  2008,	  indicates	  that	  the	  trend	  has	  continued.87	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  assume	  that	  the	   lack	  of	   reporting	  and	   lack	  of	   follow	  up	   to	  ascertain	   the	   reasons	  behind	   the	  lack	   of	   reporting,	   could	   be	   of	   assistance	   to	   those	   States	   wanting	   to	   avoid	  regulation	  of	  their	  waste	  dumping.	  	  Another	   area	   of	   concern	   is	   the	   lack	   of	   uptake	  of	   the	   convention	  by	  developing	  coastal	  States.88	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  African	  coastal	  States	  this	  could	  be	  due	  to	  the	  necessity	  of	  gaining	   income	   from	  developed	  States.	  The	  disposal	  of	  waste	   from	  developed	  States,	  as	  highlighted	  in	  the	  introduction,	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  source	  of	  income	  for	   the	   poorer	   non-­‐OECD	   States.	   A	   2001	   investigation	   into	   waste	   dumping	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Responsibility	  of	  States	  for	  Internationally	  Wrongful	  Acts,	  Report	  of	  the	  ILC	  on	  the	  Work	  of	  its	  Fifty	  third	  Session,	  UN	  GAOR,	  56	  Sess,	  Supp	  No	  10	  UN	  Doc	  A/56/10	  Y.I.L.C.,	  (2001),	  vol.II	  (Part	  two)	  A/56/49(VolI)/Corr.4	  Art	  36	  (1).	  
84	  Olav	  Stokke	  “Beyond	  Dumping?	  The	  Effectiveness	  of	  the	  London	  Convention”	  1998	  Yearbook	  of	  International	  Cooperation	  on	  Environment	  and	  Development	  39	  at	  p42.	  	  
85	  Stokke,	  above	  n	  84	  at	  p42.	  
86	  At	  p42.	  
87	  Convention	  on	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Marine	  Pollution	  by	  Dumping	  of	  Wastes	  and	  Other	  Matter,	  1972	  and	  its	  1996	  Protocol,	  Final	  Report	  on	  Permits	  issued	  in	  2008,	  LC-­‐LP.1/Circ.52	  	  (International	  Maritime	  Organisation,	  2012).	  
88	  Stokke,	  above	  n	  84	  at	  p46.	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Italy	  revealed	  that	  waste	  was	  transported	  from	  Italy,	  to	  Algeria,	  Ethiopia,	  Malawi,	  Mozambique	  Somalia	  and	  Zaire.89	  Somalia’s	   lack	  of	  ratification	  of	   the	  Convention	  or	  Protocols	  should	  not	  prevent	  both	   flag	   States	   and	   port	   States	   who	   are	   signatories	   from	   enforcing	   their	  obligations	  by	  preventing	  either	  vessels	  flagged	  to	  them	  or	  vessels	  leaving	  their	  ports	  with	  an	  intention	  to	  dump	  waste.	  The	  indications	  are	  that	  at	  one	  time	  the	  political	  will	  existed	  to	  prevent	  maritime	  dumping.	  However	  the	  wording	  used	  in	  the	  Art	  4(1)	  (a)-­‐(c),	  that	  allows	  for	  recycling	  of	  waste	  or	  dumping	  of	  any	  waste	  at	  sea,	  even	  if	  permitted,	  speak	  of	  a	  mind	  set	  that	  still	  views	  the	  ocean	  as	  a	  dumping	  ground.	  An	  extensive	  prohibition	  on	  all	  dumping	  at	  sea,	  even	  of	  organic	  matter	  or	  biological	  material	  as	  permitted,	  would	  signal	  an	  alteration	  of	  that	  mindset.	  	  The	   LDC	   imposes	   a	   prohibition	   on	   dumping	   unless	   it	   conforms	   to	   specific	  requirements	   that	   include	   permits	   for	   Annex	   II	   waste	   or	   general	   permits	   for	  other	  wastes	  outside	  Annex	  II.	  It	  would	  therefore	  follow	  if	  waste	  is	  dumped	  that	  falls	  within	   Annex	   I	   or	  without	   a	   permit	   then	   there	   has	   been	   a	   breach	   of	   Arts	  4(1)(a)	  and	  4(1)(b).	  Should	  there	  have	  not	  been	  a	  assessment	  by	  the	  State	  where	  the	  dumping	  is	  to	  occur	  then	  there	  would	  effectively	  be	  a	  breach	  of	  Art	  4(2)	  that	  requires	  a	  prior	  study	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  dumping	  site.	  Somalia	  would	  be	  in	  breach	  of	  Art	  6(1)(a)	  for	  allowing	  dumping	  to	  occur	  without	  a	  permit,	  but	  only	  if	  one	  accepts	  that	  the	  LDC	  and	  Protocol	  reflect	  existing	  CIL.	  	  Other	  breaches	  would	  occur	  for	  port	  States	  for	  allowing	  matter	  to	  be	  loaded	  within	  its	  territory	  if	  there	  was	  no	  certificate	   issued	  for	  either	  specific	  dumping,	  Annex	  II	  waste	  or	  a	  general	   permit	   for	   other	  waste.	   Flag	   States	  would	   be	   in	   breach	   if	   loading	   took	  place	  on	  their	  vessels	  within	  non-­‐party	  States	  without	  the	  prerequisite	  permits	  as	  mentioned	  above.	  Breaches	  would	  occur	   for	  both	   flag	  States	  and	  port	  States	  where	   there	  was	  a	   failure	   to	  ensure	   that	  measures	  were	  applied	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  LDC	  under	  Art	  7(1)(a)	  and	  (b)	  for	  port	  States.	  Further	  breaches	  would	  occur	   for	   failure	   to	   prevent	   and	   punish	   those	   parties	   that	   failed	   to	   take	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  Pina,	  above	  n	  3.	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appropriate	  actions	  under	  Art	  7(2).	  This	  would	   include	  Somalia	  as	  well	  as	  port	  and	  flag	  States	  from	  where	  vessels	  departed	  or	  carried	  the	  waste	  for	  dumping.	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15.3 Basel	  Convention	  Waste	  that	  has	  been	  discovered	  within	  the	  territorial	  waters	  of	  Somalia	  was	  not	  generated	  within	  Somalia	  but	  was	  allegedly	  generated	  in	  Europe.90	  This	  transfer	  of	  waste	   from	  Europe	   is	  covered	  under	   the	  Basel	  Convention	  on	   the	  Control	  of	  Transboundary	  Movements	  of	  Hazardous	  Wastes	  and	  Their	  Disposal	  1989	  if	  the	  source	   State	   is	   a	   signatory	   to	   the	   Convention.91	  Although	   Somalia	   has	   only	  recently	  ratified	  the	  Basel	  Convention	  on	  the	  24th	  October	  2010,92	  Arts	  6	  (1)	  and	  7	  apply	  to	  the	  transit	  of	  hazardous	  waste	  through	  non-­‐State	  parties.	  This	  would	  not	  preclude	  action	  being	  taken	  by	  Somalia	  against	  those	  who	  were	  carrying	  out	  the	  alleged	  dumping	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  general	  international	  law.	  	  The	  Basel	  Convention	  was	  created	  out	  of	  a	  desire	  by	  the	  UNEP	  to	  establish	  a	  set	  of	   guidelines	   to	   control	   the	   transboundary	  movement	   of	   hazardous	  waste	   that	  resulted	  in	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  1982	  Cairo	  Guidelines	  on	  Environmentally	  Sound	  Management	   of	   Hazardous	   Wastes. 93 	  The	   EC,	   the	   OECD	   states	   and	   the	   US	  established	   regulations	   regarding	   the	   transfer	   of	   waste	   across	   their	   borders,	  which	  were	  further	  amended	  by	  the	  EC	  and	  the	  OECD	  in	  1986	  to	  cover	  the	  export	  of	  waste	  to	  third	  countries.94	  The	  negotiations	  surrounding	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Basel	  Convention	  were	  centred	  on	  two	  major	  viewpoints.	  Those	  of	  the	  waste	  traders	  who	  wished	  the	  trade	  to	  remain	  a	   legal	   trade,	  as	   there	  were	  significant	  profits	   being	   made	   from	   the	   trade,	   and	   the	   view	   of	   the	   developing	   countries,	  particularly	  African	  that	  desired	  the	  trade	  to	  be	  banned	  outright	  as	  they	  were	  the	  recipients	   of	   this	   damaging	   trade.95	  Some	   of	   the	   African	   nations	   supported	   the	  trade	  as	  it	  was	  bringing	  to	  their	  shores	  much	  needed	  foreign	  currency.	  The	   Basel	   Convention	   does	   not	   ban	   outright	   the	   trade	   in	   waste.	   Rather	   it	  develops	  some	  rules	  around	  that	  trade	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  protect	  developing	  nations	  from	   becoming	   the	   dumping	   ground	   for	   developed	   nations	  who	   are	   unable	   or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Hari,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  16.	  
91	  Birnie,	  Boyle	  and	  Redgwell,	  above	  n	  53.	  
92	  www.basel.int/countries/Statusof	  Ratifications/Partiessignatories/tabid/1290/Default.aspx	  
93	  Clapp,	  above	  n	  12	  at	  p23.	  
94	  At	  p23.	  
95	  At	  p23.	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unwilling	   to	   process	   their	   own	  waste	  within	   their	   territory.96	  The	   basis	   for	   the	  Basel	   Convention	   is	   a	   modified	   version	   of	   PIC.	   PIC	   is	   the	   sequencing	   of	  arrangements	  to	  cover	  the	  export	  and	  import	  of	  waste.	  In	  its	  basic	  form	  it	  covers	  a	  notification	   that	   a	   State	  wishes	   to	  export	  waste,	   a	  written	   response	   from	   the	  importing	   State,	   confirmation	   that	   a	   contract	   exists	   between	   exporter	   and	  disposer,	  that	  covers	  the	  terms	  of	  disposal	  in	  an	  environmentally	  sound	  manner,	  and	  an	  acknowledgement	  that	  if	  the	  trade	  is	  discovered	  to	  be	  illegal	  by	  one	  of	  the	  parties,	  then	  either	  the	  exporter	  will	  accept	  the	  waste	  back	  or	  the	  importer	  will	  dispose	   of	   it	   in	   an	   environmentally	   sound	   manner.97	  Article	   4	   establishes	   the	  basic	  obligations	  of	  the	  parties	  and	  also	  enshrines	  the	  PIC	  mentioned	  above.	  Art	  4	   grants	   the	   right	   to	   States	   to	   prohibit	   the	   import	   of	   hazardous	   waste	   for	  disposal.	   Art	   4	   stops	   the	   export	   of	   waste	   to	   States	   who	   have	   prohibited	   the	  import	  of	  wastes	  and	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  the	  export	  of	  waste	  to	  States	  who	  do	  not	  consent	   to	   the	   export.	   Art	   4(2)	   establishes	   measures	   to	   be	   taken	   around	  hazardous	  waste	  from	  reduction	  in	  generation,	  (Art	  4(2)(a)),	  creation	  of	  disposal	  facilities	   for	   environmentally	   sound	   management	   of	   hazardous	   waste,98	  (Art	  4(2)(b)),	   directs	   measures	   to	   be	   taken	   by	   those	   handling	   hazardous	   waste	   to	  avoid	   pollution,	   (Art	   4(2)(c)),	   that	   transboundary	   movement	   is	   reduced	   to	   a	  minimum,	   (Art	   4(2)(d)),	   and	   to	   not	   allow	   the	   export	   of	  wastes	   to	   those	   States	  that	  have	  prohibited	  all	  imports	  of	  hazardous	  waste	  or	  to	  States	  where	  the	  waste	  may	   not	   be	   handled	   in	   accord	   with	   environmentally	   sound	   management	  practices.	  Of	  specific	  interest	  is	  Art	  4(3)	  that	  considers	  that	  illegal	  traffic	  in	  waste	  is	  criminal	  and	  Art	  4(5)	  that	  directs	  parties	  not	  to	  permit	  export	  to	  non-­‐Parties.	  Art	   4(7)	   places	   a	   prohibition	   on	   non-­‐authorised	   persons	   from	   transporting	   or	  disposing	  of	  hazardous	  wastes	  and	  requires	  the	  labelling	  and	  packaging	  of	  waste	  in	   conformity	  with	   generally	   recognised	   international	   rules	   and	   standards	   and	  the	  requirement	  that	  documents	  accompany	  any	  transboundary	  movement	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Clapp,	  above	  n	  12	  at	  p26.	  
97	  Basel	  Convention,	  Arts	  6,	  8,	  9.	  	  
98	  Basel	  Convention,	  Art	  2(8)	  defines	  environmentally	  sound	  management	  of	  hazardous	  waste	  as:	  	  	   ‘taking	  all	  practicable	  steps	  to	  ensure	  that	  hazardous	  wastes	  or	  other	  wastes	  are	  managed	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  will	  protect	  human	  health	  and	  the	  environment	  against	  the	  adverse	  effects	  which	  may	  result	  from	  such	  wastes.’	  
Chapter	  4	  	  
	   133	  
commencement	  of	   the	   journey	   to	  disposal	  point.	  Art	  4(8)	   requires	  Parties	   that	  export	  hazardous	  waste	  to	  ensure	  that	  it	  is	  handled	  in	  an	  environmentally	  sound	  manner	  in	  the	  state	  of	  import	  or	  elsewhere.	  Art	  6(1)	  requires	  the	  State	  of	  export	  to	  notify	  in	  writing	  the	  competent	  authority	  of	  any	  State	  through	  which	  there	  is	  a	  proposed	  transboundary	  movement	  of	  hazardous	  waste	  or	  waste.	  	  Clapp	   alleges	   that	   the	   BC	   does	   not	  make	   this	   trade	   in	  wastes	   illegal;	   rather	   it	  attempts	   to	   regulate	   the	   trade.99	  The	   illegality	  of	   the	   trade	   is	   created	  under	  Art	  9(1)	  and	  Art	  9(5)	  of	  the	  convention,	  which	  supports	  the	  creation	  of	  domestic	  law	  to	   criminalise	   it.100	  As	  was	   stated	   earlier,	   Somalia	   has	   only	   recently	   ratified	   the	  Basel	  Convention;	  this	  does	  not	  stop	  the	  exporting	  State	  from	  prosecuting	  those	  who	   have	   breached	   the	   domestic	   legislation	   in	   illegally	   exporting	   waste	   to	  Somalia,	  and	  the	  exporting	  State	   itself	   is	   in	  breach	  for	  allowing	  the	  export.	   It	   is	  doubtful	  however	  that	  at	  this	  time	  there	  would	  be	  any	  tangible	  evidence	  left	  to	  identify	  the	  exporting	  State.	  The	  state	  of	  degradation	  of	  the	  containers	  of	  waste	  discovered	  post	  the	  2004	  tsunami	  indicates	  that	  the	  waste	  may	  have	  been	  from	  Swiss	  and	  Italian	  companies;	  however	  the	  assertion	  that	  the	  waste	  was	  dumped	  by	   the	   Ndrangheta	   mafia	   has	   not	   been	   fully	   supported	   by	   evidence	   to	   date.101	  Clapp	  argues	  that	  the	  BC	  Secretariat	  and	  Interpol	  inefficiently	  pursue	  the	  trade	  in	  illegal	  waste	  while	  arguing	  that	  developing	  states	  view	  the	  criminalisation	  of	  the	  trade	   as	   an	   affront	   to	   their	   sovereignty,	   as	   decisions	   as	   to	   what	   they	   can	   and	  cannot	  import	  are	  made	  externally	  via	  treaty.102	  As	  mentioned	  above	  Art	  6	  requires	  the	  notification	  of	  any	  movement	  of	  waste	  to	  a	  competent	  authority	  and	  Art	  7	  applies	  that	  obligation	  to	  non-­‐Parties.	  	  Birnie,	  et	  al	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   beyond	   argument	   that	   States	   are	   required	   to	   regulate	   and	  control	  activities	  that	  fall	  within	  their	  jurisdiction	  and	  control	  if	  they	  pose	  a	  risk	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  Clapp	  above	  n	  12	  at	  p26.	  This	  failure	  to	  ban	  the	  trade	  in	  hazardous	  waste	  outright	  was	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  best	  efforts	  of	  the	  African	  states	  and	  developing	  states	  to	  achieve	  a	  total	  ban.	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  power	  of	  the	  lobby	  groups	  exceeded	  that	  of	  the	  African	  States	  and	  would	  possibly	  reinforce	  the	  neo-­‐colonial	  view	  of	  Africa.	  	  
100	  Basel	  Convention,	  Art	  9	  (5).	  
101	  Milton,	  above	  n	  2	  
102	  Clapp,	  above	  n	  11	  at	  p111.	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of	   transboundary	   pollution	   or	   environmental	   harm.103	  The	   International	   Law	  Commission,	  (ILC),	  has	  declared	  that	  things	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  and	  control	  of	  a	   State	   include	   ships	   therefore	   vessels	   dumping	   waste	   into	   the	   waters	   off	  Somalia	  fall	  within	  the	   ‘jurisdiction	  and	  control’	  of	  an	  offending	  State.104	  The	  UN	  concluded	  in	  its	  report	  following	  the	  tsunami	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  ethical	  judgment	  was	  perhaps	   displayed	   by	   states	   that	   allowed	   companies	   to	   negotiate	   waste	  agreements	  with	  a	  factionalised	  government	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  civil	  war	  without	  a	  functional	  and	  legal	  waste	  management	  system.105	  There	  was	  however,	  a	   lack	  of	  condemnation	  or	  a	  direction	  that	  those	  responsible	  are	  brought	  to	  justice	  for	  the	  breaches	  of	  the	  Basel	  Convention.	  	  	  The	  Basel	   Convention	   is	   not,	   as	   has	   been	   stated	   above,	   an	   outright	   ban	  on	   the	  export	  of	  hazardous	  waste,	  although	  this	  was	  fought	  for	  strongly	  by	  developing	  nations,	  sustained	  lobbying	  from	  industrialised	  nations	  and	  waste	  trade	  groups	  defeated	  it.106	  The	  strength	  of	  the	  lobby	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  1995	  Ban	  Amendment	   to	   the	   Basel	   Convention.	   The	   Amendment	   is	   focussed	   on	   the	  prohibition	   of	   export	   and	   movement	   of,	   hazardous	   waste	   from	   OECD	   to	   non-­‐OECD	   States.	   To	   date	   this	   amendment	   has	   not	   come	   into	   force,	   as	   sufficient	  members	   have	   not	   ratified	   it.107	  The	   lack	   of	   enforcement	   mechanisms	   and	   no	  clear	   definition	   of	   what	   ‘environmentally	   sound	   manner’	   meant,	   left	   the	  developing	   states	   still	   feeling	   that	   they	   were	   vulnerable	   to	   exports	   from	   the	  developed	  world	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  profits	   for	  the	  traders.108	  The	  Basel	  Convention	  recognises	   that	   there	   will	   be	   hazardous	   waste	   generated	   by	   industrialised	  countries	  and	  that	  the	  convention	  is	  designed	  to	  cover	  the	  trade	  between	  these	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  Birnie,	  Boyle	  and	  Redgwell,	  above	  n	  41	  at	  p143.	  
104	  Basel	  Protocol	  on	  Liability	  and	  Compensation	  for	  Damage	  Resulting	  from	  Transboundary	  Movements	  of	  Hazardous	  Wastes	  and	  their	  Disposal.(Opened	  for	  signature	  10	  December	  1999,	  not	  yet	  in	  force),	  UNEP/CHW.1/WG/1/9/2	  
105	  UNEP-­‐UNREDA,	  above	  n	  8	  at	  p134.	  	  
106	  Clapp,	  above	  n	  11	  at	  p102.	  Re-­‐enforcing	  the	  point	  made	  above	  by	  Steady	  n	  14	  p53	  above	  about	  the	  power	  of	  the	  lobbying	  groups	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  real	  political	  will	  to	  effectively	  deal	  with	  the	  management	  of	  waste	  with	  in	  the	  borders	  of	  developed	  States.	  While	  there	  is	  not	  an	  outright	  ban	  there	  is	  a	  ban	  on	  exporting	  to	  non-­‐party	  States.	  
107	  Ban	  Amendment	  to	  the	  Basel	  Convention	  on	  the	  Control	  of	  Transboundary	  Movements	  of	  Hazardous	  Wastes	  and	  their	  Disposal,	  Third	  meeting	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  Contracting	  Parties,	  (18-­‐22	  September	  1995),	  Decision	  iii/1,	  UNTS	  Doc.	  UNEP/CHW.3/35	  (Not	  yet	  in	  force).	  
108	  Moctar	  Kebe	  “Waste	  Disposal	  in	  Africa”	  1990	  14(3)	  Mar.	  Pol'y	  251	  at	  252.	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states,	   more	   than	   it	   is	   to	   stop	   export	   to	   developing,	   and	   particularly,	   African	  States.109	  The	  complex	  and	  expensive	  national	  and	   international	  procedures	  are	  better	  designed	  for	  the	  highly	  industrialised	  societies	  and	  would	  be	  well	  beyond	  the	  capabilities	  of	  developing	  States	  to	  institute.110	  Sanchez	  argues	  that	  the	  Basel	  Convention	  lacks	  clear	  regulation	  around	  how	  violations	  are	  to	  be	  handled,	  fails	  to	   enunciate	   liability	   and	   suggests	   that	   that	   the	  procedures	   for	  notification	  are	  better	   suited	   to	   industrialised	   states	   than	   developing	   States. 111 	  The	   Basel	  Convention	  does	  not	  provide	  for	  the	  handling	  of	  violations,	  this	   is	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  Parties	  to	  the	  Basel	  Convention	  under	  Art	  9(5)	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	   national	   or	   domestic	   legislation.	   	   Sanchez	   further	   identifies	   that	   the	  notification	  procedure	  provides	  gaps	   that	  can	  be	  exploited	  by	   illegal	   traders	  as	  we	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   case	   of	   waste	   exports	   to	   Somalia.112	  Sanchez	  would	   argue	  that	  the	  biggest	  threat	  is	  the	  illegal	  traffic	  in	  waste.	  The	  lack	  of	  ‘environmentally	  sound‘	  processing	  and	  poor	  controls	  and	  management	   in	  developing	  states	  are	  equally	  toxic,	  is	  pointed	  out	  by	  Sanchez.113	  	  The	  Basel	  Protocol	  on	  Liability	  is	  designed	  to	  hold	  to	  account	  those	  responsible	  for	  damage	  caused	  by	  pollution.	  114	  It	  can	  only	  be	  said	  that	  there	  is	  a	  distinct	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  by	  the	  developed	  States	  to	  sign	  up	  to	  this	  protocol	  as	  it	  has	  been	  open	  for	  signature	  for	  some	  15	  years	  and	  only	  10	  States	  have	  acceded	  to	  it,	  seven	  of	  which	  are	  African	  States.	  It	  only	  requires	  20	  States	  to	  have	  ratified	  it	  for	  it	  to	  come	  into	  force.	  Major	  producers	  of	  hazardous	  waste,	  the	  European	  States,	  India,	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  the	  UK,	  and	  the	  US,	  have	  so	  far	  avoided	  signing	  it.	   It	  must	  also	  be	  said	  that	  some	  of	  the	  larger	  African	  States	  are	  also	  notable	  by	  their	  absence.115	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  Cheyne,	  above	  n	  16	  at	  p493.	  	  
110	  Cheyne,	  above	  n	  16	  at	  p501.	  
111	  Sanchez,	  above	  n	  32	  at	  pp143-­‐5.	  
112	  At	  p145.	  
113	  At	  p145.	  
114	  Basel	  Protocol	  on	  Liability	  and	  Compensation	  for	  Damage	  Resulting	  from	  Transboundary	  Movements	  of	  Hazardous	  Wastes	  and	  their	  Disposal.(Opened	  for	  signature	  10	  December	  1999,	  not	  yet	  in	  force),	  UNEP/CHW.1/WG/1/9/2	  
115	  “Basel	  Protocol	  on	  Liability	  and	  Compensation	  for	  Damage	  Resulting	  from	  Transboundary	  Movements	  of	  Hazardous	  Waste	  and	  their	  Disposal.”	  	  (1999)	  Basel	  Convention	  <www.basel.int/countries/Statusof	  Ratifications/TheProtocol/tabid/1345/default.aspx>	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Somalia	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	  waste	   dumping	  was	   not	   a	   party	   to	   the	   convention.	  Therefore	  States	  who	  exported	  to	  Somalia	  did	  not	  have	  the	  consent	  of	  Somalia	  to	  export	   to	   it.	   The	   Basel	   Convention	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   breached	   under	   the	  following	  articles	  if	  the	  waste	  has	  come	  from	  a	  party,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  allegation	  as	  mentioned	  above	  is	  directed	  at	  Italy	  and	  Switzerland,	  as	  the	  exporters	  of	  waste	  to	  the	  Somali	  coast.	  Dumping	  in	  the	  sea	  off	  Somalia’s	  coast	  breaches	  Art	  4(2)(b)	  and	   Art	   4(2)(d).	   Art	   4(2)(d)	   has	   been	   breached,	   as	   it	   would	   appear	   that	   the	  minimisation	   of	   transboundary	   movement	   of	   waste	   has	   not	   occurred	   by	   the	  exporting	  State.	   If	   the	  Ndrangheta	  has	  been	  handling	   the	  export	  of	  waste	   from	  Italy	   this	  would	   also	   breach	   Arts	   4(3)	   and	   Art	   4(5).	   Art	   4(5)	   that	   requires	   no	  export	  to	  non-­‐parties	  would	  have	  been	  breached,	  as	  Somalia	  was	  not	  a	  party	  to	  the	   Basel	   Convention	   in	   the	   1990s	   when	   the	   dumping	   of	   waste	   from	   Italy	   is	  alleged	   to	  have	  occurred.	  However,	   should	   the	  dumping	  still	  be	  occurring	   then	  Somalia,	   who	   is	   now	   a	   party,	   would	   need	   to	   consent	   to	   the	   dumping	   and	   the	  administrative	   requirements	   under	   Art	   4	   which	   requires	   labelling	   and	  authorisation	  from	  a	  competent	  authority	  to	  be	  complied	  with.	  The	  dumping	  into	  the	  sea	  would	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  Basel	  Convention	  as	  it	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  was	  being	  handled	  in	  an	  environmentally	  sound	  manner	  or	  recycled	  by	  an	  established	   facility	   that	   complied	   with	   internationally	   accepted	   practices.	   Art	  4(7)	  would	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  breached	  as	  the	  waste	  that	  has	  been	  dumped	  off	  the	  Somali	  coast	   is	  alleged	  to	  have	  been	  dumped	  by	  the	  Ndrangheta,	  a	  criminal	  gang,	   who	   it	   is	   suggested,	   would	   not	   meet	   the	   requirement	   to	   be	   either	  authorised	  or	  allowed	  under	  Art	  4(7)(a)	   to	  handle	  hazardous	  waste.	  This	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  Ndrangheta	  from	  utilising	  a	  front	  company	  to	  handle	  waste.	  Art	  7	  that	  prohibits	  transboundary	  movement	  of	  waste	  through	  a	  State	  or	  States	  that	  are	   not	   parties	   appears	   to	   have	   also	   been	   breached.	   For	   the	   waste	   to	   be	  transported	  from	  Italy	  to	  Somalia,	  even	  by	  the	  most	  direct	  of	  routes,	  would	  have	  taken	  the	  waste	  through	  the	  territorial	  seas	  of	  many	  states,	  including	  the	  transit	  through	  Somali	  waters.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  dumping	  that	  has	  reportedly	  been	  carried	  out	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia	  occurred	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tsunami.	   Post	   the	   tsunami	   the	   UN	   was	   not	   able	   to	   verify	   all	   the	   information	  regarding	   the	   amount	   of	  waste	   and	   the	   type	  washed	   up	   as	   the	  wider	   security	  issues	  prevented	  access	  to	  the	  affected	  areas.116	  Considering	  that	  pirates	  initially	  viewed	  hazardous	  waste	  dumping	   as	   a	  motivation	   for	  piracy,	   the	  possibility	   of	  vessels	   from	   Europe	   or	   other	   developed	   states	   transiting	   the	   hazardous	  conditions,	   as	   far	   as	   attacks	   on	   vessels	   go,	  would	   seem	   to	   be	   rather	   slim.	   The	  actions	  of	   the	  pirates	  may	   indeed	  have	  assisted	   in	  preventing	  hazardous	  waste	  dumping,	  however,	  only	  extensive	  research	  into	  the	  condition	  of	  coastal	  waters	  and	  assessment	  of	  dumping	  sites	  will	  reveal	   the	  extent	  of	   the	  dumping	  and	  the	  degradation,	   if	   any,	   to	   the	   coastal	   environment.	   Given	   the	   current	   inadequate	  state	   of	   the	   hazardous	   waste	   dumping	   regime	   it	   is	   highly	   likely	   that	   future	  dumping	  of	  hazardous	  waste	  will	  not	  be	  stopped.	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  UNEP-­‐UNREDA,	  above	  n	  8	  at	  p129.	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15.4 Regional	  Agreements	  	  
15.4.1 Bamako	  Convention	  Somalia	  signed	  the	  Bamako	  Convention	  on	  the	  Ban	  on	  the	  Import	  into	  Africa	  and	  the	  Control	  of	  Transboundary	  Movement	  and	  Management	  of	  Hazardous	  Wastes	  within	  Africa	  (1994),117	  (Bamako	  Convention),	  on	  the	  1	  June	  1991	  but	  as	  yet	  has	  not	  ratified	  the	  convention.118	  The	  Bamako	  Convention	  came	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Resolution	  1153	  adopted	  at	  the	  48th	  Session	  of	  the	  OAU	  held	  in	  Addis	  Ababa.119	  This	   resolution	   firmly	   condemned	   those	   states	   that	   were	   involved	   in	   the	  importation	   of	   waste,	   and	   declared	   the	   practice	   a	   crime	   against	   the	   people	   of	  Africa	   and	  Africa	  more	  generally.120	  This	   condemnation	  was	   followed	  up	  by	   the	  creation	   of	   a	   draft	   convention	   in	   1991,	  which	   had	   as	   its	   purpose	   a	   ban	   on	   the	  importation	   of	   hazardous	   waste121	  as	   well	   as	   regulating	   trade	   in	   waste	   among	  African	  States.122	  Art	  4(1)	  sets	  out	  the	  ban	  on	  all	  importation	  of	  hazardous	  waste	  from	   non-­‐Contracting	   parties,	   any	   import	   in	   breach	   of	   this	   article	   is	   deemed	  illegal	  and	  a	  criminal	  act.	  The	  article	  also	  specifies	  co-­‐operation	  between	  parties	  to	  ensure	  that	  there	  are	  no	  imports	  from	  a	  non-­‐Party	  to	  a	  Party	  to	  the	  convention	  (Art	  4	  (1)(b)).	  Art	  4(2)	  covers	  the	  dumping	  of	  hazardous	  waste	  at	  sea	  and	  within	  internal	   waters.	   	   Art	   4(4)(a)	   sets	   out	   the	   enforcement	   obligations	   for	   parties	  under	   both	   national	   and	   international	   law.	   Bamako	   is	   seen	   as	   being	  complimentary	   to	   the	   Basel	   Convention,	   as	   the	   Basel	   Convention	   makes	  provision	   for	   stricter	   regional	   treaties,123	  although	   Clapp	   maintains	   that	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  The	  Bamako	  Convention	  on	  the	  Ban	  on	  the	  Import	  into	  Africa	  and	  the	  Control	  of	  Transboundary	  Movement	  and	  Management	  of	  Hazardous	  Wastes	  within	  Africa	  (signed	  30	  January	  1991,	  effective	  22	  April	  1998).	  
118	  “List	  of	  Countries	  which	  have	  Signed,	  Ratified/Acceded	  to	  the	  Bamako	  Convention	  on	  the	  Ban	  on	  the	  Import	  into	  Africa	  and	  the	  Control	  of	  Transboundary	  Movement	  and	  Management	  of	  Hazardous	  Wastes	  within	  Africa	  ”	  	  (2013)	  African	  Union	  <www.africa-­‐union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/Bamako%20Convention.pdf>	  
119	  Resolution	  1153	  adopted	  at	  the	  48th	  Session	  of	  the	  OAU	  held	  in	  Addis	  Ababa.	  	  
120	  Clapp,	  above	  n	  12	  at	  p25.	  
121	  Clapp,	  above	  n	  11	  at	  p103.	  
122	  Birnie,	  Boyle	  and	  Redgwell,	  above	  n	  41	  at	  p474.	  
123	  Cheyne,	  above	  n16	  at	  p494.	  The	  Bamako	  Convention	  Art	  11(1)	  requires	  agreements	  or	  arrangements	  that	  are	  not	  less	  environmentally	  sound	  than	  those	  provided	  for	  by	  the	  Basel	  Convention.	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Bamako	   Convention	   is	   an	   improvement	   on	   the	   Basel	   Convention	   as	   it	   bans	  outright	   the	   importation	   of	   hazardous	  wastes	   including	   radioactive	   substances	  and	   any	   form	   of	   ocean	   dumping,	   as	   well	   as	   banning	   hazardous	   substances	  outlawed	  in	  the	  country	  of	  manufacture.124	  The	  Bamako	  Convention	  adopts	  a	  wide	  definition	  of	  hazardous	  waste	   in	   that	   it	  includes	   ‘controlled’	  wastes	  that	  are	  not	  required	  to	  show	  that	  they	  exhibit	  any	  of	   the	   listed	   hazardous	   characteristics,	  which	   indicates	   that	   the	  waste	   streams	  that	  are	  generated	  as	  by	  products	  of	  hazardous	  waste	  are	  also	  hazardous.125	  The	  concept	  of	  an	  outright	  ban	  on	  hazardous	  waste	  reduces,	   for	  African	  states,	  the	   size	   of	   regulatory	   structures	   required	   to	   police	   the	   importation	   and	  movement	   of	   hazardous	   waste. 126 	  The	   major	   difference	   between	   the	   Basel	  Convention	  and	  the	  Bamako	  Convention	  is	  that	  the	  Bamako	  Convention	  focuses	  on	   the	   prevention	   of	   imports	   of	   hazardous	   waste	   while	   the	   Basel	   Convention	  focuses	  on	  the	  export	  of	  hazardous	  waste.	  While	  the	  idea	  behind	  an	  outright	  ban	  would	   seem	   to	   prevent	   hazardous	   waste	   dumping	   it	   has	   not,	   as	   has	   been	  discovered	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Somalia,	   been	   able	   to	   prevent	   illegal	   dumping.	  Although,	  as	  has	  been	  previously	  mentioned,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Somalia	  there	  may	  be	  doubts	  as	  to	  when	  the	  actual	  dumping	  occurred	  and	  whether	  it	  was	  legitimate	  at	  the	   time.	   By	   signing	   the	   convention	   there	   is	   no	   indication	   that	   Somalia	   has	  consented	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  convention	  unless	  this	  is	  clearly	  stated	  in	  the	  convention.127	  The	  act	  of	  ratification,	  at	  the	  constitutional	  level,	  will	  bind	  Somalia	  and	  finally	  signify	  its	  consent	  to	  the	  convention.128	  Arts	  21	  and	  22	  of	  the	  Bamako	  Convention	  cover	  signature	  and	  ratification.	  Art	  21	  states	  that	  the	  parties	  are	  not	  bound	  on	  signature,	  but	  on	  ratification	  or	  acceptance	  as	  formal	  confirmation	  or	  approval	  as	  stated	  in	  Art	  22	  (1).	  Art	  22(2)	  indicates	  that	  parties	  shall	  be	  bound	  by	  obligations	  of	  the	  convention.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  Clapp,	  above	  n	  12	  at	  p28	  en54.	  	  
125	  Cheyne,	  above	  n	  16	  at	  p498.	  Art	  (2)(1)(b).	  
126	  At	  p500.	  
127	  Shaw	  above	  Chapter	  2,	  n	  65	  at	  p910.	  There	  is	  however	  an	  obligation	  to	  act	  consistently	  with	  the	  aims	  and	  objectives	  of	  the	  convention,	  Art	  18	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties,	  above	  Chapter	  2,	  n	  103	  
128Brownlie,	  Chapter	  2	  n	  55	  at	  p611.	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There	  are	  several	  articles	  within	   the	  convention	   that	   suggest	   that	   there	  should	  be	   a	   level	   of	   cooperation	   between	  members	   and	   it	   would	   not	   be	   a	   significant	  stretch	   to	   suggest	   that	   cooperation	   should	   include	   the	   protection	   of	   the	  environment	   for	   downstream	   states	   from	   the	   dumping	   that	   took	   place	   off	  Somalia’s	  coast.129	  	  While	  Art	  10	  suggests	  strongly	  co-­‐operation	  between	  parties	  to	   the	   convention	   by	   and	   large	   the	   article	   only	   suggests	   co-­‐operation	   where	  information	  is	  exchanged	  regarding	  technical	  aspects	  of	  waste	  management,	  (Art	  10(2)(a)	   and	   (c)),	   effects	   of	   management	   as	   far	   as	   human	   health	   and	   the	  environment	   are	   concerned,	   (Art	   10(2)(b)),	   the	   transfer	   of	   technology	   and	  technical	  assistance,	  (Art	  10(2)(d)),	  and	  the	  exchange	  of	  technical	  guidelines	  and	  information	  (Art	  10(2)(e)-­‐(f)).	  There	  is	  no	  indication	  that	  parties	  should	  actively	  co-­‐operate	   in	   a	   process	   whereby	   a	   state	   is	   having	   difficulties	   protecting	   its	  environment	   from	   hazardous	   waste	   dumping	   which	   may	   have	   a	   detrimental	  effect	  on	  neighbouring	  parties.	  Art	  11(4)	  does	  suggest	  a	  level	  of	  co-­‐operation	  in	  South	  –	  South	   implementation	  of	   the	  convention	  but	   it	   falls	  short	  of	  suggesting	  that	   physical	   assistance	   in	   policing	   or	   assisting	   to	   police	   an	   area	   should	   be	   an	  avenue	  that	  is	  developed.	  Art	  11(5)	  does	  suggest	  aid	  to	  developing	  countries	  but	  more	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   developing	   management	   and	   public	   awareness	   of	  hazardous	   waste	   as	   well	   as	   the	   adoption	   of	   non-­‐polluting	   technologies.	   This	  obligation	   to	   co-­‐operate	   lies	   centrally	   with	   importing	   States	   as	   opposed	   to	  exporting	  States	  under	  the	  Basel	  Convention.	  	  As	  Somalia	  has	  only	  signed	  the	  convention	  and	  not	  ratified	  it,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  party	  and	  therefore	  there	  would	  be	  no	  existing	  obligation	  firstly	  on	  Somalia	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  convention	   and	   secondly	   no	   obligation	   on	   the	   other	   parties	   to	   assist	   in	   the	  policing	   of	   Somalia’s	   waters	   to	   prevent	   hazardous	   waste	   dumping.	   Although	  Somalia	   has	   indicated	   an	   intention	   to	   be	   bound	   through	   its	   signature	   to	   the	  Bamako	  Convention	  and,	  if	  under	  the	  rules	  of	  international	  treaties,	  found	  under	  the	   Vienna	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   Treaties,	   specifically	   Art	   12(1)(c),	   full	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Kebe,	  above	  n	  108.	  Sadia	  Eden	  is	  quoted	  as	  saying	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  Somalian	  toxic	  waste	  dumping	  is	  of	  great	  concern	  as	  it	  spills	  over	  to	  other	  African	  states.	  Bamako	  Convention	  Art	  10.	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powers	   were	   granted	   to	   its	   representative	   then	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   assert	   that	  Somalia,	  is	  in	  effect,	  a	  party	  to	  the	  Convention.	  	  	  
15.4.2 Nairobi	  Convention	  The	  Nairobi	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  Management	  and	  Development	  of	  the	  Marine	  and	  Coastal	  Environment	  of	  the	  Eastern	  African	  Region	  came	  into	  force	  in	  1996	   and	   was	   amended	   in	   April	   2010. 130 	  	   Its	   aims	   are	   to	   promote	  environmentally	  sound	  and	  sustainable	  development	  as	  well	  as	   the	  sustainable	  management	  of	  marine	  and	  coastal	  systems	  along	  the	  East	  African	  Coast.	  There	  are	  10	  contracting	  parties	  and	  Somalia	  is	  one	  of	  those.	  	  Art	  4	  outlines	  the	  general	  obligations	  of	  parties	  to	  prevent	  reduce	  and	  combat	  pollution.	  The	  terminology	  used,	  ‘The	  Contracting	  parties	  shall’	  indicates	  a	  direction	  that	  the	  parties	  need	  to	  obey.	   Art	   6	   obligates	   parties	   to	   prevent	   reduce	   and	   combat	   pollution	   caused	  through	  dumping	  of	  wastes	  and	  other	  matter	  at	  sea	  by	  ships.	  There	  is	  however	  no	   definition	   of	   dumping,	   however,	   it	   is	   covered	   under	   a	   broad	   definition	   of	  pollution	   with	   the	   phrase	   ‘introduction	   by	   human	   intervention	   …	   resulting	   in	  such	  deleterious	  effects	  as	  harm	  living	  resources,	  hazards	  to	  human	  health…’	  At	   this	   point	   the	   Convention	   has	   not	   received	   the	   necessary	   6	   ratifications	   as	  required	  under	  Art	  32(2)	  to	  enter	  into	  force.	  
	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	  The	  Nairobi	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  Management	  and	  Development	  of	  the	  Marine	  and	  Coastal	  Environment	  of	  the	  Eastern	  African	  Region	  (Adopted	  June	  1985	  entered	  into	  force	  30	  May	  1996).	  Amended	  Nairobi	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  Management	  and	  Development	  of	  the	  Marine	  and	  Coastal	  Environment	  of	  the	  Western	  African	  Region,	  (31	  March	  2010).	  
Chapter	  4	  	  
	   142	  
16 How	  are	  responsibility,	  liability	  and	  compensation	  
assigned	  in	  International	  Conventions?	  	  The	   major	   hurdle	   facing	   Somalia	   in	   seeking	   compensation	   for	   damage	   to	   its	  environment,	   caused	   by	   hazardous	   waste	   dumping	   off	   its	   coast,	   will	   be	   in	  ascertaining	  who	  is	  responsible	  and	  to	  what	  degree	  they	  are	  responsible.	  As	  has	  been	  discussed	  above,	   there	  are	  allegations	   that	   the	  waste	   found	   following	   the	  tsunami	   came	   from	   Swiss	   and	   Italian	   firms,	   however	   proving	   this	   in	   an	  international	   court	   may	   be	   another	   matter	   entirely.	   Secondly,	   significant	   time	  has	  elapsed	  since	  there	  was	  major	  talk	  of	  waste	  dumping	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia.	  This	  could	  be	   in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  unsettled	  nature	  of	  the	  state	  and	  a	  consequent	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  what	  was	  happening	  off	  the	  coast,	  aligned,	  of	  course,	  with	  the	  dangers	  associated	  with	  trying	  to	  obtain	  information	  in	  a	  situation,	  which	  could	  well	  be	  described	  as	  extremely	  hazardous.	  The	  death	  of	  Ilaria	  Alpi,	  referred	  to	  in	  the	   introduction,	   shows	   how	   dangerous	   investigations	   into	   waste	   dumping	  allegations	  can	  be.	  131	  	  With	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  central	  government	  for	  more	  than	  20	  years	  the	  ability	  of	  Somalia	  to	  track	  and	  monitor	  vessels	  dumping	  waste	  in	  its	  waters	  has	  been	  hampered.	  It	  could	   well	   be	   difficult	   to	   obtain	   reliable	   evidence	   to	   support	   prosecutions	   for	  waste	  dumping.	  The	  international	  environmental	  protection	  system	  should	  be	  robust	  enough	  to	  assign	  liability	  to	  those	  who	  breach	  international	  conventions	  on	  waste	  dumping	  and	   to	   obtain	   from	   those	   duly	   proved	   to	   have	   been	   involved,	   compensation.	  However	  things	  are	  not	  as	  simple	  or	  as	  clear	  as	  that.	  The	   Draft	   Articles	   on	   the	   Responsibility	   of	   States	   for	   Internationally	  Wrongful	  Acts,	   (Draft	   Articles),	   sets	   out	   the	   principles	   and	   codifies	   existing	   CIL. 132	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  Milton,	  above	  n	  2	  in	  which	  the	  warlord	  Boqor	  Musa	  is	  quoted	  as	  identifying	  the	  waste	  for	  guns	  deal	  as	  the	  reason	  for	  her	  killing.	  
132	  Draft	  Articles	  on	  Responsibility	  of	  States	  for	  Internationally	  Wrongful	  Acts,	  Chapter	  2	  above,	  n	  200.	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Responsibility	   can	   be	   assigned	   when	   three	   factors	   are	   present,	   firstly	   the	  presence	  of	  an	  international	  legal	  obligation,	  secondly,	  that	  there	  has	  been	  an	  act	  or	   omission	   which	   violates	   that	   obligation	   and	   is	   imputable	   to	   the	   state	  responsible	   and	   thirdly	   that	   loss	   or	   damage	   has	   occurred	   as	   a	   result	   of	   that	  unlawful	  act	  or	  omission.133	  	  	  The	  Spanish	  Zone	  of	  Morocco	  Claims	  held	  that,	  	  ‘Responsibility	   is	   the	   necessary	   corollary	   of	   a	   right.	   All	   rights	   of	   an	  international	  character	  involve	  international	  responsibility.’134	  	  This	  was	   further	   enhanced	   by	   the	  Chorzow	  Factory	  (Jurisdiction)	  case	  where	   it	  was	  held	  that,	  ‘It	   is	   a	   principle	   of	   international	   law	   that	   the	   breach	   of	   an	   engagement	  involves	  an	  obligation	  to	  make	  reparation	  in	  an	  adequate	  form.’135	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  Draft	  Articles	  on	  Responsibility	  of	  States	  for	  Internationally	  Wrongful	  Acts,	  Chapter	  2	  above,	  n	  200	  Art	  2	  which	  describes	  the	  elements	  required	  as	  an	  internationally	  wrongful	  act	  or	  omission,	  by	  a	  State,	  attributable	  to	  that	  State,	  which	  is	  a	  breach	  of	  an	  international	  obligation.	  This	  view	  is	  supported	  by	  Shaw,	  above	  Chapter	  2	  n	  65	  at	  p781.	  
134	  Spanish	  Zone	  of	  Morocco	  Claims,	  see	  Chapter	  2	  n	  107	  at	  615	  at	  p641.	  	  
135	  Chorzow	  Factory	  (Germany	  v.	  Poland)	  (Jurisdiction)	  (1927)	  P.C.I.J.	  (series	  A)	  No	  9	  at	  p21.	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  The	  primary	   responsibility	  of	   a	   state	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  environment	   is	  one	  of	  not	  doing	  or	   causing	  harm	   to	  other	   states	   -­‐	   sic	  utere	  tuo	  ut	  alienum	  non	  laedas.	  This	  concept	  has	  been	  utilised	  by	  the	  courts,	  136	  as	  well	  as	  through	  the	  principles	  established	   under	   the	   Stockholm	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Human	   Environment,	  Principle	  21	  	  ‘…the	   responsibility	   to	   ensure	   that	   activities	  within	   their	   jurisdiction	   or	  control	   do	   not	   cause	   damage	   to	   the	   environment	   of	   other	   states	   or	   of	  areas	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  national	  jurisdiction.’137	  	  This	   approach	  has	  been	   adopted	   in	   the	  UNCLOS	   in	   the	   form	  of	  Art	   192,	  which	  provides	   that	   ‘states	   have	   an	   obligation	   to	   protect	   and	   preserve	   the	   marine	  environment’	  and	  Art	  194,	  which	  directs	  states	  to,	  ‘…take	   all	   measures	   necessary	   to	   ensure	   that	   activities	   under	   their	  jurisdiction	   and	   control	   are	   so	   conducted	   as	   to	   not	   cause	   damage	   by	  pollution	  to	  other	  states	  and	  their	  environment.’	  	  	  When	  assigning	  responsibility,	  which	  party	  is	  to	  bear	  the	  responsibility,	  is	  it	  the	  State	   or	   is	   it	   the	   operator	   who	   has	   actually	   carried	   out	   the	   dumping?	   	   Birnie	  argues	  that	  it	  should	  be	  the	  State	  from	  where	  the	  material	  came.138	  It	  is	  possible	  that	   the	   State	   where	   the	   material	   was	   produced	   would	   be	   liable	   if	   it	   were	  exported	   to	   the	   transhipping	   State	   in	   breach	   of	   the	   Basel	   Convention.	   	   If	   the	  breach	  relates	  to	  the	  export	  of	  the	  hazardous	  waste	  it	  is	  the	  export	  State	  that	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  International	  Commission	  on	  the	  River	  Oder	  (1929)	  P.C.I.J.	  (series	  A)	  No	  23	  5AD	  at	  p83,	  see	  also	  the	  Island	  of	  Palmas	  (or	  Miangas)(United	  States	  v	  Netherlands)(Awards)(1928)	  II	  R.I.A.A.	  829,	  I.C.G.J.	  392	  (PCA	  )(1928)	  case	  where	  the	  concept	  of	  territorial	  sovereignty	  was	  widened	  to	  cover	  the	  instance	  where	  there	  was	  an	  obligation	  to	  protect	  within	  a	  states	  territory	  the	  rights	  of	  other	  states,	  see	  also	  Trail	  Smelter	  where	  the	  damage	  needs	  to	  have	  serious	  consequences	  and	  the	  injury	  is	  established	  by	  clear	  and	  convincing	  evidence.	  In	  the	  Advisory	  Opinion	  to	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  on	  the	  Legality	  of	  the	  Threat	  or	  Use	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  the	  court	  declared	  that	  the	  general	  obligation	  to	  ensure	  that	  activities	  within	  their	  jurisdiction	  and	  control	  respect	  the	  environment	  of	  other	  states	  was	  now	  part	  of	  the	  corpus	  of	  international	  law	  relating	  to	  the	  environment.	  	  
137	  Conference	  on	  the	  Human	  Environment	  	  U.N.	  Doc	  A/Conf.	  48/14/Rev.	  1	  (1972)	  at	  p1416.	  
138	  Birnie,	  Boyle	  and	  Redgwell,	  above	  n	  41	  at	  pp222–3.	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liable,	   if	  however,	  the	  breach	  relates	  to	  the	  actual	  dumping	  at	  sea,	  then	  the	  flag	  State	  attracts	  liability.	  	  The	  level	  of	  damage	  must	  also	  be	  assessed.	  	  At	  the	  current	  time	  the	  ‘possibility	  of	  risk	   of	   damage’	   does	   not	   meet	   the	   threshold	   for	   damage	   as	   the	   practical	  problems	   associated	  with	   defining	   and	   assessing	   a	   theoretical	   level	   of	   damage	  still	  have	  not	  been	  resolved.139	  	  Although	  the	  UNCLOS	  Art	  1(4)	  uses	  language	  that	  the	  ‘risk’	  of	  pollution	  may	  be	  enough	  when	  it	  states	  ’…	  which	  results	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  result	   in	  …’140	  The	  courts	  have	  held	   in	   the	  Trail	  Smelter	  case	   that	   the	   level	  of	  damage	  must	  be	  of	  ‘serious	  consequence’.141	  	  UNCLOS	   Art	   1(4)	   points	   to	   damage	   to	   the	   quality	   of	   seawater,	   while	   other	  conventions,	  including	  the	  UNCLOS	  specifically	  mention	  human	  health	  as	  falling	  within	  the	  range	  of	  interests	  that	  can	  be	  damaged.142	  The	  LDC	  has	  no	  definition	  of	  damage	  as	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  LDC	  is	  the	  reduction	  in	  pollution	  by	  dumping	  and	  that	  is	  where	  the	  breaches	  by	  States	  would	  be	  prosecuted.	  The	  LDC	  at	  Art	  10	  suggests	  that	   the	   development	   of	   procedures	   for	   the	   apportionment	   of	   liability	   and	  responsibility	   are	   to	   be	   undertaken.	   	   While	   there	   has	   been	   agreement	   to	   the	  establishment	  of	  procedures	  to	  assign	  liability	  under	  the	  LDC	  there	  has	  been	  to	  date	   no	   ratification	   of	   the	   agreement	   and	   as	   such	   is	   not	   in	   force.143	  This	  would	  indicate	  that	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  for	  States	  to	  accept	  responsibility	  for	  either	  their	  actions	  in	  allowing	  firms	  to	  carry	  out	  dumping	  or	  for	  their	  own	  lack	  of	  compliance	  with	  their	  obligations.	  	  The	  Protocols,	  in	  Art	  1,	  do	  not	  cover	  whether	  damage	  includes	  damage	  to	  human	  beings	  or	  is	  exclusively	  confined	  to	  damage	  to	  the	  environment.	  Art	  3(3)	  focuses	  on	   the	   transfer	   of	   damage	   or	   likelihood	   of	   damage	   from	   one	   part	   of	   the	  environment	   to	   another.	   This	   would	   set	   a	   relatively	   low	   level	   of	   damage	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  Shaw,	  above	  Chapter	  2,	  n	  65	  at	  p856.	  	  
140	  UNCLOS	  Art	  1(4)	  .	  
141	  Trail	  Smelter	  Arbitral	  Tribunal	  (United	  States	  of	  America	  v.	  Canada)	  Arbitral	  Trib.,	  3	  U.N.	  Rep.	  Int'l	  Arb.	  Awards	  1905	  (1941)	  at	  p1965.	  
142	  Vienna	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Ozone	  Layer	  1513	  UNTS	  293	  (opened	  for	  signature	  22	  March	  1985,	  effective	  22	  September	  1988)	  Art	  1(2)	  
143	  “Shortlist	  of	  Amendments	  to	  the	  London	  Convention	  1972	  which	  Entered	  into	  Force	  (March	  2004)”	  <www.imo.org/About/Conventions/Statusof/Conventions/Pages/Default.aspx>	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qualify	   if	   the	   principle	   of	   sic	   utere	   tuo	   ut	   alienum	   non	   laedas	   is	   applied	   as	   a	  general	  rule	  of	   international	   law.	  The	  Protocols	  Art	  15	  mentions	  damage	  to	  the	  environment	  of	  other	  states	  or	  to	  any	  other	  area	  of	  the	  environment	  but	  does	  not	  specify	   if	   humans	  are	   included.	  The	  Bamako	  Convention	  at	  Art	  1	  which	   covers	  definitions	   does	   not	   cover	   damage	   and	   Art	   12	  which	   deals	  with	   liabilities	   and	  compensation	  makes	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  type	  of	  damage	  that	  is	  covered,	  whether	  the	   compensation	   is	   to	   be	   focused	   on	   the	   environment	   or	   whether	   it	   covers	  consequential	  damage	  to	  humans	  as	  well.	  While	  the	  waste	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Somalia	  was	  dumped	  at	  sea	  and	  washed	  ashore	  on	  its	  coastline	  the	  deaths	  occurred	  when	  the	   villagers	   investigated	   the	   contents	   of	   the	   containers	   so	   the	   question	   of	  whether	  these	  deaths	  occurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  dumping	  at	  sea	  and	  thus	  fall	  under	  UNCLOS	  could	  be	  argued.	  	  The	   disputed	   nature	   of	   the	   territorial	   waters	   of	   Somalia	   could	   also	   provide	   a	  layer	  of	  complexity	  when	  seeking	  to	  apportion	  responsibility,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  exact	  location	  of	  the	  dumping,	  as	  it	  might	  have	  occurred	  outside	  any	  territorial	  waters	  and	  thus	  be	  located	  in	  the	  area	  where	  questions	  of	  locus	  standi	  might	  arise.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Somalia	  its	  ability	  to	  have	  standing	  before	  a	  court	  could	  well	  be	  affected	  by	   the	   consequences	   of	   being	   a	   failed	   state	   as	   there	   is	   no	   one	   authorised	   to	  represent	  the	  State	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  	  The	  matter	  of	  assigning	  responsibility	  is	  further	  mired	  when	  there	  are	  multiple	  actors	  involved;	  the	  actor	  actually	  carrying	  out	  the	  dumping	  of	  waste,	  a	  shipping	  company	  perhaps	  or	  ship	  owner,	  and	  the	  person	  who	  contracted	  that	  vessel	   to	  carry	   the	   waste.	   As	   has	   been	   seen	   in	   the	   chapter	   on	   illegal	   fishing,	   trying	   to	  assign	   responsibility	   where	   a	   vessel	   is	   using	   a	   FOC	   would	   only	   lead	   the	  investigation	  back	  to	  the	  state	  of	  registry	  and	  a	  possibly	  hard	  to	  track	  company,	  registered	  to	  a	  post	  box	  or	  some	  similar	  evasive	  measure.	  Certainly	  the	  allegation	  in	   the	   case	   of	   Somalia	   and	   waste	   from	   Italy	   is	   that	   those	   responsible	   were	  criminal	   organisations.144	  	   While	   Birnie	   et	   al	   argue	   that	   the	   State	   is	   ultimately	  responsible	  for	  prevention,	  cooperation	  and	  notification	  of	  breaches	  of	  treaties,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  Hari,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  16.	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citing	   the	  Trial	   Smelter,	  and	  Pulp	  Mills	  cases	   as	   precedent,	   these	   cases	   revolve	  around	   neighbouring	   States	   and	   is	   quite	   different	   from	   the	   case	   of	   waste	  dumping	  at	  sea	  where,	  determining	  which	  State	  is	  responsible,	  the	  flag	  State	  or	  the	   exporting	   State,	   is	   slightly	  more	   difficult.	  145	  There	   is	   also	   a	   significant	   legal	  difference	  in	  that	  the	  cases	  cited	  were	  lawful	  activities	  that	  created	  harm,	  which	  was	  unlawful,	  as	  against	  the	  dumping	  at	  sea,	  where	  the	  activity	  itself	  is	  unlawful.	  Indeed,	   if	   as	  asserted	  by	  Birnie	   that	   the	  exporting	  State	   is	  only	   responsible	   for	  lack	  of	  due	  diligence	  or	  a	  breach	  of	  obligations,	   then	   it	   is	  conceivable	  that	  both	  the	  flag	  State	  and	  the	  exporting	  State	  could	  be	  liable.	  146	  The	  Bamako	  Convention	  at	  Art	  12	  suggests	  that	  there	  should	  be	  the	  production	  of	  a	  draft	  protocol	  to	  establish	  procedures	  and	  rules	  for	  the	  assigning	  of	  liability	  and	  compensation	  for	  damage.147	  Decision	  1/19	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  State	  Parties	  26	   June	   2013	   established	   an	   ad	   hoc	   expert	   group	   on	   Liabilities	   and	  Compensation	   although	   to	   date	   there	   has	   been	   no	   suggestion	   as	   to	   how	   this	  group	  has	  progressed.	  148	  	  The	  Basel	  Convention	  established	  a	  protocol	  in	  1999	  with	  regards	  to	  liability	  and	  compensation	   for	   damage	   resulting	   from	   Transboundary	   movements	   of	  hazardous	  waste.149	  Damage	  is	  defined	  under	  the	  Protocol	  as,	  	  ‘loss	   of	   life	   or	   personal	   injury,150	  loss	   of	   or	   damage	   to	   property	  with	   the	  exception	   of	   the	   property	   of	   the	   person	   liable;151	  loss	   of	   income	   directly	  deriving	   from	   an	   economic	   interest	   in	   any	   use	   of	   the	   environment,	  incurred	   as	   a	   result	   of	   impairment	   of	   the	   environment;152	  the	   costs	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  Birnie,	  Boyle	  and	  Redgwell,	  above	  n	  41	  at	  p214.	  
146	  “Decision	  1/19	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  State	  Parties	  26	  June	  2013	  to	  Bamako	  Convention”	  	  (2013)	  <WWW.unep.org/delc/portals/119/Bamako/C1DEC.19Liabilities	  and	  compensation	  item	  1.>	  	  
147	  Bamako	  Convention,	  above	  n	  117	  Art	  12	  Liabilities	  and	  Compensation.	  
148	  “Decision	  1/19	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  State	  Parties	  26	  June	  2013	  to	  Bamako	  Convention”	  	  (2013)	  <WWW.unep.org/delc/portals/119/Bamako/C1DEC.19Liabilities	  and	  compensation	  item	  1.>	  	  
149	  Basel	  Protocol	  on	  Liability	  and	  Compensation	  for	  Damage	  Resulting	  from	  Transboundary	  Movements	  of	  Hazardous	  Wastes	  and	  their	  Disposal,	  (open	  for	  signature	  6-­‐17	  March	  2000,	  not	  entered	  into	  force)	  	  
150	  	  Basel	  Protocol	  on	  Liability	  Art	  2(2)(c)(i).	  
151	  Basel	  Protocol	  on	  Liability	  Art	  2(2)(c)(ii).	  
152	  Basel	  Protocol	  on	  Liability	  Art	  2(2)(c)(iii).	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reinstatement 153 	  of	   the	   environment 154 ;	   and	   the	   costs	   of	   preventive	  measures,155	  including	  loss	  or	  damage	  caused	  by	  these	  measures.’	  	  Some	  of	  these	  terms	  are	  quite	  broad	  and	  would	  provide	  cover	  for	  damage	  caused	  to	  the	  marine	  environment	  utilised	  by	  Somali	  fishers	  as	  well	  as	  compensation	  for	  the	   loss	  of	   life	   of	   the	  villagers	  who	  died	  as	   a	   result	   of	   contact	  with	   the	   rusting	  containers	   on	   the	   beaches.	   The	   distribution	   of	   liability	   is	   assigned	   to	   the	  generator	   exporter,	   importer	   disposer.	   The	   notifier	   or	   generator/exporter	   is	  strictly	   liable	  until	   the	  waste	   is	  delivered	  to	   the	  disposer.	  156	  	  Strict	   liability	  only	  attaches	   to	   the	   leg	   of	   the	   journey	  where	   the	  Basel	   Convention	   applies.157	  It	   has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  generator	  avoids	  liability	  when	  the	  export	  of	  the	  waste	  is	  taken	  over	  by	  a	  smaller	  company	  who	  in	  the	  circumstances	  act	  as	  the	  notifier.158	  The	  Protocol	  requires	  twenty	  ratifications	  before	  entering	  into	  force.	  At	  present	  there	  have	  only	  been	  13	  signatories	  to	  the	  protocol.159	  
	  There	   is	   little	   argument	   over	   the	   standard	   to	  which	   States	   should	   be	   held	   for	  liability.	  Both	  the	  Bamako	  Convention	  and	  the	  Space	  Objects	  Liability	  Convention	  hold	  to	  a	  direct	  or	  absolute	  standard	  for	  damage.160	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  Basel	  Protocol	  on	  Liability	  Art	  2(2)(d).	  
154	  Basel	  Protocol	  on	  Liability	  Art	  2(2)(c)(iv).	  
155	  Basel	  Protocol	  on	  Liability	  Art	  2(2)(c)(v).	  
156	  Basel	  Protocol	  on	  Liability	  Art	  4(1).	  
157	  Michael	  Tsimplis	  “Liability	  and	  Compensation	  in	  the	  International	  Transport	  of	  Hazardous	  Waste	  by	  sea:	  The	  1999	  Protocol	  to	  the	  Basel	  Convention”	  2001	  16(2)	  International	  Journal	  of	  Marine	  and	  Coastal	  Law	  295	  at	  p312.	   	  
158Tsimplis,	  above	  n	  157	  at	  p314.	  
159	  “Basel	  Convention	  on	  the	  Control	  of	  Transboundary	  Movements	  of	  Hazardous	  Wastes	  and	  Their	  Disposal	  1989	  ”	  	  (1989)	  <www.basel.int/Countries/Statusof	  Ratifications/TheProtocol/tabid/1345/deafault.aspx.>	  
160	  Clapp,	  above	  n	  12	  at	  p28	  and	  Bamako	  Convention	  Art	  4	  (3)	  (b),	  which	  applies	  solely	  to	  waste	  generators	  within	  Africa.	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17 Can	  Somalia	  obtain	  Compensation	  for	  the	  harm	  to	  its	  
environment?	  
	  The	   public	   associates	   environmental	   contamination	  with	   catastrophic	   harm	   to	  human	   health	   although	   that	  might	   not	   be	   the	   case.161	  Part	   of	   the	   problem	  with	  bringing	  a	  successful	  suit	  for	  compensation	  is	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  environmental	  law,	  being	  complex,	  filled	  with	  aspirational	  qualities	  and	  due	  to	  its	  evolutionary	  nature,	   reliant	   on	   scientific,	   political	   and	   social	   norms.162	  It	   has	   been	   suggested	  that	  the	  duty	  more	  often	  than	  not	  on	  states	  is	  to	  negotiate	  over	  a	  settlement	  and	  or	  measures	  to	  be	  taken	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  award	  of	  compensation.	  163	  The	  Trail	  
Smelter164	  case	  is	  the	  only	  one	  where	  compensation	  has	  been	  awarded	  for	  actual	  environmental	  damage.165	  It	  is	  of	  course	  not	  easy	  to	  define	  a	  quantum	  of	  damage	  as	  the	  effects	  of	  environmental	  damage	  can	  be	  significantly	  long	  lasting	  and	  the	  fullest	   extent	   of	   the	   damage	   may	   never	   be	   known	   by	   either	   the	   claimant	   or	  recipient	   state.	   Any	   suggestion	   of	   compensation	   should	   be	   quite	  wide	   ranging	  and	  encompass	  not	  only	   the	  costs	  of	   reinstatement	  of	   remediated	   territory	  but	  also	  include	  total	  clean-­‐up	  costs	  and	  costs	  to	  minimise	  on-­‐going	  damage.166	  With	  environmental	   damage	   caused	   through	   dumping	   at	   sea	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   identify	  accurately	  the	  amount	  of	  damage	  as	  well	  as	  clearly	  identify	  the	  outer	  reaches	  of	  the	  damage	   to	  a	  natural	   resource	   (both	   the	  quality	  of	  water	  and	   the	  effects	  on	  fish	   life)	   that	   literally	   flows	   in	   and	   out	   of	   the	   territory	   of	   the	   claimant	   state.	  167	  	  This	  problem	  is	  compounded	  further	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  sufficient	  evidence	  on	  which	  to	  build	  a	  case,	  as	  in	  Somalia’s	  case,	  the	  base	  line	  level	  of	  water	  quality	  and	  fish	  health	   is	  more	   than	   likely	  not	   available	  due	   to	   the	   collapse	  of	   government	  and	  the	   destruction	   of	   state	   records	   going	   back	   to	   before	   1991.	   While	   seeking	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161	  Kathleen	  F	  Brickey	  Environmental	  Crime:	  Law,	  Policy,	  Prosecution	  (Wolters	  Kluwer,	  New	  York,	  2008)	  at	  p2	  
162	  Brickey	  above	  n	  161	  at	  p11.	  	  
163	  Birnie,	  Boyle	  and	  Redgwell,	  above	  n	  41	  at	  p227.	  
164	  Trail	  Smelter	  Arbitral	  Tribunal,	  above	  n	  136	  at	  p1933.	  
165	  Birnie,	  Boyle	  and	  Redgwell,	  above	  n	  41	  at	  p227.	  	  
166	  At	  p229.	  The	  polluter	  pays	  principle	  in	  action.	  
167	  At	  p230.	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compensation	  for	  damage	  might	  be	  a	  more	  western	  approach	  to	  the	  problem,	  in	  Somalia’s	   case	   it	   is	   suggested	   that	   bringing	   peace	   and	   security	   and	   the	   re-­‐establishment	  of	   government	   services	   along	  with	   the	  exertion	  of	   some	   form	  of	  control	   over	   industry	   and	   manufacturing	   might	   be	   higher	   priorities	   for	   the	  government.	  The	   foregoing	   conventions	   establish	   varying	   time	   limits	   within	   which	   claims	  must	   be	   lodged.	   The	   problem	   that	   arises	   for	   Somalia	   and	   any	   tribunal	   is	   the	  requirement	  that	  the	  time	  be	  established	  as	  to	  when	  a	  state	  could	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  to	  know	  about	  the	  situation	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  dumping.	  Does	  it	  occur	  when	  a	  failed	  state	  is	  recognised	  as	  not	  being	  a	  failed	  state?	  Does	  the	  non-­‐failed	  state,	   by	   inference	   a	   successful	   state,	   have	   a	   backwards	   recourse	   to	   the	   time	  when	  the	  actual	  event	  occurred	  during	  the	  period	  of	  failure?	  What	  is	  the	  measure	  by	  which	   the	  state	   is	   considered	  a	  non-­‐failed	  state?	   In	   the	  case	  of	  Somalia	   is	   it	  when	  elections	  have	  been	  held	  and	  a	  new	  constitution	  created?	  But	  in	  Somalia’s	  case	   there	   are	   still	   two	   regions	   which	   are	   declaring	   themselves	   independent,	  Somaliland	  and	  Puntland,	   if	   that	   is	   the	  case	  does	   this	  effect	   the	  qualification	  of	  being	   a	   non-­‐failed	   state?	  Who	   decides	   when	   a	   failed	   state	   has	   become	   a	   non-­‐failed	  state?	  Is	  it	  a	  declaration	  by	  the	  UN	  who	  hasn’t	  officially	  declared	  Somalia	  a	  failed	   state?	   The	   previous	   section	   on	   state	   responsibility	   and	   liability	   has	  attempted	  to	  answer	  some	  of	  those	  questions.	  It	  is	  the	  courts	  that	  will	  have	  the	  final	  say	  if	  the	  matter	  ever	  gets	  that	  far.	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18 Conclusion	  It	  is	  suggested	  that	  as	  a	  global	  community	  of	  states	  the	  notion	  that	  all	  states	  are	  interdependent	   needs	   to	   be	   realised.	   In	   doing	   this,	   states,	   would	   acknowledge	  that	  each	  is	  a	  small	  part	  of	  a	  greater	  environmental	  system	  and	  the	  temptation	  to	  knowingly	  allow	  pollution	   to	  occur	   to	   another	   state	  would	  be	   reduced	  and	   the	  motivation	  to	  produce	  less	  waste	  within	  the	  borders	  of	  each	  state	  might	  take	  on	  more	   significance	   than	   it	   apparently	   does	   while	   the	   ocean	   is	   still	   seen	   as	   a	  repository	  for	  waste.	  The	  combined	  effect	  of	  the	  major	  conventions	  that	  cover	  waste	  dumping	  should	  theoretically	   have	   prevented	   waste	   from	   being	   dumped	   in	   the	   waters	   off	   the	  coast	  of	  Somalia.	  However	  as	  has	  been	  shown,	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  to	  ratify	   important	   aspects	   of	   these	   conventions	   that	   could	   serve	   to	   strengthen	  these	  conventions	  and	  provide	  more	  of	  an	  incentive	  to	  take	  a	  greater	  interest	  in	  monitoring	   how	  waste	   is	   dealt	  with,	   both	   internally	   as	  well	   as	   in	   its	   export	   to	  developing	  countries.168	  MacDonald	  has	  highlighted	  that	  States	  or	  members	  of	  a	  community	   benefit	   from	   the	   protection	   of	   that	   community.	   Therefore	   a	   State	  acting	   to	   preserve	   the	   good	   of	   that	   community	   is	   also	   preserving	   it’s	   own	  individual	  good.169	  As	  has	  been	  argued	  by	  Beyerlin	  and	  Marahaun	  this	  concept	  of	  acknowledging	   the	   overall	   solidarity	   of	   States	   as	   members	   of	   the	   same	  community	  will	  provide	  a	   significant	  moral	   incitement	   to	  dismantle	   the	  North-­‐South	  dichotomy	  that	  supports	  a	  view	  that	  developing	  countries	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	   protected	   from	   waste	   dumping	   as	   much	   as	   developed	   countries.170	  If	   as	  suggested,	  we	  are	  all	  members	  of	  the	  same	  community,	  there	  is	  no	  legal	  barrier	  to	   a	   State	   party	   to	   any	   of	   the	   above	   conventions	   holding	   a	   member	   party	   to	  account	  if	  a	  State	  becomes	  aware	  of	  breaches	  perpetrated	  by	  that	  member	  party.	  This	  would	  necessitate	  a	  State	  choosing	  to	  act	  in	  the	  role	  of	  guardian	  for	  States	  who	  were	  unable	   to	  protect	   themselves	   from	  dumping	  carried	  out	   in	  breach	  of	  anyone	  of	  the	  conventions	  listed	  above.	  This	  action	  can	  be	  supported	  legally	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  Clapp	  above	  n	  12	  p30.	  	  
169	  	  MacDonald	  1996,	  301	  p35.	  
170	  Beyerlin	  Ulrich	  and	  Marahaun	  Thilo	  International	  Environmental	  Law,	  2011	  Oxford	  Hart	  Publishing.	  p36.	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the	   basis	   of	   the	   Draft	   Articles	   on	   State	   Responsibility	   Art	   41,	  which	   allows	   all	  States	   to	   cooperate	   to	   end	   a	   serious	   breach	   by	   another	   State,	   regardless	   of	  whether	   they	  are	   affected	  by	   the	  breach	  or	  not.171	  States	  would	  have	  a	  positive	  obligation	  to	  other	  States,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  obligations	  erga	  omnes	  partes,	  which	  is	  more	  related	  to	  when	  a	  State	  breaches	  an	  obligation	  that	  is	  owed	  to	  a	  group	  of	  States	   to	   which	   it	   is	   a	   member	   in	   relation	   to	   regional,	   human	   rights	   or	  environmental	   issues.	   Third	   States	   are	   able	   to	   demand	   cessation	   and	  performance	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  injured	  State	  of	  the	  obligation	  breached.	  	  It	   is	   acknowledged	   that	   in	   the	   current	   atmosphere	   States	   are	   reticent	   to	   take	  positive	   action	   on	   behalf	   of	   another	   State,	   as	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   action	   of	   this	  nature	   could	   create	   public	   interest	   law	   at	   the	   international	   level	   that	   would	  create	  precedents	  that	  might	  be	  held	  against	  acting	  States	  in	  the	  future.	  States	  have	  obligations	  to	  each	  other	  as	  members	  of	  the	  international	  community	  to	   protect	   those	   incapable	   of	   protecting	   themselves	   or	   more	   particularly	   to	  protect	  their	  environment,	  as	  all	  States	  share	  the	  same	  basic	  resources	  by	  way	  of	  air	  and	  water.	  In	  acting	  to	  help	  a	  State	  protect	  its	  environment	  other	  States	  are	  acting	  in	  protecting	  the	  collective	  environment.	  As	  has	  been	  held	  in	  the	  Nuclear	  
Tests	  case,	  	  
‘The	  rights	  are	  the	  same	  for	  all.	  They	  reflect	  a	  community	  interest	  in	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  security,	  life,	   and	   health	   of	   all	   peoples	   and	   in	   preservation	   of	   the	   environment.	   The	   rights	   are	   held	   in	  common	  and	  the	  corresponding	  obligation	  imposed	  on	  France	  (and	  on	  any	  other	  nuclear	  power)	  is	  owed	   in	   equal	   measure	   to	   New	   Zealand	   and	   to	   every	   other	   member	   of	   the	   international	  community.	  It	  is	  an	  obligation	  erga	  omnes.’172	  	  It	   is	  a	  small	  price	  to	  pay	   if	   there	   is	  belief	   in	   the	  desire	   to	  protect	   the	  seas	   from	  pollution	   and	   degradation	   that	   will	   be	   with	   successive	   generations	   for	   a	   long	  time	  to	  come.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  Draft	  Articles	  on	  Responsibility	  of	  States	  for	  Internationally	  Wrongful	  Acts,	  above	  Chapter	  2	  n	  200	  Art	  41.	  
172	  Nuclear	  Tests	  (Australia	  v.	  France)	  (Australian	  Memorial)	  1	  ICJ	  Pleadings	  334,	  at	  pp334	  -­‐5	  para	  448.	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The	  short	  coming	  of	  international	  agreements	  is	  displayed	  when	  non	  parties,	  like	  Somalia,	  that	  wasn’t	  in	  a	  position	  to	  join	  some	  of	  the	  waste	  dumping	  conventions,	  is	  left	  unprotected	  from	  those	  who	  actively	  seek	  out	  States	  where	  enforcement	  is	  lax	   in	   order	   to	   dump	  waste.	   This	   activity	   is	   compounded	  when	   States	   that	   are	  parties	   lack	   the	   will	   to	   enforce	   conditions	   on	   actors	   that	   come	   within	   their	  territorial	   jurisdiction	   and	   to	   fully	   meet	   their	   obligations	   and	   duties	   while	  respecting	  the	  rights	  of	  others.	  	  The	  state	  of	  the	  present	  conventions	  and	  the	  level	  of	  dumping	  globally	  is	  perhaps	  a	  vast	  improvement	  on	  the	  use	  of	  the	  sea	  as	  an	  unregulated	  dump	  that	  flourished	  between	   1945	   and	   the	   1970s.	   However	   much	   has	   been	   achieved	   it	   is	   still	  possible	   to	   improve	   the	   response	   from	   States	   and	   complete	   some	   of	   the	  outstanding	  pieces	  of	  the	  framework	  that	  are	  still	  left	  unfinished,	  such	  as	  the	  ban	  on	   hazardous	   waste	   shipment	   to	   non	   OECD	   countries	   and	   associated	   liability	  conventions.	  	  The	  oceans	   are	   as	   an	   important	   contributor	   to	   the	   overall	   health	   of	   the	  planet	  and	   a	   vital	   part	   of	   the	   global	   eco-­‐system,	   not	   a	   dumping	   ground	   for	   waste	  produced	  by	  man	  who	  lacks	  the	  initiative,	  drive	  and	  will	  to	  maximise	  the	  waste	  produced	   by	   the	   industrial	   complexes	   of	   the	   world.	   While	   waste	   can	   still	   be	  dumped	  there	  is	  a	  minimal	  incentive	  to	  actively	  minimise	  waste	  production	  and	  minimal	  incentive	  to	  redefine	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  ocean	  as	  anything	  other	  than	  a	  dumping	  ground.	  That	   the	  health	  of	   the	  ocean	   is	   important	   to	  man	   can	  been	  seen	   in	   the	   recent	   report	   that	   covered	   the	   loss	   of	   bird	   life	   and	   fish	   life	   in	   the	  Pacific	  Ocean,	  contributed	  to	  in	  part	  by	  the	  enormous	  amount	  of	  waste	  generated	  by	   the	   2011	   tsunami	   in	   Japan.	   173
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  Ray	  Greg	  “The	  Ocean	  is	  Broken.”	  (22	  October	  2013).	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Chapter	  5	  
Piracy	  	   I	  am	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  Countless	  have	  died	  No	  one	  knows	  their	  names,	  no	  one	  cares	  They’ve	  just	  become	  a	  statistic	  (Helwaa)1	  
Introduction	  	  The	  previous	  three	  chapters	  have	  dealt	  with	  issues	  that	  have	  played	  a	  part	  in	  the	  rise	   in	   piracy	   off	   the	   coast	   of	   Somalia	   since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   last	   century.	   The	  previous	   chapters	   also	   looked	   at	   the	   indifferent	   response	   by	   the	   international	  community,	   particularly	   the	   lack	  of	   response	  by	   the	  United	  Nations	   (U.N.),	   flag	  States	  and	  port	  States	  to	  ships	  who	  have	  allegedly	  been	  carrying	  out	  either	  illegal	  fishing	  or	  hazardous	  waste	  dumping.	  This	  chapter	  looks	  at	  piracy,	  an	  issue	  that	  has	   generated	   a	   significant	   response	   from	   the	   international	   community,	  including	  the	  UN.	  	  It	   would	   be	   hard	   to	   calculate	   the	   number	   of	   scholarly	   voices	   that	   have	  contributed	  to	  the	  international	  discussion	  on	  piracy	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia.	  It	  is	  highly	   likely	   that	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   this	   discussion	   is	   either	   Eurocentric	   or	  Americentric	   with	   a	   few	   Asian	   and	   African	   voices	   also	   contributing.	   It	   is	  therefore	  suggested	  that	  the	  discourse	  has	  a	  significant	  bias	  in	  the	  favour	  of	  the	  victims	  and	  those	  who	  are	  active	  in	  policing	  the	  crime.	  The	  only	  contribution	  that	  has	  been	  made	  by	  the	  perpetrators	  is	  limited	  to	  a	  sentence	  scattered	  throughout	  media	  reports.2	  Much	   of	   the	   scholarly	   debate	   has	   centred	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   piracy	   and	   its	  definition	  as	   stated	   in	   the	  UNCLOS.	  Each	  aspect	  of	   the	  definition	  has	  been	  well	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Cachia,	  above	  Chapter	  1	  n	  1	  
2	  Tharoor,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  14	  and	  Waldo,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  19.	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mined	  for	  academic	  exposure.	  Numerous	  books	  have	  been	  written	  to	  cash	  in	  on	  the	  tide	  of	  piracy’s	  currency.	  There	  has	  even	  been	  a	  movie	  that	  focussed	  on	  the	  capture	  of	  the	  Maersk	  Alabama3	  and	  its	  release	  by	  the	  US	  Navy.	  The	  irony	  of	  that	  situation	  is	  that	  the	  survivor	  wasn’t	  charged	  with	  the	  ‘romantic’	  crime	  of	  piracy	  but	   the	  more	  mundane	   crime	   of	   seizing	   control	   of	   a	   ship	   by	   violence,4	  (United	  
States	   of	   America	   v	   Muse),	   found	   in	   the	   Convention	   for	   the	   Suppression	   of	  Unlawful	   Acts	   Against	   the	   Safety	   of	   Maritime	   Navigation	   1988	   (SUA	  Convention).5	  	  	  As	   stated	   in	  Chapter	  3	  notification	  of	   the	  problems	   caused	  by	   IUU	  Fishing	   and	  Hazardous	  Waste	   dumping	  was	   notified	   to	   the	   UN	   and	   various	   other	   regional	  organisations	  in	  1991	  and	  1992	  and	  1995.	  The	  UN	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  problem	  and	  one	   of	   its	   advisers	   warned	   of	   the	   consequences	   in	   1997.6	  It	   is	   therefore	   not	  possible	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  costly	  consequences	  of	  piracy	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia	  lie	  fully	  at	  the	  door	  of	  Somalia.	  The	  UN	  and	  the	  other	  regional	  organisations	  that	  were	   notified	   of	   the	   problems	   and	   failed	   to	   act	   must	   bear	   some	   of	   the	  responsibility.	  Poverty	   is	  widespread	  in	  Somalia	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  western	  world	  in	  fishing,	  possibly	  illegally,	  in	  Somali	  waters,	  combined	  with	  the	  dumping	  of	   hazardous	   waste,	   has	   provided	   motivation	   for	   some	   Somalis	   to	   prey	   on	  commercial	  shipping.7	  	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2	  the	  creation	  of	  Somalia	  was	  the	  product	  of	  a	  colonising	  effort	  from	  three	  different	  States,	  the	  British,	  Italian,	  and	  the	  French.	  The	  system	  of	  colonisation	  was	  based	  on	  a	  system	  of	   taxation,	  extraction,	  and	  domination.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Captain	  Phillips,	  Sony	  Colombia	  Pictures	  2013,	  of	  the	  Maersk	  Alabama	  incident	  in	  2009.	  	  
4	  United	  States	  of	  America	  v	  Muse,	  United	  States	  District	  Court,	  Southern	  District	  of	  New	  York,	  USA-­‐335-­‐274(Ed	  9-­‐25-­‐58)	  for	  which	  he	  is	  now	  serving	  33	  years	  and	  9	  months	  in	  prison.	  	  
5	  The	  Convention	  for	  the	  Suppression	  of	  Unlawful	  Acts	  Against	  the	  Safety	  of	  Maritime	  Navigation	  1988	  entered	  into	  force	  March	  1992.	  
6	  Lang	  Report,	  above	  Chapter	  3,	  n	  103	  at	  p9.	  
7	  Chapter	  3	  highlighted	  the	  loss	  fish	  stocks	  estimated	  at	  some	  $300M	  which	  compares	  favourably	  with	  the	  annual	  amounts	  of	  ransom	  taken	  through	  piracy.	  	  Peter	  Lehr	  has	  been	  quoted	  as	  saying	  “It	  is	  like	  a	  resource	  swap,	  Somalis	  collect	  up	  to	  $100m	  a	  year	  from	  pirates	  ransoms	  off	  their	  coasts.	  And	  the	  Europeans	  and	  Asians	  poach	  around	  $300m	  a	  year	  in	  fish	  from	  Somali	  waters.’	  Paul	  Salopek	  “Off	  the	  lawless	  coast	  of	  Somalia,	  questions	  of	  who	  is	  pirating	  who”	  Chicago	  Tribune	  (Chicago,	  10	  October	  2008.).	  
8	  See	  Pureza,	  above	  Chapter	  2	  n	  8.	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This	  was	   to	   the	  benefit	  of	   the	  colonisers	  and	   to	   the	  detriment	  of	   the	  colonised.	  When	   the	  process	  of	  decolonisation	  occurred	   the	   two	  major	  powers	  of	   the	  day	  sought	  to	  exert	  their	  dominance	  through	  influence	  over	  smaller	  strategic	  States.	  Somalia,	   because	   of	   its	   geographic	   location	  was	   one	   of	   those.	   Both	   Russia	   and	  America	  at	  varying	   times	  were	  exploiting	  Somalia	   for	   the	  exercise	  of	   their	  self-­‐interest.9	  Admittedly,	  both	  of	  these	  were	  invited	  in	  by	  the	  existing	  government	  of	  the	   day	   as	   outlined	   in	   Chapter	   2.	   With	   the	   ousting	   of	   the	   Barre	   government	  Somalia	   declined	   into	   a	   state	   of	   lawlessness	   as	   various	   tribal	   and	   clan	   factions	  sought	   to	   exert	   control.	   The	   UN	   intervened	   and	   peacekeeping	   forces	   were	  despatched	  to	  restore	  peace.	  	  The	  major	  missions	  by	   the	  UN	   to	  bring	  peace	   to	  Somalia	  were	  mounted	   in	   the	  early	  1990s.	  There	  were	  two	  main	  missions	  known	  as	  UNISOM	  I	  and	  II.	  Their	  aim	  was	   to	  monitor	   peace	   and	   to	   create	   conditions	   that	   allowed	   for	   the	   successful	  distribution	  of	  aid	   to	  starving	  Somalis.	   	  However,	  after	   the	  arrival	  of	  UNISOM	  I	  the	   two	  main	   factions	  within	   Somalia	   resumed	   their	   armed	   conflict	   and	   it	  was	  beyond	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  small	  UNISOM	  force	  to	  counter	  their	  activities.	  The	  US	  stepped	   in	   and	   UNISOM	   II	   was	   created	   with	   a	   view	   to	   securing	   operations	   to	  allow	   the	   humanitarian	   aid	   to	   proceed.	   Part	   of	   the	  mission	   also	   related	   to	   the	  capture	  of	  the	  two	  main	  warlords.	  The	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  this	  did	  little	  more	  than	  alienate	  those	  for	  which	  the	  mission	  had	  been	  established.10	  The	  Somalis	  turned	  against	  the	  US	  and	  UN	  forces	  after	  civilian	  casualties	  were	  incurred	  in	  the	  hunt	  for	  these	  warlords.	  This	  change	  in	  circumstances	  lead	  to	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  deaths	  amongst	  both	  Pakistani	  and	  US	  forces.11	  It	  was	  on	  the	  back	  of	  these	  deaths	  that	  UNISOM	  II	  was	  recalled	  and	  Somalia	  was	  left	  on	  its	  own.	  	  It	   is	   suggested	   that	   at	   this	   point	   in	   time	   the	   people	   of	   Somalia	   had	   suffered	  enough	   at	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   international	   community.	   Combine	   this	   with	   the	  appearance	   of	   foreign	   fishing	   trawlers	   off	   the	   coast	   inhibiting	   the	   ability	   of	  people	  to	  survive	  and	  it	  is	  only	  natural	  that	  the	  proliferation	  of	  arms	  left	  behind	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  See	  Herbst,	  above	  Chapter	  2	  n	  4	  at	  p124.	  	  
10	  Christiane	  Philipp	  “Somalia-­‐A	  very	  Special	  Case”	  in	  A	  Von	  Bogdandy	  and	  R	  Wolfrum	  (eds)	  Max	  Planck	  Yearbook	  of	  United	  Nations	  Law	  (Koninklijke	  Bril,	  Netherlands,	  2005)	  517-­‐554	  at	  p541.	  
11	  At	  p541.	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by	  the	  Cold	  War	  would	  be	  put	  to	  use	   in	  the	  protection	  of	   ‘their’	   fisheries’.12	  The	  reported	  incidents	  of	  trawlers	  being	  stopped	  goes	  back	  as	  far	  as	  1991.13	  	  	  2004	   brought	   the	   tsunami	   from	   Indonesia	   that	   caused	   wide	   spread	   problems	  along	   parts	   of	   the	   coast	   of	   Somalia.	   The	   seas	   brought	   to	   the	   shore	   a	   deadly	  concoction	   of	   hazardous	   waste	   that	   had	   been	   dumped	   in	   the	   waters	   off	   the	  coast14	  and	  destroyed	   fishing	   skiffs	   and	  nets.15	  The	  destruction	   of	   the	   tools	   that	  gave	  access	   to	  a	  much	  needed	   food	  source	  appears	   to	  have	  been	  the	  motivator	  for	  some	  fishermen	  to	  turn	  their	  hand	  to	  piracy.	  	  The	  rate	  of	  recorded	  pirate	  events	  at	   its	  peak	  amounted	  to	   less	   than	  1%	  of	   the	  23,000	  vessels	  that	  pass	  through	  the	  waters	  off	   the	  coast	  of	  Somalia	  annually.16	  The	  estimated	  annual	  cost	  of	  piracy	  to	  the	  global	  community	  is	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  USD6Bn-­‐USD18Bn.17	  Piracy	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia	  accounted	  for	  just	  over	  half,	  53%,	  of	  all	  international	  piracy	  incidents	  at	  its	  peak	  in	  2009.18	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Scott	  Coffen-­‐Smout	  Pirates,	  Warlords	  and	  Rogue	  Fishing	  Vessels	  in	  Somalia's	  Unruly	  Seas.	  (1998)	  p2.	  
13	  Waldo,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  19.	  Waldo	  cites	  trawlers	  from	  Egypt,	  India,	  Italy,	  Kenya,	  Taiwan,	  Ukraine,	  Yemen	  as	  being	  captured.	  However	  these	  were	  not	  the	  only	  ships	  targeted.	  	  Coffen-­‐Smout,	  above	  n	  12	  at	  p3	  cites	  a	  freighter	  and	  its	  tow	  vessel	  also	  captured	  for	  ransom	  in	  1998.	  S	  Hansen	  Piracy	  in	  the	  Greater	  Gulf	  of	  Aden:	  Myths,	  Misconceptions	  and	  Remedies	  (Norwegian	  Institute	  for	  Urban	  and	  Regional	  Research,	  Oslo,	  2009)	  at	  p20	  describes	  cargo	  ships	  being	  targeted	  as	  far	  back	  as	  1991.	  	  
14	  UNEP-­‐UNREDA,	  above	  Chapter	  4	  n	  8	  at	  p134.	  
15	  D	  Burale	  FAO	  Post	  Tsunami	  Assessment	  Mission	  to	  Central	  and	  South	  Coast	  of	  Somalia	  (Food	  and	  Agricultural	  Organisation,	  2005)	  cited	  by	  Emmanuel	  Sone	  “Piracy	  in	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa:	  The	  Role	  of	  Somalia's	  Fishermen”	  (Naval	  Postgraduate	  School,	  2010)	  at	  p49-­‐51	  cites	  1630	  skiffs	  lost	  and	  33,000	  nets	  destroyed.	  	  
16	  Lang	  Report,	  above	  Chapter	  3,	  n	  103	  p17,	  puts	  the	  figure	  at	  22,000	  –	  25,000.	  The	  UNODC	  report,	  Transnational	  Organised	  Crime	  in	  Eastern	  Africa:	  A	  Threat	  Assessment	  	  (United	  Nations	  Office	  on	  Drugs	  and	  Crime,	  2013)	  at	  p35,	  puts	  the	  figure	  at	  42,500	  quoting	  International	  Maritime	  Bureau	  statistics.	  
17	  Pirate	  Trails:	  Tracking	  the	  Illicit	  Financial	  Flows	  from	  Pirate	  Activities	  Off	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  	  (World	  Bank,	  2013)	  at	  p33,	  estimates	  USD18	  Billion	  per	  year.	  The	  wide	  variance	  in	  approximate	  cost	  is	  due	  to	  different	  factors	  being	  used	  to	  assess	  the	  cost	  from	  supplying	  naval	  assets	  through	  to	  the	  costs	  of	  insurance	  and	  security	  to	  economic	  losses	  to	  shipping	  caused	  through	  delays	  and	  economic	  losses	  to	  shippers	  and	  their	  customers,	  prosecutions	  and	  associated	  court	  costs	  and	  prison	  costs	  are	  also	  included.	  	  
18	  L	  Ploch	  and	  others	  Piracy	  off	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  (Congressional	  Research	  Service,	  Washington,	  2011)	  at	  p1	  citing	  International	  Maritime	  Bureau	  statistics.	  IMB	  Statistics	  for	  2009	  showed	  piracy	  passed	  406	  reported	  events	  of	  which	  217	  were	  Somali	  sourced	  attacks	  involving	  47	  pirated	  ships,	  IMB	  Piracy	  Centre,	  ‘2009	  Worldwide	  piracy	  figures	  surpass	  400	  (14	  January	  2010)	  www.icc-­‐ccs.org.	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It	   is	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   chapter	   to	   attempt	   to	   look	   at	   piracy	   from	   the	   Somali	  perspective;	   to	   review	   the	   history	   of	   African	   piracy	   through	   that	   lens	   and	   to	  analyse	  the	  international	  law	  of	  piracy	  from	  that	  perspective.	  	  This	   gives	   rise	   to	   questions	   such	   as	  what	   is	   piracy,	  what	   are	   the	   enforcement	  powers	  possessed	  by	  State	  navies	  operating	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia,	  do	  all	  States	  have	   the	   same	   legislation	   regarding	   piracy	   and	   does	   Somalia	   have	   anti	   piracy	  legislation?	  The	   navies	   confronting	   the	   issue	   of	   piracy	   off	   the	   coast	   of	   Somalia	   have	   been	  exposed	   to	   a	   number	   of	   issues	   surrounding	   the	   human	   rights	   of	   the	   pirates.	  These	   issues	   will	   be	   examined	   in	   light	   of	   modern	   trends	   for	   dealing	   with	  captured	  pirates	  and	  the	  disposition	  of	  their	  skiffs	  and	  attendant	  legal	  issues.	  	  The	   need	   for	   security	   on	   board	   merchant	   shipping	   as	   it	   passes	   through	   the	  waters	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia	  has	  brought	  problems	  as	  security	  companies	  are	  employed	   to	   protect	   the	   ships.	   The	   lack	   of	   controls	   on	   security	   companies,	   in	  what	  is	  a	  globally	  unregulated	  industry,	  has	  led	  to	  a	  number	  of	  incidents	  where	  pirates	  have	  been	  killed.	  Issues	  of	  liability	  and	  responsibility	  are	  investigated	  to	  ascertain	  how	  well	  these	  events	  are	  dealt	  with.	  The	   responses	   to	   incidents	   of	   alleged	   illegal	   fishing	   and	   hazardous	   waste	  dumping	   are	   investigated	   in	   previous	   chapters.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   the	   global	  response	  to	  piracy	  is	  investigated.	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19 A	  brief	  history	  of	  African	  Piracy.	  	  Compared	  to	  the	  European	  history	  of	  piracy	  that	  dates	  back	  to	  very	  early	  Greco-­‐Roman	  times,	  the	  history	  of	  African	  piracy	  is	  quite	  short.	  	  The	  advent	  of	  Barbary	  Coast	  piracy	  was	  in	  the	  early	  1500s	  and	  reigned	  in	  various	  guises	  through	  to	  the	  mid	   1800s	   when	   the	   force	   of	   American	   intervention	   closed	   it	   down.19 	  The	  Barbary	  Coast	  corsairs	  ranged	  out	  of	  modern	  Algeria,	  Tunisia,	  and	  Libya	  and	  had	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  Sultans	  or	  ‘Deys’	  of	  those	  states.20	  These	  pirates	  raided	  into	  the	   Mediterranean	   and	   the	   northern	   Atlantic	   against	   shipping	   of	   all	   different	  nations	   including	   the	  English.	   Such	  was	   the	   strength	  of	   this	  pirate	  activity	   that	  the	  leaders	  were	  able	  to	  negotiate	  with	  sovereign	  powers	  to	  form	  alliances.21	  The	  stranglehold	   that	   was	   exerted	   on	  Mediterranean	   commerce	  was	   such	   that	   the	  pirates	  were	  able	  to	  obtain	  ‘concessions’	  from	  sovereigns,	  including	  America	  that	  signed	  two	  treaties	  in	  1795	  and	  1816,22	  by	  which	  the	  pirates	  were	  paid	  a	  tax	  to	  allow	   the	   commercial	   vessels	   to	   pass	   without	   being	   raided.23	  The	   signing	   of	  treaties	  and	  the	  paying	  of	  concessions	  or	  tribute	  continued	  until	  the	  early	  1800s.	  	  The	  defining	  characteristics	  of	  this	  period	  of	  piracy	  are	  that	  it	  has	  been	  viewed	  as	  one	   of	   religion	   and	   taking	   hostages	   for	   ransom	   or	   slavery.	   The	   pirates	   of	   the	  Barbary	   Coast	   were	   Muslim	   and	   they	   were	   holding	   to	   ransom	   the	   Christian	  world,	   and	   taking	   its	  peoples	  as	   slaves	   for	   their	  benefit.	  Davis	   asserts	   that	   this	  taking	  in	  slaves	  was	  an	  act	  of	  revenge	  against	  the	  Christian	  world	  for	  the	  damage	  of	   the	   Crusades	   and	   the	   violence	   imposed	   on	   Muslim	   communities.24	  There	   is	  little	   doubt	   that	   the	   corsairs	   of	   the	  Barbary	  Coast	  were	   efficient	   at	   their	  work.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  L	  Bento	  “Toward	  an	  International	  Law	  of	  Piracy	  Sui	  Generis:	  How	  the	  Dual	  Nature	  of	  Maritime	  Piracy	  Enables	  Piracy	  to	  Flourish.”	  2011	  29	  Berkley	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  399	  at	  p400	  fn20.	  
20	  J	  de	  Montmorency	  “Piracy	  and	  the	  Barbary	  Corsairs”	  1919	  35	  Law	  Quarterly	  Review	  133	  at	  p136.	  
21	  At	  p	  139.	  Cites	  an	  alliance	  with	  France	  and	  Turkey,	  although	  signed	  directly	  by	  the	  Sultans	  and	  not	  the	  pirate	  leaders.	  	  
22	  At	  p	  140.	  
23	  At	  140	  where	  these	  concessions	  are	  described	  as	  blackmail.	  	  
24	  Robert	  Davis	  Christian	  Slaves,	  Muslim	  Masters:	  White	  slavery	  in	  the	  Mediterranean,	  the	  Barbary	  
Coast,	  and	  Italy	  1500-­‐1800	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  New	  York,	  2003)	  at	  pxxv.	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The	   estimates	   obtained	   by	   Davis	   indicate	   the	   number	   of	   those	   enslaved	   as	  between	  sixteen	  hundred	  thousand	  and	  one	  million	  slaves	  taken.25	  A	   further	   characteristic	   of	   the	   Barbary	   Coast	   corsairs	   is	   that	   there	   are	  insinuations	   that	   it	   is	   not	   ‘true’	   piracy,	   that	   it	   was	   in	   fact	   privateering	   as	   the	  actions	  of	  the	  corsairs	  were	  supported	  by	  the	  reigning	  sultan	  of	  the	  day.	  This	  is	  dependent	   on	   the	   viewpoint	   of	   the	   writer.	   The	   vast	  majority	   of	   European	   sea	  powers	  during	  the	  same	  time,	  between	  1500-­‐1800,	  utilised	  privateers	  to	  harass	  and	  interrupt	  the	  trade	  of	  their	  enemies.26	  Shnider	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  very	  little	  difference	   between	   a	   pirate	   and	   privateer	   as	   far	   as	   their	   actions	   go.27	  It	   is	   also	  highly	   likely	  that	  the	  view	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  pirate	  is	  a	  pirate	  or	  privateer	  would	  depend	   on	  who	   the	   target	   is,	   as	   the	   English	  were	   not	   restrained	   in	   calling	   the	  Barbary	   corsairs,	   ‘pirates’	   when	   their	   actions	   were	   the	   same	   as	   those	   of	   the	  licensed	  English	  privateers.28	  The	   reign	   of	   the	   Barbary	   corsairs	   was	   eventually	   brought	   to	   a	   close	   by	   the	  actions	  of	  a	  number	  of	  States	  ostensibly	  making	  war	  with	  the	  Barbary	  States.29	  From	  a	   Somali	   perspective	   history	  provides	   a	   link	   to	   a	   once	   successful	   period.	  The	  North	  African	  States	  raided	  the	  lucrative	  European	  and	  emerging	  American	  trade	   routes	   for	   both	   property	   gain	   as	   well	   as	   for	   the	   payment	   of	   tribute	   or	  ransom	   for	   the	   crews	   that	   they	  held	   in	   slavery.	  There	   is	  no	   indication	   that	   the	  piracy	   that	   has	   occurred	  off	   the	   coast	   of	   Somalia	   has	  been	  motivated	   from	   the	  same	  religious	  base	  as	  the	  Barbary	  Coast	  corsairs.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  Somalis	  share	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Barbary	  Coast	  through	  a	  common	  religious	  background.	  That	  the	  Barbary	  Coast	  pirates	  were	  driven	  by	  revenge	  for	  violence	  perpetrated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Davis	  above	  n	  24	  at	  p8.	  
26	  Alfred	  Rubin	  The	  Law	  of	  Piracy	  (2nd	  ed,	  Transnational	  Publishers,	  New	  York,	  1998)at	  p18.	  Privateers	  being	  licensed	  by	  a	  sovereign	  to	  carry	  out	  this	  action	  under	  a	  letter	  of	  marque	  and	  reprisal.	  
27	  Samuel	  Shnider	  “Universal	  Jurisdiction	  over	  "Operation	  of	  a	  Pirate	  ship":	  The	  Legality	  of	  the	  Evolving	  Piracy	  Definition	  in	  Regional	  Prosecutions”	  2012	  38	  N.C.J.Int'l	  L.&	  Com.	  Reg.	  473	  at	  p487.	  	  
28	  Rubin,	  above	  n	  26	  at	  p13.	  	  
29	  Montmorency,	  above	  n	  20	  at	  p	  141	  the	  British	  in	  1816,	  the	  French	  in	  1830,	  M	  Boot	  “Pirates,	  Then	  and	  Now”	  2009	  88(4)	  Foreign	  Affairs	  94	  at	  p99	  states	  that	  the	  Americans	  started	  their	  war	  with	  the	  Barbary	  States	  in	  1801	  and	  continued	  until	  1815.	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against	   them	   by	   the	   Christian	   Western	   world	   is	   one	   possibly	   shared	   by	   the	  Somalis,	   as	   their	   recent	   history,	   from	   colonisation	   onwards,	   has	   been	   one	   of	  subjugation	  and	  invasion	  by	  foreign	  powers	  including	  the	  UN	  forces	  of	  UNISOM.	  They	  have	  been	  exploited	  for	  self-­‐interest	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  then	  left	  on	  their	   own	   helpless	   to	   protect	   their	   fishing	   grounds	   from	   illegal	   fishing	   and	  hazardous	   waste	   dumping.	   This	   must	   certainly	   have	   generated	   feelings	   of	  animosity	  towards	  the	  developed	  world.	  As	  the	  people	  of	  Somalia	  suffered	  from	  droughts,	  poverty,	  and	  internal	  lawlessness,	  just	  off	  its	  coast	  billions	  of	  dollars	  of	  trade	   goods	   sailed	   past.	   This	   could	  well	   have	   served	   to	   fuel	   that	   animosity.	   	   It	  must	  also	  be	  acknowledged	   that	   the	  actions	  of	   the	  postcolonial	  government,	   in	  particular	   that	   of	   Said	   Barre,	   has	   also	   contributed	   to	   the	   current	   state	   of	  lawlessness	  and	  poverty	  in	  Somalia.	  	  It	  could	  be	  said	  that	  the	  pirates	  of	  Somalia	  saw	  a	  rich	  resource	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  exploited	  for	  gain,	  much	  as	  Somalia	  has	  been	  exploited	  for	  gain,	  by	  the	  colonists	  and	  secondly	  by	  the	  Cold	  War	  powers.	  	  If	  an	  analogy	  could	  be	  drawn	  between	  the	  piracy	  of	   the	  Barbary	  Coast	  and	  the	  exploitation	  of	  Somalia	   it	  could	  be	  that	  the	  Western	  or	  European	  powers	  thought	  that	  privateering	  was	  a	  legitimate	  way	  of	  dealing	  with	   those	  who	  were	   competitors	   for	   the	   same	   trade	   and	   goods,	   until	  privateering	  was	  applied	  to	   them	  by	  a	  more	  efficient	  and	  ruthless	   trader.	  Then	  the	  rules	  were	  changed;	  consequently,	  privateering	  was	  outlawed	  in	  1856	  at	  the	  Paris	   Declaration.30	  The	   Somali	   pirates	   possibly	   saw	   a	   resource	   that	   could	   be	  exploited	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  a	  few,	  much	  as	  their	  waters	  were	  being	  exploited	  for	  fish	   and	   the	   dumping	  hazardous	  waste.31	  The	   Somalis,	   quite	   possibly,	  were	  not	  aware	  of	  any	  negative	  consequences	  for	  those	  exploiting	  their	  waters;	  the	  lack	  of	  action	   by	   the	   international	   community	   could	   be	   viewed	   as	   condoning	   those	  activities.	  This	  may	  have	  provided	  the	  impetus	  to	  extract	  some	  benefit	  from	  the	  resource	  without	  the	  thought	  of	  punishment.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  See	  Paris	  Declaration,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  139.	  
31	  Waldo,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  19.	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20 What	  is	  piracy?	  	  	  The	  definition	  of	  piracy	  is	  contained	  in	  UNCLOS	  at	  Art	  101,	  (a)	   any	   illegal	   acts	   of	   violence	   or	   detention,	   or	   any	   act	   of	   depredation,	  committed	   for	   private	   ends	   by	   the	   crew	   or	   the	   passengers	   of	   a	   private	  ship	  or	  a	  private	  aircraft,	  and	  directed:	  (i)	  on	  the	  high	  seas,	  against	  another	  ship	  or	  aircraft,	  or	  against	  persons	  or	  property	  on	  board	  such	  ship	  or	  aircraft;	  	  (ii)	   against	   a	   ship,	   aircraft,	   persons	   or	   property	   in	   a	   place	   outside	   the	  jurisdiction	  of	  any	  State;	  (b)	  any	  act	  of	  voluntary	  participation	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  ship	  or	  of	  an	  aircraft	  with	  knowledge	  of	  facts	  making	  it	  a	  pirate	  ship	  or	  	  aircraft;	  	  (c)	   any	   act	   of	   inciting	   or	   of	   intentionally	   facilitating	   an	   act	   	  described	   in	  subparagraph	  (a)	  or	  (b).	  	  Piracy	   in	   its	  most	   simplistic	   form	   therefore	   is	   the	   stopping	   of	   a	   ship	   by	   some	  form	  of	  violence32	  and	  either	  taking	  the	  goods	  from	  the	  ship,	  or	  taking	  the	  ship,	  or	  taking	   the	   ship	   and	   crew	   and	   holding	   them	   for	   the	   payment	   of	  money.	   These	  actions	   need	   to	   occur	   between	   two	   ships	   that	   are	   privately	   owned,	   (not	   the	  property	  of	  the	  State).33	  This	  action	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  with	  a	  view	  to	  financial	  gain	  for	   those	   who	   take	   part	   and	   not	   on	   behalf	   of	   a	   State.	   The	   acts	   of	   violence	   or	  detention	  need	  to	  be	  illegal	  and	  not	  part	  of	  a	  legitimate	  stopping	  of	  a	  ship	  where	  authority	   is	  given	  to	  ships	  under	   international	  agreements	  or	  under	  Art	  110	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Rubin,	  above	  n	  26	  at	  pp1-­‐70	  utilises	  extreme	  levels	  of	  violence,	  ‘kill’	  and	  ‘murder’	  discussed	  in	  early	  definitions	  of	  piracy	  while	  Barry	  Dubner	  The	  Law	  of	  International	  Sea	  Piracy	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  The	  Hague,	  1980)	  at	  p1	  starts	  with	  ‘murder’	  and	  ‘rape’,	  again	  at	  extreme	  ends	  of	  violence.	  
33	  Rothwell	  and	  Stephens	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  95	  at	  p162	  suggest	  that	  actions	  taken	  for	  political	  motives	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  definition	  of	  piracy.	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the	   UNCLOS	   to	   stop	   other	   ships.	  34	  The	   inclusion	   of	   the	   term	   illegal	   acts	   in	   the	  definition	  has	   been	   argued	   as	   expanding	   the	   range	   of	   conduct	   that	   creates	   the	  liability.35	  Piracy	  can	  also	  be	  committed	  by	  those	  that	  encourage	  others	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  stopping	  of	  the	  ship	  and	  the	  taking	  of	  its	  goods	  or	  those	  who	  sail	  on	  the	  ship	  knowing	  that	  it	  is	  going	  to	  stop	  a	  ship	  and	  take	  the	  goods	  or	  hold	  the	  people	  on	   board	   for	   a	   payment	   of	   money.	   Some	   States	   refer	   to	   	   ‘piracy’	   when	   these	  actions	   occur	   within	   the	   waters	   of	   their	   State	   or	   territorial	   sea. 36 	  The	  international	  community	  calls	  these	  actions	  ‘piracy’	  when	  they	  occur	  on	  the	  ‘high	  seas’.37	  	  UNSC	   Res	   1814	   (2008)	   38	  calls	   on	   States	   to	   ‘protect	   shipping’	   that	   delivers	  humanitarian	  aid	  to	  Somalia	  after	  some	  aid	  vessels	  had	  been	  pirated	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia.	  UNSC	  Res	  1816	  (2008)39	  in	  the	  second	  paragraph	  of	  the	  preamble	  is	  ‘gravely	   concerned	   by	   the	   acts	   of	   piracy	   and	   armed	   robbery’	   against	  humanitarian	  aid	  which	   is	   some	   three	  years	   after	  notification	  by	   the	   IMO,	   that	  there	  was	  a	  problem	  with	  piracy	  and	  armed	  robbery.	   It	   is	  not	  stated	  here	  as	  to	  whether	   the	  UN	  sanctioned	  actions	  are	   to	   take	  place	  on	   the	  high	  seas	  and	  thus	  within	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   states	   under	   UNCLOS	   and	   within	   the	   definition	   of	  piracy,	   or	   within	   Somalia’s	   territorial	   waters	   and	   therefore	   within	   the	  jurisdiction	  of	  Somalia	  and	  outside	  the	  definition	  of	  piracy.	  In	  UNSC	  Res	  1816	  the	  strongest	   action	   recommended	   is	   found	   in	   paragraph	   2	   where	   states	   are	  ‘encouraged	   to	   increase	   and	   coordinate	   efforts	   to	   deter	   acts	   of	   piracy’.	   This	   is	  quickly	   followed	   by	   paragraph	   7(a)	   where	   States	   are	   authorised	   to	   enter	  Somalia’s	  territorial	  waters	  and	  to	  exercise	  rights,	  found	  in	  international	  law	  and	  permitted	  on	  the	  high	  seas,	  to	  repress	  piracy,	  and	  under	  7(b)	  to	  use	  all	  necessary	  means	   to	   do	   so.	   This	   statement	   extends	   the	   definition	   of	   piracy	   into	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Robin	  Geiß	  and	  Anna	  Petrig	  Piracy	  and	  Armed	  Robbery	  at	  Sea	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  2011)	  at	  p	  59	  states	  that	  the	  act	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  domestic	  law	  of	  the	  State	  that	  undertakes	  jurisdiction	  to	  try	  the	  pirates.	  
35	  Douglas	  Guilfoyle	  Shipping	  Interdiction	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2011)	  at	  p43.	  
36	  Rothwell	  and	  Stephens,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  95	  at	  p163.	  
37	  At	  p162.	  
38	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  SC	  Res.1814,	  S/RES/1814	  (2008)	  Paragraph	  11.	  
39	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  SC	  Res.1816,	  S/RES/1816	  (2008)	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territorial	   waters	   of	   a	   state	   and	   arguably	   outside	   the	   definition	   contained	   in	  UNCLOS.	   There	   is	   a	   note	   of	   caution	   included	   in	   this	   resolution	   where	   it	   is	  restricted	   to	   the	   situation	   in	   Somalia,	   paragraph	   (9),	   for	   a	   period	  of	   6	  months,	  paragraph	  (7).	  	  UNSC	  Res	  1846	  extended	  this	  power	  to	  enter	  Somalian	  territorial	  waters	   for	   a	   further	   period	   of	   12	  months,	   paragraph	   (10)	   and	   reaffirmed	   that	  this	  was	  restricted	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Somalia,	  paragraph	  (11).	  These	  paragraphs	  of	  the	  resolutions	  are	  counter	  to	  the	  definition	  which	  holds	  that	  piracy	  can	  only	  be	  committed	  on	  the	  high	  seas	  or	   in	  areas	  beyond	  the	   jurisdiction	  of	  any	  State,	  (Art	  101(a)(i)(ii)).	  	  Art	   101	   does	   not	   create	   an	   international	   law	   of	   piracy;	   it	   creates	   an	  internationally	   recognized	   definition	   of	   piracy.	   Geiß	   and	   Petrig	   assert	   that	   the	  law	   of	   piracy	   is	   only	   found	   in	   domestic	   or	   municipal	   law.40	  Piracy	   is	   also	   a	  creation	  of	  CIL	  however,	  there	  is	  argument	  that	  suggests	  that	  this	  is	  not	  so.41	  Art	  101	  is	  the	  result	  of	  many	  years	  of	  discussion	  and	  several	  proposals	  as	  to	  how	  the	   law	   of	   piracy	   should	   look.	   The	   advent	   of	   the	   20th	   century	   saw	   several	  attempts	  to	  codify	  the	  crime	  of	  piracy.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  was	  a	  list	  of	  subjects	  of	  international	   law	   developed	   by	   the	   League	   of	   Nations	   in	   1924	   that	   included	  piracy	  and	  was	  circulated	  to	  governments	  in	  1926.42	  These	  draft	  articles	  defined	  piracy	  as	  depredations	  upon	  property	  or	  acts	  of	  violence	  against	  persons	  on	  the	  high	  seas,	  committed	  for	  private	  ends,	  (Art	  1).	  A	  distinction	  was	  drawn	  between	  political	  acts	  and	  acts	  committed	  for	  gain.	  Art	  1,	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Geiβ	  and	  Petrig,	  above	  n	  34	  at	  p139	  –	  141.	  They	  cite	  the	  extensive	  work	  of	  the	  Harvard	  Draft	  authors	  and	  the	  follow	  on	  by	  the	  ILC	  prior	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  1958	  Convention	  on	  the	  High	  Seas	  as	  supporting	  their	  view.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  international	  law	  of	  piracy	  existed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  CIL.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  CIL	  consists	  of	  both	  the	  belief	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  states.	  There	  may	  be	  a	  significant	  belief	  that	  piracy	  is	  an	  international	  law,	  however	  the	  practice	  of	  states	  is	  quite	  different.	  The	  small	  number	  of	  domestic	  laws	  sampled	  below	  indicates	  some	  have	  imported	  the	  UNCLOS	  as	  the	  law	  of	  nations,	  while	  others	  have	  created	  their	  own	  legislation	  that	  is	  quite	  different	  and	  others	  that	  have	  no	  piracy	  law	  at	  all.	  See	  also	  Michael	  Passman	  “Protections	  Afforded	  to	  Captured	  Pirates	  Under	  the	  Law	  of	  War	  and	  International	  Law”	  2008	  33(1)	  Tul.Mar.	  L.	  J.	  1	  at	  p11	  n	  71	  where	  a	  comprehensive	  discussion	  of	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  argument	  is	  detailed.	  	  	  
41	  H	  Tuerk	  “The	  Resurgence	  of	  Piracy:	  A	  Phenomenon	  of	  Modern	  Times	  ”	  2009	  17(1)	  University	  of	  Miami	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Review	  	  at	  p3.	  
42	  League	  of	  Nations	  pub.	  C.196.M.70.1927.V	  at	  p119.	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“It	   is	  not	   involved	   in	   the	  notion	  of	  piracy	   that	   the	  above	  mentioned	  acts	  should	  be	  committed	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  gain,	  but	  acts	  committed	  with	  a	  purely	  political	  object	  will	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  constituting	  piracy”	  Art.	  3	  stated	  that	  only	  a	  private	  ship	  and	  not	  a	  warship	  could	  commit	  piracy.	  Art	  5	  provided	  the	  right	  of	  every	  warship	   to	  stop	  and	  capture	  a	  ship	   if	   the	  crew	  of	  that	  ship	  had	  committed	  piracy.	  This	  right	  was	  only	  exercisable	  on	  the	  high	  seas.	  Art	  5	  also	  supplied	  a	  right	  of	  hot	  pursuit	  into	  territorial	  waters	  unless	  the	  littoral	  state	  was	  able	  to	  continue	  the	  pursuit.	  This	  right	  was	  conditional	  on	  the	  matter	  being	  submitted	  for	  judgment	  with	  the	  littoral	  State.	  Jurisdiction	  was	  limited	  to	  the	  State	  of	  the	  ship	  carrying	  out	  the	  capture,	  unless	  it	  was	  conducted	  under	  Art	  5	  or	  unless	  an	  international	  convention	  or	  domestic	  law	  decided	  differently,	  (Art	  7).	  	  Governments	  reviewed	  the	  draft	  articles	  and	  made	  submissions	  on	  them	  at	  some	  length.	  They	  were	  not	  however,	  included	  in	  the	  final	  conference.43	  	  The	  Harvard	  Draft	  Convention	  on	  Piracy,	  (HDC),44	  was	  created	  out	  of	  the	  desire	  of	  Harvard	   University	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   work	   being	   done	   by	   the	   League.45	  The	  result	  was	  19	  Articles	  that	  brought	  together	  the	  known	  work	  on	  piracy	  at	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	  level.	  The	  19	  articles	  produced	  covered	  a	  wide	  range	  of	   subject	   areas	   related	   to	   piracy	   including	   a	   definitional	   article,	   Art	   1	   and	   an	  extensive	  definition	  of	  piracy	  under	  Art	  3,46	  	  
‘Article	  3	  Piracy	  is	  any	  of	  the	  following	  acts,	  committed	  in	  a	  place	  not	  within	  the	  territorial	  jurisdiction	  of	  any	  state:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  League	  of	  Nations	  Doc.	  C.254.1927.V.	  cited	  by	  Rubin	  above	  n	  26	  at	  p334	  n69.	  
44	  The	  Harvard	  Draft	  Convention	  on	  Piracy	  26	  A.J.I.L	  Supplement	  749	  (1932)	  
45	  Rubin	  above	  n	  26	  at	  p335	  
46	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  under	  this	  definition	  piracy	  can	  be	  committed	  from	  the	  sea	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  sea,	  which	  would	  imply	  that	  it	  could	  be	  committed	  on	  land.	  This	  implication	  is	  supported	  by	  Art	  4(1),	  which	  indicates	  that	  piracy	  may	  be	  committed	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  a	  state	  by	  descent	  from	  the	  high	  seas.	  There	  is	  no	  clear	  indication	  in	  the	  draft	  convention	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  ‘territory’	  referred	  to	  was	  the	  complete	  territory	  including	  the	  land	  mass	  as	  well	  as	  territorial	  sea	  or	  just	  the	  territorial	  waters.	  This	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  pirates	  of	  old	  who	  descended	  from	  their	  ships	  to	  raid	  ashore	  for	  provisions	  and	  property	  than	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  as	  existed	  at	  the	  time	  the	  draft	  convention	  was	  written.	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Any	  Act	  of	  violence	  or	  of	  depredation	  committed	  with	  intent	  to	  rob,	  rape,	  wound,	  enslave,	  imprison	  or	  kill	  a	  person	  or	  with	  intent	  to	  steal	  or	  destroy	  property	  for	  private	   ends	  without	   bona	   fide	   purpose	   of	   asserting	   a	   claim	  of	   right,	   provided	  that	   the	   act	   is	   connected	   with	   an	   attack	   which	   starts	   from	   on	   board	   ship	   or	  another	   ship	  which	   is	   involved	  must	   be	   a	   pirate	   ship	   or	   ship	  without	   national	  character.	  Any	  act	  of	  voluntary	  participation	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  ship	  with	  knowledge	  of	  the	  facts	  which	  make	  it	  a	  pirate	  ship.	  Any	   act	   of	   instigation	   or	   of	   intentional	   facilitation	   of	   an	   act	   described	   in	  paragraph	  1	  or	  paragraph	  2	  of	  this	  article.’	  	  	  The	  ILC	  contributed	  to	  the	  codification	  of	  piracy	  through	  their	  work	  on	  the	  law	  of	  the	  sea	  in	  1950s,	  as	  requested	  by	  the	  UNGA.	  The	  final	  report	  was	  produced	  on	  the	  1	  March	  1954.47	  This	  draft	  law	  of	  the	  sea	  included	  six	  articles	  on	  piracy,	  which	  were	   in	   essence,	   the	  French	   translations	  of	  Arts	  3,	   4(1),	   5,	   6	  10,	   and	  12	  of	   the	  HDC.48	  The	  Convention	  on	   the	  High	  Seas	  of	  April	  29	  1958	  was	   the	   first	   codification	  of	  piracy.	   The	   terms	   ‘rape’,	   ‘enslave’,	   ‘wound’,	   ‘imprison’	   or	   ‘kill’	   were	   removed	  from	  the	  definition	  of	  piracy	  created	  by	  the	  HDC.	  This,	  now	  altered	  draft	  Art	  1,	  became	  Art	  15	  of	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  High	  Seas.	  The	  remaining	  articles	  from	  the	  draft	  convention	  filled	  Arts	  14	  and	  16	  -­‐21	  of	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  HS.49	  	  	  	  	  Rubin	   asserts	   however	   that	   this	   process	   is	   not	   the	   codification	   of	   the	   law	   of	  piracy	  as	  the	  HDC	  included	  a	  view	  of	  how	  the	  law	  of	  piracy	  should	  be,	  so	  was	  in	  essence	   de	   lege	   ferenda.50	  In	   the	   literature	   to	   date	   there	   has	   seems	   to	   be	   no	  further	   discussion	   of	   this	   point.	   Although	   the	   commissioners	   charged	  with	   the	  task	   of	   creating	   the	   Convention	   on	   the	   HS	   did	   not	   give	   any	   thought	   to	   this	  proposition	  accepting	  instead	  that	  their	  task	  was	  to	  codify	  the	  existing	  law.51	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  YBILC	  6th	  Session	  1954,	  A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/	  Add.1	  p7	  UN	  Doc.	  A/CN.4/79.	  
48	  Rubin,	  above	  n	  26	  at	  p349.	  	  
49	  The	  Convention	  on	  the	  High	  Seas,	  29	  April	  1958	  450	  U.N.T.S.	  11	  entered	  into	  force	  30	  December	  1962.	  	  
50	  Rubin,	  above	  n	  26	  at	  p353.	  	  
51	  1	  YBILC,	  7th	  Session	  1955	  43	  cited	  by	  Rubin,	  above	  n	  26.	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articles	   on	   piracy	   adopted	   into	   the1958	   Convention	   on	   the	   High	   Seas	   were	  further	  adopted	   into	  the	  UNCLOS	   in	  1982	  as	  articles	  100	  -­‐107.	  Somalia	  ratified	  the	   UNCLOS	   as	   has	   been	   discussed	   at	   Chapter	   3;	   therefore,	   this	   definition	   is	  applicable	   to	  Somalia.	  As	   a	  party	   to	   the	  UNCLOS	   it	   is	   implied	   that	   Somalia	  will	  criminalise	   the	   act	   of	   piracy.	   Somalia,	   having	   been	   involved	   in	   civil	   war	   and	  unrest	   without	   an	   effective	   government	   for	   more	   than	   23	   years,	   has	   not	  criminalised	   this	   definition.52	  The	   UN	   has	   pressured	   Somalia	   to	   speed	   up	   the	  process	  of	  criminalisation.	  Other	  States	  have	  also	  been	  encouraged	  to	  criminalise	  piracy.53	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Legislative	  Decree	  No.	  5	  0f	  16	  December	  1962.Somalia	  
53	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  SC	  Res.	  2125	  S/RES/2125	  (2013)	  operative	  article	  4.	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20.1 Do	  the	  skiffs	  used	  by	  the	  Somali	  pirates	  qualify	  as	  ‘private	  ships’	  under	  
the	  UNCLOS	  There	  is	  no	  definition	  of	  ‘ship’	  under	  the	  UNCLOS.	  	  The	  SUA	  Convention54	  under	  Art	  1	  and	  Art	  2	  defines	  a	  ship	  as	  	  
‘…a	   vessel	   of	   any	   type	   whatsoever	   not	   permanently	   attached	   to	   the	   sea-­‐bed,	  including	  dynamically	  supported	  craft,	  submersibles,	  or	  any	  other	  floating	  craft.’	  	  The	  Harvard	  Draft	  Convention	  went	   to	   the	   trouble	  of	  defining	  a	   ship	  as	   ‘…any	  water	  craft	  or	  aircraft	  of	  whatever	  size.’55	  The	  Comment	  on	  draft	  Art	  1	  indicated	  that	   it	   was	   convenient	   to	   have	   a	   term	   that	   covered	   all	   the	   means	   of	  transportation	   by	   sea	   that	   could	   be	   used	   for	   piratical	   purposes.	   ‘Ship’	   was	  selected	   as	   the	   natural	  word	   as	   the	   term	  pirate	   is	   synonymously	   linked	   to	   the	  term	  ‘ship’	   in	  both	  history	  and	  fiction.56	  However	  this	  definition	  did	  not	  make	  it	  into	  the	  High	  Seas	  Convention	  of	  195857	  and	  consequently	  was	  not	  incorporated	  into	  the	  final	  version	  of	  UNCLOS.	  UNCLOS	  does	  however	  define	  a	  pirate	  ship	  as	  a,	  ‘Ship	   being	   intended	   by	   the	   persons	   in	   dominant	   control	   to	   be	   used	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  committing	  one	  of	  the	  acts	  in	  Art	  101.’	  	  This,	  however,	  still	  does	  not	  define	  a	  ship.	  Geiβ	  and	  Petrig	  suggest	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  specific	  requirement	  regarding	  the	  size	  of	  the	   offending	   ship	   is	   based	   more	   around	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   freedom	   of	  navigation	  on	  the	  HS	  found	  in	  Part	  VII,	  Art	  87(1)(a).	  Art	  90	  supports	  the	  right	  of	  navigation	   on	   the	   HS.	   Art	   (87)(1)(a)	   is	   only	   one	   of	   six	   articles	   regarding	  freedoms	  on	  the	  HS,	  albeit	  the	  first	  of	  those	  articles.	   	  They	  therefore	  argue	  that	  skiffs	   used	   by	   Somali	   pirates	   are	   capable	   of	   interfering	  with	   navigation	   on	   the	  high	  seas	  and	  thus	  could	  well	  be	  included	  in	  the	  description	  of	  a	  ship.58	  If	  the	  sole	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Convention	  for	  the	  Suppression	  of	  Unlawful	  Acts,	  above	  n	  4.	  
55	  Harvard	  Draft,	  above	  n	  44	  Art	  1(5).	  
56	  Report	  of	  the	  International	  Law	  Commission	  to	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  Seventh	  Session,	  Comment	  to	  Article	  1,	  2Y.B.	  Int’l	  L.Comm’n	  25	  (1955)	  at	  para	  5.	  
57	  League	  of	  Nations,	  above	  n	  43.	  	  
58	  Geiβ	  and	  Petrig,	  above	  n	  34	  at	  p62.	  
	   	   Chapter	  5	  
	   170	  
purpose	  of	  Part	  VII	  related	  to	  the	  freedom	  and	  right	  of	  navigation	  on	  the	  HS	  then	  this	   could	   be	   a	   valid	   argument.	   The	   aim	   of	   piracy	   from	   the	   earliest	   days	   was	  about	  the	  acquisition	  of	  property	  by	  force,	  not	  solely	  about	  freedom	  on	  the	  HS.59	  The	  ILC60	  report	  in	  discussing	  what	  type	  of	  vessel	  could	  commit	  piracy	  declared	  that	   merchant	   vessels	   only	   could	   commit	   piracy	   not	   warships.	   While	   it	   is	  accepted	  that	  the	  term	  merchant	  vessel	  is	  used	  to	  distinguish	  it	  from	  a	  warship,	  this	  would	  indicate	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  ILC	  was	  on	  vessels	  capable	  of	  carrying	  freight	  or	  commercial	  loads,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  smaller	  skiffs	  used	  by	  the	  Somali	  pirates.	  	  The	   International	  Convention	   for	   the	  Safety	  of	   Life	   at	   Sea,	   1974	   (SOLAS)	  has	   a	  variety	  of	  descriptions	  for	  a	  ship	  under	  Annex,	  Chapter	  1	  Part	  A	  Regulation	  1	  ‘(f)	  A	  passenger	  ship	  is	  a	  ship	  which	  carries	  more	  than	  twelve	  passengers.	  (g)	  A	  cargo	  ship	  is	  any	  ship	  which	  is	  not	  a	  passenger	  ship	  (h)	  A	   tanker	   is	   a	   cargo	   ship	   constructed	  or	   adapted	   for	   the	   carriage	   in	  bulk	  of	  liquid	  cargoes	  of	  an	  inflammable	  nature.	  (i)	  A	   fishing	  vessel	   is	  a	  vessel	  used	   for	  catching	   fish,	  whales,	  seals	  or	  walrus	  or	  other	  living	  resources	  of	  the	  sea.	  	  	  	  (j)	  A	  nuclear	  ship	  is	  a	  ship	  provided	  with	  a	  nuclear	  power	  plant.’	  61	  The	   first	   point	   to	   note	   is	   that	   these	   definitions	   apply	   to	   ‘ships	   engaged	   on	  international	   voyages’.62	  International	   voyages	   are	   described	   as	   those	   voyages	  that	  leave	  a	  port	  of	  a	  signatory	  to	  the	  convention	  and	  travel	  to	  a	  port	  outside	  that	  country	  or	  vice	  versa.63	  Two	  points	  here	  that	  would	  exclude	  this	  from	  applying	  to	  Somali	   pirates,	   Somalia	   is	   not	   a	   signatory	   to	   the	   convention.	   Secondly,	   there	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Rubin,	  above	  n	  26	  spends	  the	  first	  70	  pages	  of	  his	  work	  discussing	  the	  relationship	  between	  piracy	  and	  property,	  generally	  asserting	  that	  piracy	  as	  more	  to	  do	  with	  property	  and	  its	  ownership	  than	  any	  other	  central	  concept.	  At	  p71	  Rubin	  states	  that	  the	  Admiralty	  courts	  used	  the	  term	  ‘piracy’	  when	  disposing	  of	  claims	  to	  title	  by	  privateers	  who	  were	  seeking	  ownership	  of	  goods	  recaptured	  from	  foreign	  sovereign	  ships.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Report	  of	  the	  International	  Law	  Commission,	  above	  n	  56	  at	  para	  3.	  
61	  The	  International	  Convention	  for	  the	  Safety	  of	  Life	  at	  Sea	  1974	  UNTS	  Vol	  1184,	  I-­‐18961	  entered	  into	  force	  25	  May	  1980.	  	  	  
62	  SOLAS	  above	  n	  61	  Annex,	  Chapter	  1	  Reg.	  1(a).	  
63	  SOLAS	  above	  n	  61	  Annex,	  Chapter	  1	  Reg.	  1(d).	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would	  be	  difficulty	  in	  making	  the	  case	  that	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  pirates	  is	  to	  travel	  to	   another	   port	   outside	   their	   country	   when	   the	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   the	  pirates	   return	   to	   Somalia	   and	  hold	   captured	  vessels	   there.64	  The	  definition	  of	   a	  ‘fishing	  vessel’	  does	  not	  describe	  a	  ‘ship’	  but	  a	  ‘vessel’	  and	  the	  definition	  of	  piracy	  relates	  to	  ‘ships’.	  While	  SOLAS	  is	  designed	  to	  set	  standards	  for	  particular	  types	  of	  vessels	  and	  not	  to	  create	  an	  international	  definition	  of	  ‘ships’	  it	  does	  assist	  with	  attaining	  a	  view	  point	  on	  how	  ‘ships’	  are	  viewed	  at	  international	  law.	  This	   leaves	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   skiffs65	  used	   by	   the	   Somali	   pirates	   do	   not	  come	   under	   the	   classification	   of	   a	   ‘private	   ship’.66	  This	   does	   not	   exclude	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  J	  Ashley	  Roach	  Piracy	  Off	  Somalia,	  the	  Challenges	  for	  International	  Law,	  103d	  Annual	  Meeting	  of	  the	  American	  Society	  of	  International	  Law	  (26	  Mar	  2009),	  at	  p75,	  that	  indicates	  that	  hijacked	  ships	  are	  moored	  along	  the	  Somali	  coast.	  	  
65	  	  A	  ship	  is	  defined	  in	  the	  Webster	  Universal	  Dictionary	  65	  1968	  as,	  ‘Any	  large	  vessel	  used	  for	  navigating	  the	  sea,	  propelled	  by	  sails,	  steam,	  or	  other	  mechanical	  means.’	  This	  would	  seem	  to	  discount	  the	  skiffs	  utilized	  by	  the	  Somali	  pirates	  as	  being	  described	  as	  private	  ships	  as	  their	  vessels,	  in	  the	  same	  publication,	  are	  described	  as,	  	  ‘A	  light	  rowing	  or	  sculling	  boat,	  usually	  for	  a	  single	  rower	  or	  sculler.’	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  a	  dictionary	  has	  no	  place	  as	  a	  source	  of	  international	  law	  as	  sources	  are	  well	  covered	  by	  Art	  38(1)	  of	  the	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  as	  being	  international	  conventions,	  international	  custom,	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  law	  recognized	  by	  civilized	  nations	  and	  lastly	  judicial	  decisions	  and	  the	  teachings	  of	  highly	  qualified	  publicists.	  However,	  that	  would	  depend	  on	  whether	  you	  argued	  that	  piracy	  exists	  or	  not	  at	  international	  law.	  	  There	  is	  debate	  as	  to	  whether	  piracy	  is	  in	  fact	  an	  international	  crime.	  The	  drafters	  of	  the	  Harvard	  Draft	  convention	  felt,	  	  ‘…as	  there	  was	  no	  international	  agency	  to	  capture	  and	  no	  international	  tribunal	  to	  punish	  them,	  it	  could	  not	  be	  said	  that	  piracy	  was	  an	  offence	  by	  the	  law	  of	  nations.’	  Harvard	  Draft	  above	  n44	  at	  p756.	  	  This	  was	  the	  orthodox	  view.	  The	  unorthodox	  view	  held	  that	  there	  is	  an	  international	  law,	  but	  the	  international	  community	  left	  it	  to	  states	  to	  punish	  offenders.	  Harvard	  Draft	  above	  n23	  at	  p752.	  Guilfoyle	  argues	  that	  piracy	  has	  always	  been	  an	  international	  crime	  enforced	  by	  national	  laws.	  He	  supports	  his	  argument	  by	  suggesting	  that	  UNCLOS	  is	  a	  narrower	  definition	  of	  piracy	  than	  customary	  international	  law	  and	  since	  the	  law	  of	  piracy	  has	  been	  codified	  under	  UNCLOS	  this	  overrides	  customary	  international	  law.	  (Treaty	  Jurisdiction	  over	  Pirates:	  A	  Compilation	  of	  Legal	  texts	  with	  Introductory	  Notes	  Prepared	  for	  the	  3rd	  Meeting	  of	  Working	  Group	  2	  on	  Legal	  Issues,	  The	  Contact	  Group	  on	  Piracy	  off	  the	  Coast	  of	  Somalia	  Copenhagen,	  26-­‐27	  August	  2009.)	  Brownlie	  would	  argue	  that	  	  ‘even	  where	  a	  treaty	  rule	  comes	  into	  being	  covering	  the	  same	  ground	  as	  a	  customary	  rule,	  the	  latter	  will	  not	  be	  simply	  absorbed	  within	  the	  former	  but	  will	  maintain	  its	  separate	  existence.’	  Brownlie,	  above	  chapter	  2	  n60	  at	  p	  96	  citing	  the	  Nicaragua	  case	  as	  support.	  (ICJ	  Reports,	  1986,	  p14).	  will	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‘mother	  ships’	  used	  by	   the	  pirates	  as	  being	  classified	  as	  pirate	  ships	  or	  private	  ships.	  Pirates	  on	  board	  skiffs	  have	  conducted	  the	  attacks	  on	  merchant	  ships	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somali.67	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  court	  in	  United	  States	  v	  Said	  No	  10-­‐4970	  (4th	  Cir.	  Argued	  Mar	  25,	  2011)	  above	  examined	  this	  question	  at	  some	  length	  as	  the	  defence	  was	  arguing	  that	  the	  ‘law	  of	  nations’	  found	  under	  Title	  18	  U.S.C.§1651	  did	  not	  apply	  in	  the	  current	  day.	  Judge	  Raymond	  Jackson	  at	  p563	  –	  566	  carries	  out	  a	  comprehensive	  examination	  of	  the	  current	  scholarly	  works	  related	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  piracy.	  His	  finding	  at	  note	  14	  pg	  566	  is’	  
	   ‘Additionally	  there	  is	  no	  single	  court	  that	  can	  bring	  order	  to	  various	  interpretations	  of	  the	  UNCLOS.	  Rather,	  enforcement	  actions	  against	  pirates	  and	  criminal	  prosecutions	  of	  pirates	  are	  left	  to	  individual	  countries,	  many	  of	  which	  have	  different	  penalties	  for	  the	  crime	  of	  piracy	  ranging	  from	  three	  years	  to	  life	  in	  prison.	  As	  one	  scholar	  notes,	  (Joshua	  Goodwin	  “Universal	  Jurisdiction	  and	  The	  Pirate:	  Time	  for	  an	  Odd	  Couple	  to	  Part”	  2006	  39	  Vand.	  J.	  Transnat'l	  L.	  973	  at	  p1000),	  “to	  claim	  there	  is	  a	  common	  definition	  may	  be	  correct	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  a	  definition	  of	  piracy	  in	  the	  UNCLOS,	  but	  the	  interpretation	  of	  that	  definition	  can	  potentially	  vary	  greatly	  between	  states.’	  
	  
66	  Tullio	  Treves	  “Piracy,	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea,	  and	  the	  Use	  of	  Force:	  Developments	  off	  the	  Coast	  of	  Somalia”	  2009	  20(2)	  E.	  J.	  I.L.	  at	  p402.	  
67	  Milena	  Sterio	  “Fighting	  Piracy:	  why	  more	  is	  needed”	  2009-­‐2010	  33	  Fordham	  Int'l	  L.	  J.	  37;	  at	  p383.	  International	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  International	  Maritime	  Bureau	  Piracy	  and	  Armed	  Robbery	  Against	  Ships	  Annual	  Report	  (2009)	  at	  p3.	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20.2 Is	  there	  a	  difference	  between	  private	  and	  public	  ends?	  There	   has	   been	   discussion	   of	   the	   private	   ends	   requirement	   over	   a	   significant	  number	  of	  articles.68	  There	  are	  two	  schools	  of	  thought	  on	  the	  subject.	  One	  is	  that	  the	  private	  ends	  distinguishes	   it	   from	  public	  ends	  or	  governmental	  action,69	  the	  other	   is	  aimed	  at	  political	  ends70	  in	   the	  case	  of	   terrorist	   type	  groups.71	  Terrorist	  acts,	  which	  have	  as	  their	  basis	  the	  intent	  to	  coerce	  a	  government	  or	  to	  terrorize	  a	  population	  and	  are	   in	   intent	  and	  motivation,	  political.	  72	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  the	   inclusion	   of	   the	   phrase	   ‘for	   private	   ends’	   (Art	   101a)	   was	   to	   separate	   the	  actions	  of	  pirates	  from	  civil	  war	  insurgents.73	  	  The	   actions	   of	   the	   Sea	   Shepherd	   vessels	   in	   Cetaceans	   v.	   Sea	   Shepherds	   were	  categorized	   as	   piratical	   as	   they	   lacked	   the	  necessary	  political	   intent	   to	   exempt	  them	   from	   the	   definition	   of	   piracy.	  74	  The	   court	   viewed	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   Sea	  
Shepherd	   as	   private	   ends	   in	   that	   they	   encompassed	   ‘personal,	   moral	   or	  philosophical	   grounds’	   and	   not	   political	   motivation.75	  The	   Sea	   Shepherd	   ships	  were	   conducting	   operations	   in	   the	   Southern	   Ocean	   aimed	   at	   stopping	   the	  Japanese	   government	   from	   conducting	   whale	   hunts	   that	   were	   supposedly	  scientific	   whale	   research,	   (since	   refuted	   by	   ICJ76).	   The	   actions	   of	   these	   ships	  included	   crashing	   into	   whaling	   ships	   and	   general	   harassment	   by	   smaller	  inflatable	  craft.	  These	  actions	  forced	  changes	  in	  direction	  on	  the	  whaling	  ships	  as	  well	  as	  slowing	  their	  progress.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  D	  Doby	  “Whale	  Wars:	  How	  to	  End	  the	  Violence	  on	  the	  High	  Seas”	  2013	  44(2)	  Journal	  of	  Maritime	  Law	  and	  Commerce	  at	  p145	  fn59	  covers	  a	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  opinion	  as	  to	  what	  constitutes	  ‘private	  ends’	  and	  ‘public	  ends’.	  
69	  Sterio,	  above	  n	  67	  at	  p467	  	  
70	  J	  Peppetti	  “Building	  the	  Global	  Maritime	  Security	  Network:	  A	  Multinational	  Legal	  Structure	  to	  combat	  Transnational	  Threats”	  2008	  55(73)	  Naval	  Law	  Rev	  9;	  at	  p92.	  
71	  Sterio,	  above	  n	  67	  at	  p467.	  
72	  U.S.C.	  §	  2331	  (I)(A)-­‐(B)(iii)	  (2003)	  cited	  by	  Nicole	  	  Stilwell	  “Robbers	  or	  Robinhoods?:	  A	  Study	  of	  the	  Somali	  Piracy	  Crisis	  and	  a	  Call	  to	  Develop	  an	  International	  Framework	  to	  Combat	  Maritime	  Terrorism”	  2009	  7	  Loy.	  Mar.L.J.	  127	  at	  p128.	  
73	  Guilfoyle,	  above	  n	  35	  at	  p33.	  	  
74	  Inst.	  Of	  Cetacean	  Research	  v.	  Sea	  Shepherd	  Conservation	  Soc’y	  2013	  WL	  673712	  (9th	  Cir	  	  February	  25	  2013)	  	  
75	  At	  p5,	  paragraph	  1.	  
76	  Whaling	  in	  the	  Antarctic	  (Australia	  v	  Japan:	  New	  Zealand	  Intervening)	  Judgement	  of	  31	  March	  2014.	  p233	  paragraph	  67.	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The	  decision	  in	  Castle	  John	  v	  NV	  Mabeco	  held	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Greenpeace	  activists	   in	   stopping	   vessels	   from	  dumping	  pollution	  was	   piracy	   as	   the	   actions	  were	  described	  as	  private	  even	  though	  it	  related	  to	  an	  ostensibly	  political	  issue.77	  	  Kontorovich	  argued	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Sea	  Shepherd	  were	  private	  actions	  in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  the	  actions	  from	  a	  state	  sponsored	  or	  owned	  vessel.	  78	  Heller	  argued	  that	  the	  political	  motivation	  of	  the	  group,	  took	  them	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  piracy,	   as	   their	   intention	   was	   political.	  79	  However,	   it	   was	   agreed	   by	   the	   two	  scholars	   that	   their	  actions	  would	  meet	   the	  requirements	   for	   their	  actions	  to	  be	  criminalized	  as	  acts	  of	  violence	  at	  sea	  under	  the	  SUA	  Convention.80	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  instance	  of	  Somali	  pirates	  if	  the	  intention	  was	  to	  recover	  the	  money	  that	  was	  lost	  by	  individual	  fishermen,	  then	  the	  action	  is	  for	  their	  benefit.	  This	  makes	  it	  a	  private	  ends	  intention	  and	  not	  a	  public	  one.	  If	  the	  ships	  stopped	  were	  the	  ships	  that	  had	  been	  taking	  fish,	  allegedly	  illegally,	  and	  a	  ‘tax’	  was	  taken	  that	  was	  paid,	  to	  the	  government	  or	  the	  local	  licensing	  authority,	  for	  the	  fish	  that	  had	  been	  taken,	  then	  they	  would	  not	  be	  pirates.	  	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Somali	  fishermen,	  turned	  pirates,	  have	  used	  the	  contention	  that	  they	  are	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  government	  to	  protect	  their	  access	   to	   fishing	   grounds	   and	   to	   prevent	   hazardous	   waste	   dumping	   could	   be	  acting	  as	  privateers	  of	  old	  who	  carried	  letters	  of	  marque	  and	  reprisal	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	   government	   of	   the	   day	   to	   recover	   property	   taken	   by	   pirates	   or	   other	  privateers	   acting	   for	   foreign	   governments.	   Sovereigns,	   to	   fulfill	   a	   range	   of	  obligations,	  instituted	  the	  practice	  of	  privateering.	  The	  practice	  was	  designed	  to	  recover	  goods	  taken	  by	  other	  privateers	  who	  were	  acting	  for	  foreign	  sovereigns,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Castle	  John	  v	  NV	  Mabeco	  77	  ILR	  537	  (1986)	  	  
78	  Eugene	  Kontorovich	  “Yes,	  Sea	  Shepherd	  Engages	  in	  Piracy	  Under	  International	  Law”	  (2013)	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  
79	  Milena	  Sterio	  “The	  "Private	  Ends"	  Requirement	  of	  UNCLOS	  in	  the	  9th	  Circuit:	  Are	  Sea	  Shepherds	  Pirates?”	  (2013)	  United	  States	  of	  America	  
80	  SUA	  Convention,	  above	  n4,	  Art	  3(1)(c)	  which	  relates	  to	  causing	  damage	  to	  a	  ship	  which	  endangers	  safe	  navigation	  of	  that	  ship,	  or	  Art	  3(3)	  which	  relates	  to	  threats	  to	  juridical	  persons,	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  compelling	  that	  person	  to	  do	  or	  refrain	  from	  doing	  any	  act	  to	  commit	  offences	  set	  out	  in	  Art	  3(1)(b)(c)	  and	  (e).	  Although	  it	  is	  interesting	  that	  (d)	  is	  missed	  out	  as	  this	  relates	  to	  placing	  bombs	  or	  similar	  on	  a	  ship.	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but	  only	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	  goods	  seized,81	  to	  bolster	  naval	  forces	  in	  times	  of	  war	  without	   the	   expense	  of	  building	  naval	   vessels,	   and	   to	  disrupt	   the	   commerce	  of	  other	  states	  either	  during	  times	  of	  war	  or	  to	  improve	  the	  strength	  of	  commerce	  for	   themselves.	  82	  Issuing	   letters	  of	  marque	  ceased	  with	   the	  Declaration	  of	  Paris	  (1856)	  that	  banned	  the	  concept.	  83	  However	  like	  all	  treaties,	   it	   is	  only	  applicable	  to	  those	  who	  signed	  it	  and	  the	  US	  declined	  to	  sign	  it	  and	  Somalia	  did	  not	  exist	  at	  law	   at	   the	   time	   so	   could	   not	   be	   bound	   by	   it.	   It	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   the	  Declaration	  has	  become	  CIL,	  however	  countries	  that	  were	  signatories	  to	  it	  have	  continued	  issuing	  letters	  of	  marque	  to	  privateers.84	  Somali	   pirates	   might	   justified	   in	   their	   actions	   against	   IUU	   fishing	   vessels	   and	  vessels	   dumping	   hazardous	  waste.	   It	  would	   be	   difficult	   for	   them	   to	   claim	   they	  were	  operating	  under	  a	  letter	  of	  marque	  as	  there	  is	  no	  functioning	  government	  to	  issue	  the	  letters	  or	  licence	  and	  certainly,	  while	  there	  maybe	  some	  justification	  for	  attempting	  to	  retrieve	  goods,	  in	  this	  case	  illegal	  fish	  catch,	  they	  would	  be	  hard	  pressed	  to	  justify	  their	  actions	  in	  taking	  large	  commercial	  vessels	  for	  ransom	  to	  cover	   their	   loss.	   It	  would	  require	   the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Somali	   ‘prize’	   court	   to	  adjudicate	  the	  value	  of	  the	  goods	  seized	  and	  some	  form	  of	  evidentiary	  proof	  that	  the	  pirates/fishermen	  had	  fish	  catch	  to	  the	  value	  claimed.	  	  	  Bellish	  argues	   the	  case	  of	  Somali	  pirates	  who	  have	  declared	   their	   intentions	   in	  boarding	   vessels	   as	   political	   ends	   to	   stop	   illegal	   fishing	   and	   hazardous	   waste	  dumping.85	  To	   qualify	   as	   political	   ends	   the	   Somali	   pirates	   would	   need	   to	   be	  seeking	   to	   use	   their	   actions	   to	   change	   the	   government	   or	   for	   some	   other	   very	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Rubin,	  above	  n	  26	  at	  p47.	  
82	  Alexandra	  Schwartz	  “Corsairs	  in	  the	  Crosshairs:	  A	  Strategic	  Plan	  to	  Eliminate	  Modern	  Day	  Piracy”	  2010	  5	  5	  N.Y.U.J.L	  &	  Liberty	  500	  at	  p	  510.	  
83	  1856	  Paris	  Declaration,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  139,	  signatories	  included	  Austria,	  Hungary,	  France,	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  Prussia,	  Russia,	  Sardinia.	  	  
84	  Schwartz,	  above	  n	  82	  at	  p512	  who	  cites	  Spain	  and	  England	  as	  two	  countries	  who	  continued	  issuing	  letters	  of	  marque	  as	  late	  as	  the	  end	  of	  WWII.	  Todd	  Hutchins	  “Structuring	  a	  Sustainable	  Letters	  of	  Marque	  Regime:	  How	  Commissioning	  Privateers	  can	  Defeat	  the	  Somali	  Pirates”	  2011	  99(3)	  C.L.R.	  81;	  at	  p857	  claims	  that	  the	  use	  of	  letters	  of	  marque	  by	  France	  and	  Britain	  during	  the	  American	  Civil	  War	  showed	  that	  these	  states	  did	  not	  believe	  the	  Declaration	  had	  created	  CIL.	  
85	  Jon	  Bellish	  “More	  Great	  Piracy	  Facts	  in	  U.S.	  Courts:	  Private	  Ends	  Edition”	  (2013)	  Oxford.	  This	  categorization	  would	  bring	  the	  Somali	  pirates	  under	  the	  SUA	  convention	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  would	  limit,	  first	  the	  parties	  able	  to	  detain	  them,	  signatories	  to	  the	  convention	  only,	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  universal	  jurisdiction	  applicable	  to	  detain	  them.	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similar	  political	  ends.	  That	  they	  disagree	  with	  foreign	  fishing	  vessels	  taking	  their	  fish	  without	  licenses	  does	  not	  qualify	  their	  actions	  as	  political.	  Gardner	  argues	  that	  the	  distinction	  should	  not	  be	  between	  ‘private’	  and	  ‘political’	  but	  private	  and	  ‘public’	  which	  would	  prevent	  the	  concoction	  of	  perhaps	  spurious	  claims	  that	  actions	  are	  based	  on	  political	  motives.86	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Maggie	  Gardner	  “Piracy	  Prosecutions	  in	  National	  Courts”	  2010	  10	  J.	  I.	  C.	  J.	  797	  at	  p812.	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20.3 Why	  should	  piracy	  be	  a	  crime?	  For	   a	   behaviour	   to	   be	   criminalised	   it	  must	  meet	   two	  main	   criteria;	   it	  must	   be	  sufficiently	  serious	  to	  warrant	  intervention	  by	  the	  state	  and	  secondly	  it	  must	  be	  shown	   that	   criminal	   law	  offers	   the	  best	  method	  of	   regulation.87	  Feinberg	  offers	  four	  possible	  grounds	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  crime,	  harm	  to	   others,	   offence	   to	   others,	   immorality	   and	   harm	   to	   self.88	  It	   is	   suggested	   that	  piracy	  falls	  under	  the	  first	  of	  these	  four	  headings,	  harm	  to	  others.	  	  The	  principle	  that	  supports	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  state	  in	  cases	  where	  harm	  to	  others	   is	   the	   justification	   is	   based	   on	   the	   philosophy	   of	   John	   Stuart	   Mill.	   This	  states,	  
‘That	   principle	   is	   that	   the	   sole	   end	   for	   which	   mankind	   are	   warranted,	  individually	  or	  collectively,	  in	  interfering	  with	  the	  liberty	  of	  action	  of	  any	  of	  their	  number	   is	   self	   protection.	   That	   the	   only	   purpose	   for	   which	   power	   can	   be	  rightfully	  exercised	  over	  any	  member	  of	  a	  civilised	  community,	  against	  his	  will,	  is	  to	  prevent	  harm	  to	  others.’	  89	  From	  a	  Somali	  perspective	  the	  criminalisation	  of	  piracy	  is	  a	  legal	  extension	  of	  the	  moral	   law	   of	   Islam.	   While	   it	   is	   not	   expressly	   stated	   it	   is	   implied	   in	   both	   the	  verses,	  “…and	  you	  should	  forgive	  and	  overlook:	  Do	  you	  not	  like	  God	  to	  forgive	  you?	  And	  Allah	  is	  the	  Merciful	  Forgiving.”	  90	  	  “Woe	   to	   those…who,	   when	   they	   have	   to	   receive	   by	   measure	   from	   men,	   they	  demand	  the	  exact	  full	  measure,	  but	  when	  they	  have	  to	  give	  by	  measure	  or	  weight	  to	  men,	  give	  less	  than	  due.”91	  Also	  explicitly	  stated	  in	  the	  hadith,	  the	  sayings	  of	  Muhammed,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  A.	  Simester	  and	  W.	  Brookbanks	  Principles	  of	  Criminal	  Law	  (3rd	  ed,	  Brookers,	  Wellington,	  2007)	  at	  p720.	  
88	  J	  Feinberg	  The	  Moral	  Limits	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  1984	  -­‐	  1988)	  cited	  by	  Simester	  A	  P.,	  and	  Brookbanks	  W.J.,	  above	  n87	  at	  p720.	  
89	  John	  Stuart	  Mill	  On	  Liberty	  (Penguin,	  London,	  1985),	  at	  p68.	  
90	  Qur’an	  (Surah	  24,	  “The	  Light”	  v.22)	  
91	  Qur’an	  (Surah	  83,	  “The	  Dealers	  in	  Fraud,	  “	  vv.	  1-­‐4)	  
	   	   Chapter	  5	  
	   178	  
“As	   you	  would	   have	  people	   do	   to	   you,	   do	   to	   them;	   and	  what	   you	  dislike	   to	   be	  done	  to	  you,	  don’t	  do	  to	  them.”92	  Which	  could	  well	  be	  summed	  up	  as	  ‘do	  no	  harm.’	  It	   would	   seem	   that	   there	   is	   sufficient	   harm	   occurring	   to	   justify	   the	  criminalisation	   of	   piracy	   by	   states	   as	   part	   of	   their	   domestic	   law.	   The	   problem	  arises	  when	   that	   crime	  meets	   Rule	   of	   Law	   Constraints.93	  These	   constraints	   are	  that	   there	   should	   be	   no	   conviction	   without	   criminalization,	   no	   retrospective	  criminalization,	  fair	  warning	  and	  fair	  labelling.94	  	  Andreas	   and	   Nadelmann	   would	   argue	   that	   piracy	   is	   criminalized	   through	   the	  process	   of	   global	   prohibition.95	  The	   process	   of	   global	   criminalization	   has	   five	  stages,	   the	   legitimate	   use	   of	   the	   activity,	   the	   redefinition	   of	   the	   activity	   as	   a	  problem	  and	  an	  evil,	  the	  activation	  for	  the	  suppression	  and	  criminalization	  of	  the	  activity,	   the	   criminalization	  of	   the	   activity	   through	   conventions	   and	   the	   role	  of	  institutions	   on	   a	   global	   scale.	   Piracy	   has	   been	   through	   all	   of	   these	   phases,	  especially	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   Barbary	   Coast	   corsairs.	   While	   the	   practice	   of	  privateering	  and	  piracy	  were	   legitimated	  by	  the	  strong	  European	  powers	  there	  wasn’t	  a	  problem.	  Piracy	  became	  a	  problem	  when	  commerce	  was	  interrupted	  in	  a	   way	   that	   negatively	   affected	   those	   strong	   powers.96	  The	   expansion	   of	   the	  British	  navy	   to	   protect	   the	   far-­‐flung	   reaches	   of	   the	  British	  Empire	   increased	   it	  ability	   to	   reinforce	   the	   view	   that	   piracy	  was	  no	   longer	   considered	   a	   legitimate	  activity.97	  This	  British	  view	  was	  exported	  to	  its	  colonies	  and	  neighbouring	  States	  as	   increasing	   order	   came	   to	   international	   relations.98	  This	   gradually	   led	   to	   an	  international	  consensus	  that	  piracy	  was	  an	  affront	  to	  good	  order	  on	  the	  high	  seas	  and	   the	   outlawing	   of	   the	   activity.	   That	   piracy	  was	   not	   codified	   until	   the	   1958	  Convention	  on	   the	  High	  Seas	  possibly	  reflects	   the	  view	  that	   there	  was	  no	  need	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  Kitab	  al	  Kafi	  vol.2	  p146.	  
93	  Simester	  and	  Brookbanks,	  above	  n	  87	  at	  p735.	  	  
94	  At	  pp24–30.	  
95	  Peter	  Andreas	  and	  Ethan	  Nadelmann	  Policing	  the	  Globe:	  Criminalization	  and	  Crime	  Control	  in	  International	  Relations	  (Oxford	  University	  Press.,	  New	  York,	  2006)	  at	  p22.	  	  
96	  Andreas	  and	  Nadelmann,	  above	  n	  95	  at	  p	  23.	  
97	  At	  p23.	  
98	  At	  p25.	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for	  a	  convention	  as	  the	  activity	  was	  held	  to	  be	  universally	  abhorrent	  or	  the	  crime	  had	  fallen	  into	  disuse.	  That	   this	   can	  be	   claimed	   is	  possibly	  due	   the	   spread	  of	   colonisation	   throughout	  the	  world	  as	  part	  of	  the	  British	  Empire	  and	  the	  empires	  of	  other	  European	  States.	  It	  was	  the	  view	  of	  the	  mother	  countries	  that	  piracy	  was	  an	  international	  wrong	  and	  needed	  to	  be	  prohibited	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  safe	  transport	  of	  resources	  from	  the	  colonies	  back	  to	  their	  mother	  countries.	  This	  created	  some	  confusion	  as	  to	  what	  exactly	   piracy	   was.99	  By	   the	   time	   of	   the	   1960s	   when	   colonies	   were	   gaining	  independence	   the	   colonial	   powers	   had	   already	   established	   the	   international	  rules	  and	  the	   freshly	   independent	  States	  were	   left	  with	  no	  say	  as	   to	  how	  those	  rules	  would	  be	  framed.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  therefore	  that	  piracy	  was	  only	  a	  crime	  as	  far	  as	  the	  limited	  international	  community	  of	  colonisers	  went	  and	  not	  the	  rest	  of	   the	   world	   who	   ratified	   pre	   existing	   conventions	   that	   criminalised	   the	  behaviour.	  Obokata	   shuns	   the	   criminal	   approach	   by	   viewing	   piracy	   from	   a	   human	   rights	  perspective.100	  He	   takes	   a	   victim	   centred	   approach	   and	   argues	   that	   there	   is	  ground	  for	  States	  to	  pursue	  the	  pirates	  based	  on	  their	  violation	  of	  international	  human	   rights	   norms.	   He	   supports	   his	   argument	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   the	   Human	  Rights	  Committee	  has	   argued	   that	   States	  have	  a	   responsibility	   to	  pursue	   those	  private	   persons	   who	   would	   restrict	   the	   enjoyment	   of	   rights	   between	   private	  persons	   and	   to	   take	   appropriate	  measures	   to	   prevent,	   investigate	   and	   redress	  the	  harm	  or	  punish	  those	  responsible.101	  While	  this	  approach	  is	  laudable,	  it	  is	  not	  feasible	  when	  the	  current	  situation	  in	  Somalia	  is	  taken	  into	  account.	  The	  lack	  of	  functioning	   government	   and	   investigatory	   processes	  would	  make	   it	   difficult	   to	  track	  and	  bring	  to	  justice	  the	  offending	  pirates.	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  Guilfoyle,	  above	  n	  35	  at	  p29	  fn13	  citing	  various	  sources	  including	  Oppenheim,	  HDC	  and	  Rubin	  as	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  animo	  furandi	  as	  an	  element	  of	  piracy.	  
100	  T	  Obokata	  “Maritime	  Piracy	  as	  a	  Violation	  of	  Human	  Rights:	  A	  Way	  Forward	  for	  its	  Effective	  Prevention	  and	  Suppression”	  2012	  International	  Journal	  of	  Human	  Rights	  
101	  Obokata,	  above	  n	  100	  at	  p8	  citing	  General	  Comment	  No	  31	  (The	  Nature	  of	  the	  General	  legal	  Obligations	  Imposed	  on	  States	  Parties	  to	  the	  Covenant)(2004),	  CCPR/C/21	  Rev.1/Add	  13,	  para.	  8.	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20.4 What	  empowers	  the	  International	  Community	  to	  respond?	  There	   are	   two	   possible	   answers	   to	   this	   question.	   The	   United	   Nations	   Security	  Council	   has	   declared	   the	   situation	   in	   Somalia	   a	   threat	   to	   regional	   peace	   and	  security.	   In	  a	   range	  of	   Security	  Council	  Resolutions	   the	  UN	  has	  urged	  States	   to	  cooperate	   in	   a	   ‘comprehensive	   response	   to	   repress	   piracy.’102	  This	   requirement	  to	  cooperate	  is	  also	  found	  in	  the	  UNCLOS	  Art	  100.	  The	  focus	  here	  is	  the	  direction	  to,	  
‘…cooperate	   to	   the	   fullest	   possible	   extent…	   on	   the	   high	   seas	   or	   in	   any	   other	  place	  outside	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  any	  State.’103	  	  There	  is	  no	  indication	  as	  to	  what	  the	  term	  ‘fullest	  possible	  extent’	  should	  entail.	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  this	  direction	  is	  so	  broad	  that	  any	  ‘measure’	  that	  could	  be	  taken	  by	  a	  State,	  should	  an	  opportunity	  arise,	  and	  the	  State	  fails	  to	  take	  that	  opportunity,	  is	  in	  breach	  of	  this	  article.	  104	  	  To	   answer	   this	   question	   it	   is	   important	   to	   look	   at	   the	   response	   of	   the	  International	   Community	   as	   a	   whole	   as	   exemplified	   through	   United	   Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolutions	  and	  draw	  a	  comparison	  between	  the	  levels	  of	  effort	  exerted.	  It	   is	   important	  to	  separate	  the	  incidents	  of	  piracy	  from	  the	  continuing	  situation	  in	   Somalia.	   The	   United	   Nations	   Security	   Council	   in	   it’s	   resolutions	   regarding	  Somalia	  states	  quite	  clearly	  that	  the	  action	  taken	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  relates	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Somalia	  as	  being	  the	  threat	  to	  peace	  and	  security	  in	  the	  region.	  That	  is,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  functioning	  government	  and	  the	  humanitarian	  situation	  coupled	  with	   the	  perpetuation	  of	   violence	  by	  armed	  militia	   groups	  and	   the	  attempts	  at	  disarming	   and	   demobilizing	   those	   groups. 105 	  The	   UNSC	   is	   addressing	   this	  situation	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  and	  not	  the	  incidents	  of	  piracy.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  UNSCR	  2125	  above	  n	  52	  Operative	  Article	  3	  as	  an	  example.	  
103	  UNCLOS	  Art	  100.	  
104	  Roger	  Middleton	  Pirates	  and	  How	  to	  Deal	  With	  Them.	  (Chatham	  House,	  London,	  2009)	  at	  p6.	  
105	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  SC	  Res.	  1801,	  S/RES/1801	  (2008)	  	  Preamble.	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UNSC	   Res	   1851(2008)	   invites	   States	   to	   embark	   law	   enforcement	   officials,	  (shipriders),	  to	  facilitate	  the	  investigation	  and	  prosecution	  of	  suspected	  pirates.	  
106	  It	   is	   to	   be	   noted	   here	   that	   this	   invitation	   is	   quite	   possibly	   ultra	   vires	   as	   it	  breaches	  the	  UNCLOS	  Art	  92(1)	  requirement	  for	  ships	  to	  sail	  under	  one	  flag	  only.	  Further	  discussion	  on	  this	  point	  is	  found	  under	  Shiprider	  agreements	  below.	  The	  real	  crux	  of	  this	  resolution	  is	  the	  willing	  breach	  of	  the	  sovereignty	  found	  under	  paragraph	   (6)	   in	  which	   authority	   is	   granted	   to	   take	   all	   necessary,	   appropriate	  measures	   ‘…in	   Somalia’	   to	   suppress	   piracy	   and	   armed	   robbery.	   This	   action	   is	  conditional	  on	  a	  request	  from	  the	  TFG	  to	  the	  SC	  so	  there	  is	  consent	  required	  and	  States	  are	  restricted	  from	  acting	  on	  their	  own.	  	  	  UNSCR	   1897	   (2009)	   in	   its	   preamble	   makes	   note	   of	   the	   actions	   of	   Kenya	   to	  prosecute	  suspected	  pirates.	  It	  also	  appears	  to	  support	  prosecution	  in	  one	  state	  and	  incarceration	  in	  another	  state	  for	  captured	  pirates.107	  It	  is	  quite	  apparent	  that	  such	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  statement	  allows	  for	  the	  possible	  breach	  of	  a	  vast	  number	  of	  international	  human	  rights,108	  see	  discussion	  below.	  This	  preambular	   statement	  is	   given	   operative	   authority	   under	   paragraph	   12.109	  Paragraph	   6	   is	   confused	  between	   a	  military	   action	   and	   a	   police	   action	   as	   it	   starts	  with	   a	   ‘fight’	   against	  piracy	   and	   then	   goes	   on	   to	   speak	   of	   	   ‘custody	   of	   pirates’,	   ‘law	   enforcement	  officials’	   and	   ‘investigation	   and	   prosecution	   of	   persons	   detained’.	   Paragraph	   7	  follows	   the	  precedent	   set	   in	  Paragraph	  6	  by	  using	   the	   term	   ‘fight’	   three	   times.	  This	  would	  suggest	  a	  more	  militaristic	  approach	  than	  a	  police	  action.	  Paragraph	  12	   seems	   to	   ignore	   any	   and	   all	   reference	   to	   the	   application	   of	   universal	  jurisdiction	  found	  in	  Art	  105	  of	  the	  UNCLOS	  that,	  regardless	  of	  scholarly	  debate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  SC	  Res.1851	  Chapter	  2	  n	  166.	  	  
107	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  S/RES/1897,	  preambular	  statement	  9,	  
	  ‘…to	  take	  steps	  to	  prosecute	  or	  incarcerate	  in	  a	  third	  state	  after	  prosecution	  elsewhere	  captured	  pirates	  consistent	  with	  applicable	  international	  human	  rights	  law.’	  
108	  See	  Is	  there	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  apparent	  difference	  in	  treatment	  of	  the	  pirates?	  	  Below	  3.7	  
109	  UNSCR	  1897	  paragraph	  12,	  ‘Calls	  upon	  all	  States,	  and	  in	  particular	  flag,	  port	  and	  coastal	  States,	  States	  of	  the	  nationality	  of	  the	  victims	  and	  perpetrators	  of	  piracy	  and	  armed	  robbery,	  and	  other	  States	  with	  relevant	  jurisdiction	  under	  international	  law	  and	  national	  legislation	  to	  cooperate	  in	  determining	  jurisdiction,	  and	  in	  the	  investigation	  and	  prosecution	  of	  persons	  responsible	  for	  acts	  or	  piracy	  and	  armed	  robbery	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia,	  consistent	  with	  applicable	  international	  law	  and	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  pirates	  handed	  over	  to	  judicial	  authorities	  are	  subject	  to	  a	  judicial	  process,	  and	  to	  render	  assistance	  by,	  among	  other	  actions,	  providing	  disposition	  and	  logistics	  assistance	  with	  respect	  to	  persons	  under	  their	  jurisdiction	  and	  control,	  	  such	  as	  victims	  and	  witnesses	  and	  persons	  detained	  	  as	  a	  result	  of	  operations	  conducted	  under	  this	  resolution.’	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to	   the	   contrary,	   confines	   the	   prosecution	   of	   pirates	   to	   the	   capturing	   State.110	  UNSCR	  1897	   seems	  on	   the	  one	  hand	   to	   condone	   the	   cooperation	  of	   a	   range	  of	  States	  to	  investigate	  and	  prosecute	  pirates	  and	  makes	  broad	  ranging	  statements	  regarding	  international	  law	  without	  being	  specific	  about	  who	  has	  jurisdiction,	  as	  under	  Art	  105	  the	  UNCLOS,	  leaving	  a	  gap	  for	  the	  type	  of	  arrangements	  instituted	  by	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US	  with	  Kenya.	  	  	  	  There	   is	   no	   mention	   of	   capture	   and	   release	   at	   all	   or	   condemnation	   of	   those	  States	  that	  have	  chosen	  not	  to	  prosecute	  pirates,	  and	  indeed	  from	  the	  wording	  it	  seems	   to	   indicate	   that	   all	   pirates	   responsible	   should	  be	  prosecuted.111	  The	  next	  sentence	   in	   the	   same	   article	   only	  mentions	   ‘all	   pirates	   handed	   over	   to	   judicial	  authorities.’	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  there	  is	  a	  gap	  where	  only	  a	  number	  of	  pirates	  are	  handed	   over	   to	   judicial	   authorities	  with	   no	  mention	   of	  what	   happens	   to	   those	  who	  are	  not	  handed	  over	  to	  judicial	  authority.	  If	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  was	   to	   bring	   to	   justice	   all	   the	   persons	   responsible	   then	   surely	   the	   covering	  statement	  must	  include	  words	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  ‘all	  persons	  responsible	  for	  acts	  of	  piracy	  are	  to	  be	  handed	  over	  to	  judicial	  authorities’.	  This	  would	  close	  the	  gap	  where	   it	   is	  possible	   that	  some	  pirates	  may	  not	  be	  handed	  over,	  and	   instead	  be	  dealt	  with	  outside	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  law.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  the	  term	  ‘all	  persons’	  would	   reinforce	   the	   view	   that	   it	   is	   not	   just	   the	  pirates	   seizing	   ships,	   but	   those	  providing	   finance	  and	  handling	   the	   logistics	  as	  well	   that	  need	   to	  be	  brought	   to	  justice.112	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  Sterio,	  above	  n	  67	  at	  p391.	  Jarret	  	  Berg	  “You're	  Are	  Gonna	  Need	  a	  Bigger	  Boat:	  The	  Erosion	  of	  Customary	  Piracy	  Suppression.”	  2009	  44	  New	  Eng.	  L.	  Rev.	  343	  at	  p391	  citing	  the	  Report	  of	  
the	  International	  Law	  Commission	  to	  the	  General	  Assembly	  11	  U.N.	  GAOR	  Supp.	  (No	  
9)	  U.N.	  Doc	  A/3159	  (1956)	  at	  283	  	  (1956)reprinted	  in	  [1956]	  2	  Y.B.	  Int'l	  L.	  Comm'n	  283,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/CN.4/97,	  Eugene	  Kontorovich	  “International	  Legal	  Responses	  to	  Piracy	  off	  the	  Coast	  of	  Somalia”	  (Insights,	  6	  February	  2009)	  <http://asil.org./insights090206.cfm>122.	  Geiβ	  and	  Petrig,	  above	  n	  34	  refer	  to	  several	  works	  when	  the	  notion	  of	  this	  limitation	  on	  universal	  jurisdiction	  is	  discussed	  at	  p148	  fn615. 
111	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1918,	  S/RES/1918	  (2010)	  rectifies	  this	  oversight	  in	  the	  preambular	  statement	  as	  well	  as	  operative	  paragraph	  1.	  
112	  Art	  101(c)	  includes	  those	  who	  facilitate	  the	  crime	  as	  being	  pirates.	  This	  would	  include	  the	  suppliers	  of	  food	  for	  the	  hostages	  as	  well	  as	  those	  laundering	  money	  so	  would	  create	  quite	  a	  wide	  web	  of	  prosecutions.	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The	  second	  answer	  is	  based	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  Universal	  Jurisdiction	  that	  is	  found	  in	  Art	  105	  of	   the	  UNCLOS.	  The	  opening	  sentence	  of	   this	  article	   is	   linked	   to	  Art	  110	  which	  provides	   a	   right	  of	   visit	   on	   the	  high	   seas	   to	  warships,	   (Art	  110(1)),	  military	  aircraft,	   (Art	  110(4)),	   and	   to	  any	  other	   ship	  or	  aircraft	   clearly	  marked	  and	  identifiable	  as	  being	  on	  government	  service,	  (Art	  110	  (5)).	  If	  there	  is	  going	  to	  be	  a	  seizure	  there	  must	  first	  of	  all	  be	  a	  bringing	  to	  stop	  of	  the	  target	  ship.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  area	  that	  these	  two	  articles	  are	  deficient.	  There	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  level	  of	  force	   that	  may	  be	  exerted	  by	   the	  warship	   in	  order	   to	  detain	   the	  suspect	  pirate	  ship.	  It	  must	  be	  remembered	  that	  the	  action	  of	  bringing	  a	  suspected	  pirate	  ship	  to	  a	   stop	   is	  a	  police	  action	  and	  not	  an	  action	  of	  war,	   therefore	   the	  use	  of	   force	  must	  be	  considered.113	  Middleton	  states	  that	  Art	  110	  provides	  the	  legal	  basis	  for	  the	  use	  of	  force	  for	  this	  purpose	  and	  that	  customary	  international	  law	  describes	  the	  acceptable	  amount	  of	  force.	  The	  M.V.	  Saiga	  No	  2	  judgement	  held	  that,	  
‘…	  within	   international	   law	   the	  use	  of	   force	  must	  be	  avoided	  as	   far	  as	  possible	  and	   where	   force	   is	   inevitable,	   it	   must	   not	   go	   beyond	   what	   is	   reasonable	   and	  necessary	   in	   the	   circumstances.	   Considerations	   of	   humanity	  must	   apply	   in	   the	  law	  of	  the	  sea,	  as	  they	  do	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  international	  law.’114	  	  Treves	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  an	  emerging	  trend	  that	  permits	  the	  use	  of	  force	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  ‘	  unavoidable,	  reasonable	  and	  necessary.’115	  It	  must	  be	  borne	  in	  mind	  that	   the	   ships	   being	   approached	   are	   only	   suspected	   of	   having	   committed	   the	  crime	  of	  piracy.	  It	  is	  safe	  to	  assume	  that	  hailing	  the	  ship	  by	  radio	  and	  the	  use	  of	  loud	  hailer	  would	  be	  acceptable.116	  Priddy	  and	  Casey-­‐Maslen117	  argue	  that	  the	  use	  of	  force	  does	  not	  include	  warning	  shots	  across	  the	  bow	  of	  a	  ship	  to	  warn	  it	  off	  as	  the	  ruling	  in	  the	  MV	  Saiga	  held	  that	  warning	  shots	  were	  not	  a	  use	  of	  force	  against	  a	   person.	  118	  	   The	  most	   informative	   report	   that	   we	   have	   regarding	   this	   type	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  Middleton	  above	  n	  104	  at	  pp2-­‐3.	  
114	  M/V	  Saiga,	  Chapter	  3	  n	  61	  para.	  155.	  This	  decision	  was	  built	  on	  two	  previous	  cases	  the	  S.S.	  I'm	  
Alone	  (Canada/United	  States)	  U.N.R.I.A.A.	  Vol	  III	  at	  p1609	  and	  the	  Red	  Crusader	  (Commission	  of	  
Enquiry),	  (Denmark-­‐United	  States)	  I.L.R.	  Vol.	  35	  	  p.485.	  
115	  Treves,	  above	  n	  66	  at	  p414	  	  	  
116	  At	  p414	  	  
117	  	  Alice	  Priddy	  and	  Stuart	  Casey-­‐Maslen	  “Counter	  Piracy	  Operations	  by	  Private	  Maritime	  Security	  Contractors:	  Key	  Legal	  Issues	  and	  Challenges”	  2012	  10	  J.I.C.	  J.	  at	  p848.	  
118	  MV	  Saiga,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  61	  §156.	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situation	  is	  that	  of	  the	  ship	  INS	  Tabar.119	  The	  Tabar	  was	  on	  patrol	  and	  fired	  on	  a	  suspected	  pirate	  ‘mother	  ship’.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  ship	  was	  the	  Thailand	  fishing	  boat	  Ekwat	  Nava	  5	  which	  had	  been	  taken	  by	  the	  pirates	  days	  earlier.	  The	  pirates	  escaped	  but	  14	  of	  the	  boats’	  crew	  died	  in	  the	  incident.	  There	  is	  a	  report	  from	  the	  crew	  of	  the	  Tabar	  that	  suggests	  that	  the	  pirates	  on	  board	  the	  Thai	  fishing	  vessel	  fired	  on	  the	  Tabar.	  	  	  	  Art	  105	  of	  UNCLOS	  provides	   for	  the	  States	  to	  seize	  a	  pirate	  ship	  and	  arrest	   the	  persons	  on	  board	  as	  long	  as	  the	  vessel	  is	  on	  the	  HS.	  States	  are	  not	  directed	  to	  act	  but	  are	  given	  the	  option,	  as	  the	  wording	  used	  is	  ‘may	  seize’.	  This	  would	  seem	  at	  odds	   with	   the	   claim	   that	   piracy	   is	   of	   such	   a	   heinous	   nature	   as	   to	   attract	   the	  sobriquet	  of	  ‘hostis	  humani	  generis’.	  If	  piracy	  were	  truly	  a	  crime	  of	  this	  nature,	  a	  threat	   to	   all	  mankind,	   then	   the	  drafters	   of	   the	   article	  would	  have	   included	   the	  term	   ‘shall	   seize’	   leaving	  no	  option	   for	   States.	  Guilfoyle	  highlights	   the	   fact	   that	  unlike	  other	  treaties,	  such	  as	  the	  SUA	  Convention,	  the	  UNCLOS	  does	  not	  contain	  a	  prosecute	   or	   extradite	   clause120	  which	   would	   create	   a	   duty	   for	   apprehending	  states	  to	  either	  prosecute	  the	  pirates	  themselves	  or	  extradite	  them	  to	  a	  state	  that	  has	   sufficient	   nexus	   to	   prosecute	   under	   the	   principles	   mentioned	   above,	  territoriality,	  nationality	  etc.	  Gardner	  suggests	   that	   the	  use	  of	   the	   term	   ‘may’	   is	  not	   designed	   to	   limit	   universal	   jurisdiction,	   rather,	   when	   associated	   with	   the	  right	  to	  seize,	  is	  a	  geographical	  limitation	  to	  prevent	  the	  exercise	  of	  jurisdiction	  in	  the	  waters	  of	  a	  state.121	  While	  it	  is	  logical	  to	  follow	  that	  line	  of	  reasoning	  there	  is	   no	   support	   for	   the	   contention	   that	   it	   expands	   the	   exercise	   of	   jurisdiction	   to	  third	   states	   beyond	   the	   capturing	   state.	   Kontorovich	   is	   an	   ardent	   supporter	   of	  the	  contention	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  judicial	  jurisdiction	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  capturing	  state.122	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  M	  Valencia	  and	  N	  Khalid	  The	  Somalia	  Multilateral	  Anti-­‐Piracy	  Approach:	  Some	  Caveats	  (Nautilus	  Institute	  Australia,	  2009)	  at	  p4.	  
120	  Douglas	  	  Guilfoyle	  “Prosecuting	  Somali	  Pirates:	  A	  Critical	  Evaluation	  of	  the	  Options”	  2012	  10	  JICJ	  at	  p775.	  
121	  Gardner,	  above	  n	  86	  at	  p	  805.	  To	  support	  her	  argument	  Gardner	  cites	  the	  1956	  ILC	  report	  to	  the	  UN,	  Report	  of	  the	  ILC	  to	  the	  General	  Assembly	  UN	  Doc.	  A/3159,	  1956	  UN	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  ILC	  253,	  283	  where	  it	  states	  that	  “This	  right	  cannot	  be	  exercised	  at	  a	  place	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  another	  State.’	  	  	  
122	  Kontorovich,	  above	  n	  110	  at	  p2.	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21 Regional	  Responses	  to	  Piracy.	  	  The	  Djibouti	   Code	   of	   Conduct	   Concerning	   the	  Repression	   of	   Piracy	   and	  Armed	  Robbery	   Against	   Ships	   in	   the	   Western	   Indian	   Ocean	   and	   the	   Gulf	   of	   Aden,	  (Djibouti	   Code	   of	   Conduct),	   was	   formulated	   in	   response	   to	   Art	   100	   of	   the	  UNCLOS	   that	   calls	   on	   States	   to	   cooperate	   in	   the	   repression	   of	   piracy.	  123	  	   The	  General	  Assembly	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  its	  resolutions	  calling	  for	  cooperation	  and	   the	   call	   by	   the	   IMO	   to	   develop	   a	   regional	   agreement	   of	   cooperation	  supported	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Djibouti	  Code	  of	  Conduct.	  	  Art	   4(6)	   establishes	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   seizing	   participant	   State	   to	   take	  jurisdiction	   over	   the	   persons	   seized	   for	   committing	   acts	   of	   piracy.	   Art	   4(7)	  establishes	   the	   right	   of	   the	   seizing	   participant	   state	   to	   waive	   the	   exercise	   of	  jurisdiction	  and	  authorises	  the	  passing	  of	  jurisdiction	  to	  any	  other	  participant	  to	  enforce	  its	  laws	  against	  the	  pirate	  ship	  or	  persons	  on	  board.	  	  	  The	  interesting	  aspect	  of	  these	  two	  articles	  is	  the	  use	  of	  ‘participant’	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  more	  common	  signatories	  or	  parties	  to	  the	  agreement.124	  By	  using	  the	  term	  participant	   it	   opens	   up	   the	   passing	   of	   jurisdiction	   to	   States	   that	   attended	   the	  conference	   where	   the	   Code	   was	   drafted	   which	   includes	   the	   following	   non	  regional	   States;	   Canada,	   Iran,	   India,	   Indonesia.	   Italy,	   Japan,	   Nigeria,	   Norway,	  Philippines	  Singapore,	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  This	  opening	  up	  of	  jurisdiction	  raises	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  State	  that	  has	  no	  nexus	  at	  all	  to	  the	  ships	  involved	  or	  the	  crews	  or	  cargo	  on	  board,	  that	  hasn’t	  been	  involved	  in	  the	  seizure	  of	  the	  ship,	  taking	  jurisdiction.	   	   It	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  this	  measure	  does	  away	  for	  the	  necessity	  of	  MOU	  and	  bi-­‐lateral	  agreements	  to	  be	  signed	  and	  the	  necessity	  for	  extradition	  from	  one	  State	  to	  another	  and	  creates	  for	  the	  suspected	  pirate	  the	  possibility	   that	   he	   could	  be	   transferred	   from	  one	   state	   to	   another	  without	   any	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  The	  Djibouti	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  Concerning	  the	  Repression	  of	  Piracy	  and	  Armed	  Robbery	  Against	  Ships	  in	  the	  Western	  Indian	  Ocean	  and	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Aden,	  signed	  29	  January	  2009,	  Djibouti,	  effective	  29	  January	  2009.	  
124	  While	  the	  Djibouti	  Code	  of	  conduct	  is	  not	  currently	  binding,	  the	  aim,	  as	  expressed	  in	  Art	  2.2,	  is	  to	  establish	  within	  two	  years	  a	  binding	  agreement.	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real	  judicial	  oversight	  of	  the	  process.	  Chang	  argues	  that	  the	  main	  downfall	  of	  this	  agreement	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  legally	  binding.125	  
21.1 Memoranda	  of	  Understanding.	  While	  not	  universal	  in	  scope,	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  (MOU)	  have	  been	  signed	   between	   several	   States	   involved	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   pirates	   and	   regional	  countries	   such	   as	   Kenya,	   Mauritius,	   The	   Seychelles,	   Somalia	   and	   the	   United	  Republic	   of	   Tanzania. 126 	  These	   MOU	   provide	   for	   the	   prosecution	   of	   pirates	  captured	   by	   the	   naval	   forces	   operating	   in	   the	   GOA	   or	   Indian	   Ocean,	   in	   the	  territories	  of	  third	  States,	  which	  precludes	  the	  necessity	  of	  shipping	  the	  pirates	  back	  to	  the	  capturing	  State’s	  courts	  for	  prosecution.	  The	  reasons	  cited	  for	  MOU	  are,	   cost	   considerations,	   abuse	   of	   asylum	   laws	   by	   suspects,	   evidentiary	   issues	  and	  political	  considerations.127	  	  There	   are	   two	  main	   views	   on	   these	  MOU.	  One	   is	   that	   they	   breach	  Art	   105	   the	  UNCLOS	   directive	   that	   the	   seizing	   State	   may	   decide	   on	   the	   penalties	   to	   be	  imposed.	  There	  is	  no	  mention	  under	  this	  article	  of	  another	  State	  contributing	  to	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  penalty	  or	  deciding	  on	  the	  disposal	  or	  otherwise	  of	  the	  vessel	  concerned	   and	   its	   property,	   subject	   of	   course	   to	   the	   right	   of	   third	   parties,	   for	  example	  cargo	  owners,	  ship	  owners,	  charterers	  of	  the	  vessel	  and	  so	  forth.	  Indeed	  the	   strength	   of	   argument	   against	  MOU	   is	   found	   in	   the	   discussions	   held	   by	   the	  drafters	  of	   the	  article	  where	   it	  was	  expressly	   stated	   that	   the	   right	   to	   seize	  and	  adjudicate	   could	   not	   be	   exercised	   at	   a	   place	   under	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   another	  state.128	  	  Greiβ	  and	  Petrig129	  assert	  that	  the	  requirement	  of	  the	  seizing	  State	  to	  set	  the	   penalty	   confirms	   the	   view	   held	   by	   CIL	   that	   prosecution	   of	   pirates	   is	  conducted	   under	   domestic	   law	   and	   that	   the	   jurisdictional	   basis	   is	   the	  universality	  principle.	  It	  is	  possible	  however,	  that	  the	  second	  sentence	  in	  Art	  105	  does	   nothing	   more	   than	   establish	   the	   nexus	   by	   which	   the	   seizing	   State	   can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  Diana	  Chang	  “Piracy	  Laws	  and	  the	  Effective	  Prosecution	  of	  Pirates”	  2010	  33	  B.	  C.	  Int'l	  &	  Comp.	  L.	  Rev.	  273	  at	  pp278-­‐279.	  
126	  Shnider,	  above	  n	  27	  at	  p535.	  
127	  Ademun	  Ademun-­‐Odeke	  “Jurisdiction	  by	  Agreement	  Over	  Foreign	  Pirates	  in	  Domestic	  Courts:	  In	  Re	  Mohamud	  Mohamed	  Dashi	  &	  8	  Others	  ”	  2011-­‐2012	  24(1)	  U.S.F.	  Mar.L.J.	  35	  at	  p40.	  
128	  Berg,	  above	  n	  110	  at	  p379.	  
129	  Greiβ	  and	  Petrig,	  above	  n	  34	  at	  p151.	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establish	  domestic	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  prosecution	  of	  the	  pirate,	  an	  adjudicative	  jurisdiction.	   Treves	   holds	   that	   the	   use	   of	  MOU	   is	   nothing	  more	   than	   a	   ‘fiction’	  when	  allegedly	  transferring	  the	  right	  to	  the	  prosecuting	  State.130	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	  Treves,	  above	  n	  66	  at	  p402.	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21.2 Is	  there	  a	  common	  definition	  of	  piracy	  amongst	  the	  States	  responding?	  	  Once	  apprehended,	  pirates	  are	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  apprehending	  State	  and	   that	   State’s	   domestic	   law	   applies,	   should	   that	   State	   take	   up	   the	   option	   of	  prosecuting	  them.	  	  The	  SG	  was	   requested	  by	   the	  Security	  Council	   to	   compile	   information	  received	  from	  Member	   States	   as	   to	  measures	   that	   had	   been	   taken	   to	   criminalise	   piracy	  under	   their	   domestic	   legislation.131	  There	   were	   responses	   from	   42	   members	  outlining	  the	  measures	  taken	  and	  the	  current	  state	  of	  their	  legislation.132	  Of	  those	  42,	  seven	  States	  had	  imported	  into	  their	  legislation	  the	  definition	  of	  piracy	  from	  the	   UNCLOS,	   two	   had	   relied	   on	   referring	   to	   the	   Law	   of	   Nations,	   30	   had	   taken	  steps	  to	  either	  criminalise	  piracy	  as	  a	  separate	  domestic	  offence	  or	  utilised	  their	  existing	   domestic	   legislation	   for	   crimes	   like	   murder,	   robbery,	   aggravated	  robbery	  and	  damage	  offences.	  Three	  States	  had	  not	  domesticated	   the	   crime	  or	  were	   investigating	   how	   it	   could	   be	   achieved.	   The	   fact	   that	   only	   30	   states	   had	  criminalised	  piracy	  could	  indicate	  that	  the	  crime	  is	  no	  longer	  abhorrent	  as	  once	  thought	  or	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  viewed	  as	  communis	  hostis	  omnium.	  While	  in	  no	  way	  complete	  this	  survey	  indicates	  that	  while	  states	  have	  ratified	  the	  UNCLOS,	  and	  there	  are	  assertions	  that	  the	  UNCLOS	  definition	  is	  now	  considered	  CIL,	  this	  may	  not	  be	  the	  case	  in	  practice.133	  	  Of	  the	  states	  that	  have	  developed	  their	  own	  legislation	  there	  are	  common	  themes	  of	  violence	  of	  some	  description	  required,	  some	  form	  of	  seizing,	  either	  of	  the	  ship	  or	  of	  the	  crew	  and	  instances	  where	  control	  of	  the	  ship	  in	  some	  form	  is	  required.	  	  	  Examples	  of	  some	  form	  of	  violence	  are	  Germany,	  	  ‘use	  of	  force	  or	  attacks’	  found	  in	   the	   German	   Criminal	   Code	   Section	   316(c)(1)(b)134	  and	   Spain,	   Organic	   Law	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  2015	  (2011)	  S/RES/2015	  24	  October	  2011,	  paragraph	  11.	  
132	  Letter	  dated	  23	  March	  2012	  from	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  S/2012/177.	  
133	  United	  States	  v	  Hasan	  No2:10cr56,	  2010	  WL	  4281892	  (E,D,	  Va	  Oct	  29	  2010)	  at	  paragraph	  21.	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10/1995 135 	  which	   States	   ‘Whoever	   using	   violence,	   intimidation’	   as	   the	  introduction	  to	  the	  definition.	  	  Germany	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘…in	  order	  to	  gain	  control	  of	  or	  influence	  the	  navigation	  of	   a	   ship…’	   in	   the	   above	   section	   while	   the	   Czech	   Republic	   utilises	   the	   phrase,	  ‘Gaining	   control	  over	   civilian	  vessels…’	   as	   the	  descriptive	   title	   for	   their	  Section	  290	  of	  Criminal	  Code	  N.	  40/2009	  Coll.136	  	  Spain	   uses	   the	   term	   ‘…seizes,	   damages	   or	   destroys	   a	   ship…’	   to	   describe	   the	  necessary	  actions	  in	  the	  section	  mentioned	  above.	  	  Australia,	  Finland,	  Malta,	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  have	  either	  imported	  directly	  the	   provisions	   of	   the	   UNCLOS	   definition	   and	   associated	   articles	   or	   make	  reference	  to	  the	  definition	  as	  constituting	  piracy	  in	  their	  jurisdiction.137	  Kenya	  as	  one	  of	  the	  States	  to	  the	  fore	  in	  piracy	  prosecutions	  has	  imported	  both	  the	  definition	  of	  piracy	  and	   the	   relevant	  articles	   from	   the	  SUA	  Convention	   in	  a	  recent	  overhaul	  of	   its	   legislation.138	  The	   issue	   that	  arises	   for	  Kenya	  comes	   from	  the	   Merchant	   Shipping	   Act	   No	   4	   2009	   section	   470(4)	   which	   expands	   the	  jurisdiction	   of	   the	   law	   regardless	   of	   where	   the	   offence	   takes	   place,	   where	   the	  ship	  is	  and	  whatever	  the	  nationality	  of	  the	  of	  the	  person	  committing	  the	  act.	  This	  creates	  for	  Kenyan	  courts	  the	  universality	  of	  their	  jurisdiction,	  a	  jurisdiction	  that	  may	  not	  be	  supported	  by	  the	  legislation	  of	  Kenyan	  courts	  to	  exercise.139	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  Criminal	  Code	  (Strafgesetzbuch,	  StGB)	  Section	  316	  (c)(1)(b).	  
135	  Organic	  Act	  10/1995,	  23	  November	  1995	  Criminal	  Code	  (Ley	  Organica,	  Codigo	  Penal)	  
136	  Criminal	  Code	  Act	  2009	  (trestni	  zákonik).	  
137	  S/2012/177	  above	  n	  129	  Annex.	  	  
138	  Merchant	  Shipping	  Act,	  Act	  No	  4	  of	  2009	  
139	  James	  Gathii	  “Kenya's	  Piracy	  Prosecutions”	  2010	  104	  Am.	  J.	  Int'l	  L.	  416	  at	  p426.	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21.3 Conclusion	  There	  are	  many	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  definition	  of	  piracy	  in	  international	  law	  and	   within	   regional	   and	   domestic	   law.	   There	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   conciseness	   in	   the	  drafting	   of	   the	   legislation	   that	   has	   not	   been	   fully	   challenged	   in	   the	   courts	   to	  remove	   the	  doubt	   and	  provide	   clarity.	   It	   seems	   that	   there	   is	   an	   easy	   approach	  taken	   to	   the	   domestic	   enactment	   of	   legislation	   for	   piracy	   by	   implementing	  straight	   from	   the	   UNCLOS	   Art	   101	   definition.	   This	   raises	   the	   definitional	  problems	  discussed	  above	  which	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  at	  domestic	   level	  which	  does	   not	   rectify	   the	   issues	   at	   an	   international	   level.	   	   Domestic	   legislation	   that	  does	  not	   implement	  Art	  101	   from	  the	  UNCLOS	  creates	   it	  own	   issues	  by	  way	  of	  jurisdiction,	   breadth	   of	   coverage	   and	   location	   of	   the	   offences	   with	   some	  confusion	  still	  around	  whether	  crimes	  are	  robbery	  or	  piracy	  dependent	  on	  their	  location.	  This	  points	  to	  the	  necessity	  for	  a	  thorough	  overhaul	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  piracy	  last	  attempted	  under	  the	  1932	  Harvard	  Draft	  and	  1958	  Geneva	  High	  Seas	  Convention.	  While	   there	  was	  a	  view	  at	   the	   time	   that	  piracy	  was	  almost	  extinct	  and	  not	  worth	  worrying	  about,	  events	  that	  have	  transpired	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	   the	   century	   have	   brought	   a	   focus	   back	   to	   this	   ancient	   lifestyle.	   There	   is	   no	  indication	   that	   maritime	   piracy	   will	   vanish	   from	   the	   seas	   and	   therefore	  consideration	   needs	   to	   be	   given	   to	   updating	   and	   keeping	   current	   the	   law	   of	  nations	   and	   international	   law	   to	   ensure	   that	   prosecutors	   are	   fully	   equipped	   to	  bring	  to	  justice	  those	  who	  choose	  this	  lifestyle.	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22 Is	  there	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  apparent	  difference	  in	  
treatment	  of	  the	  pirates?	  	  There	  have	  been	  concerns	  raised	  about	  the	  treatment	  of	  pirates	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia	  and	  the	  possible	  breaches	  that	  maybe	  occurring	  to	  their	  rights	  either	  in	  the	  way	  they	  are	  detained	  or	   for	   the	  unfortunate	   few	  deprived	  of	   life	  by	  either	  armed	  forces	  action	  or	  by	  PMSCs.	  	  International	  human	  rights	  are	  protected	  under	  a	  number	  of	  treaties	  that	  found	  their	   genesis	   in	   the	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	   (UDHR)	   that	   was	  drawn	   up	   after	   WWII.140	  Art	   3	   gives	   a	   right	   to	   life,	   liberty	   and	   security	   of	   the	  person,	   Art	   5	   recognises	   a	   right	   to	   be	   free	   from	   torture,	   cruel,	   inhuman	   or	  degrading	   treatment	  or	  punishment.	  Art	  9	   recognises	   the	   right	   to	  be	   free	   from	  arbitrary	  arrest,	  detention	  or	  exile,	  while	  Art	  10	  recognises	  the	  right	  to	  a	  full	  and	  public	  hearing	  of	  any	  criminal	  charges	  against	  a	  person.	  The	  UDHR	  became	  the	  basis	   for	   the	   International	   Convention	   on	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights,	   (ICCPR)141	  which	   in	   its	   turn	   became	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   African	   Charter	   on	   Human	   and	  People’s	   Rights	   (Banjul	   Charter).142	  The	   Somalis	   captured	   as	   part	   of	   the	   anti	  piracy	  operation	  off	   the	   coast	   of	   Somalia	   fall	   directly	  under	   the	  Banjul	   Charter	  while	  in	  Africa	  but	  are	  subject	  to	  other	  human	  rights	  conventions	  when	  taken	  on	  board	  naval	   ships	   from	  other	  countries.	  For	  example	   the	  European	  Convention	  on	   Human	   Rights143	  when	   the	   warship	   that	   captures	   them	   is	   from	   a	   European	  Navy,	  and	  if	  taken	  by	  the	  US	  Navy	  limited	  rights	  as	  found	  in	  the	  Constitution	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  adopted	  10	  December	  1948	  and	  ratified	  on	  the	  16	  December	  1949.	  	  
141	  ICCPR	  adopted	  for	  signature	  16	  December	  1966	  entered	  into	  force	  23	  March	  1976.	  	  
142	  African	  Charter	  on	  Human	  and	  People’s	  Rights	  adopted	  in	  Nairobi	  27	  June	  1981,	  entered	  into	  force	  21	  October	  1986.	  
143	  The	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	  signed	  4	  November	  1950,	  effective	  3	  September	  1953,	  amended	  by	  Protocol	  No.11	  (ETS	  no.	  155)	  as	  of	  1	  November	  1998.	  Medvedyev	  and	  others	  v	  France	  (3394/03)	  Grand	  Chamber	  23	  March	  2010	  at	  paragraphs	  66	  and	  67,	  The	  crew	  were	  in	  French	  jurisdiction	  from	  the	  time	  the	  interception	  operation	  began,	  and	  not	  only	  when	  a	  boarding	  party	  took	  control	  of	  the	  vessel	  and	  its	  crew.	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the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  amendments.144	  	  Other	  navies	  would	  be	  constrained	  by	  the	   ICCPR	   as	   long	   as	   their	   State	   is	   a	   signatory	   or	   has	   enacted	   its	   own	   human	  rights	  legislation.	  	  Under	  the	  ICCPR,	  Art	  6	  provides	  for	  an	  inherent	  right	  to	  life	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  will	  not	  be	  arbitrarily	  taken	  from	  them,	  Art	  6(2)	  covers	  the	  death	  penalty	  and	   its	   application	  only	   in	   cases	  of	   serious	   crimes.	  The	  death	   sentence	  may	  only	  be	  given	  as	  a	  sentence	  rendered	  by	  a	  competent	  court.	  Art	  7	  protects	  people	   from	   torture	   or	   cruel,	   inhuman	  or	   degrading	   treatment	   or	   punishment.	  The	   suspected	   pirates	   detained	   on	   board	   naval	   ships	   are	   possibly	   confined	   to	  limited	  cabin	  space	  until	   they	  are	  delivered	  to	  a	   jurisdiction	  where	  they	  can	  be	  brought	  before	   a	   court.	   There	   is	   no	   evidence	   to	  date	   that	   there	  have	  been	   any	  cases	   of	   pirates	   ill	   treated	   on	   their	   return	   to	   Somalia	   as	   part	   of	   the	   catch	   and	  release	   actions	   taken	   by	   naval	   forces	   that	   have	   apprehended	   them	   or	   that	   the	  conditions	  they	  are	  subject	  to	  amount	  to	  cruel	  or	  inhuman	  treatment.	  There	  have	  been	   claims	  by	   suspected	  pirates	   of	   ill	   treatment	   by	  prison	   authorities,	   lack	   of	  medical	   attention	   and	   lack	   of	   food.	  145	  	   These	   actions	   could	   amount	   to	   breaches	  under	   Art	   7.	   This	   is	   also	   covered	   under	   Art	   5	   of	   the	   Banjul	   Convention.	   Both	  Kenya	  and	  Somalia	  have	  ratified	  the	  convention.	  	  Art	  9	  ICCPR	  grants	  the	  right	  to	  be	  free	  from	  arbitrary	  arrest	  and	  detention.	  The	  power	  to	  arrest	  and	  detain	  persons	  on	  board	  private	  ships	  must	  carry	  with	  it	  a	  power	  to	  detain.	  While	  Art	  105	  UNCLOS	  provides	  a	  power	  to	  arrest	  the	  persons	  on	  board	  a	  pirate	  ship	  there	   is	  no	  mention	  of	  a	  power	  to	  detain	  those	  arrested	  persons	  and	  transport	  them	  to	  a	  court.	  While	  it	  could	  be	  implied	  that	  a	  power	  to	  arrest	  brings	  with	  it	  a	  complimentary	  power	  to	  detain,	  it	  is	  suggested	  that	  in	  the	  matter	   of	   a	   crime	   that	   is	   of	   such	   a	   serious	   nature	   as	   to	   warrant	   Chapter	   VII	  intervention	   by	   the	   UN,	   that	   a	   power	   to	   detain	   would	   be	   written	   into	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  The	  Constitution	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  Created	  17	  September	  1787	  and	  ratified	  21	  June	  1788,	  The	  United	  States	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  ratified	  on	  the	  15	  December	  1791.	  Douglas	  Guilfoyle	  “Counter-­‐Piracy	  Law	  Enforcement	  and	  Human	  Rights”	  2010	  59(1)	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Quarterly	  at	  p155	  ‘	  In	  the	  relevant	  cases	  it	  has	  become	  common	  simply	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  extra-­‐territorial	  power	  exercised	  over	  embassies	  and	  flagged	  ships	  and	  aircraft	  as	  clear	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  jurisdiction	  over	  persons	  therein.	  (Author	  emphasis	  added).	  
145	  Gathii,	  above	  n	  139	  at	  432,	  Eugene	  Kontorovich	  “"A	  Guantanamo	  of	  the	  Seas":	  The	  Difficulty	  of	  Prosecuting	  Pirates	  and	  Terrorists”	  2010	  98	  CLR	  at	  p266	  citing	  incidents	  of	  torture	  and	  denial	  of	  religious	  privileges.	  
	   	   Chapter	  5	  
	   193	  
convention	  clearly.	  In	  other	  articles	  of	  the	  UNCLOS	  the	  power	  to	  detain	  is	  explicit	  in	  the	  article.	  Art	  73	  (4)	  states	  ‘In	  cases	  of	  arrest	  or	  detention…’,	  Art	  97(3)	  clearly	  excludes	   both	   detention	   and	   arrest	   and	   both	   are	   explicitly	   mentioned.	   Arts	  220(2)	  and	  220(6)	   carry	  with	   them	  a	   clear	  power	  of	  detention.	  The	  powers	   to	  detain	  mentioned	  above	  in	  no	  way	  rise	  to	  the	  state	  of	  seriousness	  that	  is	  alleged	  to	  be	  attached	  to	  piracy.	  The	  drafters	  of	  the	  HDC	  included	  in	  the	  similar	  article	  to	  the	   UNCLOS	   105,	   their	   Art	   11(1),	   and	   included	   within	   it	   a	   power	   to	   stop	   the	  vessel.146	  Art	   110	   (1)	   the	   UNCLOS,	   provides	   a	   right	   to	   ‘board	   only	   if	   there	   is	  ‘suspicion’	   of	   the	   ship	  being	   engaged	   in	  piracy.	  While	   it	   has	  been	   said	   that	   the	  UNCLOS	   codified	   existing	   CIL,	   it	   would	   appear	   that	   this	   was	   not	   the	   case.	   To	  assert	   that	   CIL	   granted	   a	   right	   to	   detain	  would	   also	   open	   up	   the	   definition	   of	  piracy	  to	  include	  the	  necessary	  element	  of	  robbery	  that	  has	  long	  been	  associated	  with	  piracy.147	  The	  UNCLOS	  Art	  110	  creates	  a	  right	  of	  ‘visit’	  or	  boarding,	  only,	  ‘to	  be	  carried	  out	  with	  all	  possible	  consideration’,	  (Art	  110(2)).	  It	  is	  clear	  then	  that	  when	  the	  drafters	  of	  Art	  105	  created	  the	  power	  of	  seizure,	  if	  they	  felt	  a	  need	  to	  include	  a	  power	  of	  detention	   it	  would	  have	  been	  explicit	   and	  not	   implicit.	   It	   is	  possible	  that	  suspected	  pirates	  detained	  under	  UNCLOS	  have	  a	  right	  of	  claim	  for	  unlawful	   detention	   against	   those	   states	   that	   have	   either,	   arrested	   them	   and	  transported	  them	  to	  another	  State	  for	  trial,	  or	  have	  arrested,	  detained	  and	  then	  released	   them.	   Guilfoyle	   claims	   that	   this	   power	   of	   detention	   is	   ‘likely’	   present	  through	  the	  mention	  in	  UN	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1838	  para	  3	  of	  the	  call	  to	  use	   ‘necessary	   means…for	   the	   repression	   of…piracy’	   as	   it	   is	   a	   ‘necessary’	  detention.	  148	  In	  other	  places	  Guilfoyle	  asserts	   that	   the	  phrase	   ‘necessary	  means’	  is	   a	   euphemism	   for	   military	   force.149	  It	   is	   suggested	   that	   the	   power	   to	   detain	  pirates	  must	  be	  contained	  in	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  State	  making	  the	  apprehension	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  Harvard	  Draft	  Convention	  above	  n	  44.	  This	  did	  not	  make	  it	  into	  the	  Geneva	  Convention	  on	  the	  High	  Seas.	  From	  the	  comments	  following	  the	  article	  in	  the	  HDC	  this	  right	  to	  stop	  a	  ship	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  affront	  to	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  flag	  State	  on	  one	  level,	  (2	  Moore	  Digest	  International	  Law	  Section	  318	  p.918)	  and	  at	  another	  level	  similar	  in	  context	  to	  conducting	  a	  search	  to	  gain	  evidence	  on	  which	  to	  base	  a	  search	  for	  evidence	  that	  it	  is	  a	  pirate	  ship	  (Wharton,	  Digest	  of	  Int’l	  Law	  (2nd	  Ed)	  Vol.	  III,	  p	  169-­‐171,)	  cited	  in	  the	  commentary	  to	  the	  HDC	  articles.	  	  
147	  Rubin,	  above	  n	  26	  pp50-­‐1.	  
148	  Guilfoyle,	  above	  n	  144	  at	  p159.	  
149	  Douglas	  Guilfoyle	  “Piracy	  off	  Somalia:	  UN	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1816	  and	  IMO	  Regional	  Counter	  Piracy	  Efforts”	  2008	  57	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Quarterly	  690	  at	  p695.	  Such	  a	  broad	  expanse	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  ‘necessary	  means’	  renders	  it	  almost	  meaningless.	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specifically	  granted	  to	  the	  Captain	  of	  the	  Naval	  ship	  making	  the	  arrest.	  	  	  Art	  9(2)	  ICCPR	  provides	  for	  the	  informing	  of	  the	  detained	  person	  for	  the	  reasons	  for	   their	   arrest	   and	   Art	   9(3)	   for	   the	   person	   to	   be	   brought	   promptly	   before	   a	  judge	   or	   other	   officer	   of	   the	   court	   and	   entitled	   to	   a	   trial	   within	   a	   reasonable	  amount	   of	   time.	   There	   is	   no	   definition	   of	   promptly	   in	   the	   ICCPR	   to	   provide	   a	  guideline.	   The	   ECtHR	   has	   held	   in	   Medvedyev	   v	   France,150 	  a	   case	   where	   the	  detained	  person	  was	  intercepted	  on	  the	  HS	  on	  suspicion	  of	  drug	  smuggling,	  that	  detention	   for	   13	   days	   on	   board	   ship	   did	   not	   breach	   the	   similar	   article	   of	   the	  European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights,151	  (ECHR),	   Art	   5(3).	   The	   claim	   in	   the	  
Medvedyev	  case	  was	   that	   in	   the	   circumstances	   it	  was	   ‘materially	   impossible’	   to	  avoid	   the	  13	  days	  detention	  on	  board	  ship.	  The	  court	   found	   that	   the	  detention	  had	   violated	   Art	   5(1)	   of	   the	   ECHR.	   Medvedyev	   also	   looked	   at	   the	   extra	  jurisdictional	   application	   of	   ECHR	   to	   cases	   of	   interdiction	   on	   the	   high	   seas.	  152	  Then	   end	   result	   of	   the	   courts	   discussion	   was	   that	   exercise	   of	   coercive	   law	  enforcement	   jurisdiction	   over	   a	   foreign	   vessel	   on	   the	   HS	   brings	   with	   it	   ECHR	  jurisdiction. 153 	  The	   partly	   dissenting	   judgment	   of	   Judges	   Tulkens,	   Bonell,	  Zupančič,	   Fura,	   Spielmann,	   Tsotsoria,	   Power	   and	   Poalelungi	   found	   at	   para	   13	  that	  there	  was	  a	  lack	  of	  placement	  of	  the	  suspects	  under	  judicial	  control,	  which	  would	  not	  have	  breached	  Art	  5(1).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150	  Medvedyev	  and	  others	  v	  France,	  above	  n	  143	  at	  paragraphs	  66	  and	  67.	  
151	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights.	  
152	  ECHR	  Art	  5(1)	  states;	  Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  liberty	  and	  security	  of	  person.	  No	  one	  shall	  be	  deprived	  of	  his	  liberty	  save	  in	  the	  following	  cases	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  procedure	  prescribed	  by	  law:	  1. the	  lawful	  detention	  of	  a	  person	  after	  conviction	  by	  a	  competent	  court;	  2. the	  lawful;	  arrest	  or	  detention	  of	  a	  person	  for	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  a	  lawful	  order	  of	  a	  court	  or	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  an	  obligation	  prescribed	  by	  law;	  3. the	  lawful	  arrest	  or	  detention	  of	  a	  person	  effected	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  bringing	  him	  before	  the	  competent	  legal	  authority	  on	  reasonable	  suspicion	  of	  having	  committed	  an	  offence	  or	  when	  it	  is	  reasonably	  considered	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  his	  committing	  an	  offence	  or	  fleeing	  after	  having	  done	  so;	  4. the	  detention	  of	  a	  minor	  by	  lawful	  order	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  educational	  supervision	  of	  his	  lawful	  detention	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  bringing	  him	  before	  the	  competetent	  legal	  authority;	  5. the	  lawful	  detention	  of	  persons	  for	  the	  prevention	  of	  the	  spreading	  of	  infectious	  diseases,	  of	  persons	  of	  unsound	  mind,	  alcoholics	  or	  drug	  addicts	  or	  vagrants;	  6. the	  lawful	  arrest	  or	  detention	  of	  a	  person	  to	  prevent	  his	  unauthorized	  entry	  into	  the	  country	  or	  of	  a	  person	  against	  whom	  action	  is	  being	  taken	  with	  a	  view	  to	  deportation	  or	  extradition.	  
153	  Douglas	  Guilfoyle	  “ECHR	  Rights	  at	  Sea:	  Medvedyev	  and	  others	  v.	  France”	  2010	  EJIL:Talk	  E.	  J.	  I.	  L.	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In	   the	  Cygnus	   there	  was	   a	   40-­‐day	   delay	   between	   seizure	   of	   the	   defendants	   by	  Danish	  navy	  and	  being	  brought	  before	  a	  court	  in	  Rotterdam.154	  The	  defendants	  in	  that	   case	   were	   five	   Somali	   nationals	   responsible	   for	   firing	   on	   a	   Netherlands-­‐Antilles	  registered	  vessel,	  the	  Samanyolu.	  The	  defendants	  were	  held	  on	  board	  the	  vessel	  without	  formal	  arrest	  or	  charge	  from	  the	  22	  January	  2009.	  The	  defendants	  were	   transferred,	   without	   extradition	   process,	   from	   Danish	   custody	   to	   Dutch	  custody	  on	  the	  10	  February	  2009.	  On	  the	  11	  February	  2009	  the	  defendants	  were	  finally	   brought	   before	   a	   court	   and	   had	   legal	   assistance	   assigned	   to	   them.	   The	  judge	  in	  the	  matter	  agreed	  that	  there	  was	  a	  breach	  of	  Art	  5(3)	  of	  the	  ECHR	  but	  the	  ‘exceptional	  circumstances’	  of	  the	  case,	  that	  is	  operational	  reasons,	  justify	  the	  finding	  that	  the	  lengthy	  period	  of	  detention	  without	  charge	  and	  formal	  arrest	  did	  not	  prejudice	  the	  defendants.	  From	  Medvedyev	   to	   the	  defendants	   in	  Cygnus,	  the	  time	  span	  has	  extended	  from	  13	  days	  to	  40	  days	  of	  detention	  without	  there	  being	  any	  prejudice	  to	  the	  defendants	  right	  to	  a	   ‘prompt	  hearing’.	   In	  matters	  brought	  before	   the	   ECtHR	   that	  were	   not	   based	   on	   apprehensions	   at	   sea	   the	  maximum	  appears	   to	   be	   4	   days	   between	   detention	   and	   ‘prompt	   appearance’. 155 	  	   As	  discussed	   below,	   in	   a	   technologically	   advanced	   world,	   this	   seems	  incomprehensible.	   	   In	   the	   Cygnus	   the	   Judge	   offered	   the	   solution	   of	   video	  teleconferencing	  as	  a	  means	  of	  arranging	  a	  ‘prompt	  appearance’.	  156	  At	  what	  point	  does	  the	  breach	  of	  the	  suspect’s	  human	  right,	  not	  to	  be	  deprived	  of	  their	  liberty,	  become	  sufficient	  to	  trigger	  a	  dismissal	  of	  the	  case	  for	  circumstances	  beyond	  the	  exceptional?	  	  There	   is	   also	   the	   matter	   where	   suspected	   pirates	   are	   detained	   and	   released	  without	  trial.	  For	  a	  period	  of	  time	  they	  are	  deprived	  of	  their	  liberty,	  in	  breach	  of	  Art	   9(1)	   ICCPR,	   and	   Art	   5(1)	   (ECHR),	   and	   finally	   released.157	  The	   reasoning	  behind	   the	   release	   of	   the	   pirates	   in	   the	   Absalon	   case,	   discussed	   by	   Guilfoyle	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154	  Cygnus	  (10/6000012-­‐09)	  17	  June	  2010.	  
155	  Andrew	  Ashworth	  Human	  Rights,	  Serious	  Crime	  and	  Criminal	  Procedure	  (Sweet	  and	  Maxwell,	  London,	  2002)	  at	  p	  29	  citing	  Brogan	  v	  UK	  (1989)	  11	  EHRR	  117	  and	  Brincat	  v	  Italy	  (1993)	  16	  EHRR	  591.	  	  
156	  Cygnus	  above	  n	  154	  at	  p500.	  
157	  ‘Danes	  free	  pirates	  from	  navy	  ship’	  Lloyd’s	  List	  	  (London	  26	  September	  2008),	  cited	  in	  D	  Guilfoyle	  “Counter	  Piracy,	  Law	  Enforcement	  and	  Human	  Rights.”	  2010	  59	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Quarterly148	  at	  p142.	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above,	   was	   because	   the	   Danes	   could	   not	   find	   a	   way	   to	   successfully	   prosecute	  them.	  In	  favour	  of	  the	  Danes	  was	  they	  had	  decided	  not	  to	  release	  the	  suspects	  to	  Somali	  authorities	  because	  they	  could	  risk	  torture	  or	  death.158	  	  The	  decision	  not	  to	  release	  the	  pirates	  back	  to	  the	  Somali	  authorities	  could	  also	  be	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐refoulment.	  The	  principle	  of	  non	  refoulment	  is	  enshrined	  in	  the	  1951	  Convention	  Relating	  to	  the	  Status	  of	  Refugees159	  Art	  33	  and	  in	   the	   1984	   UN	   Convention	   Against	   Torture	   and	   Other	   Cruel,	   Inhuman	   or	  Degrading	   Treatment	   or	   Punishment	   (UNCAT)	   Art	   3(1).160	  This	   principle	   of	  international	  law	  stops	  the	  rendering	  of	  a	  persecuted	  person	  to	  their	  persecutor	  in	   other	   words	   the	   expulsion,	   extradition,	   deportation;	   return	   or	   otherwise	  removal	   to	   a	   country	  where	   the	  person	   involved	   faces	   a	   risk	  of	  persecution	  or	  serious	   harm.161	  Non-­‐refoulment	   is	   different	   to	   political	   asylum	   as	   the	   persons	  under	   non-­‐refoulment	   are	   more	   often	   than	   not	   refugees	   being	   sent	   back	   to	  disaster	   or	   war	   zones	   and	   are	   not	   in	   fear	   of	   persecution	   based	   on	   their	   race,	  social	  group	  or	  class.	   	  While	   this	   is	  a	   laudable	  move	  doubt	  must	  be	  cast	  on	   the	  motive,	  as	  the	  State	  of	  Somalia	  at	  that	  time,	  2008	  was	  still	  in	  a	  state	  of	  disarray	  and	  would	  not	  have	  functioning	  courts	  or	  Police	  to	  release	  the	  prisoners	  too.	  Art	  5(5)	  of	   the	  ECHR	  provides	   for	   those	  detained	  and	  released	   in	   contravention	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  ECHR	  Art	  5	  has	  an	  enforceable	  right	  to	  compensation.	  Art	  9(4)	  ICCPR	  provides	  the	  right	  for	  a	  detained	  person	  to	  challenge	  the	  lawfulness	  of	  their	  detention	  and	  Art	  9(5)	  grants	  the	  right	  to	  compensation	  if	  the	  arrest	  or	  detention	  is	  proven	  unlawful.	  	  ICCPR	   Art	   9(3)	   specifies	   that	   persons	   awaiting	   trial	   shall	   not	   be	   detained	   in	  custody.	  From	  the	  claims	  made	  by	  the	  suspected	  pirates	  held	  in	  Kenyan	  custody,	  it	  appears	  that	  this	  is	   indeed	  the	  general	  practice.	  The	  rationale	  behind	  holding	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158	  Treves,	  above	  n	  66	  at	  p408.	  Although	  as	  stated	  above	  there	  have	  been	  no	  credible	  instances	  of	  released	  pirates	  being	  victimised	  by	  the	  Somali	  population	  or	  government	  authorities.	  	  
159	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  Relating	  to	  the	  Status	  of	  Refugees	  (entered	  into	  force	  28	  July	  1951).	  
160	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  Against	  Torture	  and	  Other	  Cruel,	  Inhuman	  or	  Degrading	  Treatment	  or	  Punishment	  U.N.	  Doc	  A/Res/39/708	  (signed	  10	  December	  1984,	  entered	  into	  force	  26	  June	  1987).	  	  
161	  Deborah	  Osiro	  “Somali	  Pirates	  Have	  Rights	  Too:	  Judicial	  Consequences	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Concerns”	  2011	  Institute	  for	  Security	  Studies	  Paper	  224	  at	  p8.	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persons	  in	  custody	  while	  awaiting	  trial	  has	  been	  refined	  to	  four	  keys	  reasons	  by	  the	  ECtHR;	  the	  risk	  that	  the	  accused	  will	  fail	  to	  appear,	  the	  risk	  that	  there	  will	  be	  interference	   with	   witnesses,	   the	   risk	   that	   the	   accused	   will	   commit	   serious	  offences	   if	   released	   and	   the	   risk	   of	   public	   disorder.162	  	  While	   the	   first	   of	   these	  reasons	  may	  be	  valid	  in	  Kenya	  were	  the	  accused	  could	  escape	  back	  to	  Somalia	  or	  disappear	  into	  the	  refugee	  camps	  in	  Northern	  Kenya,	  the	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  for	  those	  detained	  in	  both	  Europe	  and	  the	  USA.	  	  Once	  suspected	  pirates	  are	  detained	  at	  sea	  they	  are	  not	  released,	  being	  transferred	  to	  shore	  and	  prison,	  then	  to	  court,	  and	  back	  to	  prison	  when	  found	  guilty.	  Art	  10(1)	  and	  (2)	  ICCPR	  grant	  the	  right	  to	  be	  treated	  with	  humanity	  and	  respect	  as	  well	  as	  being	  segregated	  from	  convicted	  persons.	   As	  mentioned	   above	   in	   the	   claims	   by	   the	   suspected	   pirates	   lodged	   in	  Kenyan	  prisons,	  this	  right	  is	  also	  being	  breached.163	  Art	  14	  of	  the	  ICCPR	  deals	  with	  the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial.	  It	  is	  here	  that	  the	  suspected	  pirates	  transferred	  from	  capturing	  naval	  ships	  to	  a	  foreign	  jurisdiction,	  be	  it	  the	  Seychelles,	  Mauritius	  or	  Kenya	  are	  greatly	  disadvantaged.	  Under	  Art	  14(3)(a-­‐g),	  the	  pirate	  is	  entitled	  to	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  charges	  against	  him	  in	  a	  language	  he	  understands,	   to	   have	   time	   for	   the	   preparation	   of	   his	   defence	   and	   time	   to	  communicate	   with	   a	   counsel	   of	   his	   own	   choosing,	   to	   be	   tried	   without	   undue	  delay	   to	   be	   tried	   in	   his	   presence,	   to	   have	   legal	   counsel	   assigned	   to	   him	   if	   he	  cannot	  afford	  to	  pay	  for	  it,	  to	  examine	  witnesses	  and	  to	  have	  free	  assistance	  of	  an	  interpreter.	   Guilfoyle	   claims	   that	   it	   is	   highly	   unlikely	   that	   the	   trials	   in	   Kenya	  breach	  these	  Art	  14	  rights.	  He	  states	  that	  trials	  begin	  in	  as	  little	  as	  six	  weeks,	  the	  suspected	   pirates	   are	   represented	   by	   local	   lawyers	   (often	   with	   foreign	   legal	  assistance),	   translators	  are	  provided	  by	   capturing	  States	  and	   that	   the	   Judiciary	  has	   been	   brought	   to	   a	   higher	   standard	   and	   that	   in	   some	   cases	   diplomatic	  observers	   are	   present.164	  While	   all	   these	   things	  may	   be	   so,	   from	   the	   suspected	  pirates	  perspective	  he	  is	  being	  tried	  in	  a	  foreign	  court	  and	  having	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  impartiality	   of	   a	   translator	   to	   translate	   the	   entire	   proceedings.	   Built	   in	   to	   the	  right	   of	   a	   fair	   trial	   is	   the	   guarantee	   that	   the	   accused	  will	   not	   be	   compelled	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162	  Ashworth,	  above	  n	  155	  at	  p30.	  
163	  Gathii,	  above	  n	  139	  at	  p432,	  Kontorovich,	  above	  n	  145.	  	  
164	  Guilfoyle,	  above	  n	  144	  at	  pp151-­‐152.	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testify	   against	   himself	   or	   confess	   guilt,	   Art	   14(3)(g)	   ICCPR.	  This	   guarantee	  has	  been	  implied	  into	  Art	  6	  of	  the	  ECHR.165	  	  Ashworth	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  process	  is	  extremely	  out	  of	  balance	  as	  far	  as	  the	  power	  differential	  between	  suspect	  and	  the	  prosecution	  arm	  is	  concerned.166	  	  In	  essence	  those	  prosecuting	  piracy	  have	  at	  their	  very	  fingertips	  it	  would	  seem	  all	  the	  power	  of	  the	  world	  community	  endorsed	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  by	  the	  UN	  and	  the	   Security	   Council.	   The	   suspected	   pirate	   in	   contrast	   would	   appear	   to	   be	  isolated	  and	  restricted	  in	  the	  resources	  that	  he	  can	  bring	  to	  his	  defence.	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  John	  Murray	  v	  U.K.	  (1996)	  22	  EHRR	  29	  para.	  45,	  cited	  by	  Ashworth,	  above	  n	  155	  at	  p18.	  	  
166	  Ashworth,	  above	  n	  155	  at	  p9.	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23 Is	  there	  liability	  for	  the	  State	  responsible	  for	  the	  
destruction	  of	  the	  fishing	  boats	  when	  the	  suspected	  
pirates	  are	  released	  without	  being	  charged?	  	  The	  UNCLOS	  Art	  110(1)(a)	  provides	  for	  a	  right	  of	  visit	  for	  warships	  on	  the	  high	  seas	   where	   some	   there	   is	   a	   reasonable	   ground	   for	   suspecting	   that	   a	   ship	   is	  engaged	   in	  piracy.	  This	  article	   is	   further	   reinforced	  by	   the	  UNSC	   in	  some	  of	   its	  resolutions	  that	  state,	  
‘Renews	  its	  call	  upon	  States	  and	  regional	  organizations	  that	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  do	  so,	   to	   take	  part	   in	   the	   fight	  against	  piracy	  and	  armed	  robbery	  at	   sea	  off	   the	  coast	  of	  Somalia,	   in	  particular,	  consistent	  with	  this	  resolution	  and	  international	  law,	  by	  deploying	  naval	  vessels,	  arms	  and	  military	  aircraft	  and	  through	  seizures	  and	  disposition	  of	  boats,	  vessels,	  arms	  and	  other	  related	  equipment	  used	  in	  the	  commission	  of	  piracy	  and	  armed	  robbery	  at	  sea	  off	   the	  coast	  of	  Somalia,	  or	   for	  which	  there	  are	  reasonable	  grounds	  for	  suspecting	  such	  use.’167	  There	  is	  no	  guidance	  as	  to	  what	  might	  constitute	  a	  ‘reasonable	  ground’	  although	  from	  an	  example	  it	  appears	  that	  being	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  an	  area	  where	  piracy	  has	  been	   carried	   out	   would	   be	   sufficient. 168	  	   This	   level	   of	   behaviour	   is	   further	  amplified	   by	   the	   case	   of	   the	   INS	   Tabar,	   mentioned	   above,	   where	   the	   ship	  concerned	  was	  described	  as	  a	  pirate	  vessel	   in	   ‘description	  and	   intent.’169	  	  While	  this	  may	  be	  helpful	  it	  is	  doubtful	  that	  the	  description	  of	  the	  ship	  alone	  could	  be	  matched	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  ‘Pirate	  ship’	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  UNCLOS	  Art	  103,	  
‘A	  ship	  or	  aircraft	   is	  considered	  a	  pirate	  ship	  or	  aircraft	   if	   it	   is	   intended	  by	   the	  persons	  in	  dominant	  control	  to	  be	  used	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  committing	  one	  of	  the	  acts	  referred	  to	  in	  article	  101.	  The	  same	  applies	  if	  the	  ship	  or	  aircraft	  has	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  SC	  Res.	  2077	  S/RES/2077	  (2012)	  operative	  article	  10	  as	  an	  example.	  (Author	  emphasis	  added).	  
168	  Matteo	  Crippa	  “Is	  there	  a	  liability	  for	  the	  Destruction	  of	  Suspected	  Pirate	  Skiffs?”	  (2013).	  Citing	  EUNAVFOR	  and	  Combined	  Task	  Force	  151	  reports.	  
169	  Valencia	  and	  Khalid,	  above	  n	  119	  at	  p4.	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used	   to	   commit	   any	   such	   act,	   so	   long	   as	   it	   remains	   under	   the	   control	   of	   the	  persons	  guilty	  of	  that	  act.’	  The	   mental	   element	   of	   the	   definition	   would	   need	   to	   be	   abundantly	   apparent	  from	  the	  manner	  of	  the	  ship.	  That	  it	  is	  alleged	  that	  shots	  were	  fired	  at	  the	  Tabar	  would	  go	  some	  way	  to	  support	  the	  ground	  that	  there	  was	  an	  intention	  to	  commit	  a	  criminal	  act,	  it	  just	  might	  not	  have	  been	  piracy.	  If	  that	  criminal	  act	  fell	  outside	  the	   right	   of	   visit	   granted	   under	   the	   UNCLOS	   Art	   110	   then	   there	   would	   be	   no	  grounds	   for	   the	   action	   taken	   by	   the	   Tabar	   unless	   the	   ship	   was	   stopped	   and	  significant	   enquiries	   made.	   The	   intention	   of	   those	   that	   fled	   the	   incident,	   the	  alleged	  pirates,	  could	  have	  been	  to	  do	  with	  arms	  smuggling	  or	  people	  trafficking,	  neither	  of	  which	  grant	  a	  right	  of	  visit	  under	  the	  UNCLOS	  although	  there	  may	  be	  a	  right	  under	  other	  conventions	  if	  both	  parties	  are	  signatories.	  	  	  The	  Enrica	  Lexie	   incident	   described	  below	   indicates	   that	   a	   ‘reasonable	   ground’	  could	  be	  as	  little	  as	  a	  being	  a	  fishing	  boat.170	  	  Should	   it	   be	   proven	   that	   there	   were	   no	   grounds	   for	   suspecting	   that	   the	   ship	  stopped	   was	   a	   pirate	   ship,	   as	   appears	   the	   case	   in	   the	   EUNAVFOR	   incident	  referred	  to	  above,	  then	  under	  the	  UNCLOS	  Art	  101(3)	  the	  flag	  State	  could	  apply	  on	   behalf	   of	   the	   ship	   stopped	   for	   compensation.	   Once	   again	   this	   would	   prove	  hard	   to	   achieve	   at	   this	   current	   point	   in	   time	   as	   the	   State	   of	   Somalia	   is	   still	  recovering	   from	   23	   years	   of	   turmoil	   and	   bringing	   action	   against	   some	   of	   the	  worlds	   largest	   economies	   who	   are	   reputedly	   trying	   to	   help	   them	   would	   be	   a	  significant	  request	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	  Discussed	  below.	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24 Are	  those	  that	  kill	  the	  pirates	  and	  the	  innocent	  fishermen	  
held	  to	  account?	  	  It	   is	  not	  as	   though	   the	  wrongful	  death	  of	  either	  a	  pirate	  or	  an	   innocent	  person	  suspected	   of	   piracy	   is	   not	   going	   to	   happen.	   There	   have	   been	   several	   recorded	  incidents.	  These	  are	  just	  examples	  of	  what	  has	  happened.	  An	  alleged	  pirate	  was	  reportedly	  killed171	  in	   incident	  and	  an	   innocent	   fisherman	  was	  killed	  when	  shot	  by	  Italian	  Marines	  who	  were	  on	  board	  a	  merchant	  ship,	  the	  Enrica	  Lexie.172	  Add	  to	  these	  incidents	  the	  video	  clip	  of	  the	  Avocet	  security	  guards	  shooting	  at	  a	  skiff	  that	  crashes	   into	   the	   side	   of	   the	   ship	   and	   prior	   to	   that,	   the	   incident	   involving	   the	  
Almezaan	   in	   which	   one	   of	   the	   suspected	   pirates	   was	   killed.173	  Apart	   from	   the	  incident	   involving	   the	  Enrica	  Lexie	  there	  has	  been	  no	   thorough	   investigation	  of	  the	  circumstances	  and	  no	  court	  hearing	  to	  adjudicate	  on	  the	  evidence.	  Guilfoyle	  suggests	  that	  should	  there	  be	  a	  failure	  to	  investigate	  wrongful	  killings	  there	  may	  be	  grounds	  for	  attribution	  of	  State	  responsibility.174	  	  While	   the	   security	   guard	  may	   be	   subject	   to	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   jurisdictions,	   flag	  State,	   nationality	   state,	   flag	   State	   of	   the	   vessel	   fired	   on	   and	   the	   State	   of	   the	  security	   company;	   there	   is	   little	   direction	   as	   to	   which	   State	   would	   take	  precedence	   in	   the	   case	  of	   a	  wrongful	  killing.	  Guilfoyle	   thinks	   that	   is	   a	  practical	  question	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  lottery	  won	  by	  the	  State	  that	  takes	  the	  offender	  into	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  Fox	  news	  Private	  Guards	  Kill	  Somali	  Pirate	  for	  the	  First	  Time	  24	  March	  2010.	  http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/03/24/private-­‐guards-­‐kill-­‐Somali-­‐pirate-­‐for-­‐first-­‐time.	  
172	  James	  Brown	  Pirates	  and	  Privateers:	  Managing	  the	  Indian	  Ocean's	  Private	  Security	  Boom	  (Lowy	  Institute	  for	  International	  Policy,	  Sydney,	  2012)	  at	  p10.	  The	  Enrica	  Lexie	  is	  an	  Italian	  bulk	  carrier	  that	  had	  embarked	  a	  detachment	  of	  Italian	  Marines	  as	  a	  Vessel	  Protection	  Detail.	  The	  Marines	  were	  still	  employed	  by	  the	  Italian	  Government	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Italian	  military	  and	  so	  liability	  would	  devolve	  to	  the	  state.	  This	  incident	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  recall	  of	  the	  Italian	  ambassador	  to	  India	  and	  the	  eventual	  imprisonment	  of	  the	  marines	  in	  an	  Indian	  prison	  awaiting	  trial	  on	  charges	  of	  murder.	  	  
173	  EU	  NAVFOR,	  “Pirate	  Dies	  in	  Attempted	  Hijacking	  –EU	  NAVFOR	  Detains	  Pirate	  Action	  Group”	  24	  March	  2010.	  Cited	  in	  Priddy	  and	  Casey-­‐Maslen,	  above	  n	  116	  at	  p843.	  
174	  Douglas	  Guilfoyle	  “Shooting	  Fishermen	  Mistaken	  for	  Pirates:	  Jurisdiction,	  Immunity	  and	  State	  Responsibility	  ”	  (2012).	  His	  view	  is	  supported	  by	  James	  	  Crawford	  and	  Simon	  	  Olleson	  “The	  Nature	  and	  Forms	  of	  International	  Responsibility	  ”	  in	  Malcolm	  Evans	  (ed)	  International	  Law	  (3rd	  ed,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford,	  2010)	  at	  p	  454.	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custody	   first.175	  In	   the	  Enrica	  Lexie	  quoted	  above,	   there	  was	  a	  definite	  action	  by	  the	   Indian	   Government	   to	   seek	   the	   apprehension	   of	   those	   responsible	   for	   the	  killing	  under	  the	  territorial	  principle	  discussed	  further	  below,	  as	  the	  victim	  was	  on	  a	  vessel	  registered	  under	  an	  Indian	  flag.176	  That	  the	  Italian	  ship	  ventured	  into	  Indian	  waters	  was	  a	  factor	  that	  also	  gave	  India	  jurisdiction	  to	  act.	  	  That	  situation	  may	  have	  been	  easier	  to	  resolve	  as	  the	  offenders	   in	  this	  case	  were	  working	  for	  the	   Italian	   government	   and	   there	   were	   clear	   lines	   of	   State	   authority	   and	  responsibility	   back	   to	   the	   Italian	   Government.	   However	   compare	   this	   to	   the	  
Tabar	   incident	   mentioned	   above.	   177 	  There	   is	   no	   evidence	   of	   thorough	  investigation	   by	   the	   Indian	   Navy	   as	   to	   the	   circumstances	   of	   the	   killing	   and	   it	  would	   appear	  no	   credible	  witnesses.	   	   It	   is	  much	   less	   so	   in	   the	   first	   case	  of	   the	  killing	  of	  the	  Somali	  pirate.	  As	  to	  which	  State	  prosecutes	  the	  unfortunate	  security	  guard	  responsible	  for	  the	  killing	  of	  the	  pirate	  it	  comes	  down	  to	  a	  matter	  of	  which	  State,	  either	  Somalia,	  unlikely,	  or	  the	  flag	  State	  of	  the	  vessel	  from	  which	  the	  shot	  or	  shots	  were	  fired.178	  Art	  94(4)(b)	  of	  the	  UNCLOS	  requires	  that	  each	  ship	  be	  in	  charge	   of	   a	   master	   and	   certified	   officers.	   The	   SOLAS	   Annex	   and	   general	  provisions	   Chapter	   XI-­‐2	   Special	   Measures	   to	   Enhance	   Maritime	   Security	  regulation	   8(1)	   makes	   it	   clear	   that	   the	   Master	   shall	   not	   be	   constrained	   in	  matters,	  which	  in	  his	  judgment	  are	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  the	  safety	  and	  security	  of	  the	  ship.	  	  The	  GUARDCON	  contract	  for	  the	  Employment	  of	  Security	  Guards	  on	  Vessels	   at	   Part	   II	   Section	   4(8)	   clearly	   apportions	   responsibility	   for	   the	   safe	  navigation	   and	   overall	   command	   of	   the	   vessel	   to	   the	   Master.	   However,	   with	  regard	  to	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  (Section	  4(8)(b)),	  the	  team	  leader	  is	  required	  to	  advise	  the	  Master	  when	  he	  is	  going	  to	  engage	  the	  Rules	  for	  Use	  of	  Force.	  Section	  4(8)(c)	  leaves	   the	   responsibility	   for	   the	   use	   of	   force	  with	   the	   security	   personnel.	   The	  Masters	  retention	  of	  authority	  is	  reinforced	  under	  Section	  4(8)(d)	  as	  to	  ordering	  of	   a	   cessation	   in	   firing	   under	   all	   circumstances	   but	   does	   not	   override	   the	  individuals	  right	  to	  protect	  them	  self	  in	  a	  case	  of	  self-­‐defence.	  	  The	  control	  over	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175	  Guilfoyle	  above	  n	  174.	  If	  the	  matter	  is	  ever	  actually	  investigated.	  	  
176	  It	  would	  also	  be	  possible	  for	  India	  to	  claim	  jurisdiction	  based	  on	  the	  passive	  personality	  principle,	  also	  discussed	  below.	  	  
177	  Valencia	  and	  Khalid,	  above	  n	  119.	  
178	  Guilfoyle,	  above	  n	  174	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the	   ship	   by	   the	  master	   is	   restated	   in	   the	   IMO	   guidance	   on	   the	   deployment	   of	  armed	  security	  personnel.179	  The	  US	  has	  issued	  Port	  Security	  Advisory	  Guidance	  on	   Self	   Defence	   and	   Defence	   of	   others	   by	   U.S.	   Flagged	   Commercial	   Vessels	  Operating	   in	   High	   Risk	   Waters180	  where	   the	   ship’s	   masters’	   authorisation	   is	  needed	  if	  the	  action	  is	  taken	  in	  defence	  of	  the	  cargo	  or	  ship,	  but	  is	  not	  required	  in	  defence	   of	   the	   person	   or	   of	   others.	   Returning	   to	   the	   Avocet	   incident	   for	   a	  moment,	   the	   Master	   of	   the	   Avocet	   would	   be	   responsible	   at	   a	   minimum	   for	  returning	   to	   check	  on	   the	   safety	   of	   the	   crew	  of	   the	   skiff	   that	  was	   fired	  on	   and	  where	  practicable	   to	   render	   the	  necessary	   assistance	  under	  Art	  98(1)(a)	   –	   (c).	  That	   there	   is	   no	   indication	   of	   this	   happening	   or	   any	   investigation	   into	   the	  circumstances	  by	  the	  IMO,	  in	  itself	  condones	  this	  type	  of	  lack	  of	  responsibility.	  So	   were	   these	   actions	   justified	   as	   self-­‐defence	   and	   whose	   law	   of	   self-­‐defence	  applies?	  Presumably	  it	  would	  be	  the	  flag	  State	   laws	  of	  self-­‐defence,	  but	   it	  could	  also	  be	  the	  law	  relating	  to	  self-­‐defence	  for	  the	  nationality	  of	  the	  security	  guard,	  the	  security	  company,	  the	  owners	  of	  the	  vessel,	  the	  territorial	  waters	  where	  the	  incident	  occurred	  and	  on	  to	  a	  list	  that	  is	  almost	  endless	  and	  certainly	  not	  clear	  at	  any	   given	   time.	   The	   personal	   doctrine	   of	   self-­‐defence	  would	   limit	   the	   right	   of	  security	  guards	  to	  deal	  only	  with	  attacks	  on	  ships	  and	  not	  to	  pre-­‐emptive	  firing	  shots	  at	  the	  suspected	  pirates	  to	  keep	  them	  from	  committing	  an	  act	  of	  piracy.	  	  The	   two	   incidents	   highlighted	   above,	   regarding	   the	   death	   of	   possibly	   innocent	  seamen,	   show	   the	   lack	   of	   understanding	   of	   the	   legal	   consequences	   of	   utilising	  Private	   Security	   Companies,	   (PSC),	   as	  well	   as	   the	   significant	   legal	   complexities	  that	  arise	  following	  the	  death	  of	  a	  pirate	  or	  suspected	  pirate.181	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179	  International	  Maritime	  Organisation	  MSC.1/Circ.1405/	  Rev.2	  25	  May	  2012	  at	  paragraph	  5.9	  of	  the	  Annex.	  	  
180	  US	  Coast	  Guard	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security,	  Guidance	  on	  Self	  Defence	  and	  Defence	  of	  others	  by	  U.S.	  Flagged	  Commercial	  Vessels	  Operating	  in	  High	  Risk	  Waters,	  Port	  Security	  Advisory	  (3-­‐09),	  18	  June	  2009	  
181	  Fox	  news,	  above	  n	  171	  where	  the	  journalist	  highlighted	  the	  issue	  of	  who	  was	  responsible	  for	  investigating	  the	  death	  of	  the	  pirate,	  the	  flag	  state	  of	  the	  shipping	  company	  or	  the	  flag	  state	  of	  the	  security	  guard	  involved	  or	  indeed	  it	  could	  be	  Somalia	  if	  the	  event	  occurred	  in	  its	  territorial	  waters	  which	  is	  unclear	  from	  the	  article.	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25 The	  problems	  with	  deployment	  of	  Private	  Security	  
Companies	  	  As	   a	   response	   to	   piracy	   there	   have	   been	   a	   number	   of	   recommendations	   to	  merchant	  shipping	  lines	  on	  to	  how	  best	  to	  protect	  the	  ships	  sailing	  through	  the	  Gulf	   of	   Aden	   and	   the	   eastern	   reaches	   of	   the	   Indian	   Ocean.	   These	   include	   the	  deployment	   of	   passive	   measures,	   the	   employment	   of	   State	   defence	   force	  personnel	  as	  on	  board	  security	  (Vessel	  Protection	  Detachments	  VPD)182	  and	  the	  utilisation	   of	   Private	   Military	   Security	   Company	   (PMSC)	   guards 183 	  The	  employment	   of	   either	   VPDs	   or	   PMSCs	   has	   generated	   concern	   over	   the	   precise	  legal	  position	  of	   either	  when	  operating.	   	   PMSCs	  exist	   in	   a	   legal	   lacuna	   in	   some	  respect,	  as	  there	  are	  no	  overarching	  binding	  international	  agreements.184	  	  	  A	   first	   step	   towards	   regulating	   the	   PSC	   industry	   in	   relation	   to	   Piracy	  was	   the	  formulation	   of	   the	   Montreux	   Document,	   which	   outlines	   the	   obligations	   of	  countries	  with	   private	  military	   and	   security	   companies	   in	  war	   zones.185	  	  While	  piracy	   off	   the	   Coast	   of	   Somalia	   is	   not	   a	   declared	  war	   zone,	   but	  more	   of	   a	   law	  enforcement	  action,	  the	  guidelines	  provide	  pertinent	  reading.	  	  In	  2010	  the	  UN,	  as	  a	   result	   of	   a	   working	   group	   developed	   a	   draft	   convention	   on	   PMSCs	   for	  consideration	   and	   action	   by	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Council	   (Draft	   Convention	   on	  PMSCs).186	  The	  Draft	  Convention	  on	  PMSCs	  has	  as	   its	   focus	  the	  use	  of	  PMSCs	  by	  States	   to	   bolster	  military	   forces.	   	   The	  working	   group	   identified	   the	   gap	   in	   the	  international	  regulation	  of	  PMSCs	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  PMSCs	  have	  been	  responsible	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182	  Brown,	  above	  n	  172	  at	  p9.	  
183	  The	  BMP4:	  Best	  Management	  Practices	  to	  Deter	  Piracy	  off	  the	  Coast	  of	  Somalia	  and	  in	  the	  Arabian	  Sea	  Area,	  (2010	  Witherby	  Seamanship	  International,	  Edinburgh)	  Section	  8	  pg	  23.	  
184	  C	  Liss	  “Regulating	  Private	  Military	  and	  Security	  Companies	  at	  Sea:	  New	  Developments	  and	  Challenges”	  (A	  regional	  Response	  to	  Maritime	  Piracy:	  Enhancing	  Public-­‐Private	  Partnerships	  and	  Strengthening	  Global	  Engagement,	  Dubai,	  June	  2012)	  at	  p2.	  
185	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  ‘	  The	  Montreux	  Document:	  On	  Pertinent	  International	  Legal	  Obligations	  and	  Good	  Practices	  for	  States	  Related	  to	  Operations	  of	  Private	  Military	  and	  Security	  Companies	  during	  Armed	  Conflict	  September	  2008.	  	  
186	  Report	  of	  the	  Working	  Group	  on	  the	  use	  of	  mercenaries	  as	  a	  means	  of	  violating	  human	  rights	  and	  impeding	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  peoples	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  A/HRC/15/25	  2	  July	  2010.	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for	   breaches	   of	   human	   rights	   for	   which	   few	   of	   the	   offenders	   have	   been	   held	  accountable.	   The	   working	   group	   identified	   that	   while	   PMSCs	   and	   contractors	  have	  been	  held	  accountable	  within	  municipal	  law	  for	  some	  breaches187	  there	  has	  been	  a	  lack	  of	  prosecutions.188	  	  There	  is	  also	  the	  International	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  Private	  Security	  Service	  Providers	  (2010),	  (ICOC).189	  As	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  the	  ICOC	   had	   708	   companies	   as	   signatories. 190 	  The	   ICOC	   has	   as	   it	   aim	   the	  endorsement	  of	  the	  Montreux	  Document	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Respect,	  Protect,	  Remedy	  framework	  provided	  by	  the	  Special	  Representative	  to	  the	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General	  on	  Business	  and	  Human	  Rights,	  as	  well	  as	  respecting	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  respect	  for	   human	   rights.	   The	   IMO	   have	   produced	   a	   set	   of	   guidelines,	  MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2	   for	   the	  employment	  of	  PMSCs	  and	  privately	   contracted	  armed	  security	  personnel	  (PCASP).191	  The	  guidelines	  are	  not	  binding	  and	  provide	  what	  at	  best	  could	  be	  described	  as	  the	  compilation	  of	  general	  information	  to	  be	  used	  when	  employing	  PMSCs	  or	  PCASP.	  There	   is	  an	  avoidance	  of	  any	  definitive	  statements	   regarding	   liability	   should	   there	   be	   an	   incident	   that	   involves	   the	  taking	   of	   life.	   Generally	   these	   documents	   cover	   the	   same	   basic	   ground.	   The	  respect	   for	   human	   rights,	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   security	   guard	   to	   utilise	   extreme	  violence	  in	  the	  defence	  of	  either	  himself	  or	  of	  others,	  and	  requirements	  to	  report	  incidents	  of	  that	  exercise	  to	  competent	  authorities.	  	  There	   have	   been	   other	   initiatives	   designed	   to	   strengthen	   the	   control	   of	   PSCs	  worldwide	  including	  documents	  such	  as	  the	  Department	  for	  Transport,	  ‘Interim	  Guidance	  to	  Flagged	  Shipping	  on	  the	  Use	  of	  Armed	  Guards	  to	  Defend	  Against	  the	  Threat	  of	  Piracy	  in	  Exceptional	  Circumstances.’192	  	  The	  BMP4:	  Best	  Management	  Practices	  to	  Deter	  Piracy	  off	  the	  Coast	  of	  Somalia	  and	  in	  the	  Arabian	  Sea	  Area193	  identifies	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  measures	   to	  deter	  pirate	  attacks.	  These	  measures	  include,	  reliance	  on	  Naval	  protection,	  creating	  a	  citadel,	  or	  secure	  area	  on	  board	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187	  Draft	  Convention	  on	  PMSCs	  above	  n	  185	  at	  ¶19-­‐20	  	  	  
188	  At	  ¶36.	  
189	  The	  International	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  Private	  Security	  Service	  Providers	  	  9	  November	  2010	  
190	  www.icoc-­‐psp/uploads/Signatory_Companies_-­‐_August_2013_-­‐_Composite_	  List2.pdf	  	  
191	  MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2	  25	  May	  2011.	  
192	  Department	  for	  Transport,	  ‘Interim	  Guidance	  to	  UK	  Flagged	  Shipping	  on	  the	  Use	  of	  Armed	  Guards	  to	  Defend	  Against	  the	  Threat	  of	  Piracy	  in	  Exceptional	  Circumstances’	  November	  2011.	  
193	  The	  BMP4	  above	  n	  183.	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the	  ship,	  the	  use	  of	  non-­‐lethal	  defences	  (Long	  Range	  Acoustic	  Devices,	  Fire	  hoses	  directed	   at	   the	   pirates),	   Unarmed	   shipboard	   guards	   and	   the	   deployment	   of	  armed	  guards	  or	  military	  teams	  from	  the	  flag	  State	  defence	  forces.	  While	  each	  of	  these	   measures	   have	   had	   some	   success	   in	   reducing	   pirate	   attacks	   the	   most	  problematic	   appears	   to	   be	   the	   deployment	   of	   armed	   guards	   aboard	  merchant	  vessels.	   These	   armed	   guards	   present	   a	   number	   of	   concerns	   for	   the	   shipping	  companies	  ranging	  from	  the	  increase	  of	  risk	  to	  ship’s	  crews	  through	  to	   liability	  and	  insurance	  issues	  in	  the	  case	  of	  death	  or	  injury	  and	  the	  complex	  legal	  issues	  associated	  with	  employing	  lethal	  force	  at	  sea.194	  	  As	   an	   example	   of	   the	   type	  of	   incident	   these	  measures	   are	  designed	   to	   address	  there	  is	  a	  video	  recording	  of	  an	  incident	  on	  board	  the	  Avocet.195	  	  This	  video	  shows	  guards	  on	  board	  the	  ship	  shooting	  at	  an	  approaching	  skiff	  until	  it	  hits	  the	  side	  of	  the	  ship.	  	  	  	  What	   can	   be	   said	   in	   sum	   is	   that	   there	   is	   no	   definitive	   binding	   international	  legislation	  or	  regulation	  to	  control	  the	  actions	  of	  PCASP	  on	  board	  merchant	  ships	  as	  they	  pass	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia.	  There	  is	  reluctance	  by	  ships	  to	  report	  incidents	  that	  occur	  as	  stopping	  the	  ship	  costs	  significant	  time,	  which	  amounts	  to	  money.	  There	  are	  questions	  of	  responsibility	  and	  liability	  that	  shipping	  companies	  would	  no	  doubt	  wish	  to	  avoid.	  The	  definitive	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  is	  that	  there	  have	  been	   innocent	   fishermen	   and	   suspected	   pirates	   killed.	   There	   have	   been	   some	  investigations	   and	   self-­‐defence	   has	   been	   claimed	   as	   the	   reasons	   behind	   the	  shootings.	   There	   are	   unsubstantiated	   allegations	   that	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	  suspected	  pirates	  being	  killed.	  These	  incidents	  are	  easy	  to	  avoid	  as	  they	  happen	  in	   the	   main	   on	   the	   high	   seas	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   any	   State	   to	   actively	   and	  willingly	  intervene.	  Unless	  there	  is	  sufficient	  corroborated	  evidence	  of	  these	  acts	  supplied	  by	  an	  independent	  source,	  neither	  pirates	  nor	  security	  companies,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  anyone	  being	  held	  to	  account	  is	  very	  slim.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194	  Brown,	  above	  n	  172	  at	  p6.	  
195	  M	  Bockmann	  and	  A	  Katz	  “Shooting	  to	  Kill	  Pirates	  Risks	  Blackwater	  Moment.”	  (2012)	  Washington	  DC.	  There	  is	  insufficient	  background	  to	  the	  video	  footage	  to	  form	  an	  opinion	  as	  to	  what	  has	  happened	  prior	  to	  and	  post	  the	  shooting,	  but	  there	  is	  sufficient	  to	  form	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  moves	  to	  regulate	  the	  PMSC	  industry	  may	  be	  timely.	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26 Conclusion	  	  As	   stated	   in	   the	   introduction	  piracy	   is	   not	   a	  new	  phenomenon.	  The	   conditions	  that	  exist	  today	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  pirates	  operate	  have	  not	  changed	  since	  the	  golden	  age	  of	  piracy.	  What	  has	  changed	  is	  the	  global	  perspective	  on	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  criminals	  are	  dealt	  with.	  Where	  once	  it	  was	  acceptable	  to	  ‘attack’	  pirates	  with	  warships,	  capture	  and	  try	  them	  and	  dispense	  justice	  on	  the	  high	   seas,	   now	   it	   is	   expected	   that	   the	   pirate	   will	   face	   a	   criminal	   court	   where	  justice	  will	  be	  subject	  to	  process	  and	  procedure.	  	  Piracy	  was	  and	  is	  about	  nothing	  more	  than	  the	  control	  of	  property.	  As	  such	  it	  is	  a	  criminal	   offence	   and	   should	   be	   dealt	   with	   by	   way	   of	   Police	   action.	   Patrolling	  controls	  piracy,	  policing	  eradicates	  it.196	  	  If	  Police	  action	  is	  initiated	  in	  a	  clear	  and	  precise	  manner	   from	   the	   U.N.	   Security	   Council	   down	   then	   those	   involved	  will	  know	  what	  their	   limitations	  are	  and	  the	  procedures	  to	  take.	  This	  will	  condition	  the	  terminology	  used	  making	  it	  clearer.	  The	  use	  of	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘fight’	  and	  ‘war’	  on	   piracy	   bring	   the	   wrong	  mindset	   to	   the	   problem.197	  Guilfoyle	   quite	   correctly	  refers	   to	   the	   utilisation	   of	   ‘policing	   resources,‘	   which	   creates	   a	   mindset	   of	  effective	   patrolling,	   evidence	   gathering	   for	   court	   prosecution	   and	   the	   eventual	  prosecution	  of	  pirates.198	  Navies	  have	  had	  to	  be	  trained	  in	  a	  range	  of	  protocols	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  apprehension	  of	  pirates	  to	  ensure	  evidence	  is	  not	  lost	  or	  presented	  in	   a	   way	   that	   meets	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   prosecuting	   state 199 .	   Piracy	  provisions	   of	   UNCLOS	   are	   not	   working.200	  More	   because	   the	   provisions	   were	  created	  at	  a	  time	  when	  piracy	  was	  rife	  and	  not	  largely	  historical	  and	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  modern	   pirate	  working	   out	   of	   Somalia,	   Nigeria	   or	   Asia	   than	   for	   any	   other	  reason.201	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  Martin	  Murphy	  “Piracy	  and	  UNCLOS:	  Does	  International	  Law	  Help	  Regional	  States	  Combat	  Piracy?”	  in	  Peter	  Lehr	  (ed)	  Violence	  at	  Sea:	  Piracy	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Global	  Terrorism	  (Taylor	  &	  Francis	  Group,	  New	  York,	  2007)	  at	  p168.	  
197	  Sterio	  above	  n	  67	  at	  p463.	  
198	  Guilfoyle,	  above	  n	  120	  at	  p770.	  	  
199	  At	  p781.	  
200	  Murphy,	  above	  n	  196	  at	  p172.	  
201	  At	  p172.	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Universal	   jurisdiction	   is	   not	   the	   be	   all	   and	   end	   all	   to	   the	   scourge	   of	   piracy.	  Kontorovich202	  describes	  universal	  jurisdiction	  as	  failing	  to	  end	  impunity	  for	  the	  crime	  based	  on	  the	  low	  use	  rate	  of	  1.47	  per	  cent	  for	  prosecutions	  of	  piracy.	  This	  is	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   usage	   by	   the	  Western	   world	   of	   universal	   jurisdiction	   for	  crimes	  of	  human	  rights	  abuses	  located	  in	  developing	  States.	  	  The	  serious	  consequences	  of	  piracy	  require	  a	  more	  precise,	  principled	  definition	  of	  what	  constitutes	  an	  act	  of	  piracy.203	  Extended	  regional	  cooperation	  is	  a	  possible	  solution	  to	  the	  problem.	  Prisons	  and	  speedy	  appearance	  before	  courts	  are	  needed	  to	  avoid	  breaches	  of	  human	  rights.	  There	  needs	  to	  be	  greater	  involvement	  of	   impartial	  bodies	  to	  ensure	  that	  those	  apprehended	  are	  accorded	  all	  the	  protections	  available	  to	  them.	  	  If	   the	   navies	   and	   armed	   forces	   of	   the	   global	   community	   are	   insufficient	   to	  provide	  security	  for	  ships	  transiting	  piracy	  prone	  areas	  and	  there	  is	  a	  reliance	  on	  PMSC	  to	  fill	  the	  void,	  then	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  stringent	  regulation	  and	  control	  of	  those	  companies.	  Clear,	  enforceable	  regulation	  that	  sets	  stringent	  boundaries	  as	  to	   the	   action	   that	   can	   be	   taken	   to	   deter	   pirates	   needs	   to	   be	   created	   and	  promulgated.	   Accountability	   for	   those,	   either	   within	   the	   PMSC	   or	   the	   military	  needs	  to	  be	  as	  balanced	  as	  that	  for	  the	  pirates	  and	  any	  transgressions	  need	  to	  be	  investigated	  and	  the	  offenders	  brought	  to	  justice.	  	  Piracy	   has	   never	   gone	   away.	   Indeed	   it	   could	   be	   classified	   as	   the	  world’s	   third	  oldest	  profession.	  What	   is	   required	   is	   constant	  attention	   to	   the	   conditions	   that	  stimulate	   piracy	   along	   with	   constant	   attention	   to	   the	   legislation	   designed	   to	  bring	  to	  justice	  those	  that	  perpetrate	  it.	  While	  the	  actions	  of	  pirates	  occur	  mostly	  out	  of	  view	  of	  the	  world,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  pirates	  to	  be	  out	  of	  the	  worldview.	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  Eugene	  Kontorovich	  and	  Steven	  Art	  “An	  Empirical	  Examination	  of	  Universal	  Jurisdiction	  for	  Piracy”	  2010	  104	  A.	  J.	  I.	  L.	  436	  at	  p453.	  
203	  Bento,	  above	  n	  19	  at	  p414.	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27 Conclusion	  	   I	  am	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  My	  silent	  cries	  go	  unheard	  My	  tears	  unwiped,	  my	  eyes	  blurred	  I	  am	  Somalia	  (Helwaa)1	  
	  	  
27.1 Failed	  States	  If	  all	  the	  attention	  that	  has	  been	  focussed	  on	  Somalia	  over	  the	  last	  twenty	  years	  by	  the	  international	  community	  has	  failed	  to	  solve	  the	  failed	  state	  crisis	  and	  has,	  perhaps,	   contributed	   to	   its	   ongoing	   instability,	   it	   is	   not	   beyond	   the	   realm	   of	  possibility	  that	  the	  wrong	  focus	  has	  been	  adopted.	  	  In	   essence,	   the	   outside	  world	  wants	   to	   see	  what	   it	   knows	   and	   understands,	   a	  sovereign	  and	  central	  government.	  The	  Somalis	  see	   this	  not	  as	  enhancing	   their	  life	   but	   as	   a	   direct	   threat	   to	   their	   peace.2	  The	   State	   is	   seen	   as	   dominating,	  enriching,	   and	   empowering	   those	  who	   control	   it	   and	   exploiting	   and	   harassing	  those	  without	  control.3	  	  The	  response	  to	  the	  Somali	  crisis	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  misreading.4	  This	  misreading	  is	   based	   largely	   on	   a	  Western	   philosophy	   of	   war	   and	   peace	   and	   control	   by	   a	  central	   government.	   Any	   other	   variation	   is	   too	   challenging	   for	   the	   West	   to	  comprehend.	  This	  creates	  enormous	  problems	  when	  a	  solution	  for	  a	  failed	  state	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Cachia,	  above	  n	  1	  Chapter	  1.	  
2	  See	  Menkhaus,	  above	  Chapter	  2	  	  n128	  at	  p84.	  	  
3	  H	  Richardson	  “Failed	  States,	  Self	  Determination	  and	  Preventive	  Diplomacy:	  Colonialist	  Nostalgia	  and	  Democratic	  Expectations”	  1996	  10	  Temp.	  Int'l	  Comp.	  L.	  Jl;	  at	  ;	  at	  	  p28.	  
4	  Richardson,	  above	  n2	  at	  p77.	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is	  crafted	  externally	  to	  the	  actors	  within	  the	  state.	  The	  cost	  of	  this	  failure	  by	  the	  West	  is	  enormous,	  both	  to	  itself	  and	  to	  those	  states	  it	  is	  hoping	  to	  help5.	  Much	  of	  the	  programme	   for	   rebuilding	  Somalia	   is	  driven	  by	   the	  US’s	   fear	  of	  a	   collapsed	  state	  becoming	  a	  haven	  for	  terrorist	  activity	  which	  will	  be	  carried	  out	  against	  its	  assets	  and	  citizens.6	  If	  one	  analyses	  this	  approach,	   it	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  people	  of	  Somalia	  being	  helped	  into	  a	  more	  stable	  environment,	  it	  reflects	  more	  of	   the	   external	   actors,	   acting	   for	   their	   benefit.	   This	   is	   little	   difference	   between	  this	  approach	  and	  that	  taken	  by	  the	  colonists.	  The	   term	   ‘failed	   State’	   has	   no	   legal	   consequences	   and	   is	   nothing	  more	   than	   a	  political	   descriptor	   of	   a	   state	   that	   lacks	   effective	   government.	   There	   are	  consequences	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term.	  These	  are	  more	  of	  a	  practical	  nature	  than	  a	  legal	   consequence,	   although	   some	  of	   the	   consequences	  have	   legal	   implications.	  Amongst	  these	  is	  the	  inability	  of	  a	  state	  to	  form	  international	  relationships,	  the	  lack	   of	   standing	   in	   courts,	   and	   the	   loss	   of	   voting	   power	   within	   international	  institutions.	  	  The	  inability	  of	  the	  international	  community,	  including	  international	  institutions,	  to	   conceive	   of	   something,	   other	   than	   a	   functioning	   State,	   as	   part	   of	   the	  community,	   is	   a	   hindrance	   to	   the	   efficient,	   legitimate,	   processes	   required	   to	  assist	  the	  State	  in	  reconstituting	  itself	  in	  a	  functioning,	  non-­‐threatening	  manner.	  	  While	  this	  model	  remains	  the	  only	  acceptable	  version	  there	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  those,	  who	  for	  whatever	  reason,	  geographic,	  political,	  religious	  and	  sociological	  do	  not	  measure	  up	  to	  some	  ill	  defined	  value	  laden	  model.	  While	   the	   colonists	   may	   have	   drawn	   boundaries	   that	   ignored	   the	  make	   up	   of	  tribal	   institutions	  and	  their	   traditional	  homelands	  that	   is	  not	   the	  cause	  of	  State	  failure.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Richardson,	  above	  n2	  at	  p77.	  
6	  Thomas	  Englehardt	  The	  United	  States	  of	  Fear	  (Haymarket	  Books,	  Chicago,	  2011).	  The	  thesis	  of	  this	  book	  is	  that	  the	  United	  States	  lives	  in	  a	  state	  of	  perpetual	  fear.	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27.2 Illegal	  Fishing	  A	  consequence	  of	  a	  State	  lacking	  effective	  government	  is	  the	  inability	  to	  provide	  protection	  for	  State	  resources.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Somalia	  that	  has	  meant	  the	  3000M	  coastline	   is	   left	  unprotected	  and	   the	   resources	   that	  dwell	  within	   the	   territorial	  waters	   are	   open	   to	   any	   to	   fishers	   both	   legal	   and	   illegal	   that	   want	   to	   reap	   a	  substantial	   harvest.	  7	  That	   there	   is	   international	   law	   that	   exists	   to	   stop	   illegal	  fishing	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   bring	   it	   to	   a	   halt.	   It	   falls	   on	   those	   entrusted	   with	  governance	   at	   State	   level,	   outside	   Somalia,	   that	   make	   the	   decisions	   about	   the	  deployment	  of	  resources	  that	  put	  in	  to	  effect	  the	  existing	  law.	  There	  are	  however	  problems	  with	  that	  law.	  The	  central	   focus	  of	  UNCLOS	  is	  not	   fishing.	  There	   is	  very	   little	  explicitly	   fishing	  focused	  content	  and	  considering	   that	   fishing	   is	  a	  major	  sea	  activity	   it	   is	  at	  best	  puzzling	  why	  there	  is	  this	  lack	  of	  focus.	  This	  gap	  is	  filled	  through	  the	  use	  of	  other	  agreements,	  which	  attempt	   to	   fill	   those	   inadequacies.	  The	  FSA	  aims	   to	  address	  the	  inadequacies	  of	  high	  seas	  fisheries	  management.	  Issues	  regulated	  by	  the	  FSA	  include	   unregulated	   fishing,	   overcapitalisation	   and	   excessive	   fleet	   size,	   vessel	  reflagging	   to	   escape	   controls,	   insufficiently	   selective	   gear,	   unreliable	   databases	  and	  lack	  of	  cooperation	  between	  states.8	  RFMO	  focus	  more	  on	  the	  HS	  and	  are	  species	  specific.	  The	  major	  drawback	  with	  these	  agreements	  is	  that	  they	  do	  not	  take	  account	  of	  other	  valuable	  species	  that	  may	  be	  fished	  for,	  or	  the	  possibility	  that	  by-­‐catch	  is	  dumped	  and	  damaging	  to	  the	  overall	   fishing	   resource.	   RFMOs	   are	   also	   beset	   with	   the	   lengthy	   time	   frame	  applied	   to	   their	   decision	  making	   processes.	  9	  The	  major	   problems	   that	   Somalia	  faces	  with	  these	  agreements	  is	  that	  the	  relevant	  RFMOs	  came	  into	  being	  after	  the	  collapse	   of	   the	   Barre	   government	   and	   therefore	   Somalia	   is	   not	   a	   contracting	  party	   and	   secondly,	   it	   is	   specifically	   for	   tuna	   type	   species	  with	   other	   lucrative	  fish	   stocks	   such	   as	   lobster	   and	   shrimp	   -­‐	   being	   overlooked.	   One	   of	   the	   main	  drawbacks	   of	   RFMO	   is	   the	   length	   of	   time	   that	   it	   takes	   to	   make	   any	   sort	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Tharoor,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  14	  at	  p2.	  The	  value	  of	  fish	  stocks	  taken	  from	  the	  waters	  of	  Somalia	  by	  foreign	  illegal	  fleets	  is	  estimated	  in	  excess	  of	  USD300	  million.	  
8	  FSA,	  above	  Chapter	  2	  n	  69	  at	  p2.	  
9	  Stokke	  and	  Vidas,	  above	  Chapter	  4	  n	  84	  at	  p26.
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decision	   as	   the	   bodies	   normally	   meet	   once	   every	   12	   months	   and	   reaching	  agreement	  can	  be	  a	  process	  drawn	  out	  over	  several	  years.	  This	  problem	  of	  glacial	  decision-­‐making	  is	  compounded	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  not	  even	  all	  members	  adhere	  to	  the	   conservation	  and	  management	  measures,	  nor	   fulfil	   their	   responsibilities	   as	  flag	  States.	  The	  prohibition	  on	  non-­‐flag	  States	   investigating	   the	  breaches	  of	   the	  international	   fishing	   regime	   and	   the	   utilisation	   of	   FOC	   States	   are	   a	   major	  contributor	   to	   the	   ease	   of	   operation	   by	   illegal	   fishers.	   10 	  While	   seemingly	  unrelated	  this	  particular	   issue	  is	   linked	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  sovereignty	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2	   on	   failed	   States	   as	   states	   try	   to	  protect	   the	   ‘sovereignty’	   of	   ‘their’	  vessels	  from	  the	  exercise	  of	  sovereignty	  by	  other	  states.	  	  	  A	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  to	  reign	  in	  both	  nationals	  and	  national	  fishing	  fleets	  that	  are	   determined	   to	   continue	   illegal	   fishing	   contributes	   significantly	   to	   the	  problem	  of	  illegal	  fishing.11	  Soft	  law	  approaches,	  FAO	  IPOA-­‐IUU	  being	  one,	  may	  have	  been	  an	  inducement	  to	  sign	  up	   to	   less	  onerous	   conditions	   to	   control	   illegal	   fishing.	  The	   scale	  of	   illegal	  fishing	  internationally	  is	  so	  large	  and	  detrimental	  to	  conservation	  measures	  that	  try	  to	  protect	  fish	  species	  from	  extinction,	  that	  any	  measure	  that	  allows	  states	  to	  opt	   out	   or	   diminish	   their	   commitments	   no	   longer	   has	   a	   part	   to	   play	   in	   the	  international	  framework.	  Illegal	  fishing	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  conservation	  issue	  instead	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  conservation	  and	  transnational	  criminal	   law	  problem.	  Until	  the	  perspective	  is	  changed,	  the	  problem	  will	  continue.	  PSCs	  involved	  in	  establishing	  maritime	  security	  for	  Somalia	  and	  its	  regions	  have	  met	  a	  number	  of	   logistical	  problems	   that	  have	  reduced	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  companies	  in	  supplying	  quality	  security	  for	  the	  fisheries	  off	  Somalia’s	  coast	  and	  reducing	  the	  incidents	  of	  illegal	  fishing.	  The	  major	  legal	  hurdle	  is	  establishing	  the	  extent	   of	   legitimate	   authority	   that	   the	   PSCs	   have	   to	   act	   on	   behalf	   of	   non-­‐sovereign	   entities	   in	   carrying	   out	   basic	   governmental	   tasks	   in	   the	   form	   of	  security	  over	  national	  fisheries.	  There	  has	  been	  significant	  discussion	  regarding	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Flotham	  and	  others,	  above	  Chapter	  2	  n	  8	  at	  p14.	  
11	  Cantrell,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  57	  at	  p400.	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the	  actions	  of	  pirates	  as	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  their	  actions	  being	  sanctioned	  in	  a	  form	  similar	  to	  the	  privateers	  of	  old.12	  However,	  the	  Paris	  Declaration	  still	  stands	  as	  outlawing	  the	  practice.	  
27.3 Hazardous	  Waste	  Dumping	  UNCLOS	   provides	   the	   framework	   for	   the	   prevention	   of	   hazardous	   waste	  dumping	   in	   the	   sea.	   It	   relies	   on	   the	   strength	   of	   supporting	   international	  regulation	  and	   standards	   to	  do	   its	  work.	   If	   these	   standards	   and	   regulations	  do	  not	   fulfil	   their	   role	   than	   UNCLOS	   fails	   in	   its	   role.	   The	   LDC	   and	   the	   Protocol	  support	   the	  UNCLOS.	  However,	  both	  of	   these	  agreements	   failed	   in	   their	   role	   to	  prevent	   hazardous	  waste	   dumping.	   The	   due	   diligence	   function	   of	   the	   LDC	   has	  allowed	  waste	   to	   be	   dumped	   off	   Somalia’s	   coast	   because	   the	   PIC	   requirement	  was	  not	   fully	  explored	  by	  the	  exporting	  state.	  The	  Protocols	   lack	  of	  compliance	  and	  political	  will	  to	  enforce	  or	  to	  hold	  others	  to	  account	  has	  also	  contributed	  to	  the	  dumping	  problem.	  The	  Basel	  Convention	  does	  not	  impose	  an	  outright	  ban	  on	  the	  transport	  of	  hazardous	  waste	  and	  the	  political	  will	  required	  to	  put	   in	  place	  the	  ban	  amendment	  that	  precludes	  the	  export	  of	  waste	  from	  OECD	  to	  non-­‐OECD	  countries,	   would	   see	   the	   waste	   stopped	   from	   being	   exported	   to	   developing	  states.	  	  The	  Basel	  Convention	  has	  been	  criticised	  because	  it	  does	  not	  criminalise	  hazardous	  waste	  exports,	   it	  only	  attempts	  to	  regulate	  the	  trade.	  13	  Criticism	  also	  centres	  on	  the	  notification	  procedure	  as	  the	  illegal	  traders	  exploit	  the	  gaps	  in	  it.14	  Like	   the	   illegal	   fishing,	   the	  biggest	   threat	   to	   the	  hazardous	  waste	   regime	   is	   the	  illegal	   traffic.15	  In	   part,	   this	   is	   due	   to	   the	   inefficiencies	   of	   the	   both	   the	   Basel	  Convention	   Secretariat	   and	   Interpol	   along	   with	   the	   argument	   of	   developing	  States	   that	   view	   the	   criminalisation	   of	   the	   trade	   as	   an	   affront	   to	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Arky,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  27	  at	  p26	  and	  Bawumia	  and	  Sumaila,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  Error!	  
Bookmark	  not	  defined.13	  at	  p7.	  	  
13	  Clapp,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  11	  at	  p26.	  This	  failure	  to	  ban	  the	  trade	  in	  hazardous	  waste	  outright	  was	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  best	  efforts	  of	  the	  African	  states	  and	  developing	  states	  to	  achieve	  a	  total	  ban.	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  power	  of	  the	  lobby	  groups	  exceeded	  that	  of	  the	  African	  States	  and	  would	  possibly	  reinforce	  the	  neo-­‐colonial	  view	  of	  Africa.	  	  
14	  Sanchez,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  32	  at	  p145.	  
15	  Sanchez,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  31	  at	  p145.	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sovereignty,	   as	   decisions	   as	   to	   what	   they	   can	   and	   cannot	   import	   are	   made	  externally	  via	  treaty.16	  The	  notion	  that	  all	  States	  are	  interdependent	  needs	  to	  be	  realised	  by	  the	  global	  community	  of	  States.	  In	  doing	  this,	  States	  would	  acknowledge	  that	  each	  is	  a	  small	  part	   of	   a	   greater	   environmental	   system.	   There	   is	   no	   temptation	   to	   knowingly	  allow	  pollution	  to	  occur	  to	  another	  State.	  The	  motivation	  to	  produce	  less	  waste	  within	  the	  borders	  of	  each	  State	  takes	  on	  more	  significance	  and	  the	  oceans	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  recover.	  States	  acting	  to	  preserve	  the	  good	  of	  the	  community	  are	  also	  preserving	  their	  own	  individual	  good.	  Non-­‐parties,	  like	  Somalia,	  benefit	  from	  the	  collective	   actions	   of	   States	   against	   those	   who	   actively	   seek	   out	   States	   where	  enforcement	  is	  lax	  in	  order	  to	  dump	  waste.	  	  
27.4 Piracy	  Piracy	   is	   not	   a	   modern	   phenomenon.	   It	   is	   possibly	   the	   world’s	   third	   oldest	  profession.	  Two	  things	  have	  changed	  however,	  the	  technology	  and	  the	  legitimate	  treatment	   of	   pirates.	   The	   global	   perspective	   on	   human	   rights	   influences	   the	  approach	   taken	   to	   prosecute	   them.	   Where	   once	   it	   was	   acceptable	   to	   ‘attack’	  pirates	   with	   warships,	   capture	   and	   try	   them	   and	   dispense	   justice	   on	   the	   high	  seas,	   now	   the	   pirate	   faces	   a	   criminal	   court	   where	   justice	   will	   be	   subject	   to	  process	   and	   procedure.	   The	   law	   that	   supports	   the	   prosecution	   is	   located	   in	  UNCLOS	  and	   in	  national	   legislation.	   	   It	   is	   in	   these	   two	  areas	  where	  definitional	  problems	  occur.	  The	  serious	  consequences	  of	  piracy	  require	  a	  precise	  definition	  of	  what	  constitutes	  an	  act	  of	  piracy.17	  The	  definition	  of	  piracy	  is	  located	  in	  a	  time	  when	  piracy	  was	   largely	  historical.	  The	  spate	  of	  activity	  off	  Somalia’s	  coast	  has	  emphasised	   the	  definitional	   shortcomings.18	  Universal	   jurisdiction	   is	   not	   the	   be	  all	  and	  end	  all	  to	  for	  piracy.	  It	   is	  failing	  to	  end	  impunity	  for	  the	  crime	  based	  on	  the	  low	  usage	  rate	  of	  1.47	  per	  cent	  for	  prosecutions	  of	  piracy.	  19	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Clapp,	  above	  Chapter	  3	  n	  10	  at	  p111.	  
17	  Bento,	  above	  Chapter	  5	  n	  19	  at	  p414.	  
18	  Murphy,	  above	  Chapter	  5	  n	  192	  at	  p172.	  
19	  Kontorovich	  and	  Art,	  above	  Chapter	  5	  n	  198	  at	  p453.	  
	   	   Chapter	  6	  
	   215	  
Piracy	  was	  and	  is	  about	  nothing	  more	  than	  the	  control	  of	  property.	  As	  such	  it	  is	  a	  criminal	   offence	   and	   should	   be	   dealt	   with	   by	   way	   of	   police	   action.	   Patrolling	  controls	   piracy,	   policing	   eradicates	   it.20	  Police	   action	   requires	   clear	   and	  precise	  legislation	  to	  support	   it.	  This	  guides	  those	   involved	  who	  know	  their	   limitations	  and	  the	  procedures	  to	  take.	  The	  use	  of	  terms	  such	  as	   ‘fight’	  and	  ‘war’	  on	  piracy	  bring	   the	   wrong	   mindset	   to	   the	   problem.21	  Utilisation	   of	   policing	   resources	  creates	   a	   mindset	   of	   effective	   patrolling,	   evidence	   gathering	   for	   court	  prosecution	  and	  the	  eventual	  prosecution	  of	  pirates.22	  	  While	   the	   use	   of	   armed	  PMSC	   is	   applicable	   on	   land	  where	   oversight	   is	   readily	  available,	   it	   is	   not	   an	   acceptable	   answer	   on	   the	  HS	  where	   a	   number	   of	   factors	  culminate	  in	  poor	  decision-­‐making.	  A	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  extra	  judicial	  killings	  of	   pirates.	   These	   killings	   occur	   on	   HS	   beyond	   any	   official	   oversight	   and	   with	  apparent	  impunity.23	  The	  lack	  of	  binding	  international	  agreements	  that	  cover	  the	  use	   of	   PSMC	   creates	   a	   legal	   loophole.	   States	   may	   not	   be	   accountable	   for	   the	  actions	  of	  the	  security	  guards.	  	  	  The	  action	  of	  naval	  patrols	  to	  inhibit	  piracy	  has	  been	  one	  sided	  as	  far	  as	  the	  local	  Somali	   people	   are	   concerned.	   While	   there	   have	   been	   some	   eight	   UNSCRs	  extending	  enforcement	  powers	   into	  Somali	  waters	   to	  control	  piracy	   there	  have	  been	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   UNSCRs	   dealing	   with	   the	   matters	   relating	   to	   IUU	  Fishing.	  The	  first	  of	  these,	  UNSCR	  1897	  appeared	  in	  2009.	  24	  Far	  from	  extending	  to	   the	   cooperating	   States	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   piracy	   an	   extension	   into	   the	  sovereignty	   of	   Somalia	   to	   protect	   fisheries	   and	   prevent	   hazardous	   waste	  dumping,	   this	   resolution	   at	   Paragraph	   5	   acknowledges	   Somalia’s	   rights	   to	   it	  natural	   resources	   offshore.	   It	   then	   goes	   on	   to	   identify	   the	   importance	   of	  preventing	   illegal	   fishing	   and	   illegal	   dumping	   and	   calls	   on	   States	   to	   offer	  technical	  assistance	  to	  Somalia	  and	  regional	  authorities,	  as	  well	  as	  nearby	  States	  to	   enhance	   capacity	   to	   ensure	   coastal	   and	  maritime	   security.	   The	   article	   then	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Murphy,	  above	  Chapter	  5	  n	  192	  at	  p168.	  
21	  Sterio,	  above	  Chapter	  5	  n	  67	  at	  p463.	  
22	  Guilfoyle,	  above	  Chapter	  5	  n	  117	  at	  p770.	  	  
23	  The	  problems	  with	  deployment	  of	  Private	  Security	  Companies,	  above	  Chapter	  5,	  §7.	  	  
24	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1897,	  above	  Chapter	  2	  n	  165	  paragraph	  5.	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goes	  on	  to	  reinforce	  that	  this	  is	  more	  about	  combating	  piracy	  and	  armed	  robbery	  and	  any	  efforts	  should	  be	  coordinated	  through	  the	  Contact	  Group	  on	  Piracy	  off	  the	  Coast	  of	  Somalia.	  By	  contrast	  to	  piracy,	  the	  acknowledged	  catalysts	  for	  piracy	  are	  dealt	  with	  by	  way	  of	  the	  compilation	  of	  reports	  whose	  recommendations	  are	  not	  followed	  up.	  States	  are	  urged	  to	  ‘positively	  consider	  investigating’	  hazardous	  waste	  dumping	  some	  14	  years	  after	  it	  was	  first	  notified	  to	  the	  UN	  that	  there	  was	  a	  problem.	  	  The	  international	  effort	  is	  focused	  on	  piracy	  as	  the	  disease	  and	  not	  on	  what	  is	  the	  disease,	  which	  is,	  the	  loss	  of	  effective	  government,	  illegal	  fishing,	  and	  toxic	  waste	  dumping.	  There	  appears	   to	  be	  sufficient	   international	   law	   to	  support	  Somalia’s	  cause	  in	  stopping	  the	  IUU	  and	  waste	  dumping,	  however,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  hindrance	  in	  that	  it	  requires	  State	  to	  State	  action	  which	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  a	  failed	  State	  or	  an	  autonomous	   State	   that	   is	   not	   recognised	   by	   the	   international	   community.	   The	  loss	  of	  effective	  government	  aside	  the	  other	  issues	  affecting	  Somalia	  are	  all	  of	  a	  policing	  nature.	  Illegal	  fishing	  is	  a	  crime	  perpetrated	  by	  those	  wishing	  to	  benefit	  from	  lax	  laws	  and	  enforcement,	  as	  is	  hazardous	  waste	  dumping.	  Piracy	  is	  also	  a	  crime,	   and	   all	   three	   crimes	   need	   equal	   treatment	   and	   apportionment	   of	  resources.	  	  
27.5 Conclusion	  	  The	   global	   community	   has	   responded	   to	   the	   loss	   of	   effective	   government	   in	  Somalia.	   The	   problem	   is	   that	   the	   response	   is	   limited	   to	   the	   self-­‐interest	   of	   the	  developed	   world	   against	   the	   interest	   of	   the	   developing	   world,	   in	   this	   case	  Somalia.	  Cooperation	  amongst	   the	   international	  community	   is	  a	   force	   for	  good.	  Unfortunately,	   this	   cooperation	   currently	   reflects	   the	   self-­‐interest	   of	   the	  activated	   parties.	   A	   change	   needs	   to	   occur	   where	   cooperation	   focuses	   on	   the	  interest	  of	  all	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  all.	  	  On	   a	  positive	  note	   as	   can	  be	   seen	   from	   the	  discussion	   above	   Somalia	   is	   taking	  steps	   to	   rectify	   the	  problems	   it	   faces	  or	  has	   caused	   through	  not	  having	   clearly	  established	   maritime	   zones	   that	   comply	   with	   the	   current	   international	  standards.	  These	  steps,	  and	  the	  election	  of	  a	  President,	  indicate	  that	  matters	  are	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moving	   further	   towards	   stability,	   which	   will	   in	   the	   longer	   term	   affect	   the	  possibility	  of	  a	  resurgence	  in	  piracy	  and	  better	  controls	  over	  territorial	  waters	  to	  prevent	  illegal	  fishing	  and	  further	  hazardous	  waste	  dumping.	  	  	  	  In	   conclusion	   it	   can	   be	   stated	   that	   the	   three	   major	   issues	   that	   have	   created	  problems	   for	   Somalia	   and	   the	   international	   community	   revolve	   around	   the	  concepts	   of	   a	   state,	   sovereignty	   and	   the	   necessity	   to	   treat	   breaches	   of	  agreements	   relating	   to	   both	   illegal	   fishing	   and	   hazardous	   waste	   dumping	   as	  transnational	  criminal	  law	  offences	  and	  police	  them	  accordingly.	  The	  response	  of	  the	  global	  community	  to	  piracy,	  which	  is	  treated	  as	  a	  crime,	  is	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  responses	  to	  the	  issues	  of	  illegal	  fishing	  and	  hazardous	  waste	  dumping	  which	  are	   not	   treated	   as	   crimes.	   The	   lack	   of	   criminalisation	   of	   illegal	   fishing	   and	  hazardous	  waste	  dumping	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  piracy	  is	  criminalised	  is	  masked	  by	  the	  self-­‐interest	  of	  the	  global	  community.	  Looking	   to	   the	   future,	   further	   research	   is	   required	   into	   alternatives	   for	   the	  concepts	   of	   a	   state	   and	  what	   constitutes	   sovereignty.	   As	   the	  world	   appears	   to	  contract,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   State	   borders	   are	   becoming	   far	   more	   porous	   with	  technological	   advances	   and	   the	   reach	   and	   influence	   of	   international	  corporations,	   the	   exclusive	   control	   States	   once	   had	   is	   being	   limited.	   As	   more	  territories	  seek	  to	  become	  independent	  of	  their	  dominant	  partners	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  number	  of	  separate	  States,	  with	  a	  strong	  nationalist	  flavour,	  will	  expand	  and	   borders,	   once	   seen	   as	   permanent,	   will	   begin	   to	   crumble.	   Newly	   won	  sovereignty	   for	   these	   new	   territories	   having	   been	   hard	  won	  will	   not	   be	   easily	  surrendered.	   Therefore	   any	   new	   concept	   of	   sovereignty	  will	   have	   to	   take	   this	  into	  account.	  It	  is	  not	  suggested	  that	  there	  is	  a	  move	  to	  a	  one-­‐world	  government,	  however,	  it	  is	  suggested	  that	  the	  problems	  facing	  the	  planet	  regarding	  resources	  are	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   any	   one	   country	   to	   deal	   with	   inside	   its	   borders.	   The	  discussion	  of	  a	  one-­‐world	  government	  therefore	  needs	  to	  move	  from	  the	  fringes	  to	   a	   more	   central	   and	   academically	   examined	   proposition.	   The	   international	  fishing	   regime	   could	   well	   be	   due	   an	   intensive	   overhaul	   and	   the	   creation	   and	  institution	   of	   a	   single	   piece	   of	   international	   law	   that	   combines	   the	   existing	  framework	   into	   a	   comprehensive	   single	   treaty	   under	   a	   central	   UN	   directorate	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with	  enforcement	  powers	  to	  cover	  those	  areas	  beyond	  current	  State	  jurisdiction.	  Like	   the	   international	   fishing	   regime,	   hazardous	   waste	   dumping	   could	   benefit	  from	  a	  singular	  all	  encompassing	  agreement	  that	  replaces	  the	  existing	  regime.	  It	  is	  important	  that	  any	  future	  agreement	  regarding	  hazardous	  waste	  dumping	  is	  in	  effect	  a	  total	  ban	  on	  the	  use	  of	  the	  sea	  as	  an	  easily	  accessible	  facility	  to	  dispose	  of	  waste	   generated	   on	   land.	   It	  will	   be	   important	   to	   resolve	   issues	   of	   liability	   and	  compensation	  and	  have	  these	  embedded	  within	  the	  legislation	  instead	  as	  being	  tacked	   on	   as	   area	   to	   be	   worked	   on	   at	   a	   later	   stage.	   As	   previously	   discussed,	  piracy	  is	  not	  about	  to	  disappear.	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  that	  the	  international	  anti	   piracy	   regime	   becomes	   a	   more	   comprehensive	   whole	   and	   problems	  associated	  with	  its	  current	  state,	  lack	  of	  clarity	  around	  its	  definition,	  the	  validity	  of	   third	  party	   State	   courts	   and	   transfer	   agreements,	   can	  be	   solved.	  The	   thorny	  issue	  of	   the	  use	  of	  Private	  Armed	  Security	  Guards	   and	   their	   responsibility	   and	  the	   liability	  of	  shipping	  companies,	  security	  companies	  and	  States	   for	  wrongful	  killings	  needs	  to	  be	  brought	  under	  an	  expansive	  single	  document	  that	  is	  agreed	  to	  by	  States	  and	  not	  signed	  up	  to	  by	  security	  companies.	  Security	  companies	  will	  need	  to	  sign	  a	  domestic	  version	  of	  that	  will	  bind	  them.	  At	  the	  moment	  there	  are	  too	   many	   gaps	   in	   the	   law	   that	   allows	   these	   wrongful	   killings	   to	   take	   place	  without	  accountability.	  	  	  As	  a	  last	  note	  and	  certainly	  not	  something	  of	  a	  legal	  nature,	  however,	  as	  a	  step	  to	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  Somalia	  and	  its	  future,	  those	  States	  who	  have	  used	  Somalia	  for	  their	  own	  ends,	  the	  colonists	  and	  Cold	  War	  Powers,	  might	  consider	  offering	  an	  apology	   to	   the	  people	  and	  government	  of	  Somalia	   to	  heal	   the	  past	  and	  help	  clear	  the	  way	  for	  a	  better	  future.	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Annex	  1	  
Recognition	  of	  States	  	  
Declaration	  on	  the	  `Guidelines	  on	  the	  Recognition	  of	  New	  States	  
in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union'	  (16	  December	  1991)	  
	  In	  compliance	  with	  the	  European	  Council's	  request,	  Ministers	  have	  assessed	  developments	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  with	  a	  view	  to	  elaborating	  an	  approach	  regarding	  relations	  with	  new	  states.	  In	  this	  connection	  they	  have	  adopted	  the	  following	  guidelines	  on	  the	  formal	  recognition	  of	  new	  states	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union:	  The	  Community	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  confirm	  their	  attachment	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  Helsinki	  Final	  Act	  and	  the	  Charter	  of	  Paris,	  in	  particular	  the	  principle	  of	  self-­‐determination.	  They	  affirm	  their	  readiness	  to	  recognize,	  subject	  to	  the	  normal	  standards	  of	  international	  practice	  and	  the	  political	  realities	  in	  each	  case,	  those	  new	  States	  which,	  following	  the	  historic	  changes	  in	  the	  region,	  have	  constituted	  themselves	  on	  a	  democratic	  basis,	  have	  accepted	  the	  appropriate	  international	  obligations	  and	  have	  committed	  themselves	  in	  good	  faith	  to	  a	  peaceful	  process	  and	  to	  negotiations.	  Therefore,	  they	  adopt	  a	  common	  position	  on	  the	  process	  of	  recognition	  of	  these	  new	  States,	  which	  requires:	  -­‐	  respect	  for	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  the	  commitments	  subscribed	  to	  in	  the	  Final	  Act	  of	  Helsinki	  and	  in	  the	  Charter	  of	  Paris,	  especially	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  -­‐	  guarantees	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  ethnic	  and	  national	  groups	  and	  minorities	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  commitments	  subscribed	  to	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  CSCE	  -­‐	  respect	  for	  the	  inviolability	  of	  all	  frontiers	  which	  can	  only	  be	  changed	  by	  peaceful	  means	  and	  by	  common	  agreement	  -­‐	  acceptance	  of	  all	  relevant	  commitments	  with	  regard	  to	  disarmament	  and	  nuclear	  non-­‐proliferation	  as	  well	  as	  to	  security	  and	  regional	  stability	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-­‐	  commitment	  to	  settle	  by	  agreement,	  including	  where	  appropriate	  by	  recourse	  to	  arbitration,	  all	  questions	  concerning	  State	  succession	  and	  regional	  disputes.	  The	  Community	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  will	  not	  recognize	  entities	  which	  are	  the	  result	  of	  aggression.	  They	  would	  take	  account	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  recognition	  on	  neighbouring	  States.	  The	  commitment	  to	  these	  principles	  opens	  the	  way	  to	  recognition	  by	  the	  Community	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  and	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  diplomatic	  relations.	  It	  could	  be	  laid	  down	  in	  agreements.	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Annex	  2	  
Recognition	  of	  States	  	  	  
Declaration	  on	  Yugoslavia	  (Extraordinary	  EPC	  Ministerial	  
Meeting,	  Brussels,	  16	  December	  1991)	  
	  The	  European	  Community	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  discussed	  the	  situation	  in	  Yugoslavia	  in	  the	  light	  of	  their	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  recognition	  of	  new	  states	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  They	  adopted	  a	  common	  position	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  Yugoslav	  Republics.	  In	  this	  connection	  they	  concluded	  the	  following:	  The	  Community	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  agree	  to	  recognize	  the	  independence	  of	  all	  the	  Yugoslav	  Republics	  fulfilling	  all	  the	  conditions	  set	  out	  below.	  The	  implementation	  of	  this	  decision	  will	  take	  place	  on	  15	  January	  1992.	  They	  are	  therefore	  inviting	  all	  Yugoslav	  Republics	  to	  state	  by	  23	  December	  whether:	  -­‐	  they	  wish	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  independent	  States	  	  -­‐	  they	  accept	  the	  commitments	  contained	  in	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  Guidelines	  -­‐	  they	  accept	  the	  provisions	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  draft	  Convention	  –	  especially	  those	  in	  Chapter	  II	  on	  human	  rights	  and	  rights	  of	  national	  or	  ethnic	  groups	  –	  under	  consideration	  by	  the	  Conference	  on	  Yugoslavia	  -­‐	  they	  continue	  to	  support	  -­‐	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Secretary	  General	  and	  the	  Security	  Council	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  and	  -­‐	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  Conference	  on	  Yugoslavia.	  	  The	  applications	  of	  those	  Republics	  which	  reply	  positively	  will	  be	  submitted	  through	  the	  Chair	  of	  the	  Conference	  to	  the	  Arbitration	  Commission	  for	  advice	  before	  the	  implementation	  date.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  the	  Community	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  request	  the	  UN	  Secretary	  General	  and	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  to	  continue	  their	  efforts	  to	  establish	  an	  effective	  cease-­‐fire	  and	  promote	  a	  peaceful	  and	  negotiated	  outcome	  to	  the	  conflict.	  They	  continue	  to	  attach	  the	  greatest	  importance	  to	  the	  early	  deployment	  of	  a	  UN	  peace-­‐keeping	  force	  referred	  to	  in	  UN	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  724.	  The	  Community	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  also	  require	  a	  Yugoslav	  Republic	  to	  commit	  itself,	  prior	  to	  recognition,	  to	  adopt	  constitutional	  and	  political	  guarantees	  ensuring	  that	  it	  has	  no	  territorial	  claims	  towards	  a	  neighbouring	  Community	  State	  and	  that	  it	  will	  conduct	  no	  hostile	  propaganda	  activities	  versus	  a	  neighbouring	  Community	  State,	  including	  the	  use	  of	  a	  denomination	  which	  implies	  territorial	  claims.	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